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SUMMARY 
Opposition to Paul as central to the occasion of the letter to the Galatians 
· (expressed in scholarly circles in terms of different opponent hypotheses) is 
identified as a pivotal factor in the interpretation of that letter. An analysis of some 
of the received opponent hypotheses reveals that today, as throughout the history of 
the critical interpretation of the letter, they are basically different proposals sharing 
the same historical and methodological components. Both components are critically 
examined and it is suggested that inadequate assumptions lead to an anachronistic 
and ethnocentric view of the nature of the conflict and consequently, from a his-
torical point of view, a distorted cypher key to the interpretation of the letter. 
The proposal of a social-scientific approach to the letter presents, at the meth-
odological level, the components of an alternative cypher key. It attempts to be 
interdisciplinary in that it accounts for the otherness of foreign cultures and distant 
historical eras in an integrated and explicit way. 
Because of the methodological components an alternative set of historical com-
ponents can be suggested. A focus on contemporary views on first-century Judaism 
and the expansion of the Pauline communities in the first-century world not only 
. points to shortcomings in the received views but provides an alternative perspective 
on the communicative context of the letter. A first but important step is taken to 
construct a probable first-century Mediterranean communicative context for the 
interpretation of the letter. 
In view of this alternative communicative context it is possible to redefine the con-
flict as a truly first-century Mediterranean one in which Paul's authority and honour 
were at stake. This makes it possible to construe the text in a different way. Instead 
of regarding the letter to the Galatians as a document of intra-Christian struggle 
about conflicting theological or doctrinal convictions, it is suggested that the letter 
be construed as the product of Paul's missionary endeavour within the household 
setting, the subculture of first-century Judaism, and the confines of orality and reli-
gion in the first-century world. 
viii 
CHAPTERl 
OPPONENT HYPOTIIESES AS A CYPHER KEY ID THE 
INTERPRETATION OF PAUL'S LEITER TO THE GALATIANS 
It is clear that Galatians is Paul's response to what 
he considered to be an alanning crisis in the 
Galatian churches; and ... the first step in 
understanding Paul's letter must be some attempt to 
reconstruct this Galatian crisis. 
(Barclay 1988:36) 
1 OPPONENT HYPOTIIESES AND THE PI.AN OF TIIlS STUDY 
One issue, perhaps even the central one, in the interpretation of Paul's letter to the 
Galatians for at least the past hundred years is the part played by opponent 
hypotheses. In fact, virtually every study of the letter to the Galatians contains 
references to the identity of Paul's opponents, or constructions of their activities, 
either in the letter itself or in Galatia if not in both. 
The term opponent hypotheses will be used to designate the different hypotheses 
about the identity of Paul's opponents. It should, however, be noted that none of 
these hypotheses refer exclusively to the identity of Paul's opponents without at the 
same time carrying a whole ballast of methodological and historical assumptions. 
They are, in short, complex configurations consisting of both historical and meth-
odological components which function as cypher keys for interpreting the letter to 
the Galatians. It will be argued that they are particular instances of the selfsame 
methodological and historical components which constitute different versions of 
·similar cypher keys applied to the letter to the Galatians. Thus (if a complex set of 
arguments can be combined in one sentence) it is this: constructions of the occasion 
of the letter to the Galatian - which are fundamentally affected by the conduct of 
opponents - are based on assumptions about the situation in Galatia. These, in 
short, are what opponent hypotheses are about. What is meant by methodological 
and historical components can be explained in passing. 
A necessary distinction may be made between methods and research procedures on 
the one hand and methodology as the 'study of principles underlying, fundamental 
to and implicit in the conduct of scientific inquiry' (Mabry 1984:145) on the other. 
Methodological issues include philosophical questions about the 'principles, rules 
and assumptions which underlie the conduct of research,' together with 
epistemological questions regarding the 'possibility of gaining knowledge about that 
whicp we wish to study and the ways appropriate to the quest for such knowledge' 
(Mabry 1984:145). The philosophical questions will relate to the position in terms of 
the philosophy of history, which may vary from a history-of-ideas to a social-
scientific approach to historical interpretation. Epistemological aspects, in this 
1 
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study, include such issues as values and attitudes determining interpretive activities, 
the aim of interpretation and the nature of historical knowledge. 
Historical components are concerned with assumptions about the social and his-
torical conditions that are in turn assumed when reading the letter. In opponent 
hypotheses they primarily relate to the situation in Galatia and the specific occasion 
of the letter. The concept communicative context, rather than the situation in Galatia 
or the occasion of the letter, will be used in this study. 
A cypher key is a construction by a reader or interpreter - consisting at the least of 
methodological components and historical components related to the topic of inter-
pretation - by means of which a text is interpreted or construed. Each of these com-
ponents may be explicitly argued or implicitly assumed, overt or covert, examined or 
unexamined. Each cypher key makes use of a communicative context (since inter-
pretation without a context is impossible), which in turn consists of historical com-
. ponents garnered from the sources by means of some methodological approach. 
Thus opponent hypotheses as cypher keys are particular scholarly constructions 
(consisting of both historical and methodological components) by means of which 
the letter to the Galatians is construed. Opponent hyPotheses are taken in this study 
to be cypher keys of the same kind, since (as is to be argued) they share, broadly 
speaking, the same historical and methodological components. 
The aim of this study is to examine whether opponent hypotheses are an 
appropriate cypher key to the interpretation of the letter to the Galatians and to 
suggest, as an alternative cypher key, a social-scientific approach. Both the meth-
odological and the historical components of opponent hypotheses as a cypher key 
will be examined, and alternatives will be suggested in both regards. 
In order to reach this aim, I shall start with an analysis of the part played by 
opponent hypotheses in the interpretation of the letter. From the analysis in the first 
chapter of opponent hypotheses as the generally approved cypher key to the letter 
to the Galatians, both the historical and the methodological components will be 
·identified. The methodological approach that dominates opponent hypotheses will 
be described as a history-of-ideas approach, with Paul's letters themselves setting 
the interpretive agenda. That is to say, the letter to the Galatians itself serves as the 
primary source in establishing the communicative context. The two central sets of 
historical components consist, on the one hand, of assumptions on the expansion of 
the early Jesus movement and on the other hand a set of assumptions on first-
century Judaism. One result of these cypher keys is that the cause of the conflict in 
Galatia becomes the focus. It will be argued that they usually disregard the question 
as to the nature of the conflict. 
The thesis of this study, however, is that an alternative approach to the interpreta-
tion of the letter to the Galatians is possible once the investigation shifts from the 
3 
cause(s) to the nature of the conflict. In arguing this thesis, one can hardly do other 
than start at the point of historical interpretation. That is to say, apart from a critical 
examination of the methodological components of opponent hypotheses as a cypher 
key (together with the underlying assumptions on the nature of the conflict), an 
alternative view of historical interpretation will be presented. (That will be the topic 
of chapter 2.) 
It should be kept in mind from the outset that assumptions on at least two levels are 
at stake. The choice of a particular definition of historical interpretation (as part of 
a cypher key consisting of certain configurations of historical and methodological 
components) should be kept apart from the interpretation itself. The first depends 
on one's aim of interpretation, which influences (but is not the same as) the specific 
way in which that aim is reached. To be concrete: the choice of a social-scientific 
cypher key (in contrast to any other cypher key) depends on a definite aim of inter-
pretation, while the social-scientific cypher key itself (and the way in which it is 
utilised) can in turn be analysed in terms of its constituting elements. 
· Contrary to the received view of historical interpretation, which is labelled a history-
of-ideas approach, it will be argued in the second chapter that claims of historical 
interpretation should be accompanied by a historical aim of interpretation. That is 
to say, the social-scientific methodological configuration to be suggested in this 
chapter is the product of a whole set of philosophical and epistemological choices. It 
represents a set of values and attitudes which fundamentally characterise the inter-
pretive activity as a historical and interdisciplinary activity - thus as a particular aim-
of-interpretation position. 
Part and parcel of methodological configurations are views on aspects such as text, 
context and meaning. An exposition of these aspects in the third chapter should be 
seen in contrast to the view assumed in opponent hypotheses. 
From the analysis of the historical components of opponent hypotheses in the first 
chapter it inevitably follows that two sets of components should be examined in 
greater detail. Although assumptions on the expansion of the early Jesus movement 
and fixed ideas on first-century Judaism are often only tacitly assumed in opponent 
hypotheses, they are not inoperative. As a matter of fact, viewpoints on the Pauline 
·movement as constituted on the basis of (theological) ideas conflicting with Jewish 
Christianity on the one hand, and first-century Judaism on the other hand, are 
generally accepted. The result: the nature of the Pauline movement is fundamen-
tally determined by idiosyncratic theological or dogmatic ideas. It will be argued 
that these criteria are the product of both historical and methodological assump-
tions which are well established in most opponent hypotheses. It therefore comes as 
no surprise that the majority of opponent hypotheses operate with a view of the con-
flict as primarily a conflict of convictions, hence a theological or doctrinal conflict. 
It is to be argued that, despite the methodological shortcomings, these keys are 
flawed by several historical shortcomings. Apart from an examination of the his-
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torical components in the fourth chapter, a first indication will be suggested of the 
direction in which research has to develop (if an alternative cypher key is to be pre-
sented). 
Following on the discussion of methodological configurations, where the importance 
of a communicative context in the reading of any text will be stressed, a first step in 
; constructing a first-century Mediterranean communicative context will be attempted 
in the fifth and sixth chapters. A recognition of the role of cultural context in the 
interpretive process, together with an acceptance of the differences between foreign 
cultures and distant historical eras, inevitably challenges the communicative context 
taken for granted in most opponent hypotheses. Description of the nature and 
expansion of the Pauline communities, it will be argued, can no longer be restricted 
to theological or doctrinal components. 
In view of these historical problems, together with the methodological principles to 
be argued in this study, the investigation will then shift to the nature of the conflict 
and at least four areas of great significance will be marked down for critical 
examination and exposition. 
The first will be an exploration of the first-century Mediterranean world (as the 
cultural context within which the conflict took place) as an example of an agrarian 
culture. Together with the oral nature and substantive character of first-century reli-
gion, the agrarian features will receive special attention in chapter 5. 
·As the environment within which the conflict took place, the first-century Mediter-
ranean socio-cultural system and the nature of groups (especially the nature of the 
Pauline communities) in the first-century world will be investigated. Thus the social 
networks, together with the socio-cultural codes and conventions regulating social 
interaction within the smaller sphere of first-century groups in general and the 
Pauline communities in particular, will be the subject of chapter 6. 
This will be followed, finally, by an attempt to describe the nature of the conflict in 
Galatia as a first-century Mediterranean conflict. Given the constructed com-
municative context, it will be suggested that the conflict was of a social nature and 
took place within the confines of first-century authority structures and authority 
networks of which Paul was a part. It should be noted from the outset that rejection 
of opponent hypotheses as a cypher key does not mean rejection of opponents, or of 
a conflict as such, in Galatia. Rather, a particular definition of the conflict (which 
takes it for granted that it was a conflict about conflicting convictions) is questioned. 
Although no attempt will be made to identify the opponents (in terms of the alterna-
tive cypher key), it seems unquestionable that there were people who opposed Paul. 
·While such distinctions as are described here cannot function as hard-and-fast rules 
(and are subject to several shortcomings), they are useful - from an analytical point 
of view - in identifying and evaluating the constituent aspects of different cypher 
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keys. However, prior to the discussion of methodological components it is necessary 
to scrutinise opponent hypotheses as a cypher key in the interpretation of the letter 
to the Galatians. 
2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OPPONENT HYPOTHESES AS CYPHER KEYS 
One of the two questions which traditionally dominated Pauline research is 
Situationsanalyse which is concerned with the question of Paul's Gemeindesituation 
and more precisely the identity of his opponents (see Theillen 1979:16).1 As a mat-
ter of fact, Kiimmel describes it as the 'wichtigste Frage' (1970:56) for the inter-
. pretation of Paul's letters. 
The significance of opponent hypotheses in Pauline research can be seen, in the first 
instance, in the way the letters are interpreted. It was the Tiibingen scholar FC Baur 
who first made Paul's opponents a decisive key to the whole body of the apostle's 
writings (see Ellis 1975:271-272; Eckert 1971:4; Howard 1979:1). In the words of 
Koester: ' ... without a reconstruction of the thoughts of the opponents, many sec-
tions of the Pauline letters would remain completely incomprehensible' ( 1982: 117). 
The epigraph (quotation) at the beginning of this chapter is more than representa-
tive of scholarly opinion on the occasion of the letter as well as the direction which a 
search for a solution should take. As far as it goes, the letter is Paul's response to a 
crisis in Galatia, and the very first step in understanding the letter is to reconstruct 
that crisis. As will be pointed out, even scholars who appear to be critical of con-
structions of the opponents' identity as a basis for interpreting the letter very often 
rely on such constructions, and especially on the assumed elements of the cypher 
key. 
Even though the nature of the crisis and the communicative context assumed in con-
structing it are not immediately apparent, the nature of the crisis or conflict is 
directly related to the assumed or constructed nature of the Pauline movement. 
While the notion of a crisis created by opponents, and even the theological or doc-
trinal nature of the crisis, is well established as the cause of the letter, there is no 
general agreement in scholarly debate on the identity of the opponents. 
Furthermore, the identity of the opponents is vital to 'das Gesamtbild von der Ges-
chichte des Urchristentums' (Eckert 1971:229; and see Hawkins 1971:13). Regard-
ing the construction of the history of the early Jesus movement, King (1983:342) says 
that 'everyone is agreed they [Paul's opponents] stand at the center of the issues 
involved'. The letter to the Galatians in particular (especially chapters 1 and 2) very 
1 The other one is the 'Traditionsanalyse, d.h. <lurch die Herausarbeitung traditioneller 
Redewendungen, Formeln und Lieder, wies man nach, wie sehr auch Paulus in Gemeindetraditionen 
eingebettet war' (TheiBen 1979:16). 
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often plays an exclusive part in constructing the history of early Christianity (see 
Sanders 1966; Meyer 1981:320; Gaventa 1986:311). Many insights into the develop-
ment of the early Jesus movement, the relationship between Jewish and Gentile 
believers and the bitter disputes within the movement emerge, according to the 
received view, from Paul's letter to the Galatians (see Barclay 1988:1). 
Given the importance of the opponents notion in many scholarly circles, no stone 
was left unturned to determine their role and identity (see Betz 1973:88; Lyons 
1985:76; Martyn 1985:313; Lategan 1987:50; Hawkins 1971; Fletcher 1982). At once, 
however, an inconsistency becomes apparent: the opponents are identified and 
located in terms of a specific construction of the history of early Christianity and a 
specific interpretation of the letter to the Galatians, and conversely the identity of 
the opponents has a decisive influence on how, for example, the letter to the 
Galatians is interpreted and the history of the early Jesus movement constructed. 
One aim of this study is to make a critical examination of the primary assumptions 
underlying opponent hypotheses as cypher keys and to suggest some alternatives. 
Methodological assumptions accompanied by particular historical assumptions, 
which presuppose each other and function within identifiable configurations of 
assumptions, will be pointed out. Stated in terms of the title of this study, an alterna-
tive to opponent hypotheses as the cypher key to the interpretation of the letter to 
the Galatians will be suggested.2 The cypher key to be suggested, just as in the 
received view,3 consists of a particular configuration of methodological and historical 
components. 
3 THE SCHOLARLY CONSTRUCTION OF PAUL'S OPPONENTS IN THE 
!ETIER TO TIIE GAIATIANS 
3.1 Some central issues 
'[F]iir die Darstellung des vor- und nebenpaulinischen Christentums haben wir 
keine direkten Zeugnisse' (Eckert 1971:20). Similarly, there is no primary evidence 
of the opponents and apart from the construction based on Paul's letter, nothing is 
known of their existence prior to or after the encounter in Galatia (see Schmithals 
1965:106). The result is 'that we have no primary evidence with regard to the origin, 
2 As will be argued shortly, the choice between the two cypher keys is based on methodological as 
well as historical aspects. Given certain preferences and values, together with an aim of interpretation, 
a methodological choice is made as to the kind of scientific inquiry to be conducted. Historical assump-
tions, on the other hand, can more readily be related to particular studies and positions on historical 
aspects such as the nature of first-century Judaism. 
3 The received view is the concept used in the philosophy of science 'referring to the way of 
understanding things in vogue among a large number of practitioners and in the popular mind' (Malina 
1986c:171). The received view, Malina says, is 'a very powerful and dogmatic orthodoxy, controlling 
academic departments, key journals as well as grant and/or fellowship bestowing agencies' (1986c:171). 
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thoughts, and personalities that made up the opposition' (Betz 1979:5). Thus the 
problem in general is that the only evidence for scholarly constructions of the 
opponents is based on Paul's perspective. 
Even if it were true that Paul described them in detail, a historian can hardly dis-
agree with MuBner's view that 'er [Paulus] nicht eine objektive und unparteiische 
Beschreibung des gegnerischen Standpunktes bietet' (1974:23), or with that of Lyons 
that 'our only source of certain information about the Galatian opponents is Paul's 
obviously one-sided, probably exaggerated, even distorted characterizations of them' 
(1985:78; see also Barclay 1988:37). Thus the first point to note is that if there were 
opponents, opponent hypotheses are based on one-sided, hostile evidence. 
Secondly, it is important to realise that Paul does not even identify or describe the 
so-called opponents (see Gunther 1975:14; Noack 1980:17-19; Gaston 1984:63; 
. Lyons 1985: 104 ). The picture of the opponents is a construction based on what Paul 
says, not necessarily to or about the opponents, but to the Galatians in general (see 
Walter 1986:355; Barclay 1987:74). What is needed is an imaginative construction 
that uses the text as a mirror reflecting the people and their arguments as sup-
posedly resisted by Paul. 
Thirdly, it will be pointed out that the idea of a theological or doctrinal crisis is a 
scholarly creation based on a specific interpretive tradition. Since Paul neither 
identifies any opponents nor unequivocally mentions any in the letter to the 
Galatians, all scholarly attempts to construct their identity presuppose a specific 
socio-historical setting and communication situation. In this regard neither the inter-
pretive tradition started by Baur (which characterises early Christianity as consisting 
of rival parties)4 nor the Religi,onsgeschichtliche assumptions governing the theologi-
cal viewpoints of the opponents5 can be overlooked. In short, given the state of the 
evidence, it needs to be pointed out that the assumed nature of the conflict more 
often than not reflects a particular communicative context. One point to be pressed 
home in this study is that most opponent hypotheses are simultaneously the product 
of and part and parcel of fixed views on the nature and historical development of 
. the early Christian movement.6 
4 See furthermore chapter 4 § 2.2. 
5 Various kinds of background material on gnosticism, apocalypticism, Judaism and the Zealot 
movements (to name only a few) are used to identify the opponents' theological position (see Hawkins 
1971:81; Fletcher 1982:6). 
6 In many instances it is difficult to avoid concepts such as early church, Pauline Christianity, Jewish, 
or Gentile Christianity (once again to name only a few) which are anachronistic to Paul's world. The 
concepts early Christianity/early Christian movement and Jesus movement will be used synonymously in 
this study as blanket terms for the Jesus movement, in all its variety, where it took root in the Roman 
Empire and beyond in the pre-Constantine era (see Meyers & Strange 1981:197). The believers 
addressed in Paul's letters and associated with him in the different cities of the Empire will be referred 
to as Pauline Christianity or the Pauline movement. Often members of the Pauline movement will be 
included as members of the Jesus movement. It will, however, be clear that the concept Jesus move-
ment is not used in Thei.Ben's strict sense of 'the renewal movement within Judaism brought into being 
through Jesus and existing in the area of Syria and Palestine between AD 30 and AD 70' (1978:1). For 
this section of first-century Judaism associated with Jesus, Charlesworth's concept (see 1990:38) 
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Before introducing the question on what is known of the opponents, some remarks 
on the recipients of the letter would be helpful. 
3.2 The recipients of the letter to the Galatians 
Information on the EKKATlO'iau;; i:Tlc;; fcxAai:iru;; (1:2) to which the letter is addressed, 
is extremely scarce. In Galatians 3:1 Paul merely calls them fcxA<haL At present 
there is no solution in sight to the dispute as to where these churches were located 
(see for example Kiimmel 1975:296-298; Johnson 1975:101; Betz 1979:3-5; 
Longenecker 1990:lxi-lxxii). The argument ranges between two theories - the ter-
ritory hypothesis (the so-called North Galatian theory) and the province theory (the 
so-called South Galatian theory). Unlike the argument of, for example, Betz [who 
admits that the arguments on both sides are mostly speculative but then goes on to 
say: 'it is more probable that the Galatian churches were located in central Anatolia' 
(Betz 1979:5)], the location of the churches, though it would have been helpful, is 
not essential to the argument in this study.7 Since the argument is to be based on 
socio-cultural codes and conventions which, arguably, were widespread in the first-
century Mediterranean world, such disputes do not affect this position.8 It is 
however not ruled out that newly discovered evidence on particularities regarding 
either the letter or the location of the churches might prove in some instances to 
alter this view. 
3.3 What do we know about Paul's opponents in Galatia? 
What scholars actually mean by the question, What do we know about Paul's · 
opponents? is: What does the text really say about the opponents? The answer, 
however, is straightforward and simple: nothing! Nothing at least, in the sense that 
the text does not identify or describe opponents. There is, however, a sense in which 
the text does say things which are taken as references to, and descriptions of, 
opponents and interpreted accordingly. In this regard two questions have tradi-
tionally dominated the research: Who were the opponents? and What was their 
Palestinian Jesus movement can be used in contradistinction to the Pauline movement. 
7 It should be noted that preference for either of the two theories depends very largely on one's 
evaluation of the historical reliability of Acts. Acceptance of the South theory favours the historical 
reliability of Acts whereas the North theory displays a sceptical attitude (see Bruce 1970:265, but dis-
puted by Longenecker 1990:lxviii). The limited value of both theories should also be acknowledged. 
Only when the correlation with Acts is at issue does it really matter whether the southern or the north-
ern locality is chosen. Once a scholar gets down to the interpretation of the letter or the identity of the 
opponents, both theories are of limited value, if not totally negligible (see also Tyson 1968:244-245). 
8 The same argument applies to the dispute on the date of the letter (see Lategan 1984b:105-106; 
Longenecker 1990:lxxii-lxxxviii). Criticism of the received view on the interpretive tradition of the letter 
will, no doubt, also put the question as to the recipients and date into perspective as part and parcel of 
that tradition. 
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theologi,cal position? (or more precisely, What were the charges against Paul?) The 
aim of both is to identify the opponents. 
Gunther identifies at least eight different positions in the history of research.9 The 
following incomplete list from the past twenty years or so give a complementary 
indication of the variety of scholarly answers: Syncretists (Talbert 1967:29); non-
Christian Jews (Harvey 1968:330); non-Pharisaic Jewish Christians (Hawkins 
1971:344); Judaizers with Essene and/or Qumran background (Ellis 1975:293-295); 
Hellenistic Jewish Christians (Schutz 1975:126); Judaizers, i.e. Jewish Christian mis-
sionaries (Koester 1982:118); Palestinian Jewish Christians (Liidemann 1983:146-
147; 1984:45); Jews proclaiming the Gospel (Martyn 1985:314); Jews, not Jewish 
Christians (Walter 1986:351); Jewish Christians from Jerusalem (Lategan 1987:51); 
Christian Jews (that is, Jewish Christians) from Jerusalem (Longenecker 1990:xcv). 
It would be fair to say that, broadly speaking, the theories can still be divided into 
three basic types: opponents as Judaizers, as Gnostics, or the two front hypotheses 
(see Fletcher 1982). However, as should already be apparent from the above list, 
this distinction is of limited value, since within each type the differences are much 
greater than would appear from these categories. For example, were the Judaizers 
local Jews or Jews from beyond Galatia; were they Jews by birth or only proselytes? 
With each new book or article on the topic it becomes more and more difficult to 
categorise clearly the different authors' viewpoints. Thus, in order to make sense of 
the variety of positions (all claiming to be based primarily on the letter itself), a dif-
ferent approach will be followed. Rather than trying to categorise each position, the 
spectrum of historical elements constituting each position will be identified. In this 
way each proposal can be seen as one configuration of different historical ele-
ments.10 Note how, very often, an alteration in any one of these elements results in a 
totally different configuration. 
Liidemann's configuration will serve as a point of departure to bring into the open 
the elements present in most configurations, hence constitutive of the occasion of 
the letter to the Galatians. 
9 On Galatians Gunther (1975:1) mentions the following views: Local Jews (K. Lake); Judean 
pneumatic, syncretistic Jews (Crownfield); Judaizers (the vast majority of scholars); Local Judaizing 
. Gentiles (Munck); Syncretistic Jewish Christians (Fitzmeyr); Gnostic Jewish Christians (Schlier, 
Stahlin, Wegenast, H Koester); Libertine Gnostic Jewish Christians (Schmithals); Judaizers AND 
libertine pneumatics (Lutgert, Ropes, Knox, Enslin, Richardson, Jewett). 
10 It should be noted that most of the aspects to be considered do not concern the letter to the 
Galatians only but rather Paul's activities in general. For example, the question of whether he preached 
to Jews or Gentiles is a question that touches on fundamental aspects, not only in Pauline interpreta-
tion in general but also in the history of early Christianity in particular. For that reason answers to 
some of the issues obviously cannot be inferred from the letter alone. 
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3.3.1 Were the opponents insiders or outsiders? 
Galatians 1:6ff, Ludemann maintains, refers to 'eine antipaulinische Agitation in 
Galatien' (1983:144). What the text says is that uv€c; Elatv oi i:cxp6:aaovtE<; uµCic;; 
KCXt 0€AOV1:E<; µE'l:CXO"l:pElJJCXt 1:0 Eixxyy€Xwv 'l:OU Xptai:ou (Gl 1:7; and see 5:10), 
which is taken to mean that a group of persons proclaimed a gospel to the Galatian 
congregation that was diametrically opposed to that of Paul. 
Ludemann's position - as the majority view - is that they were missionaries from 
outside (see also Kummel 1975:298; Jewett 1970/1:204; Sanders 1983:18; Barclay 
1988:43; Smiles 1989:23). Some scholars argue that the opponents were members of 
the Galatian community (see Tyson 1968:252; Harvey 1985:86). Adherents of either 
group - those who see the opponents as insiders or those who see them as outsiders 
- are surely not in agreement among themselves on the identity or origin of the 
opponents.11 
3.32 What was the opponents' message? 
A further anti-Pauline element can be inferred from the content of the opponents' 
preaching: according to Galatians 6: 12, 'Die Gegner haben versucht, die Bes-
chneidung der Galater einzufiihren' (Ludemann 1983: 144) and in terms of 
Galatians 4:10 other legal prescriptions such as the observance of days, months, and 
years are ascribed to their gospel (see Kummel 1975:299-300; Longenecker 
1990:xcv). 
Depending on the ethnic identity of the Galatians and their opponents, the demand 
for circumcision can be interpreted differently. For some scholars circumcision pro-
vided social security for Gentiles (see Barclay 1988:58-59); according to others, cir-
cumcision would have served to protect them from the antagonism of Zealots (see 
Jewett 1971/2:206; Longenecker 1990:xcv). Still others take circumcision to be the 
final step of full incorporation into the Jewish community (see Harvey 1968:323). 
It is noteworthy that, while apparently there is unanimity concerning circumcision as 
(one of) the major feature(s) of the opponents' message, it is not immediately clear 
what is meant by circumcision. Cosgrove (1988:7), referring to studies of Sanders, 
Beker, and Jewett, points out that it is not clear whether the opponents 'defined cir-
cumcision as an entrance requirement, a matter of obedience towards God expected 
11 The arguments in support of both sides are as variegated as the identity of the opponents. For the 
outside position it shifts from the notion that Paul refers to them in the third person and to the 
Galatians in the second, which means they were geographically separate (Barclay 1988:43), to Jewett's 
arguments that the opponents' outside origin is indicated by the sudden shift of opinion among the 
Galatians, the struggle for allegiance in the congregation, the fact that Paul r~fers to them as separate 
from the Galatians, and the opponents' alleged orientation to Jerusalem (see 1970/1:204). This exam-
ple will suffice to suggest the variety with regard to every single aspect. 
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of those regarded as already members of his people, a necessary step towards "full 
membership," or an initiation rite ... into a higher plane of Christian spirituality'. 
These examples point not only to different definitions but also to different con-
figurations with other elements such as the relationship to Jerusalem and the eth-
nicity of both the Galatians and the opponents. 
3.3.3 In dispute, Paul's gospel or apostleship? 
·In the third place 'die Opposition [hat] wahrscheinlich den Apostolat Pauli bes-
tritten' (Ludemann 1983:145). This inference is drawn from a combination of 
Galatians 1:1 and 1:12 which is taken as an emphatic declaration of the independ-
ence of his disputed apostleship (see also Schlier 1971:21). One alternative is that 
his gospel rather than his apostleship was the focus of dispute (see Lategan 1988a; 
Smiles 1989:21; Longenecker 1990:xcv) while others maintain that, in his case, 
apostleship and gospel cannot be separated (see Schutz 1975:134; Betz 1976:105; 
Beker 1980:42; Roetzel 1982:64, 67; Brinsmead 1982:58; Meeks 1983:115). 
3.3.4 Was Paul independent of the Jerusalem apostles or not? 
Finally, 'bestand eine weitere antipaulinische Attacke darin, Paulus Abhanggigkeit 
von den Jerusalemer GroBen vorzuhalten' (Ludemann 1983:145). Paul's emphatic 
denial of dependence on the Jerusalem church for his gospel (see GI 1:17; 2:2) is 
taken to be a reaction to an accusation of dependence. It is interpreted in at least 
two adverse ways: (1) that the opponents brought up Paul's dependence on 
Jerusalem as an accusation, or (2) that the opponents made an explicit point of 
. Paul's dependence on Jerusalem in order to point out his deviation from them (see 
Kummel 1975:300). 
Decisions on this question are closely related to the content of their message as well 
as the question of Paul's gospel or apostleship as the disputed issue. 
3.35 Ethnic identity: Jews or Gentiles? 
The question of ethnic identity (Jews or Gentiles) applies to both the Galatian 
recipients of the letter and the troublemakers. The central role attributed to circum-
cision in the construction of the crisis (see, for example, Barclay 1988:46) causes 
serious difficulties in explaining the ethnic identity of both the Galatians and their 
opponents. 
The majority take it that the letter was addressed to Gentiles (see Harvey 1968:323; 
Betz 1979:4; Beker 1980:42; Barclay 1988:45). The main reasons are that they were 
not circumcised (GI 6:12) and used to worship idols (GI 4:8-9). Others argue 
strongly for a Jewish identity- either Gentiles who were formerly God-fearers or 
.proselytes, or Jews of the Greek-Jewish communities in the Empire (see Davies 
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1981:311-312)-while yet others deny any prior connection with Jewish synagogues 
. or communities (see Barclay 1988:52).12 
The opponents, the majority of scholars maintain, were Jews by birth (see Jewett 
1970/1:203; Betz 1979:7; Beker 1980:42; Walter 1986:351).13 Some, however, think 
they were Gentiles (see Munck 1959:87). 
33.6 Judaizers? 
As in the case of many other components, there is no broad consensus on what is 
meant by the term lou&x{{,Etv in Galatians 2:14. Judaize and, correspondingly, 
Judaizers are typically used in contemporary literature to mean 'to promote a Jewish 
lifestyle' (see Cosgrove 1988:6 n 1). Betz, for example, argues that lou&X°l{,EtV in 
Galatians 2:14 'includes more than submitting to Jewish dietary laws; it describes 
forcing one to become a Jewish convert obliged to keep the whole Torah' 
(1979:112). On the other hand, some scholars maintain that it means 'to live like a 
Jew' or to 'adopt the lifestyle of a Jew' and does not allude to forcing others to do so 
(see Harvey 1968:322; Cosgrove 1988:6 n 1; Barclay 1988:36; Hansen 1989:258 n 1). 
Taylor's interesting conclusion on this topic is that (in the fourth century, at least) 
.Judaizers who are traditionally taken to be Jews (Jewish Christian.s) turn out to be 
Gentiles who promoted a Jewish lifestyle (see 1990:319). 
It is an almost impossible task to point out all the scholarly positions: virtually every 
possible configuration has a defender.14 Since it is not the aim of this study to adopt 
any of the existing opponent hypotheses or to elaborate on any of them, no attempt 
will be made to propose an alternative configuration of elements. 
Despite the disagreement on particulars there is surprisingly widespread agreement 
that a crisis existed and also on the nature of the crisis. This calls for an examination 
of the preconditions for this state of affairs. 
12 Barclay maintains that while they were not former God-fearers or proselytes, they were neverthe-
less impressed by the message of the opponents, which provided in their social needs. Being dissociated 
from ancestral worship, the idea that circumcision provides a Jewish identity for the Christian move-
ment also, was necessary for people with an insecure social identity (see Barclay 1988:58-59). Harvey 
on the other hand argues that these Gentiles were former God-fearers (see 1968:323, 1985:81). 
13 It should be noted that while the majority (see for example Koester 1982:118; Ludemann 1983: 
146; Lategan 1987:51) take it that they were Jews who were Christians (thus, Jewish Christians), others 
maintain they were Hellenistic Jewish Christians (see, for example, Schiltz 1975:126). Still others take 
them to have been non-Christian Jews (see Harvey 1968:330; Walter 1986:351). 
14 In the light of the great variety of suggestions on the identity of the opponents, the idea of a gen-
eral profile (see for example Longenecker 1990:xciv) of the opponents is nothing other than my view 
(configuration) on them. It should be noted that such general profiles more often than not merely 
represent the majority view with, in many instances, close family resemblances between the proposed 
arguments. 
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To my mind, the above overview of the elements that constitute opponent 
. hypotheses already suggests some indicators of the direction in which these 
preconditions should be sought. First, while the occasion of the letter is considered 
important, there is a tendency to restrict the debate to differences on ideas (belief 
systems). That is to say, a remarkable absence in scholarly arguments of allusions to 
the socio-cultural conditions in the first-century world within which ideas and beliefs 
functioned and originated (see further§ 5). Secondly, it became apparent from the 
arguments that particular definitions of concepts are taken for granted. In fact, it 
seems as if a coherent notion of the nature of the Pauline movement and the devel-
opment of the early Christian movement, together with a fixed idea of first-century 
Judaism, are tacitly assumed in the arguments and definitions. An analysis of the 
method used to pinpoint the opponents and their views, namely mirror reading, may 
expose the role of these aspects. 
4 MIRROR READING IN OPPONENT RESEARCH 
The generally accepted method of determining the identity of the opponents and 
their charges against Paul is referred to as mi"or reading: the text is used as a mirror 
which reflects, in what Paul says, the position and views of the opponents.15 It is a 
·widely accepted principle of exegesis in opponent research (see Berger 1980:372-
378). According to Tyson it is precisely the diverse conclusions reached by equally 
competent scholars which force us to use the mirror reading method (1968:242-243). 
However, the majority of scholars use the method without reflecting on it or even 
admitting that they use it (see, for example, Talbert 1967:30-32; Schmithals 1972:20-
21, 28; Ellis 1975:293; King 1983; Lategan 1987:50; Du Toit 1988:73-74).16 The 
reason may be that the mirror reading method is closely bound up with the assumed 
occasion of the letter. The letter to the Galatians should be seen as Paul's reaction 
to the crisis caused by his opponents (see Tyson 1968:243). Several assumptions 
internal to the method can be listed. 
Firstly, is it assumed that the opponents 'must have held a theological conception 
diametrically opposed to Paul's' (Betz 1973:103), which implies that whatever Paul 
affirms or denies, his opponents must have done the opposite (see Gaston 1984:63; 
Lyons 1985:81, 104). To be more precise, it is assumed that what Paul says was 
rejected by his opponents and what he denies was actually their point of view. 
Secondly, on the basis of Paul's defence (answers to them) it can thus be determined 
·what the opponents' charges were and what their identity was. The assumption is 
that a defensive letter can supply reliable information regarding the opponents and 
15 While most scholars use the term mi"or reading (see Gaston 1984:63; Lyons 1985:80; Barclay 
1987, 1988) Howard, referring to the same method, prefers charge approach (1979:8). 
16 Sumney argues that, 'up to now, interpreters have given insufficient attention to questions of 
method when identifying Paul's opponents' (1990:11). 
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their position (see Lyons 1985:80-81; Barclay 1987:73). The letter can be used to 
construct, from Paul's supposed answers, not only the charges and accusations 
against Paul but even the opponents' own point of view. 
In short, the mirror reading method works as follows: the conflict reflected in the 
-letter to the Galatians (which should be seen as an apologetic or defensive letter) 
demands that the letter be understood as an answer to charges or accusations (not 
explicitly mentioned) made by opponents. If Paul's defence is read, the accusations 
and charges can be derived from the negative of his denials. Mirror reading, 
Longenecker correctly states, 'works only where there is reasonable assurance that 
we are dealing with either polemic or apology' (1990:lxxxix).17 
4.1 Mirror reading in perspective: reflecting historical constructions 
Since no single word from the opponents themselves is available, it is said that 
(assuming the letter to the Galatians to be Paul's apology towards or polemic 
against them) their charges and accusations can be deduced from the letter (see 
Berger 1980:375-377). Rather than listing the different charges identified within 
each configuration, which would cover a few pages, it is more important to question 
the method in principle. That can be done once some of the basic features of mirror 
reading have been uncovered. 
The first is the great variety of the charges and accusations against Paul that are 
·constructed by modern scholars.18 According to Tyson that situation calls for a 
uniform methodology, a mirror reading method (see 1968:242). He fails to realise, 
however, that it is the current practice of mirror reading which is responsible for the 
variety. 
Secondly, a comparison between the different scholarly works shows that exactly the 
same answer by Paul is used to identify totally different charges (see Eckert 1971:1-
18; MuBner 1974:14-24; Ellis 1975; Brinsmead 1982:19-22). 
The problem, to my mind, is that the basic nature of mirror reading is not acknowl-
edged: the mirror reflects the image in front of it. This is another way of saying that 
the charges and accusations, together with Paul's answers, are directly dependent on 
particular configurations of historical assumptions. Two examples will illustrate the 
point. 
17 Interestingly, when other scholarly interpretations are unacceptable (e.g., on the Mosaic law) it is 
·easy to conclude that mirror reading at this point 'seems to fail us' (Longenecker 1990:c). 
18 For an indication of some charges and accusations by opponents see, for example, Talbert 
1967:27-32; Tyson 1968:245-250; Jewett 1970/1:200-204; Schmithals 1972:19-21; MuBner 1974:12-13; 
Ellis 1975:293; Gunther 1975:14-16; Schutz 1975:125-126. 
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In the light of the fact that the charges themselves are not clearly stated, Howard -
who questions the mirror reading method - asks whether there were any direct 
charges at all (see 1979:8). His solution is to propose an alternative scenario: it is 
possible that the opponents did not accuse Paul at all, directly or indirectly, but 
'actually considered him to teach circumcision as they themselves did and in fact 
treated him as ally' (1979:9). He believes that 
rather than assuming that the opponents held the opposite position 
from the one they ascribed to Paul, they held in fact the same position 
... who preached circumcision and who said that Paul did the same 
because he like them was dependent on the Jerusalem apostles for his 
gospel. 
(1979:9) 
His position differs from that of Baur in that 'it contends that the judaizers believed 
that Paul, like them, taught the necessity of circumcision and the law for salvation 
and were totally unaware of his non-circumcision gospel' (1979:2).19 Primarily 
Howard accepts the basic assumption (or a modified form of it) of the historical 
construction proposed by Baur of early Christianity as characterised by a conflict 
between a Pauline and Petrine faction (see chapter 4). 
Howard has, however, changed the scenario but not the method of mirror reading 
(see Lyons 1985:96). In fact, his change of scenario demonstrates that the mirror 
reflects the scenario and that the text only serves as a vehicle for that mirror image. 
Similarly, in Jewett's construction of a zealous nomistic Christian group in Judea 
(see 1970/1:204) it is not so much the text of Paul's letter as his historical scenario 
that determines the mirror image.20 Jewett argues that 'a nomistic Christian group 
·in Judea' (1970/1:204), who offered a completion of Paul's gospel, was responsible 
for the agitation in Galatia. His hypothesis is that 
Jewish Christians in Judea were stimulated by Zealotic pressure into a 
nomistic campaign among their fellow Christians ... It appears that the 
Judean Christians convinced themselves that circumcision of Gentile 
Christians would thwart Zealot reprisals. 
(1970/1:205) 
The supposed situation becomes apparent in his interpretation of Galatians 6:12-13; 
19 The Galatians were, according to Howard, unaware of Paul's non-circumcision gospel. The 
Jewish Christians also, who assumed that Paul held by the same circumcision gospel as they, were 
unaware of Paul's position. Learning of his illness, they inferred that Paul was afraid on that account to 
burden the Galatians with circumcision. Thus. they only completed what Paul omitted because of the ill-
ness. This unawareness of the law-free gospel came about because Paul withheld it even from the 
Jerusalem apostles until much later (1979:9-10). Given such an exegesis, critical remarks are to be 
expected; Williams, for example, thinks that at several points 'questionable logic, excessive imaginative 
exegesis, and overly speculative historical reconstructions interfere with a thorough and persuasive 
analysis of Paul's argument in Galatians' (1981:308). 
20 Jewett's proposal is adopted by Longenecker (see 1990:xcvi) in his recent commentary on the let-
ter to the Galatians. 
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Under what circumstances would a nomistic Christian group in Judea 
be in danger of anti-Pauline persecution and have an interest in con-
verting the Gentile churches to nomism in order to save itself from 
such a threat? 
(1970/1:204) 
This historical construction is clearly suspect.21 However, it does show how the text 
is turned to fit the image in front of the mirror. Circumcision is interpreted and the 
. opponent hypothesis developed according to a constructed historical context. 
4.2 Can mirror reading be reconditioned? 
To my mind, the debate on common pitfalls inherent in mirror reading suggests that 
mirror reading as a method can be modified only up to a point. However, it indi-
cates a more serious pitfall, namely that the nature of the method, which becomes 
apparent from the use or application of it, cannot be changed by internal adjust-
ments. 
The first pitfall can be referred to as the temptation of present-mindedness. The mir-
ror reading method readily lends itself to caricatures of opponents that are con-
temporary with the interpreter. The high incidence in Protestant circles of the view 
that Paul's opponents were 'legalistic, mean-minded Jewish Christian with a streak 
of fundamentalist biblicism' (see Barclay 1987:81) is significant. Hickling correctly 
warns that doctrinal conflict 'as it emerged in the church at later periods has been 
silently taken as a model for the time of Paul' (1975:286). Apart from the inherent 
weaknesses, it also points to the argument that mirror reading reflects more of the 
. researcher than of the text. Not only an adjustment in the criteria but also a 
reconsideration of the use of the method in particular cases seems to be at stake. 
A second pitfall is that proponents of mirror reading do not take the logic of the 
method seriously. Barclay (see 1987:80-81) refers to it as the mishandling of 
polemics. If it is true that the occasion of the letter was a polemical or apologetic 
situation, then that fact should be taken seriously when interpreting the letter. Paul 
can hardly be taken at face value in a situation where he is going out of his way to 
show the worst side of his opponents, putting them in the worst possible light (see 
Hickling 1975:285; Barclay 1987:75; Sanders 1985:361-362; Neyrey 1988:94). Nei-
ther the effects of polemics as such nor the assumption that Paul's account is a 
polemic are taken seriously (see Sumney 1990:97). Furthermore, Paul's interpreters 
are apt to take sides in the debate. Thus, one of the main assumptions that sanctions 
21 Is it plausible that Jewish Christians in Judea would be influenced by Zealotic pressure to such an 
extent that they in order to avoid persecution would go to Galatia for a 'sudden missionary enterprise' 
(Jewett 1970/1:206)? If that much intimidated, would they then 'tactfully ... not mention that circumci-
sion imposed the obligation to obey the entire range of the law' (1970/1:207)? Barclay also suspects 
·that Jewett takes the charge too seriously (1987:75). 
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the mirror reading method, namely that Paul was reacting to charges and accusa-
tions by opponents, would certainly distort the mirror image. Interpreting a polemic 
can be a tricky business, and the codes and conventions of first-century polemics 
may pose a further difficulty. 
Thus the main objection to mirror reading as a method of identifying Paul's 
opponents is inherent not in the method but in the fact that the nature of the 
method is disregarded in the use of it. There is no recognition of its circular nature. 
Not only is it presumed that opponents were present but also what kind of 
opponents they were.22 
Since the nature of the conflict is assumed, the identity of the opponents follows 
suit. This is confirmed by the questions posed in the received view, which is not 
whether there were opponents or what the nature of the conflict was, but who they 
were. Not what constituted the conflict but which opponents caused the trouble. The 
textual witnesses are squeezed to the last drop to provide evidence for a theological 
or doctrinal conflict (that is, a conflict about ideas) and consequently the opponents 
are identified in the same vein. 
In the previous section it became apparent that the questions assume a communica-
tive context where the conflict was of a theological or doctrinal nature. Instead of 
seeing the necessity of historical constructions as a 'broad context' to identify 
opponents and as 'a test for a hypothesis about the opponents' identity' (Sumney 
1989:52), it should be used as a constraint on the question about the nature of the 
conflict and the existence of opponents as such. Were there opponents primarily 
informed by adverse theological ideas? Was Paul reacting to their (deviant) ideas? 
In short, both the nature of the conflict and the nature of the Pauline movement 
(communities) are taken for granted. 
The first two pitfalls mentioned by Barclay regarding the mirror reading method -
undue selectivity and over-interpretation (see 1987:79-80) - merely emphasise this 
point.23 Undue selectivity and over-interpretation are not the result of negligence or 
malice on the part of the researchers, or of inaccuracy, but simply reflect the true 
nature of mirror reading: the mirror reflects what is placed in front of it. The point 
is that the mirror not so much reflects Paul's opponents but rather the researcher's 
constructed communicative context and ideas with regard to them. What is 
22 It should be noted that contemporary scholarly investigations of the pitfalls of mirror reading (see 
Barclay 1987:79-83; Hansen 1989:167-170) focus on the shortcomings inherent in the approach. In 
other words, they attempt to establish some fundamental principles of a sound methodology for the 
identification of the opponents (see Sumney 1990). 
23 Undue selectivity has to do with the practice of selecting certain words or phrases or certain kinds 
of phrases, such as possible slogans or defense statements, to determine the opponents' position. Over-
interpretation, on the other hand, occurs when every single statement in the letter is read as if it were a 
rebuttal of some vigorous counterstatement by the opponents (see Barclay 1987:79). 
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apparently needed is not more mirror images but more reflection on the object -
that is, the communicative context in front of the mirror. 
In conclusion, the main objection to mirror reading as currently used in opponent 
hypotheses is not primarily directed at the inherent features of the method: it fol-
lows from the uncritical use of it. Without a critical discussion of the communicative 
context, it merely establishes what is presupposed. Mirror reading as such is not 
rejected, since historians and exegetes alike make use of it24 and it can indeed be 
used as a critical tool. With regard to the identification of the opponents the method 
seems to fail the test, because its inherent weaknesses are not compensated for in its 
application. It is applied as a bag of tricks to solve a problem it is not intended for. 
Mirror reading can be used neither to fill historical gaps nor to construct the ignored 
or denied communicative context (see Sumney 1990:100). Instead, mirror reading 
should be used in conscious acknowledgement and awareness of the assumed or 
postulated communicative context. Only then can it be of any value as a historical 
method. What needs to be avoided is the vicious circle effect.25 It calls for a critical 
methodology and a different philosophy of history (see further chapter 2). 
4.3 Concluding remarks: situating mirror reading 
Mirror reading, by assuming that Paul is reacting to charges and accusations by 
opponents, affirms exactly what has to be proved - namely whether Paul in the let-
ter to the Galatians is reacting against charges by opponents. By assuming an apol-
ogy, the charges (and ultimately the positions and identity of the opponents) can be 
identified. By assuming that Paul is answering the charges, it can be proved that it is 
an apology. From all that has been said, it seems to me justified to conclude that, 
regarding the well-known and conventional method of mirror reading, it is 
impossible to identify the opponents without assuming their existence and identity 
(see also MuBner 1974:25; Lyons 1985:120). 
While the mirror reading method assumes opponents, the opponent hypotheses 
presuppose the mirror reading method. Thus not only mirror reading but more par-
24 Anyone assuming or constructing the occasion of an ancient text, or postulating an audience, in 
some way makes use of the mirror effect. The understanding of what is in a text very often presupposes 
a construction of what is not there. 
25 Circularity, as will be argued in a subsequent chapter, is due to the nature of interpretation and 
the pre-understanding which is part of it. Keck (see 1979:16) is an exponent of the kind of circularity to 
be avoided. What is needed is to introduce some form of outside control over what is presupposed (for 
an example of this, see Stowers 1986:25). This can be achieved when the claim that the text alone 
should be used has been avoided, and when a communicative context is argued and not assumed. 
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ticularly the broader philosophical and historical frame within which it operates as 
an interpretive tool should be examined. 26 
In the sections to follow, mirror reading and opponent hypotheses are placed in a 
wider frame. Both the philosophy-of-history position (methodological assumptions) 
and the assumed communicative context (historical assumptions) taken for granted 
in the application of mirror reading have to be considered. If, for example, one loses 
sight of the fact that in Paul's lifetime there was as yet no fixed body of doctrine and 
no generally accepted ecclesiastical - either Jewish or Christian - organisation (see 
Koester 1982: 117), then anachronistic conceptions of these aspects can easily be 
projected into the first century. 
It will be argued in the rest of this chapter that opponent hypotheses as cypher keys 
consist of two aspects, closely connected and mutually dependent. The first is the 
history-of-ideas approach to historical research (methodological components) which 
characterises the mirror reading method and consequently the nature of opponent 
hypotheses. Secondly there are ·some historical assumptions on the nature and 
expansion of the Pauline communities which provide the framework within which 
opponent hypotheses operate. Both aspects will be analysed critically in this study. 
Although historical and methodological components are closely connected and 
·often presuppose each other, they will as far as possible be kept apart. First, we turn 
to the methodological components of the received cypher keys. 
5 OPPONENT HYPOTIIESES AS A HISTORY-OF-IDEAS APPROACH 
It has been indicated that opponent hypotheses in general and the mirror reading 
method in particular are characterised by the assumed communicative context, 
which consists of both methodological and historical components. In this section it 
will be indicated that the historical components of opponent hypotheses are part 
and parcel of a history-of-ideas philosophy. It will be indicated that, in terms of this 
approach (a common one in opponent hypotheses), assumptions on the communica-
tive context of the letter are sought in the realm of ideas, theologies and doctrine. In 
short, the (history-of-ideas) methodological components affect every single aspect of 
26 Very much aware of the problems regarding mirror reading, Barclay (see 1987; 1988) and Sum-
ney (see 1990:97-113) still think that it can be salvaged. What is needed is 'a carefully controlled 
method of working which uses logical criteria and proceeds with suitable caution' (Barclay 1987:84) . 
. Barclay mentions seven of the most appropriate criteria. It may be true that these criteria would 
restrict many of the far-fetched constructions we have today. Barclay's own construction of what is 
virtually certain and highly probable proves that. The problem with his argument is that he does not 
respond to the fundamental objection to the method, namely that it only confirms what is supposed at 
the beginning - in other words, the illegitimate circularity of the method (see Lyons 1985:104). Bar-
clay's use of the 'whole letter as in some sense a response to the crisis brought about by the opponents' 
(1988:38) differs from those scholars he criticises in that he tries to avoid being selective. It is not, 
however, difficult to see that even the criteria he uses (see 1988:41) still presuppose that Paul was 
responding to charges and accusations and that the letter should be read that way. 
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opponent hypotheses - from assumptions on the nature of the Pauline movement to 
·assumptions on the nature of the conflict in Galatia. 
5.1 The fallacy of idealism and a challenge to (theological) reductionism 
What is meant by a history-of-ideas approach is that Paul is essentially seen as a 
'theologischer Denker' (Theillen 1979:17) and the context of his communication as 
primarily that of a 'theological seminary' (Scroggs 1975:21). This, according to 
Holmberg (1978:201-203), leads to the fallacy of idealism where 'all developments, 
conflicts and influences are at bottom developments of, and conflicts and influences 
between ideas' (Holmberg 1978:201). Exegetically, says Elliott, 'we have failed to 
take account of the fact that all ideas, concepts and knowledge are socially 
determined' (1981:4). In fact, scholars have failed to explain not only that all ideas 
are socio-culturally determined, but also which socio-cultural setting has been taken 
for granted. The challenge it poses for the interpretation of language that has a loca-
tion prior to one's own, is the tendency to see such language in terms of one's own 
perception of the pre-understood subject matter rather than that which may be 
unique to the original author (see further chapter 2). 
·An overemphasis in research on the literary and theological dimensions, to the 
detriment of historical or sociological aspects led to a justifiable reaction among 
New Testament scholars.27 A strong reaction against the so-called fallacy of idealism 
has arisen in the past decade or so, especially among scholars who are interested in 
the social-scientific interpretation of the New Testament (see, for example, Smith 
1975:19; Scroggs 1980:165; Meeks 1983:164; Malina 1983:131; Tidball 1983:11; Gal-
lagher 1984:91; MacDonald 1988:23-24). 
With regard to the question of Paul's opponents in the letter to the Galatians it 
implies that the problem should be seen, not one-sidedly as a matter of pure theol-
ogy and doctrine, but in terms of the broader socio-cultural context. Then the con-
flict would no longer be between 'a good Paul and evil opponents' (Scroggs 
1980: 175) but would be described in terms of the socio-cultural codes and conven-
tions applicable to the first-century Mediterranean world. The challenge is to 'begin 
with the early believers in their concrete, historical reality rather than with an 
abstract "early church" which is often merely a vehicle for the theology of the New 
Testament writings' (Best 1983:183). The reaction to the history-of-ideas approach 
insists that the New Testament words should be placed squarely in the first-century 
·communicative context from which they came. 
27 Scholars concerned with the historical interpretation of the New Testament have long recognised 
this problem. It became clear, in the words of Schubert that 'the resurging insistence on a religious and 
theological interpretation of the New Testament' (1947:216), is a dangerous enterprise. Schmithals 
warned over twenty years ago that we should be careful not to overload the theological differences in 
the early church with a burden they can not carry - that is, to blame the differences and schisms in the 
early church solely on prevailing theological differences (see 1965:103 n 2). 
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Many scholars who jumped on the bandwagon of a sociological or social-scientific 
interpretation of Paul's letters (or of the New Testament) in actual fact merely 
interpret the text in terms of a new set of concepts or academic jargon, but the real 
challenge to the fallacy of idealism is a methodological one. It calls for an alteration 
in the philosophical and epistemological components of interpretive attempts (see 
Craffert 1991). In other words, it calls for a rejection of a history-of-ideas approach 
(philosophy) together with its accompanying tools and perspectives in favour of a 
social-scientific approach, and an explicitly historical aim-of-interpretation 
(epistemological) position instead of nonhistorical aims. In the following chapter the 
theoretical foundation and epistemological justification of a social-scientific 
approach to the historical study of the letter to the Galatians will be suggested. 
5.2 Opponent hypotheses and the fallacy of idealism 
Without suggesting that all opponent hypotheses share exactly the same view of his 
torical components, it would be as well to point out that, broadly speaking, they 
have a salient feature in common at a fundamental level: a history-of-ideas construct 
of the situation in Galatia which may be referred to as the received communicative 
context.28 Not only the main components but also the constituent parts of this 
(received) communicative context bear the stamp of the history-of-ideas approach. 
That is to say, the historical components of opponent hypotheses as a cypher key, 
together with their constitutive parts, share the same general traits: they are drawn 
from the realm of ideas, doctrines or dogmas. 
The following components will be mentioned in brief to illustrate this point: the 
situation in Galatia, the nature of Paul's letter to the Galatians, assumptions on the 
nature of the Pauline movement and the nature of the conflict in Galatia.29 
Sanders's description of the situation in Galatia perfectly illustrates the history-of-
ideas influence on the occasion of the letter: 
Missionaries were attempting, apparently with some success, to con-
vince Paul's Gentile converts that to be heirs of the biblical promises 
they had to accept the biblical law. To put it in terms used earlier: the 
Gentile converts could enter the people of God only on condition that 
they were circumcised and accepted the law. 
(1983:18) 
28 In a subsequent chapter the notion of communicative context will be discussed in more detail (see 
chapter 3). Suffice it to point out that it consists, at the least, of the social, cultural and historical 
aspects which constitute the context of communication. 
29 While most components have already been mentioned in the previous section, and since the 
object is not to identify the opponents as such, the examples that follow are designed purely to illustrate 
the point with regard to the underlying methodological and historical assumptions in opponent 
hypotheses as cypher keys. 
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The key words and phrases in his description all reflect a situation where opposing 
dogmatic or doctrinal viewpoints were in some kind of competition (see also Meeks 
1983:115). The point at issue was a theoretical dispute about entrance requirements 
for becoming part of the people of God. 
To some the opponents were missionaries who 'trailed Paul from place to place 
seeking to correct his misrepresentation of the gospel' (Roetzel 1982:65; see also 
Schmithals 1983:49) while others prefer to see these missionaries as opposing Paul's 
. apostleship. All in all, it would be fair to say that the crisis is described as a theologi-
cal or doctrinal conflict between Paul and 'rival preachers', with the focus on con-
flicts in terms of 'conflicting theologies' (Neyrey 1988:94) or belief systems. 
Therefore the letter is read with the assumption that Paul responded to what he 
considered an alarming crisis where either his gospel or his apostleship, or both, 
were disputed by some. In fact, Paul's letters, it is maintained, were written either to 
'combat wrongheaded ideas, false Christologies or theological heresies' (Elliott 
1981:4), or, on the other hand, to promote and propagate certain ideas or 
Christologies (see Hickling 1975:284).30 
Closely related to the assumed nature of the crisis are assumptions about the nature 
of the Pauline movement, including elements of the expansion of the early Christian 
movement as well as its perceived position within first-century Judaism. 
It is commonly believed that there was by this time [Paul's lifetime] a 
well organized and theologically articulate judaizing party in Galatia 
who were not merely recommending certain Jewish observances, but 
also advocating "another gospel" - that is to say, a Jewish version of 
Christianity which differed, in important points of doctrine, from that 
originally preached by Paul. 
(Harvey 1968:323) 
Harvey's description gives a balanced view of the Pauline movement as competing 
with rival Christian factions (groups) with regard to matters of doctrine. 
Simultaneously, first-century Judaism is perceived as normative Judaism, implying 
that adverse positions would have been taken as apostasy. 
In view of these examples, together with the previously discussed components of the 
different configurations of opponent hypotheses, there can be little doubt that the 
debate on the identity of Paul's opponents and the opponent hypotheses as a cypher 
key takes place on the plane of ideas, doctrines and dogmas. The historical com-
ponents are restricted to those which fit a history-of-ideas view. Consequently the 
30 Du Toit, for example, maintains that opponent hypotheses are misleading, since they reduce the 
struggle in the letter to a theological dispute about conflicting viewpoints (see 1990:156). However, a 
few pages further he states that the persuasive aim or pragmatic intent of the letter is to induce the 
Galatians to reject ('afsweer') the heresy ('dwaalbeskouings') and return to the true gospel (see 
. 1990:160). 
23 
nature of the conflict is limited to the sphere of ideas, ideologies or theological 
viewpoints. 
While the methodological issues will be discussed in greater detail in the next two 
chapters, it is also necessary to investigate the historical components of the received 
cypher keys. 
6 OPPONENT HYPOTIIESES AND COMMUNICATIVE CONIBXT 
Given the generally approved history-of-ideas approach to Paul's letter to the 
Galatians, the thesis to be argued in this part of the study is that the majority of 
cypher keys are hallmarked not only by the history-of-ideas approach but also by a 
clearly identifiable communicative context. That is to say, the history-of-ideas meth-
odology is accompanied by a (received) set of historical components which is not 
only determined by the history-of-ideas approach but has almost achieved the status 
of a self-evident fact. These methodological and historical components have, over 
the years, grown into a variety of configurations which allow variation within their 
confines but hardly ever break out of them. 
It should furthermore be realised that this communicative context (to be referred to 
as the received communicative context) consists, broadly speaking, of some 
generally approved historical components which are firmly embedded in the wider 
setting of the early Jesus movement as well as the Jewish subculture and the first-
century Mediterranean world.31 Generally approved components (such as circumci-
sion and membership of the people of God) which are part and parcel of most 
. cypher keys fit into a wider setting.32 
While most of the historical components contributing to scholarly constructions of 
the occasion of the letter to the Galatians have already been identified, it might not 
yet be perfectly clear to what extent they influence our interpretive attempts. 
31 In a subsequent chapter the components generally referred to in discussions on the occasion of 
the letter will be considered in relation to their embeddedness in this wider setting (see chapter 4). At 
the moment the spotlight focuses on the presence of these components in the majority of opponent 
hypotheses as a cypher key. 
32 Traditionally, discussions on the occasion of the letter are concerned with the events directly sur-
rounding the activities of the troublemakers - that is, the identity of the opponents, circumcision as 
reason for the conflict, or the assumed situation in Galatia (such as the activities of deviant mis-
sionaries). The point at issue is that these aspects are embedded in assumptions on at least the wider 
framework of the expansion of the early Jesus movement and the subculture of first-century Judaism -
both of which ultimately form part and parcel of one's view on the first-century Mediterranean setting 
of the communication. 
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6.1 Two trends regarding the occasion of the letter 
While it has already been suggested that opponent hypotheses as cypher keys cannot 
be divorced from views on the occasion of the letter, at least two clear trends can be 
identified in research concerning the occasion of the letter to the Galatians. Despite 
differences between them - even claims that the occasion of the letter is omissible -
it should be pointed out that they basically share the selfsame communicative con-
text which has become part and parcel of Galatian studies to a point where it is 
taken for granted as a self-evident fact.33 In studies on both trends the components 
(of the communicative context) covertly influence the outcome of the interpretation. 
On the one hand, it has become commonplace in some circles (literary approaches) 
to be (at least in theory) highly critical of any reliance on a historical 
(re)construction of the occasion of the letter. There are scholars nowadays who 
· devaluate. the occasional character of Paul's letters, particularly in view of some 
methodological considerations. Hartman proposes several reasons which, according 
to him, suggest that Paul had two intentions, 'the one regarding the specific occasion 
and, secondly, the one related to more general interest' (Hartman 1986:145; see also 
Lategan 1988a:413). Hartman mentions several 'facts' (see 1986:137-139) regarding 
the Pauline letters which, according to him, are in tension with the occasional 
character of the letters.34 To my mind, the most important aspect of his position 
concerns the arguments in favour of the idea that Paul had a wider audience in mind 
than those mentioned or intended as first addressees. ·on the basis of three aspects 
of text linguistics - the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects (see 1986:141-142) 
- he argues that the same text can be read with each of the three aspects in mind; 
one can focus either on the syntactic aspect or on the semantic aspect (as Luther 
did) or in 'a third kind of rereading the text with its expressions and contents is 
strictly understood as a message in its concrete historical situation' (Hartman 
1986:142). The point to be noted is that Hartman uses the different aspects of 
linguistics as subsequent or juxtaposed components which can, depending on the 
reader, be used at will. 
·In justifying this position he appeals to the philosophical positio~ of Gadamer and 
Ricoeur, stating that once texts have left the author's hand 'we are free to read them 
according to our own minds' (Hartman 1986:144). A final argument is that Paul 
himself gave some indications that the letters were intended for a wider audience.35 
33 Although the concept communicative context is preferred in this study, the generally approved 
concept (occasion of the letter) will be used when referring to the received viewpoints. 
34 Hartman's/acts include aspects such as that they are real letters and not artificial 'epistles'; the 
letters contain rhetorical arguments, and styles which one would not expect in occasional private let-
ters; Paul's letters, such as many other letters, were considered as a replacement or representation of 
the author (see 1986:137-139). I shall not discuss all these aspects in detail. Suffice to say that from the 
theoretical discussion which will follow it will become clear why I think these /acts can be interpreted 
very differently. 
35 The letter to Philemon was intended not only to Philemon but also to those in his house, and 1 
Corinthians also to 'all who call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ in every place, theirs and ours' 
(Hartman 1986:144). 
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The question is whether he is correct in deducing from this argument that Paul had 
two interests, the one occasional and the other more general. That Hartman's argu-
ment implies an ongoing communication process which includes present readers is 
confirmed by Lategan, who positively accepts Hartman's arguments (see 1988a:412-
413). Their argument indeed 'presents a problem for exegetes trying to say what a 
text meant historically' (Hartman 1986:145). The influence of this position on the 
interpretation of the letter will be spelled out more clearly in the discussion of 
literary approaches to the letter. 
On the other hand, the occasional nature of the letter was certainly not disregarded 
·by the founding fathers of modem New Testament research in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Scholars such as Baur, Lightfoot, Llitgert, Ropes and 
Munck placed the controversies of Paul squarely within their respective construc-
tions of the whole of early Christian history (see Hawkins 1972; Fletcher 1982; Ellis 
1975). What is not always properly appreciated is the overall framework or matrix 
(the communicative context) which these fathers left behind and which is nowadays 
shared by proponents of both trends. Like them many scholars (historical 
approaches) still emphasise that the occasion of the letter is indispensable to any 
interpretation of the letter; they accept (if not explicitly, at least in theory) that 
Paul's letters were occasional writings 'in the sense of having been occasioned by 
some development in the relationship between Paul and the community or person in 
question' (Watson 1987:9 and see Keck 1979:15-16; Roetzel 1982:50; Du Toit 
1984a:2-3; Jervell 1984d:55). To focus on the letter to the Galatians: it is taken to be 
a real letter written by Paul to a particular community within a very specific socio-
historical situation (see Hansen 1989:22). Consequently there can be little doubt 
that Paul's theology was 'contextual theology' (Beker 1980:56). 
It has already been suggested that, despite major differences about the identity and 
theology of the opponents, opponent hypotheses are all configurations comprising of 
the same historical elements. It will be pointed out that, broadly speaking, readings 
in terms of historical and literary convictions36 - even when these are denied - basi-
cally share the same view on the expansion (development) of the early Jesus move-
ment in the first-century world together with a view on (normative) Judaism in 
Paul's lifetime. 
6.1.1 Historical approaches 
According to Betz, the recipients and their situation are of vital importance for the 
interpretation of the letter; they are the reason why Paul wrote the letter (see 
36 In this context these two concepts refer, respectively, to an approach that explicitly argues some 
kind of context versus approaches that avoid explicit historical constructions. Literary approaches are 
those which approach the text from the viewpoint of some literary category, be it a reader-oriented, an 
epistolary or a rhetorical one. 
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1979:65). According to Betz, he was thinking, in the letter to the Galatians, of 
Christianity as 'a separate and self-conscious new religion' (1979:28) in contrast to 
the mother religion, Judaism. Paul's letter to the Galatians is one of the first docu-
ments testifying to this development (see also Betz 1979:246, 263; Davies 1981:314; 
Meyer 1981:321). 
The importance of the above remarks for his interpretation of the letter and his 
identification of the opponents should not be underestimated. The opponents, 
Jewish-Christian missionaries (see Betz 1979:7), created the situation which forced 
Paul to write the letter.37 Therefore an interpretation of Paul's letter without con-
sidering their agitation against him is inconceivable (see Betz 1979:88, 99) . 
. His aim (to analyse the letter as an 'apologetic letter' which presupposes a 'court of 
law' (1979:24) situation where the Galatians are the jury, Paul the defendant and 
the opponents the accusers) reveals the importance of the supposed situation. 
Without the supposed context of the Pauline movement separate from Judaism, and 
the existence of rival groups within the Jesus movement, the scenario of an 
apologetic letter and a law case is not appropriate. The fact that the recipients were 
Gentiles and the opponents Jewish-Christian missionaries, and that the opponents 
attempted to persuade the Galatians to accept the Torah and circumcision, 
ultimately determines Betz's interpretation of the letter. The letter must be read as 
an intra-Christian debate and it must be accepted that early Christianity was at that 
stage organised into well-established groups,38 all with their own missionaries 
opposing each other. 
There _c~n be little doubt that Betz's interpretation is fully in line with the received 
yiew on th\ expansion of the early Christian movement and with the assumption of a 
r normative Judaism in Paul's lifetime (see further chapter 4). 
The position of Barclay (1988) is interesting in that it is in many instances diametri-
. cally opposed to Harvey's configuration (1968, 1985). Harvey probably would not 
disagree with Barclay's position, as clearly stated in the epigraph to this chapter, that 
the first step in understanding Paul should be to reconstruct the occasion of the let-
ter. They furthermore agree that the crisis which occasioned the letter was brought 
on by the question of circumcision (see Barclay 1988:45; Harvey 1968:323). To both 
of them the notion of God-fearers is important. While they disagree on some other 
points of detail, it will be argued that they share the assumption of some kind of 
37 It is Paul himself, Betz maintains, who 'puts the opponents in a historical perspective' (Betz 
1979:7) since 'Galatians as a whole was written to be a defense of Paul's gospel as his reading of the 
tradition, contrasted with the way his opponents understood and interpreted it' (1979:65). 
38 According to Betz the letter to the Galatians and 2 Cor 6:14-7:1 represent opposing groups in 
early Christianity. The former (Gentile Christians) and the latter (Jewish Christians), and ultimately 
the Antioch incident and the situation which led Paul to write his letter to the Galatians, have to do 
with different theological views of the two groups (see 1973:99-102). 
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·normative Judaism in terms of which Paul and the Pauline movement should be 
seen, as well as the received view on the expansion of the Pauline movement. Dis-
cussion of some of these points will serve as a final example of the historical 
approach. 
According to Harvey, the Galatian Christians were Gentiles; but since they were 
well grounded in Old Testament and Jewish exegesis, they must have belonged to 
the class of God-fearers. The opponents were members of the local Jewish com-
munity (see 1985:86) who secured the support of the people; who only recently 
became proselytes but were now members of the Christian community (see 
1968:323-324; 1985:87). While it is true that the Jewish community was anxious to 
take them back, Paul's real opponents were those Christians in Galatia who were 
ready to yield to this pressure and were persuading others to do the same (see 
1968:327). Reacting to threats of persecution or discrimination from the Jews, they 
tended to return to the observances expected of God-fearers (see 1968:329-330). 
A valuable insight in Harvey's argument is that the nature of the opposition in 
Galatia was not theological or doctrinal but a matter of practice. Behind the 
·theological argument in the letter lies a practical matter - that of Jewish obser-
vances such as keeping the sabbath, Jewish festivals and ritual cleanliness (see 
1968:327-329, 1985:87).39 
Barclay, on the other hand, maintains that while the majority of those addressed in 
the letter were Gentiles, the opponents were Jewish Christians (see 1988:59). He 
argues that the success of the opponents was due to the social situation of Paul's 
converts. They had left the social security of their Gentile religion and were not 
really part of the alternative social structure, the synagogue community (see 
1988:58-60). They were very open to the Pauline message. After Paul left, their 
newly created social identity was endangered by a social insecurity that made them 
the targets of Jewish Christians. 
The argument that the Galatians' conversion would have weakened their sense of 
social identity assumes that people joined the Pauline movement primarily on the 
basis of individual perceptions of cognitive aspects. They were impressed by the 
message of the agitators. Circumcision would have ensured proselyte status in the 
Jewish community, and as proselytes they could share in the social security of the 
Jewish religion with its long-established pedigree. Becoming proselytes would have 
39 Harvey's insistence that the conflict was not merely a theological or doctrinal dispute in the 
modern sense is noteworthy (see 1968:324). He however did not really go beyond the history-of-ideas 
approach. He merely refined (and correctly so) the theological and doctrinal debate. The point is that 
the content of first-century Jewish doctrine favoured orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy. But that is a 
long way from an expansion of research to the socio-cultural aspects that contributed to the conflict 
(see chapters 5 and 6). 
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meant minor social adjustments only. In short, it is assumed that adherence to such 
a religious group was based primarily on the acceptance of a belief system. 
Despite differences in their respective configurations of opponents' identity, these 
scholars do share two views: the occasion of the letter is important for its interpreta-
tion, and the received view on the nature of the communicative context is taken for 
granted. 
As against those who explicitly argue for some form of historical context within 
which to understand what Paul was saying, there are others who argue against it. 
They do so mainly for two related reasons: historical constructions are deemed 
speculative, and they prefer to rely on the text of Galatians only. 
6.12 Literary approaches 
This group of scholars maintains that the primary problem with the interpretation of 
the letter to the Galatians is that historical questions have so dominated the discus-
sion (especially of chapters 1 and 2) that the literary aspects have been neglected. 
My intention is not to criticise their positions but to point out that they have merely 
opted for alternative configurations of the same historical elements, including the 
received view on the nature of the communicative context. 
Their main argument is that we know less about the historical situation than has 
long been imagined. In fact, this should occasion no regret: the literary function of 
the autobiographical sections in the letter, or a reader-oriented approach, will pro-
. vide the long awaited solution. 
Let us begin with Lyons who, in criticising Betz for the 'ingenious reconstruction of 
the historical situation' (Lyons 1985:102) which influences his interpretation of the 
letter, assumes that he himself approaches the letter ahistorically. He strongly reacts 
to the role of historical constructions in determining the genre and thus the inter-
pretation of the letter to the Galatians (see 1985:98, 102, 120), since they provide ·a 
precarious foundation upon which to construct solid exegetical conclusions' 
(1985:98). Since he does not pretend to solve the historical questions posed by the 
autobiographical remarks in Galatians 1 and 2, his aim is primarily literary - that is, 
to determine the role of the autobiographical narrative in the letter to the Galatians 
(see 1985:136), or as it subsequently became clear, its rhetorical function (see 
1985:154, 159, 163). The illusion is created that this literary approach does not rely 
on any historical situation but rests only on 'textual evidence' (1985:124) from the 
letter to the Galatians. ' 
I can partly agree with Lyons's diagnosis of the problem but not with his remedy. He 
correctly remarks that 'one's prior view of the historical context in which a piece of 
·literature emerged decisively co-determines its interpretation' (1985:104) and fur-
thermore that 'the unexamined historical assumption of nearly all studies of 
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Galatians ... that Paul's autobiographical remarks respond apologetically to specific 
accusations made by invading Judaizing opponents' (1985:76-77) has dominated the 
interpretation of the letter. His remedy, however, is to investigate the 'literary 
character and scope' (1985:105) of Paul's autobiographical statements, since 'we 
know less about the historical situation to which Paul's letters respond than "clair-
· voyant" scholars would lead us to believe' (1985:120). Says he (1985:79): 'Such his-
torical reconstructions would scarcely seem to be secure bases for exegesis of the letter or 
for determining the function of Paul's autobiographical remarks' (italics mine). Lyons's 
remedy assumes that the fault of the majority (and especially of Betz's) interpreta-
tion is a mistaken generic conception. He quotes Hirsch's famous dictum that 'an 
interpreter's preliminary generic conception of a text is constitutive of everything 
that he subsequently understands' (1985:117). On that basis he then concentrates 
solely on the letter to the Galatians, since his concern 'is primarily literary' (italics 
mine) and his remedy is to determine (on the basis of the textual evidence) what 
ulterior motives Paul may have had in writing the letter, i.e. 'how Paul's 
autobiographical remarks function within the letter to the Galatians' (1985:124). 
Although he admits the importance of the historical situation, Lyons tends to 
underestimate the influence of the historical situation40 on his own reading, 
erroneously imagining that the historical element can be ignored and that the his-
torical and literary questions are independent. How can he escape the truism -
which he correctly states - that one's prior view of the historical context in which a 
piece of literature emerged decisively co-determines its interpretation? He himself 
· has a very specific context in mind when he reads the letter to the Galatians. 
Although not a response to the accusations of his opponents, Paul's letter to the 
Galatians is, according to Lyons, still occasioned by the conduct of troublemakers 
(see 1985:126, 136, 143, 151, 153). These were Christians and probably members of 
the Galatian churches (1985:127 n 17); it seems that they were all Gentile Christians 
(see 1985:129, 148, 151, 162-163, 165, 169), and Paul is trying to dissuade them from 
converting back to Judaism (see 1985:129, 150, 169, 173). Underlying the discussion 
40 One reason for the one-sided emphasis on the literary (to the detriment of the historical) may be 
his incorrect reading of Hirsch. For Hirsch genre is not a literary concept defining various literary forms 
(see Hirsch 1967:120); it is a historical and heuristic and not a 'species concept' (Hirsch 1967:110) used 
as a hermeneutical tool. As Hirsch says: 'A generic conception is apparently not something stable, but 
something that varies on the process of understanding' (1967:77). Hirsch uses the genre concept in a 
communicative or interpretative situation where 'types of meaning are always necessarily wedded to 
types of usage, and this entire, complex system of shared experiences, usage traits, and meaning 
·· expectations which the speaker relies on is the generic conception which controls his utterance. 
Understanding can occur only if the interpreter proceeds under the same system of expectations, and 
. this shared generic conception, constitutive both of meaning and of understanding, is the intrinsic genre 
of the utterance' (1967:80). Thus genre for Hirsch is closely connected to the author's intention: 'The 
genre concept turned out to be the principle for determining whether a particular meaning was willed -
whether it belonged' (1967:121), in other words, all valid interpretation 'is founded on the re-cognition 
of what an author meant' (1967:126). In a word, it refers to historical context (see further chapter 2). 
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of the troublemakers' situation and conduct is the assumption of a clear separation 
between Jewish and Gentile Christians (see 1985:151, 161, 164). These are all 
deductions from the letter itself - in other words, from Paul's perspective on the 
situation; but, as it transpires, Lyons has at least the following assumed context in 
·mind which brought him to his interpretation of Paul's words: Pauline and Jewish 
Christianity were two separate entities within early Christianity, and the problems 
with troublemakers were all internal to Christianity as already distinct from 
Judaism. This assumption does not result from his reading of the text: it is assumed 
as a context from the very beginning of his interpretation. 
Lategan voices an objection against Lyons similar to the latter's objection against 
Betz when he says, regarding the concept of autobiography, that it leads Lyons 
'despite himself, to think primarily still in terms of a historical reconstruction when 
dealing with the Galatian material' (1988a:424). Although not primarily concerned 
with the identity of the opponents (he does base his own argument on it), Lategan 
constitutes a second example from the literary side of the influence of an assumed 
communicative context on the reading of the letter to the Galatians. This meth-
odological position is furthermore becoming more and more influential in New 
Testament studies. To do justice to Lategan's approach, a summary of his intention 
is in order. 
Lategan is interested in the 'present reader' and the way the 'meaning potential of 
the text is actualized' (1988a:413). An important point of departure is that the letter 
to the Galatians is part of 'an ongoing communication process which not only 
involves the original senders and addressees, but also the present readers' 
(1988a:412). We are among the addressees (recipients and readers of the letter) and 
are thus directed by the same clues in the text as the first readers. According to 
Lategan any statement about the present reading of the text is dependent on 'an as 
clear as possible understanding of the text as intended for its original readers' 
(1988a:412). He warns, however, that any reconstruction of the original real readers 
must depend on a prior encounter between the text and the present reader (see 
1988a:413).41 He points out the circularity of such an endeavour: only through a 
present-day reading of the text can we encounter the original readers. His solution, 
given the fact that all we have is Paul's presentation of his audience as a literary 
construct (see 1988a:414), is to infer from clues in the text what the message was, 
what Paul wanted to communicate and who the opponents must have been - that is, 
doing exactly what the first readers had to do. 
If I understand him correctly, Lategan is saying that in order to understand the letter 
. to the Galatians - that is, to find the direct and indirect instructions and clues left 
41 The implication of his position is clear from the distinction he makes between Paul's construct of 
the opponents and that of the present-day reader (see 19883 :412): Paul's construct has to be 
determined from the clues in the text, while that of the present-day reader is a historical activity. 
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for the reader in the text (see 1988a:418) - it is necessary to say something more 
about the 'wider argumentative context of the letter' (1987:50).42 This is derived 
entirely from the textual evidence, since we know almost nothing about the situation 
apart from what we read in the letter (see 1987:50). Furthermore, Lategan is 
hesitant about referring to Paul as the historical Paul - it is the author Paul, as we 
know him from the text and intertextually from the other letters (see 1987:50-51). 
Regarding the opponents the exegete should distinguish carefully between the 
actual flesh-and-blood opponents (historical persons or groups) whom Paul is fight-
ing, and Paul's construct of them. A historical identification of the opponents 
depends on 'an intermediate step, that is, on a reconstruction of Paul's construct of 
his audience' ( 1988a:414 ). Thus, it is possible to delineate the features of his. 
audience as a 'literary construct' which can then, as a second step, be compared to 
the historical persons involved. Lategan scrutinises the text for clues and instructions 
in order to construct the opponents in the text, and as a second step he then looks 
·beyond the text in order to identify the opponents in the text with the real flesh and 
blood opponents in the first-century world. Thus Lategan is concerned with the text 
and the reader clues in the text which provide the communicative thrust of it (see 
1987). From the textual evidence Lategan obtains numerous pieces of information 
about the opponents - not the historical opponents (since that would be part of the 
second step) but the opponents in the text. They were envoys from Jerusalem, and 
Lategan can even pinpoint many of their arguments (see 1987:50, 52).43 
Given his claim that he concentrates on the textual evidence to construct the 'wider 
argumentative context', his fixation on the text misleads one into thinking that it 
really is the text that provides the information: he does not admit that, underlying 
his reading of the text, there is a tacit assumption about the historical situation in 
which Paul is writing. Lategan provides an excellent demonstration of two assump-
tions to be examined in this study. First, there is the history-of-ideas approach which 
concentrates only on Paul's theological or doctrinal motive or argument (see 
1988a:428). Secondly, a concentration on the function of the narratives in the devel-
42 He defines argumentative situation in close relation to the rhetorical situation of a letter. In the 
rhetorical situation, attention is directed in the first place to the strategies used by a writer to persuade; 
in the argumentative situation the focus is on 'the issue for which persuasion is sought' (1989:2). In 
short, these issues consist of the topoi in dispute between Paul and his opponents, which all arise in the 
theological/doctrinal sphere (see Lategan 1989:9-10). To be sure, as a basically literary or textual con-
cept it can best be related to what is referred to as the co-text and the context of reference and not to 
the situational context - not to mention the context of culture (see subsequent chapters). 
43 Lategan's hypothesis is based on the textual evidence of the letter: Paul is challenged both by the 
Galatian churches and by certain representatives from Jerusalem. The envoys from Jerusalem per-
suaded the Galatians to follow a different interpretation of the gospel, which probably runs as follows: 
in addition to faith in Christ they should accept the Jewish way of life, which would provide people 
from a Hellenistic background with the support of a moral system and guidelines by which to structure 
their lives (see 1987:50). Jerusalem, 'the centre of authority of the young developing church' (1987:50), 
supports and blesses the opponents who, according to Lategan, must be Jews (see 1987:55). 
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· opment of Paul's thought (see 1988a:424) does not mean that Lategan's reading is 
context-neutral or asituational. The first readers did not have the text only, and 
Paul's clues in the text, and his construction of the opponents and situation in the 
text. They shared a context with Paul. He communicated with them in their real 
situation - and unless we assume that his attempt to communicate was totally 
unsuccessful, or even incomprehensible, we can assume that they received the letter 
within a specific communicative context. 
If the clues in the text bear a social and cultural stamp, as we shall argue, how then 
can we, as addressees and recipients, expect simply to read the letter in order to 
understand the communication? What about the communicative context, especially 
the cultural context, in terms of which the interaction between Paul and the 
Galatians was actualised? 
Lategan's argument - that we know almost nothing about the situation apart from 
what we read in Paul's letter(s)- does not seem to be valid in the light of everything 
he assumes as a context in which to search for readers clues. What he apparently 
assumes about the communication situation is that first-century people were very 
concerned about correct doctrine; that people would, on the basis of dogmatic con-
victions, have become members of the Pauline movement; that those groups were 
primarily religious groups - to name only a few aspects, apart from the wider situa-
tional context that is tacitly assumed: Paul is working outside Judaism and he is 
opposed by Jews from Jerusalem. The division between Pauline Christianity and 
Jewish Christianity is clearly implied. These are part of the frame within which the 
clues in the letter make sense. 
We should remember that the clues for the first readers were given within a specific 
communicative context, which implies that they could only be understood in terms 
of the shared socio-historical and socio-cultural codes and conventions of their 
world. Were the clues identified by Lategan also the clues recognised by Paul's first 
readers? It is impossible to know for sure, unless more of their socio-cultural codes 
and conventions are taken into account in contemporary attempts to discern the 
communication. 
A final example, to point out which assumptions are taken for granted and at what 
. point in the argument they are introduced, is that of Cosgrove. He claims to make 
use of the insights of linguistics and literary criticism and his attempt is highly inter-
esting. Two principles guide his discussion. The first is that not 'a reconstruction of 
the historical situation at Galatia but a reconstruction of the epistolary perspective 
on that situation comprises the prerequisite for interpreting the letter' (1988:16). 
Modern readers need to be 'briefed by Paul on the problem at Galatia before we 
can rightly hear the letter'; which implies that in order to enter the dialogue we need 
to subject the letter to 'two distinct readings. And the first reading must lead to a 
definite standpoint from which the second reading can proceed' (1988:16). 
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Secondly, Cosgrove distinguishes between a text's 'marked' and 'unmarked' mean-
ings (see 1988:19). Words, sentences and even larger textual complexes find their 
meaning in 'the context of certain situationally given assumptions' (1988:19). Only if 
the letter assumes marked meanings for words that are decisive in the debate is it 
justified to use these words to interpret the letter (see 1988:21). He maintains, 
however, that if 'there are no situationally marked meanings that we need to be 
aware of in order to follow Paul's argument, we may read the letter simply on the 
basis of our general understanding of the language Paul employs' (1988:21-22). 
Only later do we learn that 
we cannot determine the relevance of the autobiography for the 
Galatian situation without a prior understanding of that situation, so 
we cannot identify the apostle's specific purposes in the paraenesis 
without at least a prior understanding of the problem at Galatia as he 
sees it. 
(1988:33) 
Only at this point does he reveal that Betz's historical reconstruction is especially 
. valuable. The point to note is that somehow this assumed historical viewpoint plays 
a more significant part than is spelled out. In fact, although he admits the sig-
nificance for all subsequent exegetical work of a decision as to the nature of the 
Galatian problem (see 1988:38), the role and origin of the hypothesis is disregarded. 
As in previous examples, the role of the assumed problem at Galatia and Paul's 
view of it is underplayed in the claim that the letter itself is the 'only one control on 
the immediate context of Galatians' (1988:21). What kind of conflict is reflected, if 
any? Is it a leadership struggle? Does it concern the nature of Paul's gospel, making 
it a theological or doctrinal matter? Or does it perhaps lie at a more social and per-
sonal level of entering into and living in the social network of the first-century 
world? The answer to these questions to a much greater extent is determined by the 
more general semantic context (what I call the context of culture and context of situa-
tion). This so-called general understanding is not unmarked but fundamentally 
marked by the assumed communicative context. Cosgrove's decision to take the 
opponent hypothesis and the Galatian problem for granted has determined the 
nature of this general understanding. To my mind he only pays lip service to the gen-
eral semantic context which is supposed to indicate the instances of marked mean-
. ing and their meaning potential in particular cases (see 1988:21). 
Studies in the literary vein which claim to focus on the text only (and avoid historical 
constructions with regard to opponents or the occasion of the letter as a means of 
interpretation)44 are spotlighted for several reasons. The role of presuppositions in 
44 Apart from the examples already mentioned, Du Toit (see 1990) provides a text-immanent 
approach to the letter which represents these sentiments exceptionally well. He first of all warns against 
the danger of historical constructions of the opponents, since this leads to misrepresentations of the let-
ter. Such constructions do not flow organically from the text but rather force frameworks on it which go 
against the grain of the text (see 1990:158). 
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interpretation, the nature of language and of texts, and the philosophy-of-history 
view expressed by them are all significant factors. However, the present objective 
was to point out the role of historical aspects in the form of an assumed communica-
tive context which is present in one way or another. It should be noted that 
. opponent hypotheses and the received view on the communicative context are pre-
sent in these literary approaches despite the fact that a construction of the occasion 
is either denied or rejected. Being unaware or careless of the communicative context 
does not make it inoperative. 
6.2 Some observations on opponent hypotheses as a cypher key and the occasion of 
the letter 
If the above examples are representative of opponent hypotheses as a cypher key to 
the interpretation of the letter to the Galatians, some remarkable features may be 
noted. 
Firstly, it can be concluded that what opponent hypotheses as a cypher key have in 
common is not only the importance they attach to the occasion of the letter; they 
also share, broadly speaking, the selfsame communicative context. That is to say, 
they have in common not only the fact that the occasion of the letter plays a central 
part in its interpretation, but also what the components are (both historically and 
methodologically speaking) of the generally approved occasion (communicative con-
. text). It turned out that opponent hypotheses consist of more than the identification 
of opponents and their theological viewpoints. They are complex configurations of a 
wide variety of historical components, most of which are tacitly assumed because 
they are part and parcel of a broader communicative context which nowadays is 
taken for granted. 
Secondly, as to the structure of opponent hypotheses it became clear that not only 
the history-of-ideas methodology but also a very particular set of historical com-
ponents contribute to making opponent hypotheses a cypher key to the letter to the 
Galatians. 
Thirdly - moving to the content of the historical components - although a wide vari-
ety of opponents are identified, they all bear the mark of the generally approved 
occasion of the letter. That is to say, the situation in Galatia is constructed on the 
selfsame basis as the conflict. 
Within the confines set by the assumed situation in Galatia, opponent hypotheses 
are different configurations of the same historical components, differently inter-
. preted and differently assembled. The elements contributing to the received com-
municative context can be clearly analysed (and examined). It should be noted that 
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the debate operates at a particular leveI.45 Generally approved assumptions include 
the notion that the Pauline movement had already seceded from first-century 
Judaism (read normative Jwlaism) and that, within the Jesus movement itself, the 
Pauline movement represented a very specific group - the Hellenistic (Gentile) 
wing as opposed to a more Jewish wing. 
Fourthly, it seems as though the history-of-ideas approach ensures a remarkable 
unanimity with regard to the nature of the conflict: a theological or doctrinal conflict 
. caused by conflicting definitions of aspects such as circumcision and membership of 
the people of God. Unwarranted elements such as social, political or personal 
aspects are ruled out beforehand. The conflict is seen as an intra-Christian dispute 
between proponents of rival theological positions on the spectrum of early Christian 
views. Jewish Christians were opposed to Gentile or Hellenistic Christians, of whom 
Paul was one. 
Fifthly, what is absent from the assumptions about the communicative context is just 
as significant as what is part of it. Events, groups and social realities are described 
without taking cognisance of the social conditions and socio-cultural setting of the 
first-century Mediterranean world. An important step would be to situate the con-
flicts, with their theological or doctrinal components, within the religious and social 
network of the first-century world. 
Finally, in this whole process the consequences of accepting uncritically Paul's per-
spective on the events and conflict should not be underestimated. He himself 
provides the interpretive agenda in that his view on the conflict is taken at face 
value without being interpreted within the plausible socio-cultural setting in which 
·he operated. This is especially noteworthy on the premise that we know nothing 
about the context apart from what Paul says. On the contrary, the received com-
municative context (which usually functions implicitly) is tacitly assumed in most 
interpretations of the letter. 
7 SOME CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECfS 
Scholarly viewpoints on the nature of the conflict in Galatia are, it seems, largely 
determined by assumptions about the occasion of the letter, which in turn result 
from the history-of-ideas approach together with historical assumptions on the situa-
tion in Galatia. Starting off as they did from assumptions that the conflict was 
45 Circumcision marked final entry into the Jewish community, while God-fearers were that group 
of Gentiles who were attracted to 'the synagogue in order to hear more about the celebrated 
monotheism of the Jews' (Harvey 1968:323). God-fearers were those, according to Barclay, who were 
'attracted to Jewish practices and Jewish theology' (1988:57). Concepts such as Judaism, Christianity, 
Jewish Christianity, membership of these entities, and circumcision as a universal identity marker are an 
indication of the level at which the debate took place. These are all concepts divorced from the social 
· realm and firmly part of the realm of ideas. 
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primarily constituted by conflicting convictions between different groups in the early 
Jesus movement, it is no wonder that opponent hypotheses as a cypher key mostly 
disregard social and cultural factors. 
By way of pointing the direction to an alternative cypher key, two issues will briefly 
be mentioned: firstly, the need to focus on the nature of the conflict and, secondly, 
to bring into play (in the debate on the occasion of the letter) the fact that the letter 
to the Galatians is first and foremost a first-century document. 
7.1 (Re)defining the nature of the conflict: a central question in Galatian studies 
Not only the methodological but also the historical components associated with 
opponent hypotheses need to be reconsidered. Suffice it to say that the doubts cast 
·on the history-of-ideas approach go hand in hand with an examination of the his-
torical assumptions mentioned in previous sections. Meeks, for example, says it is 
time 
that we took seriously the well-known fact that most of the New 
Testament documents, including the Pauline Epistles that have pro-
vided the central motifs of Protestant theology, were immediately 
addressed to problems of behavior within the communities. 
(1986a:185) 
Taking the communicative context seriously has consequences at both the meth-
odological and the historical level. Was Paul's major concern in writing the letter to 
the Galatians really their theological differences, or is it only from a contemporary 
point of view (in the interest of theological purity and dogmatic certainty) that his 
letter is read in that way? Is Paul not seen too much as a modern pastor or 
theologian or, in the words of Schoeps, 'a fully matured professor of theology' 
(1969:2) defending his faith and ideas with regard to theological issues against 
others (the sects and Roman Catholics)? Answers to such questions have to address 
the methodological as well as the historical assumptions in the received view, but 
they must also be explicit about the assumptions of the alternative view. 
To be sure, the intention is not to argue that Paul did not have a peculiar message 
or theological idea he wanted to convey. As a matter of fact, what Paul said is still 
the prime focus of any interpretation of his letters in a first-century Mediterranean 
communicative context. The point is that his message can hardly be determined 
unless his letters are interpreted historically. To repeat a 'provocative statement' of 
Scroggs: 'the historical understanding of theological and ethical affirmations is not 
completely achieved until the social reality of those making such affirmations is 
comprehended and brought to light' (1986:138). If it is _true thaf '[l]ike every other 
aspect of culture, the meaning of theological ideas is determined contextually' 
(LaFargue 1988h:5), then Holmberg is right in saying that 'no serious theological 
discussion can in the long run do without the connection with reality that is 
mediated by historical investigation' (1978:1). A rejection of the history-of-ideas 
approach, together with an examination of the historical assumptions of the received 
view, should be seen in this light. 
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· On the methodological side, the deficiencies of both the mirror reading method and 
the history-of-ideas approach to historical interpretation have been pointed out. 
Given an a-historical aim of interpretation represented by several attitudes and 
assumptions about historical interpretation, it will be argued that a social-scientific 
approach to the interpretation of the letter to the Galatians can provide an alterna-
tive cypher key. In terms of a consistent historical aim of interpretation, the dif-
ferences between this and contemporary opponent hypotheses, especially literary 
approaches, to this text will become apparent.46 
7.2 Paul's letter to the Galatians as a first-century document 
A second and related aspect which to my mind should be taken seriously, is that 
Paul's letters stem from a first-century world which differs in most aspects from our 
own world. Paul's world differs from our own and, in the words of Roetzel, '[t]o get 
the full force of Paul's remarks we need to know what brought them on, but we can 
only hope to do that by first getting an understanding of his correspondents' world 
view' (1982:20). The fact that the letter to the Galatians presents us with a cross-
. cultural and historical communicative event to be interpreted in a modern Western 
or even third-world African society implies that we should at least consider the pos-
sible effects of such a cultural and historical distance between the text and any other 
situation. 
This point is well made by LaFargue when he says: 
"God" exercises a dominant influence on the meaning of everything in 
Paul's life-world, but the essential content that "God" has for Paul is 
itself determined by the totality of other elements in that world. This 
God cannot then be placed in another cultural world, such as the 
medieval or modern one, and remain self-identical. 
(1988a:349) 
The selfsame principle applies to the possible conflicts, their nature and causes, 
reflected in the letter to the Galatians. If this principle is granted, modern inter-
preters have little choice but to attempt, as effectively as possible, to enter the frame 
of reference and the meaningful experiential world of the original recipients. The 
alternative, as will be argued, is to be satisfied with anachronistic and ethnocentric 
interpretations of the first-century Mediterranean world. Thus one of the aims will 
46 Although the communicative context of any text is extremely wide-ranging, only some of the 
often neglected aspects regarding Paul's communicative context will be discussed. Such relevance has 
to be argued: it cannot be assumed. It should furthermore be noted that despite the outcry for an 
explicit statement of assumptions in research, it remains a problem that many of the assumptions to be 
discussed have to be unearthed from scholarly arguments by means of implicit remarks and general 
attitudes. It should be granted that it is impossible to bring all assumptions into the open; but when 
they fundamentally prejudice research, as is believed to be the case with opponent hypotheses, they 
need to be raised to a conscious level for examination and evaluation. 
38 
be to determine, as well as possible, the original communicative context and com-
munication event between Paul and the Galatians. 
This historical aim of interpretation admittedly says nothing about either the pos-
sibility or the means to reach it. In this regard I fully agree with Vorster (see 
1977:21) when he says, regarding the letters in the New Testament, that communica-
tion was possible only if there was a shared experience of meaning, frame of 
reference, and relevance. These letters can continue to communicate if con-
temporary readers are willing to build up the experience of meaning necessary to an 
understanding of those letters and to adapt to the author's frame of reference. This 
study is an attempt to add some flesh to the bones by critically testing the com-
municative context and experimentally proposing some alternative. 
However, I have a fundamental disagreement with his final qualification- that 
today such a frame of reference can in most instances be deduced only from the text 
itself. This remark is true only as a second step or at a secondary level. In part it is 
· this assumption, in a variety of disguises, which to my mind prevents research from 
grasping the communicative context in its entirety. One version (that of Cosgrove) 
reads: 'Not a reconstruction of the historical situation at Galatia but a reconstruc-
tion of the epistolary perspective on that situation comprises the prerequisite for 
interpreting the letter' (1988:16). The (methodological) reasons for this disagree-
ment should become abundantly clear in the next chapter. What is called for is not 
, only a foundation of interpretation as a historical enterprise but also a proposal on 
how to bridge the gap between the first-century and twentieth-century world. In 
doing so, most of the methodological issues touched upon in this chapter will be 
dealt with. 
CHAYfER2 
SOCIAl.rSCIENTIFIC INlERPRETATION: THE QUEST FOR IDSTORICAL 
SCH01ARSHIP 
In deliberate reaction to the unavoidable reduc-
tionism and anachronism of theologically oriented 
scholarship, the new social approach aims to be con-
sistently historical and descriptively holistic. 
(Stowers 1985:149) 
1 ME1HODOLOGICAL CONFIGURATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 
It has been stated that the objective of this study is a critical evaluation of opponent 
hypotheses as a cypher key and the search for an alternative key to Paul's letter to 
the Galatians. It is in no way an attempt to provide an alternative suggestion as to 
the identity of the opponents or their theological position but only a suggested alter-
native approach to the problem of interpreting the letter as such. While the his-
torical components of the cypher key will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the 
focus in this chapter (and the following one) will be on the methodological com-
ponents and configuration of the cypher key. Thus it is not only a set of alternative 
historical assumptions that is at stake but an altogether different attitude toward 
texts, context, meaning and, ultimately, the interpretation of the letter to the 
Galatians as such. 
While the main objective of this chapter is to present a social-scientific methodology 
(some of the components have already been mentioned) which underlies this study, 
it should be kept in mind that the presentation of a methodology has the character 
·of a post-mortem rather than of a premedical examination. From the analytical 
(post-mortem) angle, the exposition of one's methodology means taking apart and 
analysing the components of what used to function as a living organism. It means 
explaining and justifying (in the sense of explaining how and why a certain position 
has been reached and held, not of telling right from wrong) the particular configura-
tion of components, at a philosophical as well as an epistemological level, that is 
taken for granted in a study. From a reader's perspective, a methodological exposi-
tion functions as a mental map, an aid to a more meaningful understanding of the 
interpretation. More often than not a methodology functions covertly rather than 
overtly in determining interpretive choices and critical and evaluative remarks, and 
in directing a scholar's arguments. Hopefully the methodological discussion will 
enable the reader to keep track of the (covert) social-scientific methodology 
underlying this study. 
The distinction between methods and methodology (see chapter 1, § 1) turns out to 
be useful. Methodology has to do with the assumptions and principles underlying a 
study at a philosophical and epistemological level. Methods are like tools or techni-
ques that may be used for a variety of tasks. In theoretical jargon, methods may be 
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used in an almost infinite number of methodological configurations of values, 
assumptions, and principles.1 
The objective of this chapter can thus be stated more concretely: to set out explicitly 
the methodology, and some of its components, which underlies the social-scientific 
approach to be applied in this study. In doing so, several other methodological posi-
tions - or the spectrum of views on many of the components - will be introduced in 
such a way as to focus on the position taken in this study. This does not necessarily 
. mean that adverse positions will be misrepresented. 
As with the historical assumptions, the metaphor of a configuration2 will be used as 
an analytical tool to bring into the open the different elements constituting the 
social-scientific methodology3 to be followed. Regarding the philosophical com-
ponents, the philosophy-of-history position (history-of-ideas approach) has already 
been noted as a bone of contention in the search for an appropriate cypher key to 
the letter to the Galatians. What this study suggests is a social-scientific approach to 
the historical interpretation of the New Testament as opposed to both the history-
of-ideas approach and certain other views on historical interpretation identified in 
opponent hypotheses. Arguments on epistemological as well as philosophical levels 
will be used to justify a social-scientific approach as a historical aim-of-
interpretation activity. 
2 SOCIAlrSCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION: A HISTORICAL ENTERPRISE 
As early as 1947, Schubert warned that '[m]ore than any other special field of his-. 
torical study, New Testament research has always suffered from a curious inability 
·to be thoroughly historical in method and in aim' (1947:214). Those words seem to 
be even truer today than forty years ago. However, in the field of New Testament 
research (as in many other fields) historical interpretation is, to say the least, a 
prejudiced concept which is understood in many different ways. For that reason 
alone it is imperative not only to describe clearly what is meant by historical inter-
1 The very same tools may be used for a variety of tasks. Similarly, the same methods or models or, 
if you like, reading strategies (e.g. rhetorical analysis, speech act or reader-oriented approaches, 
approaches from the social sciences) may be used in a variety of methodological configurations. 
2 The advantages of this way of analysing and describing methodological positions will be discussed 
in the next chapter; but an advance awareness of some of the analytical advantages may be helpful in 
following the discussion. It can easily be demonstrated by means of the social-scientific approach. In 
itself, the use of the methods and models of the social sciences cannot guarantee any significant dif-
ference in interpretive results. Adopting different academic concepts and models of an existing aim-of-
interpretation position (epistemology) and philosophy-of-science position would not make much of a 
difference. The same argument applies to alternative views on aspects such as texts and interpretation. 
3 There is no unified social-scientific approach to the New Testament. The social-scientific 
approach referred to in this study consists of a particular configuration of methodological components. 
In that sense the social-scientific approach is used in this study to designate the particular definition of 
it as an interdisciplinary approach. 
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pretation in this study but also to indicate how it differs from some other notions of 
historical interpretation in New Testament studies. 
2.1 What is social-scientific interpretation? 
Social-scientific interpretation, in this study, is taken to be an interdisciplinary 
activity by historically-oriented social scientists. In the words of Stowers quoted in 
the epigraph to this chapter, it is a 'deliberate reaction to the unavoidable reduc- -
tionism and anachronism of theologically oriented scholarship' and aims 'to be con-
sistently historical and descriptively holistic' (1985:149). The aim of the approach, in 
other words, is to reduce 'socially anachronistic and ethnocentric reading' 
(Rohrbaugh 1987a:23) of New Testament texts and 'to achieve a more accurate and 
comprehensive understanding of the biblical documents and of the societies m 
which they emerged' (Elliott 1990h:6). 
Malherbe's analysis of hospitality in the first-century Mediterranean world (see 
1983:92-112) is a case in point, demonstrating some of the differences between the 
traditional (received) approach and this social-scientific approach.4 (It is further 
relevant in that hospitality is to be discussed as one of the historical components of 
the alternative cypher key.) Malina points out that 'Malherbe speaks of hospitality 
as though the meaning of the term were quite apparent to contemporary U.S. per-
sons who use the term largely to refer to the entertaining of relatives and friends' 
(1986C:178). The main difficulties with Malherbe's historical interpretation are, fir-
stly, the implicit use of contemporary social science models and, secondly, superfi-
cial psychology5 or disregard of the rules of hospitality in the first-century Mediter-
ranean world (see Malina 1986c:l79-180). 
On the other hand, two features of a social-scientific interpretation as historical 
. interpretation stand out pertinently. The first is the explicit objective of utilising the 
social sciences in a historical enterprise; the second is a commitment to respect 
cultural/historical differences which can be described as the ideal of understanding 
other cultures or historical eras from within. 
4 I have dealt with this matter elsewhere, defining the social-scientific approach as an inter-
disciplinary approach (see Craffert 1991). For that reason the detailed discussion will not be repeated 
here. It should be noted that at least four different moulds of interaction between history and the social 
sciences are identified - each resulting in a different philosophy of history. Of the four moulds 
identified (see 1991:128-129), Malherbe's position is closest to that of traditional historians who are 
hostile to social theory and who use concepts and models from the social sciences in a more or less 
unconscious and implicit way. 
5 This refers to the assumption in many New Testament studies that persons in the first-century 
Mediterranean world were very similar to contemporary Western persons. Their actions and reactions 
are evaluated in terms of a knowledge of people in industrial W estem individualistic societies (see 
Malina 1981:51ff; Rohrbaugh 1981':118 n 30). 
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2.1.1 Social-scientific interpretation as interdisciplinary research 
Defined as an interdisciplinary approach, social-scientific interpretation needs to be 
distinguished not only from historical interpretation as it is understood in the 
received view on New Testament science (traditional historical criticism) but also 
from the ahistorical interpretation of literary and reader-oriented approaches (see 
Malina 1986c: 173) and even from other definitions of social-scientific interpretation 
(see Craffert 1991). Despite the differences, certain features of historical interpreta-
tion shared by these views are, from the social-scientific point of view, found to be 
insufficient or inappropriate in one way or another for historical interpretation. 
The social-scientific approach is characterised by the development in historical 
research known as new history and the parallel development in the social sciences: 
referred to in sociology, for example, as historical sociology and in anthropology as 
'interpretive anthropology' (Marcus & Fisher 1986:32). Both movements are 
marked by the removal of the antithetical relationship between history and the 
social sciences, the development of a philosophy of history which acknowledges the 
unity between history and the social sciences, and a philosophy of the social sciences 
which admits a perspective of change and contingency. 
Different philosophies of history, some traditional, others interdisciplinary, compete 
for supporters.6 What we are beginning to see in the social sciences, history 
included, 
is a rigorous combination of the sociologist's acute sense of structure 
and generalities with the historian's sharp sense of change and 
uniqueness. Attempts which take the two-sidedness - human beings as 
creators and creatures, makers and prisoners - seriously. 
(Craffert 1991:139) 
All interpreters use models. 'Human perception is selective, limited, culture-bound 
and prone to be unaware that it is any or all of the above' (Rohrbaugh 1987a:23); 
perception is always by means of cognitive filtering and by the use of cognitive maps 
(see Carney 1975:1-4; Elliott 1986:6). Against the received view in biblical scholar-
ship, the position of most practitioners of the social-scientific approach is significant 
in two respects. On the one hand it demands the explicit and conscious use of 
models as against the implicit and unconscious use of them, and on the other hand 
the use of accepted social-scientific models as against intuitive or common-sense 
models. 
6 In the course of this chapter, the effect of the different philosophies of history will be spelled out 
in more detail. It will also become apparent that different philosophies of history affect the historical 
components of a cypher key. Thus this discussion is as essential to an understanding of the meth-
odological component as it is to an appreciation of the historical components. 
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It follows logically from the assumption on the omnipresent nature of models or 
cognitive maps in human perception that if social-scientific models are not used, 
humans rely on common-sense models - that is, the accepted wisdom of their group 
in understanding, arranging and categorising (see Camey 1975:3). So many opinions 
and decisions are involved in scientific enquiry that 'we cannot possibly support 
them all with personally examined evidence... "Good reasons" presuppose expert 
authority' (Botha 1990b:66). However, a social-science model is not different in kind 
from a common-sense model - 'it is simply more general in form, more consistent 
internally (at least in appearance), and hence better able to support a process of 
scientific or quasi-scientific deduction and testing' (Humphreys 1980: 17). Models 
may therefore be seen as particularised contexts (see Craffert 1992:8). 
2.1.2 Social-scientific interpretation as understanding from within 
The social-scientific approach to be applied in this study also rules out the ahistori-
cal aim of interpretation in many New Testament studies. Stated positively, its aim is 
to be consistently historical. 
In a negative sense the object of understanding.from within 7 is to avoid the tendency 
to perceive ancient (or foreign) texts, distant historical eras or alien cultures as 
though they are very similar (commensurable) to that of the interpreter. The 
tendency, in fact (unless an interpreter explicitly and consciously tries to avoid it) is 
to see them in terms of one's own perception of the pre-understood subject matter 
(see Rohrbaugh 1978:24). 
2.2 Conceptions of historical interpretation in New Testament research 
Many scholars today still regard historical criticism as the dominant approach in 
New Testament research8 (see Malina 1986c:171-173; Schneiders 1982:57; WS Vor-
ster 1991:18), and indeed the major approach not only to historical interpretation in 
general but also to research on Paul's opponents. However, it is being rejected by 
many others as inadequate 'to its aims and claims, i.e. to interpret texts historicatly' 
(Malina 1986C:172). If Krentz (see 1975:33-54) can be trusted with regard to the 
goals and aims of the historical-critical approach, then the social-scientific approach 
(which is one of the main objectors) does not reject the aims of historical criticism 
but rather tries to complement it. Krentz says: 
We can thus expand our description to say that hearing texts on their 
own terms is not only the first, but even the "fundamental act of all 
7 As a theoretical issue, understandingfrom within will be discussed later in this chapter (see§ 6.2). 
8 In New Testament research the received view for the past fifty years can broadly speaking be 
described as a literary and theological enterprise where ideology (theology) and the history of ideas 
· dominated and history and the concrete social history, not to mention the social and cultural matrix 
within which those texts were produced, were almost totally neglected (see Holmberg 1990:1-3; Meeks 
1983:1-5; Scroggs 1980; Malina 1986c:172). 
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textual interpretation". It is the essential basis for all other use of the 
text, both in historical scholarship and in the proclamatory mission of 
the church. 
(Krentz 1975:41) 
However, in specifying such aims it often turns out to be inadequate as a historical 
interpretation. 
From the point of view of the social-scientific approach, several definitions of his-
torical interpretation in New Testament studies are unacceptable. Without present-
ing any of them in detail, I intend to indicate the most common elements of the 
received tradition of historical interpretation (appearing in a variety of configura-
tions). 
The first element has already been mentioned as a history-of-ideas approach where 
ideas are dealt with as though they are unrelated to concrete socio-cultural realities 
and conventions. A second element is expressed by Cosgrove amongst others (see 
1988:21), who maintains that every interpreter who reads the text in Greek is 
engaged in a historical-critical understanding of the letter. His argument (that over 
and above the particular occasion of the letter, the interpreter brings to the text a 
pre-understanding of the language) presupposes that such knowledge is sufficient to 
designate it as a historical interpretation. A final element can be mentioned, namely 
the role of background information and the justification of historical interpretation 
in New Testament studies. In defining historical interpretation as a social-scientific 
enterprise, all three of these elements will be addressed in one way or another. To 
give an indication of the issues at stake, the notion of background studies and the 
argument that reading a Greek text justifies a historical interpretation will be men-
tioned shortly. 
2.2.1 Historical interpretation and background studies 
. Closely related to the history-of-ideas approach, the best expression of the nature of 
historical interpretation in New Testament research is to be found in a recognition 
of the value of background information - hence the subdiscipline, New Testament 
background (see Marshall 1979:12; Herzog 1983:106; Meyers & Strange 1981:23). 
The function of New Testament background is to promote a better understanding of 
the theological or ethical statements of the texts. 
The merit of background studies is stated in the justification of a historical inter-
pretation of the New Testament. Background information is useful in settling diffi-
cult or obscure passages in ancient texts. Malherbe, for example, maintains that the 
early Christian communities 
themselves came into existence in response to preaching, and social 
factors no doubt contributed to that response ... The social character 
of the communities does appear, in some cases, to have contributed to 
the conditions that called forth the documents and does enable us to 
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grasp more firmly the intention of those documents. It is therefore of 
the utmost importance that we know as much as we can about them in 
order to understand the issues under discussion. 
(1983:11-12) 
Much the same justification for historical interpretation is to be found in WS Vor-
ster's argument that the very nature of the New Testament writings makes historical 
interpretation inevitable and necessary (see 1991:15). However, historical inter-
pretation based primarily on the nature of the subject matter does not in itself 
reveal anything about the nature of the historical interpretation as such. Since the 
contrary is not argued (for New Testament studies), the suspicion cannot be avoided 
that what is at stake here is an endorsement of the received view (namely, that back-
ground information is helpful but not essential). 
In short, historical (background) information, it is maintained, promotes a better 
understanding of the theological or ethical statements in texts. From a historical 
aim-of-interpretation position, however, texts are not understood better by using or 
referring to the background; they are understood by means of it. Background 
information is needed not to understand texts better but to understand them at all 
(see Elliott 1990h:2). Unless we have an idea of how the first-century world worked, 
says Malina, we shall misunderstand the ideas in their texts (see 1986d:92; 1987). 
Scroggs insists that the theological and ethical statements which cover virtually the 
whole of the New Testament can only be fully understood if one understands the 
social reality which gave rise to them (see 1986:138). Then a totally different picture 
of background information emerges: it is not helpful as background but essential as 
feeding ground. The main difference between historical information as background 
and as feeding ground lies in the definitions of the nature of historical interpreta-
tion. Each is characterised by a particular way of defining the problem of other cul-
tures and a particular way of dealing with other cultures. 
2.2.2 Greek texts and historical interpretation 
The notion that reading a text in Greek counts as a historical interpretation is 
widespread in New Testament exegesis. In a sense it is obviously true. However, 
without an accompanying historical aim of interpretation it is all too easy to negate 
the otherness of the Greek text and the cultural system from which it came. Even 
foreign texts, alien cultures or distant historical eras can be dealt with without recog-
nising their differentness. 
The social-scientific approach to the problem of other cultures is characterised fir-
stly, by the commitment to uphold the otherness of cultures and historical eras and 
secondly by the aim of adhering to the canons of historical scholarship. The received 
views lack both features which are regarded as essential to the social-scientific 
approach. 
These differences call for a further examination of the relevant philosophies of his-
torical interpretation. 
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3 THE AIM OF INTERPRETATION: HISTORICAL OR NONHISTORICAL? 
Brett draws attention to the fact that 'any talk about method should be preceded by 
an analysis of interpretive interest' (1990:357). The question of method can indeed 
be explored fruitfully only when the prior discussion on interpretive interests has 
reached some clarity. However, interpretive interests are not neutral, ad hoc choices 
which can be decided on the spur of the moment. They function within the sphere of 
particular theories and philosophies of science which are inherent in and constitu-
tive of interpretive interest, and they express core assumptions about views on 
reality. Any consideration of interpretive interests should thus be preceded and 
accompanied by an analysis of these philosophical aspects, without which all discus-
sion on the levels of method and interpretive interests can be of little value. In 
explicit terms, then, interpretive interests are subject to and fundamentally 
determined by the aim of interpretation, which is a basic philosophical orientation 
towards interpretation. 
At least two overarching aims of interpretation can be identified, the historical and 
the nonhistorical, and both consist of core assumptions and values. Thus, what Brett 
refers to as interpretive interests will, in this study, be distinguished from the aim of 
interpretation, which is a related but rather different matter. In other words, inter-
pretive interests have their place within the parameters set by particular aim-of-
interpretation positions. 
An identical argument can be developed from at least two different perspectives (or, 
if you will, from the angle of two different academic disciplines) to illustrate the 
spectrum of theories, values, and attitudes (philosophies of science) which underlie 
particular aims of interpretation. The first is studies in literature; the second, inter-
pretation in the social sciences. 9 In both instances it will be restricted to two 
antithetical positions which consist of different beliefs, values and commitments, dif-
ferent orientations and attitudes. 
9 Because the New Testament evidence is literary and originates from a foreign culture and a long-
past historical era, arguments in New Testament research commonly arise both from literary studies 
and from the social sciences. Since arguments, models and insights from both these fields will be used 
and critically examined in this study, it is important to open the discussion by including both fields in 
the metatheoretical discussion. It goes without saying that at the metatheoretical level the same inter-
pretive issues haunt academic discussions in both fields. Strictly speaking, what is to be presented as the 
social sciences consists in not one but several academic disciplines. However, at the level of theories 
and philosophies of science they can, broadly speaking, be treated as a unity. From an interdisciplinary 
point of view the division into different academic disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology, is a 
matter of practice and not of principle. Janssen points out that the same antithesis exists when writing 
the history of political thought (see 1985:116). 
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.3.1 Studies in literature 
Although not all his descriptions will find equal support in this study, a rather 
extensive quotation from Barton will exemplify the two orientations to be con-
sidered. He points out that 
any critical judgments one may make on a literary work or on a bibli-
cal text must be either historical or non-historical in character. There 
is no middle way. To opt for the non-historical alternative means that 
all suggestions about the text's meaning are to be justified in terms of 
features within the text as read by a modem reader; questions of the 
author's intention, even of the author's possible intention, are 
irrelevant. Such a reading can never coherently be charged with 
anachronism, since it is not making historical proposals about how the 
text could have been understood when it was written: it is asking 
about its coherence as it stands. To opt, on the other hand, for the his-
torical alternative is to be committed to asking questions about what 
the author or authors of the text meant it to mean; to be interested in 
the quest for the ipsissima verba; to seek out possible information 
about the literary conventions of the author's day .... 
(1987:138) 
Like Barton, Hirsch distinguishes between a 'historical, a posteriori approach' and a 
'nonhistorical, a priori approach' to the interpretation of texts (1984a:91). In the first 
instance, he argues, an allocratic norm is used when interpreting a text and in the 
second an autocratic norm (see 1982:240). 
Under the autocratic norm, authority resides in the reader, while 
under the allocratic norm, the reader delegates authority to the 
reconstructed historical act of another person or community. 
(Hirsch 1982:241) 
Fundamental to this distinction is the assumption (to be considered later) of 'no 
meaning without an author of meaning' (Hirsch 1984a:90).10 The meaning of a text is 
construed by a reader, but the norm applied by a reader remains at issue. Several 
keys can be applied successfully to a particular text, but the ultimate question con-
cerns the locus of authority. To the Humpty-Dumpty question, 'Who shall be the 
master?' only two answers are possible in textual interpretation: the reader's norm or 
the writer's norm (see Hirsch 1982:238-239; 1984a:91; 1985b:17). At the outset it 
·should be stated very clearly that the choice is not between an author and a reader; 
it is a matter of whose norm or authority, the author's or the reader's, is given 
priority by the reader. Is the cypher key that of the reader, or is it one used by the 
10 The notion of the author's intention is contentious and, to say the least, a concept widely familiar 
but understood in many different ways. It will be avoided as far as possible. To escape confusion, it will 
suffice to say that in this study it is understood as a synonym for the historical meaning of a text (e.g. 
Hirsch 1976:6, 1983:746; Skinner 1988:232). 
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reader but resting on an interpretive authority that lies in the past or in another cul-
ture? 
Assuming for the moment that it is possible to choose a cypher key from an alien or 
distant culture or era, and that such a key can be applied with a certain amount of 
accuracy, interpretation in the historical vein has a very particular structure and 
character which differs from that of the nonhistorical one. Some of the differences 
have been pointed out in the lengthy quotation from Barton. In a strict sense, an 
interpretation which rests on the autocratic norm of the reader cannot be 
anachronistic. In other words, autocratic interpretations resting on the reader's 
norm, are always right; they cannot be called right or wrong, since they offer no 
external standard in respect of which they could be either one or the other.11 
Allocratic interpretations, on the other hand, can in principle be revised because the 
norm of interpretation lies in another culture or era. Interpretations following the 
allocratic norm might be subjected to historical discipline (testing) and critical scru-
tiny. They are 'revisable ex post facto on the basis of changing theories and evidence 
about a determinative historical event' (Hirsch 1982:242). Allocratic interpretations 
are thus the only sort which can in principle be right or wrong (see Hirsch 1982:244; 
Morgan 1988:11) . 
. The difference, in short, seems to be the construction of the historical approach and 
its explicit appeal to an interpretive norm which is not that of the present reader. It 
can be that of any person or era in the past.12 Given an allocratic norm, the 
inevitable demand is to explicate and argue one's cypher key. 
3.2 Interpretation in the social sciences 
It is important to note that, structurally, the problem is much the same whether we 
are trying to interpret a literary text, an alien culture or a historical event. Anything 
handed down to us which elicits the need for understanding partakes of the tension 
11 As an embodiment of the values and attitudes of the nonhistorical approach, the position 
occupied by poststructural critics on historical interpretation is that they can never be right, since there 
are no 'correct interpretations' (see Abrams 1977:427). If there is only a ceaseless play of anomalous 
meaning, full of 'indeterminable', 'undecipherable', 'unreadable', and 'undecidable' misreadings (see 
Abrams 1977:433), then deconstructive criticism cannot fail: there is no 'complex passage of verse or 
prose which could possibly serve as a counter-instance to test its validity or limits' (Abrams 1977:435). 
12 An example from a poker game illustrates the principles very clearly. The dealer could decide on 
a sub-code for playing the game, and that could be his/her reasoned or preferred key for the game. 
·Suppose, however, the dealer says that the club's founder wanted them to follow a certain sub-code. To 
follow that sub-code they would have to determine it. The point Hirsch wishes to make with this exam-
ple is that in the latter case 'it is not the dealer's reasoned preference for a sub-code that governs the 
decision, but rather his principle for a way of choosing principles' (19843 :91). In practice it makes a sig-
nificant difference: 'nothing less than the difference between a nonhistorical, a priori approach to inter-
pretation, and an historical, a posteriori approach to interpretation' (19843 :91). 
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between strangeness or alienness and familiarity (see Bernstein 1983:28, 141; 
Hernadi 1988:753). The basic problem we have to deal with, in anthropological 
terms, is the temptation to read into or project our own standards and concepts onto 
what is being studied, or, on the other hand, to 'go native' (see Bernstein 1983:93-
. 94). Meaning realised in language, says Malina (1986C:190), 'is rooted in a social 
system. Hence to derive meaning in some articulate way, one must somehow have 
recourse to a social system, either one's own or that of the informants' (italics mine). 
Several types of social theories have been developed in answer to this problem. 
Powell identifies three types of social theories: naturalist theories, deep structure 
social theories, and anti-necessitarian viewpoints (see 1989:28-31). Stowers prefers 
three positions, namely fu.nctionalism, strict intentionalism, and mediationism (see 
1985:152-154), while Haralambos (see 1980:18) distinguishes betweenpositivism and 
phenomenology. Although they do not share the same terms, or even concepts from 
the same conceptual spheres, broadly speaking these descriptions tend to describe 
the same categories. The alternatives are a science generated by historical concerns 
or one generated by nonhistorical concerns.13 
Different theories of science are at issue. Broadly speaking, the alternatives are 
between an experimental science close to the natural sciences, in search of law-like 
explanations (the nonhistorical approach), or on the other hand (the historical 
approach) an interpretive science in search of meaning and the illumination of con-
. text (see Geertz 1973:5; Holmberg 1990:12). At each pole two sides of the same 
coin will illuminate the assumptions and values of each position. 
At the nonhistorical end, commensurability between different (even alien) cultures 
is presupposed. It is further assumed that 'all societies share a commensurable 
underlying "hidden teleology" of functions' (Stowers 1985: 155-156). The same point 
is argued by Powell. A great deal of modern social science is naturalistic in that it 
rests on the assumption that 'there are inherent or necessary structures to human 
13 In a recent study I have argued this issue in more detail (see Craffert 1992:2-7). Rather than 
identifying three positions in a linear order, I see the debate as a struggle at the antipositivist end, 
where a variety of positions can be identified of which a historical and a nonhistorical position form the 
extremes of a continuum which runs vertically at the antipositivist end of the horizontal spectrum. The 
positions on the second continuum are all in some way a reaction to the positivist position they wish to 
supersede, but by the same token they are related to it. 
Rather than: 
positivism - - mediationism - - anti-positivism 
my suggestion is: 
historical 
I 




nature and social life' (1989:28). His second category, deep structure social theories 
such as conflict theories (Marxism) 'are fatally flawed at the very beginning by their 
. failure to carry out consistently the rejection of naturalism' (1989:29). Anti-
necessitarian theories, on the other hand, reject the idea of laws and 'invariant 
sequences or unavoidable structures to social life' (1989:30). 
The reverse side of the nonhistorical coin is reflected in the assumption, maintained 
by most functionalist sociologists (see Holmberg 1990:140; Stowers 1985:152; 
Saldarini 1988:19), that social phenomena can be analysed quite independently of 
the beliefs of the actors. The implication is that the interpreter's model and not the 
participants' point of view is dominant. Ignoring the intersubjective meanings of 
participants - that is, interpreting all other societies in the categories of one's own -
can only be disastrous to a comparative science (see Taylor 1977:125). 
At the other pole there is the historical approach with the general aim of 
understanding other societies from within.14 Contrary to the idea that social 
phenomena and societies can be analysed independently of the beliefs of the actors, 
social scientists have increasingly come to realise that 'any explanation which 
involves conceptions of structured social relations, has to be grounded empirically in 
knowledge of what different structural locations and relations actually meant to 
. those assigned to them' (Abrams 1982:211). One central fact that anthropologists 
have discovered is that 'people lead meaningful lives' and 'these meanings can only 
be discovered within the context of those lives' (Cohn 1980:201). Thus, if one's aim 
is to reduce anachronistic and ethnocentric interpretations, the ideal of understand-
ing these meanings.from within increasingly becomes an imperative. Unless we begin 
by characterising a society or culture in its own terms, says Macintyre, 'we shall be 
unable to identify the matter that requires explanation' (1971:223; see also Skocpol 
1984:368; Geertz 1973:14, 18; Mommsen 1978:21). 
While the nonhistorical approach treats social reality as a system, hence as a thing, 
the historical approach postulates that to 'treat social reality as anything other than 
a construction of meanings is to distort it' (Haralambos 1980:498 and see Stowers 
1985:153-155). The interpretive tum, Rabinow and Sullivan says, 'refocuses attention 
on the concrete varieties of cultural meaning, in their particularity and complex tex-
ture, but without falling into the traps of historicism and cultural relativism in their 
classical forms' (1979b:4).15 The explanatory power of the anti-necessitarian type of 
14 Burke adds that sociologists 'who concern themselves with the actor's point of view, whether they 
call themselves "phenomenologists", "symbolic interactionists", or whatever, are much closer than the 
functionalists to historians who have never ceased trying to look at the past through the eyes of con-
temporaries' (1980:28-29). 
15 In the words of Marcus and Fischer: 'The authority of "grand theory'' styles seems suspended for 
the moment in favor of a close consideration of such issues as contextuality, the meaning of social life 
to those who enact it, and the explanation of exceptions and indeterminants rather than regularities in 
phenomena observed - all issues that make problematic what were taken for granted as facts or 
certainties on which the validity of paradigms had rested' (1986:8). 
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theory identified by Unger 'comes from its capacity to render comprehensive con-
tingency and change rather than to fit a particular society into a general framework' 
(Powell 1989:30). 
When compatibility and commensurability between phenomena are not assumed, 
. the alternatives are to go native16 (see Bernstein 1983:93-94) or adopt an interpre-
tive stance where compatibility and commensurability are not assumed but 
demonstrated (see Janssen 1985:119). 
3.3 Interpretation as communication or as exploitation 
The same tendency is apparent in studies in the social sciences and in literary 
studies, namely the fundamental difference between studies with a historical or a 
nonhistorical aim of interpretation. Broadly speaking, two sets of values and 
assumptions with regard to interpretation can be identified. The assumption of com-
mensurability between cultures and the neglect of the intersubjective meanings of 
another era or culture are two of the main features of the nonhistorical approach in 
literary studies and in the social sciences. The opposite is true of a historical aim of 
interpretation. 
The question, it seems, is not whether the reader or interpreter construes a text or 
text-analogue to mean something but rather the way in which it is done. Whose 
norm is taken as authoritative? Granting authority to the historical author, actor, or 
. native is to assign an allocratic norm to the cypher key. This aim of interpretation 
can be described in short as communicative: it is an attempt to interpret in two 
worlds at once. The term communicative approach is used to designate the aim of 
historical interpretation, if for no other reason than to indicate that interpretation is 
a two-way activity. In the words of LaCapra: 'A text is a network of resistances, and 
a dialogue is a two way affair; a good reader is also an attentive and patient listener' 
(1983:64). If the historicality (voice) of a text or text-analogue is not respected as 
something other than that of the interpreter, it cannot be heard. 
On the other hand, authority of interpretation can be ascribed to the need for con-
temporary relevance where the authority of interpretation resides with the inter-
preter. This can be described as an exploitative approach: the ideal is to make valu-
able that which comes down from the past (see Hirsch 198Sb:17). 
Incommensurability and the intersubjective meanings of others are sacrificed at the 
shrine of contemporary relevance. To assign all power of interpretation to the 
reader's solitary act of reading is to evade history; it is to fail to recognise how not 
only the reader but also the text is contextual (see Dean 1986:270). 
16 Obviously nothing forbids one to go native. However, anyone involved in teaching others cannot 
afford this choice (see Hanson & Martin 1973:205). 
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At the methodological level, which consists of philosophical and epistemological 
components, the differences between various definitions of historical interpretation 
seem to be sharply defined. A historical aim of interpretation within the confines of 
an interdisciplinary approach represents a different methodology. Commensurability 
is not assumed but demonstrated/argued, models are used explicitly and consciously 
as heuristic tools (not as iron matrixes) and the commitment to respect otherness is 
highly valued. However, the exact nature of such a methodology and especially the 
differences between a social-scientific and the received views of interpretation, 
should still be discussed in more detail (see § 6). 
Given the choice (both in literary studies and in studies in the social sciences) of 
either a historical or a nonhistorical aim of interpretation, three basic questions still 
need to be addressed. First, is a communicative approach possible in principle? Sec-
ondly, why should a historical aim of interpretation be preferred to a nonhistorical 
one? Thirdly, how is a social-scientific communicative approach to be conducted? 
4 IS A COMMUNICATIVE APPROACH POSSIBLE? 
What is called 'the problem of other cultures' is succinctly expressed by Hanson and 
Martin: 
The axiom of cultural difference leads us in conflicting directions. On 
the one hand it counsels internal understanding by sympathetic 
duplication in order to avoid ethnocentric distortion of other cultures; 
on the other hand it generates a barrage of arguments insisting that 
such internal understanding is impossible to achieve. 
(1973:194) 
To ask whether a communicative approach is possible in principle is to ask whether 
·it is reasonable to maintain the differentness of other cultures in view of the subjec-
tive nature of interpretation. 
In literary studies, few scholars deny that the interpreter can try to determine the 
historical meaning of a text. According to Hirsch, the actual questions are 'whether 
we should try' and 'whether we could succeed if we try' (Hirsch 1976:8). These ques-
tions are often met by two objections to a communicative approach: it is either seen 
as uninteresting and unimportant (e.g. Stout 1982:7) or else as ~ible to 
determine (e.g. Wellek and Warren 1956:148-149). The first objection will be dealt 
with in the next section (as one answer to the question of whether we should try to 
determine the historical meaning) while some of the philosophical issues involved in 
the second will be explored in this section. 
To be sure, the bone of contention is not whether it is possible to understand people 
or texts from another culture or era but whether interpretation is so contaminated 
by subjectivity that it is impossible to understand from within. Are all readings of 
texts and interpretation of cultures in the end merely subjectivistic; is a claim to the 
contrary an exercise in self-deception? Essentially it is a question of how to deal 
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with the acknowledgement of human subjectivity in view of the simultaneous experi-
ence of the otherness of texts or cultures. I am going to advocate a particular way of 
dealing with these issues.17 If understanding from within is not impossible, the way 
in which it can be approached will be dealt with shortly. 
4.1 The inescapability of historicity 
Gadamer argues that it is the naivety of so-called historicism to believe that a his-
torical object can be seen as though it is ontologically independent of the subject 
(see 1960:283). With reference to Heidegger, Gadamer sees being historical as 'a 
·mode of being for human Dasein' (Gadamer 1979a:132). Objectivity is an illusion. 
Historians are part of an unbroken chain through the past which addresses us (see 
Gadamer 1979a:145). Like understanding in general, the task of hermeneutics when 
considering a text demands not a method but 'a radical account of actual 
understanding' (Gadamer 1979a:150). According to Gadamer, the divide between 
past and present was part of the naivety of a historicism which did not take its own 
historicity seriously. 'Der Zeitenabstand ist daher nicht etwas, was iiberwunden wer-
den muB' (Gadamer 1960:281; and see Gadamer 1979a:155-156), but rather a living 
continuity, a tradition with a continuing effect. Therefore the meaning of a work is 
not determined or fixed by authorial intention but transcends the author's 
understanding (see Gadamer 1960:281; Ermarth 1981:188; Linge 1976:xvii). 
Because a text has a 'Wirkungsgeschichte' (Gadamer 1960:283) it presents the pos-
sibility of dialogue between the interpreter and the text. For that reason the inter-
preter is already part of the tradition (or Wirkungsgeschichte) of the text. The posi-
tion of the interpreter loses its present privileged nature and becomes a 'fluid and 
relative moment in the life of effective history' (Linge 1976:xix). By a process of 
. fusion of horizons, understanding becomes possible; 'Vielmehr ist Verstehen immer 
der Vorgang der Verschmelzung solcher vermeintlich fiir sich seiender Horizonte' 
(Gadamer 1960:289). Meaning is transferred in the process whereby the horizons of 
interpreter and text are fused into a new understanding (see Linge 1976:xix; 
Bernstein 1983:142-144). For Gadamer there are two separate horizons. Historical 
consciousness notes the difference between its own horizon and that of the tradition. 
The projection of the historical horizon is only a phase in the process of understand-
ing where the historical horizon is overtaken by our present horizon - not a placing 
of oneself within the former but a widening of one's own horizon to include it (see 
Gadamer 1960:289-290; Bleicher 1980:112; Schneiders 1982:61-62, 64). To 
Gadamer this means that understanding always implies a pre-understanding 'which 
is in tum pre-figured by the tradition in which the interpreter lives and which shapes 
his prejudices' (1979a:108). 
17 The two approaches identified in this study, historical and non-historical- represented by the 
positions of Hirsch and Gadamer respectively - should be appreciated as overstatements in order to 
clarify their differing emphases. 
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However, Gadamer is often accused of subjectivism (see Bernstein 1983:124). In his 
·attempts to warn against objectivism, foundationalism, and some kind of 
Archimedean point outside our historical situation, he did not make it clear how the 
interpreter guard against relativism or subjectivism (see Bernstein 1983:155; 167-
169; Van Niekerk 1990:10-11). An instructive observation by Bernstein (who reads 
Gadamer quite sympathetically) is that Gadamer failed to make explicit his view 
that claims to truth must always be supported by argumentation. Interpretive claims 
need to be backed up by argument; '[f]or although all claims to truth are fallible and 
open to criticism, they still require validation - validation that can be realized only 
through offering the best reason and arguments that can be given in support of 
them' (Bernstein 1983:168). It is, however, Hirsch's criticism in particular that 
clearly spotlights Gadamer's neglect (and especially that of some of his followers) of 
the determinate aspect of texts and human action. 
In the first instance, conflict in interpretations is resolved by an appeal to tradition. 
'The determinate meaning of a text at a given point in time is what a present culture 
would generally take that meaning to be' (Hirsch 1967:250). Bernstein confirms that 
Gadamer's appeal to the truth of an interpretation 'amounts to what can be 
argumentatively validated by the community of interpreters who open themselves to 
what tradition "says to us'" (1983:154). 
Secondly, the meaning of a text is determined by a fusion of horizons; but how can a 
fusion take place 'unless the things to be fused are made actual, which is to say, 
unless the original sense of the text has been understood' (Hirsch 1967:254). 
Thirdly, to insist that people of different eras cannot understand each other (the 
past is ontologically alien to us) implies a denial of communication between con-
temporaries with different perspectives. 
Differences in culture are manifestations of this root possibility of dif-
ferences among men ... That is the real ontological gap - the one that 
subsists between persons, not the one that subsists between historical 
eras. If the former can be bridged, as Gadamer and Heidegger admit, 
then so can the latter. 
(Hirsch 1967:258) 
By emphasising the aspect of historicity, also in New Testament studies, the dated-
. ness or otherness of texts, cultures and historical eras is underplayed. 
4.2 Perspectivism and otherness 
Neither the historicist 'fallacy of the inscrutable past' (Hirsch 1976:39) nor the fal-
lacy of the 'homogeneous present-day perspective' needs to be accepted (see Hirsch 
1976:41). To admit that cultures often differ greatly is not to deny the possibility of 
understanding another culture from within. 'The distance between one culture and 
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another may not in every instance be bridgeable, but the same is true between per 
sons who inhabit the same culture' (Hirsch 1976:42). In principle then, the argument 
goes, the gap of understanding remains the same in respect of any other person in 
any time or place. The argument concerning perspectivism, and its influence on 
human perception and interpretation, explicates the dated or determined side of the 
·coin (see Hirsch 1976:44-49). 
As to the fact that every act of textual interpretation involves at least two perspec-
tives - that of the author/native and that of the interpreter, which are held 
simultaneously - Hirsch argues that one can no longer suppose that 'a meaning 
appears differently from different perspectives, but is compelled to concede the 
absolute impossibility of viewing meaning from different perspectives' (1976:48). 
How does he argue the case? 
He argues against 'perspectivists', that is, scholars who see validity of interpretation 
as 'entirely a function of the encounter between a text and one's inescapable cultural 
self (1976:45).18 Since each of us sees the world from a different perspective, we 
would each have to (mis)understand the other culture in our own way. But this is not 
entirely true. Two people standing even a few meters apart, looking at the same 
building, would see different things. But even if they were looking from different 
sides of the building, both would perceive (i.e. visually interpret) the same building: 
'Even if I see only one side of a building, I still know that it has other sides, and that 
the object of my perception is a whole building, not just the side that I see' 
· (1976:47). The first paradox, Hirsch points out - that of 'the intentionality of con-
sciousness' (1976:48) - is that although the two can agree that they see different 
things, they are equally correct in saying that they see the same thing. The implica-
tion is that perspective effects do not necessarily distort or relativise what is 
understood, or 'a diversity of perspectives does not necessarily compel a diversity of 
understood meanings' (1976:48). 
There is a second paradox of perspectivism. Perspectivists would do better to fall 
back on the Kantian argument that even if two people view the building from the 
identical physical perspective, they would still see different things because each sees 
the building in terms of his or her own categorical system. Every interpretation of 
verbal meaning is constituted by the categories in terms of which it is construed. 
18 Perspectivism in its classical form is the legacy of the Kantian insight 'that man's experience is 
preaccommodated to his categories of experience ... Kant postulated a universal structure in human 
subjectivity which constitutes experience, and which thereby guarantees the possibility of scientific 
knowledge. Dilthey and others extended the insight to domains of cultural experience and postulated 
. that, beyond this universal subjectivity, there exists a cultural subjectivity ... which are analogously con-
stitutive of all cultural experience' (Hirsch 1976:46). But if all interpretation is determined by the inter-
preter's cultural categories, how is understanding of other cultural categories possible? Dilthey's ans-
wer is that human beings are capable of grasping culturally alien meanings because they are able to 
accept culturally alien categories. Individuals can imagine themselves other than they are (see Hirsch 
1976:46-47). 
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However, unlike a physical object which stands there in some concrete form, verbal 
meaning does not exist as a object; it exists only in human consciousness. 'Apart 
from the categories through which it is construed, meaning can have no existence at 
all' (1976:48). The paradox then is that interpretive perspectivism as an extension of 
'the great Kantian insight on which it is ultimately based ... argues for the constitu-
tive nature of cultural categories' (1976:48). Hirsch thus concludes that the 'deepest 
significance' of perspectivism 'implies that verbal meaning exists only by virtue of 
the perspective which gives it existence' (1976:48). Verbal meaning can only exist 
from one perspective. In terms of this paradox, the perspectivist can no longer sup-
pose that a meaning appears differently from different perspectives but is compelled 
to concede the absolute impossibility of viewing meaning from different perspec-
tives. 
The point to be pressed home is that the experience of the otherness of texts, cul-
tures or historical eras adds a dimension to one's appreciation of the subjectivist 
nature of interpretation. If it is true that one's perception need not necessarily be 
merely subjectivistic, then understanding from within is possible in principle in the 
sense that otherness can be discovered. If the above argument holds, then a his-
torical aim of interpretation is not a delusion (in the sense that all interpretations 
are, in the end, disguised brands of merely subjective encounters with the other). 
4.3 Historicality: the datedness of texts, cultures, and historical eras 
One of the real differences between a communicative and an exploitative approach 
is the way in which they deal with datedness or hlstoricality. An apparent strength of 
exponents of the exploitative approach (certain interpretations of Gadamer, modern 
literary theorists following that line, and, I would add, social scientists working in the 
aftermath of functionalism and other grand theories) is that 'they make datedness a 
nonproblem' (Hirsch 1984h:216). 
Datedness, or the principle of historicality, can be expressed as follows: 
[A] historical event, that is to say, an original communicative event, 
can determine forever the permanent, unchanging features of mean-
ing ... Gadamer's historicity implies that meaning must change over 
time; but historicality maintains that meaning can stay the same if we 
choose to regard meaning as a historically determined object. 
(Hirsch 1984h:216) 
The principle of historicality denies the claim of historicity that a text can only be 
read from the interpreter's perspective. Any text can be read by means of any pos-
sible cypher key and any word sequence can be respoken or reauthored in any pos-
sible way. However, stable meaning 'depends, then, on pastness' (Hirsch 1984h:216). 
Historicality emphasises the pastness of meaning or the otherness of cultures and 
makes it a central issue of interpretation. While historicity focuses on the character 
of otherness from the perspective of the subject (see Schneiders 1982:54), his-
toricality focuses on the possibility of escaping the perspective of the subject by 
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learning a new perspective. Historicality emphasises the commitment to otherness 
or differentness; datedness is a central aspect of interpretation.19 
What has been argued here is that a reconstruction is not totally compromised by 
the interpreter's historicity. It is asserted, in fact, that a text can be read, a culture 
interpreted, or a historical era understood primarily in its pastness or otherness.20 
4.4 Objective historical knowledge: the nature and status of interpretive claims 
Kuenzli (see 1980:47) is right in stating that reader-oriented approaches to litera-
ture have exposed all objective interpretations as subjective readings. In two 
respects, however, proponents of this exploitative approach have overstated their 
case. 
·They are simply wrong if they claim (see charge of impossibility) that a text can be 
approached with any set of questions except the one argued to be that of the author 
or natives. After all, why should all other readings be tolerated except this one (see 
Skinner 1988:232)? They are furthermore wrong if they assert that it is impossible to 
escape one's subjectivity - that is, that one cannot learn another set of codes and 
conventions or adopt a different perspective, that of an author or native (see Hirsch 
198Sa:195). 
To be sure, the ideal of objective historical knowledge does not compromise the 
method used to obtain it or claims to have reached it.21 Emphasising objective his-
torical knowledge has nothing to do with, the view that language truthfully reflects 
extratextual reality, nor does it deny that it is the subject who construes meaning. 
Far from claiming assured results or a science devoid of values and interests, this 
view is objective in the sense that the interpreter consciously and explicitly attempts 
to reduce the subjectivity, both personal and cultural, which haunts all interpreta-
tion.22 The acknowledgement, in hermeneutical theory, of human subjectivity not 
19 As will be argued (see§ 6), the philosophical choice and theoretical commitment to upholding 
the otherness of texts or cultures have far-reaching effects on one's interpretive methodology. 
20 In a similar debate in the field of anthropology this position is expressed by Hanson (see 1976) in 
opposition to Caws (see 1974; 1976). 
21 Hirsch (see 1976:82) accedes that we cannot escape our historical world as a pre-given which 
constitutes our experiences (and our perceptions). The challenge is to deal with this methodological 
difficulty. In fairness to competing views, the debate is more often conducted on a continuum where all 
participants are trying to express the kind of comparisons that are possible between different cultures 
or language games or the status of such knowledge. Very seldom does one find a total rejection of the 
possibility of comparing paradigms (total subjectivism) or an outright denial of one's subjectivity (total 
objectivism). 
22 
'The naive objectivity advertised by traditional scientists - that scientists register, evaluate, and 
describe raw evidence without any additions, interpretations, or alterations - is now recognised as an 
elusive fiction' (De Beaugrande 1983:86). On the contrary, objectivity as described in this study is rela-
tive objectivity; 'a self-reflexive model that includes its own conditions for observation and application' 
(De Beaugrande 1983:86) or what Schneiders (see 1982:54) refers to as methodological objectivity. By 
submitting one's own models of science and society to the test of acknowledgement and criticism, one 
creates an awareness by which one can, paradoxically, 'achieve significant progress toward understand-
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only brings realisation of another's subjectivity but also an explicit confrontation 
with one's own subjectivity.23 
What has been argued in this section is a particular philosophical and epistemologi-
cal position from which to deal with the problem of other cultures. The subjectivity 
problem should not be exaggerated into something impossible to escape (see Hirsch 
1976:148; 1985a:194). As Putnam (1984:239) says, 
we do sometimes get things right ... [and the] contemporary tendency 
to regard interpretation as something second class reflects, I think, not 
a craving for objectivity but a craving for absolutes - a craving for 
absolutes and a tendency which is inseparable from that craving, the 
tendency to think that if the absolute is unobtainable, then "everything 
goes". 
Subjectivity should be taken up as a methodological challenge. 
The counter-argument (from an exploitative point of view) of a false dichotomy 
between an author's norm and a reader's norm rests on the assumption that we 
never have the author's or natives' key. It is, they maintain, no more than a construc-
tion. This is not, however, a valid objection, since 
[ d]eference to the wishes or intentions of other persons is always 
deference to one's idea or construct [italics mine] of their wishes. And 
when their intentions are at odds with our own, the fact that we have 
constructed those intentions does not remove the conflict. 
(Hirsch 1985b: 17) 
Despite the subjective nature of perceptions and interpretations, the possibility of 
escaping mere subjectivity cannot be ruled out. This is not, however, a claim for all 
forms of objectivity. 
It would be foolish to think that it is easy to determine what an author, especially an 
ancient one, wanted to convey or express, or what the natives are up to in what they 
do. As a matter of fact, '[w]hether or not an interpretation is telling the historical 
truth is a question that nobody can answer' (Hirsch 1982:247; see Skinner 1988:280). 
In this regard Skinner expresses an attitude worth adopting: 'My precepts, in short, 
are only claims about how best to proceed; they are not claims about how to 
guarantee success' (1988:281). It would furthermore be a mistake to think that even 
in face-to-face communication an understanding of the speaker's meaning is 
guaranteed. Even then, De Beaugrande says (1983:90), you do not know - 'you build 
ing the "real" world' (De Beaugrande 1983:87). 
23 This position more or less resembles what is referred to as scientific realism as represented by 
such scholars as Putnam and Bhaskar (see Bhaskar 1978; Mouton 1988; Stowers 1985:162-166). It is 
ironic, says Rohrbaugh, that a 'positivist historicism' was the context out of which 'an overwhelming 
sense of the relativity of all human perspectives grew ... From an understanding of the historicity of 
events, it is not a very long step to seeing the inevitable historicity, and thus inevitable datedness, of 
human thought about those events' (1978:24). 
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a model of the discourse situation and the presented texts and tune the models as far 
as is expedient'. The paradox is not removed by the choice of a communicative 
approach: it is only a suggestion for dealing with it in a particular way, namely con-
sidering why all interpretations are not equally true. A communicative approach 
makes this a central issue of interpretive methodologies. 
A choice for the objective side24 has at least two advantages (which will be discussed 
in due time). Firstly, it fosters a society where the ideal is to discover the voice of 
the other. Secondly, it expects and provides results different from what one already 
has. 
5 INIERPRETATION AS COMMUNICATION: VALUES AND ATIITUDES 
The second issue to be commented on is this: why should a historical aim of inter-
. pretation be preferred to a nonhistorical one? Why should the author's meaning be 
preferred to what an ingenious reader can construe a text to mean, or why should an 
anthropologist be content with the native's point of view when the imerpretive pos-
sibilities are almost unlimited? The major objection is that it is uninteresting and 
unimportant. 
The defence of a communicative approach can hardly be other than, on the one 
hand, to appeal to the question of relevance (see Abrams 1977:434) and on the 
other hand to fall back on an appeal to values. It will be argued in this section that 
the historical aim of interpretation (avoiding anachronistic and ethnocentric inter-
pretations) is based on values which are part and parcel of a particular view of 
reality. It is my contention that a communicative approach to texts, cultures or his-
torical eras rests on a set of humanistic values which are not necessarily present in a 
24 To move beyond the categories of objectivism and relativism is more easily said than done. Rorty 
accuses even Gadamer of being a 'weak textualist' (Rorty 1981b:167; and see 1981b:168) who has not 
succeeded in escaping the categories of subjectivism and objectivism which he tries to defeat (see also 
Bernstein 1983:199-201). Although Gadamer would probably disagree with that criticism, it suggests 
· that as yet the scholarly debate is still trying to cope with these categories: it has not yet moved beyond 
the categories in question. On the level of practical interpretation much still needs to be done in terms 
of the establishment of values before one can even think about moving beyond subjectivism and objec-
tivism. A movement beyond objectivism or relativism presupposes a type of community of the very kind 
Bernstein tries to develop; 'the shared understandings and experience, intersubjective practice, sense of 
affinity, solidarity, and those tacit affective ties that bind individuals together into a community must 
already exist' (Bernstein 1983:226). Such a community presupposes a spectrum of values, and if these 
are absent one can hardly appeal to the kind of arguments represented by such a position (e.g. an 
appeal to Gadamer to secure absolute truths). These values include solidarity, public freedom, a will-
ingness to talk and to listen, mutual debate, and a commitment to rational persuasion (see Bernstein 
1983:226). These values and the knowledge they presuppose, rather than the establishment of an 
Archimedean point from which reality can be controlled and which ultimately controls us, are the ideal 
- to let others be themselves rather than to control or dominate them. The movement beyond objec-
tivism and relativism 'gains "reality and power" only if we dedicate ourselves to the practical task of fur-
lhering the type of solidarity, participation, and mutual recognition that is founded in dialogical com-
munities' (Bernstein 1983:231). 
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nonhistorical ( e~loitative) approach. The presence or absence of these values says 
something about the scientific culture fostered by a society. 
5.1 Politics rather than epistemology 
It has been argued that there are no compelling epistemological reasons why the 
historicality of a text should be sacrificed to the historicity of text or interpreter. In 
the words of Hirsch, 'nothing argued at the level of epistemology ... can decide the 
issue between autocratic and allocratic norms of interpretation' (1982:242). The 
choice of going native or impressing one's own standards on a text, culture or society 
is not made at an epistemological level, nor is it deduced from empirical fact or 
logic.25 Both approaches (communicative and exploitative) deal with the subject-
object dilemma, but in different ways. Consequently they presuppose different 
values and attitudes. 
What became clear is that the choice - whether to be subject to one's own historicity 
or to emphasise the historicality of the other - takes place at the level of the politics 
of interpretation. Thus it is decided by values and attitudes.26 In the paragraphs to 
follow it will be considered whether the option of a communicative approach is 
indeed worth pursuing. 
5.2 Values and scientific culture: the ethics of interpretation 
In the 'Age of Reading' the author was the first to go in the 'systematic dehumaniz-
ing' process (Abrams 1979:566-567). If we allow this dehumanisation, what we lose 
is 'access to the inexhaustible variety of literature as determinably meaningful texts 
by, for, and about human beings [italics mine] as well as access to the enlightening 
25 Hirsch maintains: 'We, not our texts, are the makers of the meanings we understand, a text being 
only an occasion for meaning, in itself an ambiguous form devoid of the consciousness where meaning 
abides. One meaning of a text can have no higher claim than another on the grounds that it derives 
from the "nature of interpretation," for all interpreted meanings are ontologically equal; they are all 
equally real' (1976:76). 
26 If there is truth in the argument that the choice of autocratic or allocratic norms is ultimately a 
question of politics rather than epistemology, then that position which provides the most desired or 
desirable practice should be chosen. Hirsch's version of Pascal's gamble in this specific case is illumi-
nating. 'Let us weigh the practical gain and loss in calling heads - that is, that objective historical truth 
exists. Let us estimate the two chances. If you win, you win something. If you lose, you lose nothing. Do 
not hesitate then, gamble on the existence of objective truth' (1982:243; and see Wright 1984:87). The 
intention of this argument, says Hirsch, is to remove the delusion that it would ever be possible to show 
'that objective truth is impossible or that accurate historical interpretation is a delusion' (1982:244; see 
also Marsh 1967:2-3). His reference to Max Weber's contribution in this regard is worth pondering: 
'No one will venture to contend that Weber neglected or underestimated the cultural, personal, social, 
and political influences that impinge upon the seeking of objective truth. He was the master of that 
subject. Yet no one has spoken of the goal of objective truth - Wissenschaft - with more impressive and 
infectious fervor than Weber did in that 1919 lecture' (1982:244-245; see also Hanson & Martin 
1973:207 n 1). 
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things that have been written about such texts by the humanists and critics who were 
our precursors' (Abrams 1979:588). Abrams questions whether that is not too high a 
cultural price to pay. 
This presents a moral question which Rorty (who would not necessarily share the 
communicative approach) cannot really give an answer to since he likewise objects 
to, the 'inhumanism' of modern textualism in eliminating the author and, with the 
author, the idea of 'man' altogether (1981h:173). His passion for the other is well 
expressed when he says that scientific knowledge has value if it gives us hope: when 
it interprets other people to us, enlarges and deepens our sense of community. 
When it enables us, the 'educated, leisured, policy-makers of the West', to see 
'exotic specimens of humanity as also "one of us," the sociologists as having done the 
·same for the poor (and various sorts of nearby outsiders), the psychologists having 
done the same for the eccentric and the insane' (Rorty 1981a:S81). The probability 
of truth and the possibility of increased humane action is expanded by the emphasis 
on our common humanity. 
This moral argument is expressed by Hirsch in what he calls 'a fundamental ethical 
maxim for interpretation'.27 Unless there is 'a powerful overriding value in dis-
regarding an author's intention (i.e., original meaning), we who interpret as a voca-
tion should not disregard it' (1976:90). Closely connected to this there is a second 
ethical injunction (which he also does not see as an absolute one) against 
anachronistic reading. We should not use an author's words for our own purposes 
any more than we should use another person for our own ends (see Hirsch 1976:90). 
Both injunctions boil down to respect for the other. To save the text, especially a 
traditional text, from becoming extinct, by 'maldng it true according to our current 
beliefs ... lowers the value and credibility of humanistic scholarship' (Hirsch 
1984h:218). In the words of Skinner: 
It has proved a short step from emphasizing the public character of 
meaning to abandoning any concern with authorial intentionality. One 
way of making the move has simply been to disavow any interest in 
what authors may have meant in favour of explaining what their texts 
mean to us. The study of texts thus becomes a purely consumer-
oriented study of 'reader response'. 
(1988:272) 
Talking about consumer interests, is it not too high a price for society to pay - not 
only to lose access to the variety of past literature and interpretations but also to 
drop from our repertoire the type of hermeneutics demanded in interpreting judicial 
and other normative texts (see Skinner 1988:281)? 
27 He is criticised by Danneberg and Muller for formulating this maxim as an extension of Kant's 
practical imperative (see 1984:12). Although Hirsch (see 1984a:89) admits that his reliance on Kant is 
not well founded, the justification of interpretive norms (ethical maxims) can be defended on other 
grounds. 
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The price to be paid for a disregard of the principle of understanding.from within 
can be expressed more clearly in terms of the far-reaching effects on interpretive 
interests. Not only particular values but also interpretive interest brings to the fore 
the question: 'What sort of culture do we want to foster?' (Hirsch 1982:244 ). The 
kind advocated by a communicative approach is well expressed by Marcus and Fis-
cher: 
In the face of undeniable global structures of political and economic 
power, ethnography, as the practical embodiment of relativism and 
interpretive anthropology, challenges all those views of reality in 
social thought which permaturely (sic] overlook or reduce cultural 
diversity for the sake of the capacity to generalize or to affirm 
universal values, usually from the still-privileged vantage point of 
global homogenization emanating from the West. 
(1986:33) 
Somehow, a particular aim of interpretation in the final analysis reflects a particular 
view of reality. This, again, can be clearly illustrated in terms of the justification for 
. particular interpretive aims: the appeal to relevance, for example. 
5.3 Interpretive aim and the relevance of texts 
At issue is the justification of interpretive interests. What kind of justification can 
one possibly have not only for reading a text but for reading it in any possible way? 
Knowledge for its own sake, like reading a text for its own sake, is a fallacy. Some 
knowledge is not worth having; or, conversely, if knowledge has no value it is not 
worth pursuing - which does not imply immediate relevance or value (e.g. with 
regard to racism, social justice or political ideologies) but potential value for some-
one. At the bottom line, even the decision to devote time and energy to a task for 
one's own sake raises the question of value and relevancy. 
The relevance and value of interpretive interest are perceived differently from the 
point of view of different aims of interpretation. On the one hand it is asserted that 
texts are read in the light of prior interests; the opposite view is that relevance can-
not be decided in advance. On the one hand it is maintained that a text may mean 
whatever the reader finds interesting and relevant according to contemporary needs; 
. and on the other hand it is maintained that not present-mindedness but the con-
tribution to human discourse of a text or culture should decide its relevance. The 
choice for the present relevance of a text or culture rests on a second closely con-
nected assumption - the independent life of a text once it has left the hand of the 
author. 
5.3.1 Readers' interests and the independence of texts 
The view that texts are perceived as having independent lives of their own is part 
and parcel of the argument that texts are read because of their relevance. The argu-
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ments of Gadamer and Ricoeur that are used in New Testament studies are well 
known.28 Both assume that a text achieves a life of its own, since the text changes 
from one reading to the next. What happens in jurisprudence happens in every 
process of . understanding, namely 'produktiver Rechtserganzung' ( Gadamer 
1960:312; and see 1960:312-323; the English translation in Truth and Method 
1979b:294 is 'creative supplementing'). A 'text's career escapes the finite horizon 
lived by its author. What the text says now matters more than what the author meant 
to say .. .' (Ricoeur 1977:320). Once a historical text starts to create new meanings, 
what matters most is the public meaning of the text (see Skinner 1988:272). Such a 
view implies that a reader, by means of creative supplementing, adds (to) the mean-
ing of a text. To read is to create meaning,29 and reading is done out of prior inter-
est in a text or with a view to 'the aesthetic pleasure a text provides' (Juhl 1984:71) 
or the 'possibilities for existence that the text opens for the reader' (Schneiders 
1982:62).30 
. Two pertinent objections to this position may be mentioned before the issue of rele-
vance is discussed in the subsequent section. The first is that the meaning of a text 
or text-analogue is assumed and not subjected to interpretation (see Hirsch 
1984b:215). As a result, the truth of the text is that of the reader, which is another 
way of saying that the historical gap between text and reader is bridged by tradition 
(see Stout 1982:8; Wright 1984:95-96). Conflict in interpretations is solved by an 
appeal to tradition. 'The determinate meaning of a text at a given point in time is 
what a present culture would generally take that meaning to be' (Hirsch 1967:250). 
Also Bernstein maintains that Gadamer's appeal to the truth of an interpretation 
'amounts to what can be argumentatively validated by the community of interpreters 
who open themselves to what tradition "says to us"' (1983:154). The implication is 
that a 'papal-like authority' decides on the meaning of a text for 'the problem of 
determining the true character of a changing tradition is the same as the problem of 
determining the true character of a changing meaning' (Hirsch 1967:250). 
Gadamer's view, according to Van Niekerk, 'leaves an open door for dogmatism and 
irrationalism' (1990:12). 
Secondly, if it is accepted that no linguistic code can determine the meaning of a 
. text, then some human agency or act is needed to decide on the system of codes and 
conventions that shall determine textual meaning (see Hirsch 1984a:90). A text does 
28 With regards to the occasion of the letter to the Galatians, it has been pointed out (see chapter 1 
§ 6.1) that Hartman and Lategan, for example, rely on this argument in support of the view that the let-
ter should be read from the vantage point of contemporary interests and not within its own historical 
situation. 
29 As will be argued in the next chapter, it is not disputed that to read is to create meaning. What is 
at issue is the norm by means of which a reader chooses to construe a text to mean something. 
30 This is no place to decide the different natures of texts. The object of this study is obviously not to 
talk about literary texts as objects of aesthetic pleasure but to apply particular principles to classic (in 
the sense of texts valuable to a society), normative or ancient texts. 
64 
not exist prior to being construed by a reader. A text has to represent 'somebody's 
meaning - if not the author's, then the critic's' (Hirsch 1967:3). Contrary to scholars 
who believe that it is only possible to understand a text in our own terms, Hirsch 
. says that if we 'do not construe a text in what we rightly or wrongly assume to be its 
own terms then we do not construe it at all' (1967:135). The point should be clear. 
Texts have independent lives in so far as they can, by means of a number of keys, be 
construed by readers to have meaning. Either way, it is confirmed that the text 
represents somebody's meaning - the question becomes, 'Who's meaning or inter-
pretive norm should be preferred?' If some pertinent (historical) norm is not used, 
readers make use of such keys as happen to be around - usually their own (see also 
Skinner 1988:233; Rohrbaugh 1978:24). 
The fact that texts can be read in any number of ways does not indicate that they 
should also be read according to the reader's norm. Nor is it an open invitation to 
see a text as leading a life of its own. In fact, readers' norms, more often than not, 
are simply the tradition controlled by those who happen to be in power. This will be 
pointed out more clearly in discussing to the dilemma of relevance. 
532 The dilemma of relevance 
The dilemma of relevance, in short, is that different concepts of it, to a large extent 
·attributable to different values and attitudes, are currently used in support of indi-
vidual aims of interpretation. 
Gadamer argues that it is the naivety of so-called historicism to believe that a his-
torical object can be seen as ontologically independent of the subject (see 1960:283). 
Suffice it to say that, according to him, the historicity of human nature does not 
allow a division between past and present - only a dialogue, since the interpreter is 
already part of the tradition of the text (his emphasis on historicity). One of the con-
sequences of this philosophical position, highly valued in New Testament research, 
is that texts are read out of prior interest; 'The entire process of "exegeting" assumed 
the relevance of the text from the beginning' (Herzog 1983:110; and see Brett 
1990:376). This task of exegesis is well expressed by Schneiders, 'namely, participa-
tion in the work of interpreting the text as the Church's normative source of revela-
tion' (1982:57). 
If it is true that interpretive interests cannot be separated from presuppositions 
about the aim of interpretation that carries them, then interpretive interests do not 
determine what is relevant and valuable: it works the other way round. In other 
·words, what is regarded as a relevant and valuable reading will ultimately determine 
one's interpretive interests. This emerges clearly in the view expressed above. Some 
interesting choices are presented by opposing views on the aim of interpretation 
(see Hirsch 1985a:189-190 for a brief summary of the opposing views). 
From the point of view of a communicative approach, the ultimate aim of inter-
pretation is to understand the text or text-analogue from within, thus to hear the 
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voice of the other - be it a text, a culture or a society. In the words of the 
anthropologist Geertz, the aim of interpretation in a historical approach is 'not to 
answer our deepest questions, but to make available to us answers that others ... 
·have given, and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man has said' 
(Geertz 1973:30) or to enlarge 'the universe of human discourse' (1973:14). The 
ideal of discovering from within (rather than creating.from without) expresses an 
acceptance of others as equally human and important and constitutes an aim of 
interpretation in the human sciences which respects that humanity. This is what 
Skinner calls the 'anthropological justification' (1988:286) for studying intellectual 
history. Three pertinent differences with an exploitative approach may be noted in 
particular. 
The first is that, as in the case of the exploitative approach, the wish is to accom-
modate the past to the present, but without distorting the past.31 However, the value 
and relevance of a text or culture are not presupposed but are demonstrated by the 
contribution to human discourse. Before deciding whether a particular text is valu-
able, it is necessary to understand what the text meant (see Hirsch 198Sa:190). 
Translatability between cross-cultural concepts overstates the urge for relevance 
while the objective of a communicative interpretation is not to translate but to learn 
'different styles of reasoning' (Skinner 1988:252). What is needed is to be retrained 
'to new ideas (i.e., new for us) from the past' (Hirsch 1985a:196). 
Secondly, the investigation of alien systems of belief, whether text or culture, allows 
us to stand back from our own prevailing assumptions and structures and discover 
their contingency. This paves the way for a greater degree of understanding, hence 
tolerance, of cultural diversity. The greatest advantage, however, is the possibility of 
acquiring a perspective from which to view our own in a more self-critical way, thus 
enlarging our present horizon instead of simply 'fortifying local prejudices' or 
degenerating into 'uncritically accepted ideologies' (Skinner 1988:287). 
The third and related advantage is that, unlike autocratic or exploitative interpreta-
tions, allocradc or communicative interpretations have the advantage of offering 
something new - in the sense of the other who is beyond the boundaries of the 
aesthetics and the text-in-itself. In the words of Hirsch (1982:246): 
Interpretation, as the general term for cognition, is hardly limited to 
the boundaries of texts or to the arbitrary confines of fiction and 
poetry. Historical interpretation is the humanistic pursuit par 
excellence and embraces not just texts but contexts. 
31 To avoid misunderstanding, it should be re-emphasised that the past is not seen in a positivistic 
sense as something to be discovered. The past is a construction by the interpreter or historian; but it 
can be constructed by means of allocratic or autocratic norms and concepts. The commitment to 
respect otherness indeed makes a difference. Moreover, the choice of this approach does not deny any 
other approach, nor does it claim to be the one and only way to deal with the these interpretive prob-
lems. Indeed, the decision is taken in terms of values which are arbitrarily chosen. 
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For this reason, paradoxically, the 'stronger commitment to history and the authorial 
norm might yield a greater commitment to the demands of present relevance' 
(Hirsch 1985b:28). Says Wright, 'understand the past's otherness and it will speak 
most directly to us' (1984:85). Two features of the different definitions on relevance 
may be elaborated. 
First, an apparent difficulty with the communicative approach is that pastness poses 
an obstacle to the present relevance of a text.32 If we adopt the writer's or actor's 
norm, are we not condemned to mere antiquarianism? The real job of interpreta-
tion, according to the objectors from an exploitative point of view, is to revitalise the 
texts of the past so that they mean something in the present. 
However, the study of the past for its own sake is not simply to be equated with anti-
quarianism (see Tosh 1984:24).33 It may just be surprising how much we come to 
. learn about ourselves when confronted with the otherness and datedness of other or 
older socio-cultural systems. Rather than expecting a text or text-analogue to add to 
our problems and questions, it is read for its contribution to human discourse. Rele-
vance is found in the imaginative application of historical meaning to a different 
world. The possibility of discovering something new is inherent in the use of an 
allocratic norm, whereas under an exploitative norm it is not a real possibility. 
Secondly, breathing life into an outdated past meaning poses a problem to a com-
municative approach. In terms of the value determinacy of the aim of interpretation, 
the obvious answer from the communicative approach would be that outdatedness is 
preferable to making a text conform to the reader's truth. Rather than forcing texts 
into moulds which provide artificial respiration, outdatedness can lead to the 
replacement of such texts. What is often not appreciated is that under the exploita-
tive reader norm, the preference of those who happen to be in power ultimately 
determines relevance and value (see Hirsch 1985b:17). When the value and rele-
vance of a text is assumed, the discovery of something new or something other is 
hardly possible, since the meaning of the text is already mediated by tradition. 
32 The fear is often expressed, in objecting to the historical paradigm, that to restrict the meaning of 
a text to the historical meaning is an unnecessary narrowing down of the hermeneutic project (see Pal-
mer 1969:65). It is seen as a deadening, dry-as-dust enterprise which turns literary texts into museum 
objects (see Hirsch 19858 :190). Perhaps that is also what Vorster has in mind when he says that 'mean-
ing and communicability of the New Testament text cannot be explained by the use of the historico-
critical methodology ... What is needed is a text-oriented methodology' (1984:119). 
33 How a merely antiquarian interpretation can be avoided will be discussed at a later stage. Suffice 
it to say that the distinction between meaning and significance as applied by Hirsch is, to my mind, a 
useful analytical tool to do just that. 
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6 SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION AS A COMMUNICATIVE 
ENTERPRISE 
It has been argued that a communicative approach to historical interpretation is 
possible, and reasons have been stated why it is desirable. The third issue to be com-
mented on is how such an approach is to be implemented. To do this, the theory and 
practice of interpretation have to be connected. In other words, the practical 
implications of a communicative approach to interpretation need to be pointed out. 
At issue, therefore, is how to put into operation the methodological aspects claimed 
to be constitutive of social-scientific interpretation as a communicative approach. 
While the analysis of the methodological components of the cypher key was done by 
taking the components apart, a final consideration in dealing with the theory of the 
communicative approach is to explore the possible ways in which the whole fits 
. together. 
The nature of interpretation is directly related to the aim of interpretation and con-
sequently to the values and attitudes constituting an approach. Different theories 
lead to different ways of fitting together the whole. However, possible con-
ceptualisations of the whole and related issues are not entirely clear from the 
previous discussions. The emic-etic distinction in the social sciences will be used to 
explore some of these issues and to fill out the map of the practical nature of inter-
pretation. 
6.1 Emics and etics: pointing to some possibilities of a communicative approach 
A mere distinction between emic and etic studies34 does not adequately explain the 
nature of the problem to be addressed, since different dilemmas (depending on the 
aim of interpretation) face the interpreter dealing with the otherness of foreign 
texts, alien cultures or distant historical eras. Thus, in order to deal with the emic 
and etic problem it should be situated within the ambience already discussed, of the 
aim of interpretation. Both approaches accept, but understand in totally different 
. terms, that the historical or cultural gap can be bridged. 
From the point of view of nonhistorical approaches to the social sciences, the emic-
etic distinction is used to designate a dichotomy between two separate ways of inter-
34 Geertz prefers the concepts 'experience-near' and 'experience-distant'. 'An experience-near con-
cept is roughly, one which an individual - a patient, a subject, in our case an informant - might himself 
naturally and effortlessly use to define what he or his fellows see, feel, think, imagine, and so on, and 
which he would readily understand when similarly applied by others. An experience-distant concept is 
one which various types of specialists - an analyst, an experimenter, an ethnographer, even a priest or 
an ideologist - employ to forward their scientific, philosophical, or practical aims' (Geertz 1979l':226-
227). These concepts (derived from a psychoanalyst, Kohut) express the same distinction as emic versus 
etic analyses (see Geertz 1979l':226). 
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preting (see Pike 1966:153-155; Brett 1990:359-365; Segal 1990:20-21). An etic inter-
pretation is one where outside concepts are used; an emic one, where the concepts 
of those involved are used. For example, speaking from a materialist perspective,35 
Harris's use of the concepts (see 1976:343) and that of his follower Silverman (see 
1977:9-11) result in two separate studies, the one emic and the other etic, which can 
as a second step be related to one another (see Silverman 1977:10; Feleppa 
1986:250). 
It is not only the nature of interpretation that is important but also what is meant by 
the concepts. Understanding from within is seen in these approaches as correlated to 
anemic description/interpretation of a foreign or ancient society. Etic explana~ions 
on the other hand need to be defended before the bar of the modern sciences, not 
before the bar of history (see Brett 1990:362). According to Saliba, for example, 
functional studies typify the etic standpoint, since the concepts used to understand 
the others are 'more often than not, foreign to the native's world view' (1977:195). 
An 'anthropologist who adopts the etic outlook is interested in interpreting the data 
·with little regard to the understanding which people have about what they are doing 
and thinking' (Saliba 1977:195). 
Two features stand out clearly from an exploitative point of view. Two different 
kinds of interpretation are identified, the one internal and the other external, and 
the grand-theory style of etic interpretation has little regard for the native's point of 
view. 
However, the 'methodological conception of the contrast is not predominant' 
(Feleppa 1986:244). From the point of view of a communicative approach, a totally 
different set of issues is at stake. 
What is challenged is, first of all, the (erroneous) assumption that the nature of 
interpretation is determined by the set of concepts that is used. That is not the case, 
since - as has been argued - the nature of interpretation is determined mainly by 
the aim of interpretation. Both interpretations (those using emic and those using 
etic concepts) are challenged by the methodological assumptions of a communica-
tive approach. Thus, from this point of view, emic and etic concepts and not emic 
·and etic interpretations may be identified. In both instances, however, the interpre-
tive problem is the same, namely whether the concepts and phenomena cover the 
same categories (see Runciman 1983:119). Both have to face the challenge pre-
sented by the commitment to respect otherness without distorting it by present-
mindedness. 
Secondly, the communicative point of view challenges a particular interpretation of 
understanding from within. Salmond (in Feleppa 1986:252) correctly points out that 
35 It has been argued that on this level functional and materialist studies share the same theory of 
science (see 3.2). 
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even in etic interpretations the subjects' views are material ·to the act of interpreta-
tion, and even in emic ones the anthropologist's questions and act of understanding 
are material to the way in which the conversation and analysis proceed. Whether 
insiders' or outsiders' concepts and categories are used, from a communicative point 
of view the very same dilemma has to be faced - namely, to establish a match 
between the concepts used and the meaningful experience of those involved in it. 
From this point of view understanding from within is not a matter of the 
'sympathetic duplication' (Hanson & Martin 1973:194) of other cultures, nor is it to 
're-enact or re-create' (Skinner 1988:252) the experience of the natives. It also does 
not mean interpreting by means of native's or actor's concepts instead of one's own, 
but learning and being able to participate in certain practices (that of the others) 
and acting according to their rules (see Pauw 1987:84; Hanson & Martin 1973:204). 
With reference to the discussion on interpretive assumptions, I would agree with 
Salmond (in Feleppa 1986:252) that '"[e]mics" and "etics" are useful thumbnail-
sketch terms for different interpretive attitudes, but I don't find them an adequate 
base for delineating anthropological theory'. The distinction may function for 
analytical and critical purposes, to indicate when one is speaking in one's own con-
ceptual language and when one is using the actor's language (see Geertz 1975:74) -
when one is using concepts related to contemporary models and theories and when 
one is dealing in concepts used by the natives. Social scientists are increasingly com-
ing to realise that the use of etic concepts which are not grounded in the cultural or 
historical spheres of those involved, is a misrepresentation of them. The challenge is 
to know what the natives mean by their concepts and whether etic concepts do jus-
tice to the other world. 
If one aspect is clear, it is that the distinction between emic and etic interpretations 
can hardly be maintained in terms of a communicative approach. To be pointed out 
in more detail are the necessary, concrete preconditions which distinguish a his-
torical from a nonhistorical approach - the putting into operation of a communica-
tive approach. Since the philosophical and epistemological differences have already 
been considered, the focus will be on the practical aspects that distinguish them. 
6.2 A communicative approach as understanding from within 
In this section it will become clear what interpretive constraints are, in this study, 
implied by the notion understanding from within. Theoretical notions and meth-
odological commitments find their meaning (get teeth) in the practical imple-
mentation of interpretive principles. At issue is the task of implementing a com-
municative approach that avoids the trap of present-mindedness. 
Winch is one of the philosophers who strongly objects to the idea (in mainstream 
social sciences) that the object, methods and aim of the social sciences are the same 
as, or even analogous to, those of the natural sciences (see Winch 1958:72). He does 
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·not deny the possibility of developing and employing sociological concepts and 
categories other than those of the participants (see Winch 1977h:161; Dallmayr & 
McCarthy 1977:139). As a matter of fact, on the possibility of comparing different 
societies and language games, he says: ' ... the question is not whether we can do this, 
but what sort of comparison is involved' (Winch 1977a:208). His claim is that the 
social scientist's access to data, the formulation of the 'more reflective understand-
ing' and the application of concepts must be mediated through the participant's way 
of viewing the world (see Winch 1958:89). The interpreter must understand the lan-
guage game that is being played (see 1977h:162; Dallmayr & McCarthy 1977:139). 
Despite some criticism, Stowers expresses an important and lasting implication of 
Winch's position.36 He says that 
the explanation of a society in terms of its own beliefs, intentions and 
concepts (as the participants understand them) must come before 
explanations in terms of causes. Anthropologists or historians of antiq-
uity who a priori assume that certain causes of "functions" belong to a 
certain "pattern of behavior" cannot justify their assumptions without 
reference to the particular beliefs and will almost certainly impose 
their own beliefs on the subjects of study. 
(1985:159) 
An understanding of human affairs - whether literary texts or socio-cultural codes, 
conventions and actions - from a communicative point of view is based on the fun-
damental humanistic value that 'the human world is essentially a network of mean-
ings and that, therefore, nothing in this world can be adequately understood without 
understanding of these meanings "from within"' (Berger 1974:126). 
Two interpretive constraints are to be deduced from these principles. 
A first constraint may be designated as the avoidance of iruufficient puzzlement. The 
historical question, according to Skinner, is incompletely posed in literary studies 
when the historian has failed to enquire up to the point of 'what the author of the 
text may have meant by it' (1988:282). In cultural and historical studies, historical 
interpretation of a communicative approach has not been achieved without explicit 
curiosity about others' meaningful lives converted into the question as to what the 
actors or natives are up to. Such studies are not necessarily unhistorical, they are 
. historical studies characterised by insufficient puzzlement. The commitment to 
cultural/historical otherness, in short, needs to be put into operation by means of a 
definite curiosity about the author's or actor's point of view. 
36 Stowers sees Winch as a strict intentionalist - in other words, he takes it that Wmch sees each 
society as a closed system. Since there is 'complete incommensurability between different cultures ... no 
one can evaluate a culture except on its own terms' (1985:157-158). The mediationist view would, 
according to Stowers, be situated between the two extreme mirror opposites. The kind of extreme 
relativist position attributed to Winch, which is rather a caricature, hardly exists (see Bernstein 1983:92) 
and neither does Winch maintain that view (see 197'78:208). 
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A second constraint is to learn a new style of language and reasoning (see Skinner 
1988:252; Hirsch 1985a:196), a new set of categories and cultural concepts. Without 
being retrained into the world of the other culture or era and the commitment to 
apply a different style of reasoning, exploitative interpretation cannot be avoided. 
To be sure, if this is not an explicit and conscious process, the interpreter might be 
making too facile a use of those cultural tools that might be lying around. What is 
needed is to learn how 'to reach the same conclusions and prescriptions for action as 
natives would in the same circumstances' (Hanson & Martin 1973:204). Without the 
commitment to otherness being set in operation as a process of learning the codes 
and conventions - the system of meaning - of others, the chance of reducing 
anachronistic and ethnocentric interpretation is rather slim. If otherness is 
embedded in the socio-cultural network of the meaning of others, then otherness 
can never be assumed: it has to be demonstrated. 
Given the commitment to maintain the historicality of texts, cultures or historical 
eras, the second aspect - well expressed by Winch - brings to the fore some further 
constraints on nonllistorical interpretations . 
. 6.3 A communicative approach as thick description 
Since it is we who want to understand the others, says Winch, the onus is on us to 
extend our understanding to make room for their concepts (see 1977h:179). One 
such approach has been suggested by Geertz's notion of a thick description. 
Thick description can be described as sorting out the structures of signification of the 
natives involved (see Geertz 1973:9). One cannot perceive what one's informants 
perceive. One has to gain access to the natives' or participants' interpretations of 
their symbolic forms - that is, 'words, images, institutions, behaviors - in terms of 
which, in each place, people actually represent themselves to themselves and to one 
another' (Geertz 1979h:228). He emphasises that if we want to make sense of alien 
phenomena, the 'trick is to figure out what the devil they think they are up td 
( Geertz 1979h:228), or the 'culture of a people is an ensemble of texts ... which the 
anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom they properly 
belong' (1979a:222). Confronted with the Zande category of magic, Winch suggests 
as a general principle that since 'it is we who want to understand the Zande 
category, it appears that the onus is on us to extend our understanding so as to make 
. room for the Zande category, rather than to insist on seeing it in terms of our own 
ready-made distinction' (Winch 1977h:179). 
The double task, Geertz (1973:27) says, 
is to uncover the conceptual structures that inform our subjects' acts, 
the "said" of social discourse, and to construct a system of analysis in 
whose terms what is generic to those structures, what belongs to them 
because they are what they are, will stand out against the other 
determinants of human behavior. 
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In one word, thick description is an attempt to include simultaneously model and 
evidence, etic and emic concepts, into a dialogical process. It opens up the 
possibility of an analysis which does justice to the subjective experience of the 
participants, rather than reductive formulas which profess to account for them (see 
Geertz 1979a:222). It starts with a guess as to what the others are up to, or what we 
think they are up to (see Geertz 1973:15; Ricoeur 1977:329). 
If an interpreter neither starts intellectually empty-handed nor falls completely for 
the experience-near concepts of the participants, then two characteristics should 
simultaneously be kept in mind: the inevitability of using contemporary models, and 
secondly the way in which models are used.37 Since I have discussed this issue in 
some detail elsewhere (see Craffert 1992), suffice it to touch in passing on the most 
important points. 
Since all exegetes use models, the first set of issues has to do with the explicit and 
conscious use of models as opposed to the implicit and unconscious use of models. If 
models are not used explicitly and consciously, they function unconsciously and 
implicitly to structure and influence interpretive activities. As a third interpretive 
constraint the explicit and conscious use of models allows interpreters at least to be 
explicit about their own biases; and it allows criticism and dialogue. Implicitly 
assumed models are often no more than projections of the interpreter's world onto 
that of the natives or actors. 
The second set of issues has to do with how models function in research activities. 
The culture- and time-specific nature of models accords them, by definition, a 
preliminary status. Far from representing everlasting and absolute features, they are 
abstracted representations of particular worlds (most often the interpreter's 
meaningful world). When not only the other culture but also the tools (models) are 
seen as constructions, it becomes easier to challenge their ability to uncover 
universals and laws.38 Therefore models should not be applied to the evidence but 
should, as far as possible, be used as heuristic tools for their explanatory power to 
explicate context and world. The interaction between models and evidence is a 
matter of dialogue rather than of an application of the models. Thus, a fourth 
constraint is the use of models as heuristic tools rather than as iron matrixes. 
37 We cannot approach the other except by means of our models, concepts and categories (see 
Jarvie 1977:202; Mommsen 1978:20; Nipperdey 1978:4) but at the same time we should beware of 
forcing our standards onto them. Neither do we have to accept that what the subject thinks it's up to 
(the subject's own vocabulary) is always the best (see Rorty 19818 :578-579). In fact, such a subject may 
·not have used or even have been aware of the etic concepts or models used by modern interpreters (see 
Runciman 1983:13; Brett 1990:363; Segal 1990:21). 
38 The intricate relationship between data and model (text and context) will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Suffice it to point out that the relationship is seen, at one leve~ as an instance of the 
hermeneutical circle and not of breaking out of it. The assumed or constructed context of a particular 
text functions as a parameter within which a text is construed to be and mean something and not 
something else. 
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The constraints mentioned in this chapter will, in the next chapter, be linked to the 
validation of interpretive claims. With these remarks the table is set for the 
discussion of further methodological aspects before the historical components of 
traditional opponent hypotheses (cypher keys) are analysed in some detail. The 
present discussion can be extended to include other methodological components, 
such as those that apply to texts, language and context, but without repeating the 
·whole theoretical debate. 
CHAPTER3 
ON METHODOWGICAL CONFIGURATIONS: TEXT AND CONTEXT 
Meaning, then, may be conceived as a self-identical 
schema whose boundaries are detennined by an 
originating speech event, while significance may be 
conceived as a relationship drawn between that self-
identical meaning and something, anything, else. 
(Hirsch 1984b:204) 
1IN1RODUCI10N 
In order to challenge interpretive traditions which underscore different readings of 
the letter to the Galatians, the constitutive components of various methodological 
positions need to be compared and examined. In doing so, it is necessary to find a 
way in which not only critical practices (methodological positions) but also individ-
ual components of such positions can be mapped and examined in a meaningful 
way. Apart from the philosophical and epistemological components already dis-
cussed (chapter 2), views on aspects such as interpretation, meaning, text, and context 
will be added in this chapter . 
. The aim of interpretation as a philosophical and epistemological category, has been 
identified as the constituting element of methodological positions. Two trends that 
comprise a reaction to a positivistically oriented science have been identified on a 
continuum: historical (communicative) and nonhistorical (exploitative) approaches. 
In elaborating on the variety of methodological positions, I propose - instead of 
being content with a linear model of critical practices - to explore the model of 
methodological configurations. Despite its apparent use in categorising critical prac-
tices, it will also be used to classify the variety of views on aspects such as interpreta-
tion, meaning, text and context. 
The main objective of this chapter is to present the social-scientific approach as a 
particular configuration of methodological components, consisting of those aspects 
of a historical aim of interpretation that have already been mentioned and including 
a particular view on interpretation, meaning, text and context. Although no other 
methodological positions are to be discussed in detail, views on these components 
Will enable us to compare and evaluate alternative proposals. The validation of 
interpretive claims is closely related to definitions, categories, and particular meth-
odological positions. To put it differently, particular aim-of-interpretation positions 
. become concrete within particular views on interpretation, meaning, text and con-
text, and the evaluation and examination of such methodological positions should 
include reflection on these components. 
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2 A MAP OF METIIODOLOGICAL COMPONENTS 
Critical practices, whether social-scientific or historical-critical interpretation, 
literary or reader-oriented approaches, derive their individual features in part from 
. aspects such as interpretation, meaning, text and context. They are identified in terms 
of different methodological configurations of these components. In order to give an 
adequate account of the interpretive strategy adopted in this study (a social-
scientific approach as a communicative enterprise), it is necessary to account also 
for philosophical and epistemological views on these components. Because of the 
diversity of perspectives on these issues, it is necessary to have a model mapping the 
spectrum of critical practices. 
The objective is to provide a coherent system by means of which the different com-
ponents (text, context, interpretation, and so forth) can be described in terms of 
their meaning and contribution to the interpretive process. It should be remem-
bered that the aim is not so much to locate methodological positions in the study of 
the letter to the Galatians on a map of critical practices as to compare and evaluate 
the foundational assumptions and interpretive claims of various opponent 
hypotheses. It is more important to consider each component of a methodological 
position in its own right than to map different critical practices. 
In the previous chapter the configuration metaphor was used to designate different 
·methodological positions and their constitutive components. It can also be applied 
in our understanding of the individual components of different critical practices. To 
obtain a clear grasp of the explanatory power of the configuration metaphor, it 
should be seen in contrast to one other model for the classification of critical prac-
tices: the linear model. 
2.1 The linear model in the dock 
The linear model of communication (author -text- reader) is a very popular one 
nowadays for the classification of interpretive literary criticism - not only in secular 
but also in New Testament studies (see Barton 1984:19-23; Lategan 1984a:l-3). It is 
a classification system used to describe the individual components in methodological 
positions. Not only is it believed that this model can locate and relate most of the 
components which dominate the hermeneutical debate at present: it is also used to 
classify the chronological sequence of critical practices (see Lategan 1984a:2-3; 
Rabinowitz 1989:81). 
According to the linear model, the locus of meaning in biblical studies has shifted 
·from the author to the text and thence to the reader/reading. The history of critical 
practices is accordingly located on this linear scale. Historical criticism is identified 
with an interest in the source; structural and text-immanent approaches are located 
in the text segment, and audience- and reader-oriented approaches represent the 
final development as the relationship text-reader (see Lategan 1984a:3-4). 
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If common denominators of the reader sector were to be listed briefly, the following 
would undoubtedly be included. The notion of text became unstable in that it is no 
longer seen as a static object to be interpreted but as an ongoing process of com-
munication (see Lategan 1988b:70; Vorster 1988:36-40; Rabinowitz 1989:82). Inter-
pretation, then is not a matter of discovery but of creation, and the meaning of a text 
is the result of this encounter between reader and text. Finally, the context of the 
author or original creation of the text is unimportant, for the text outlives its author. 
In a word, the subjective and creative elements in interpretation are taken seriously. 
The advantages of a configuration model in mapping the variety of critical practices 
make it clear why the linear model should be avoided: not because it is wrong, but 
because it is inadequate to the variety of critical practices, and moreover misleading 
in that it misrepresents not only the spectrum of critical practices but also the fea-
tures of individual components. While only two advantages will be discussed, the 
explanatory power of a configuration model will be further illustrated when discuss-
ing the individual components of a communicative methodological position. 
Firstly, critical practices (particular methodological position) are not ascribed in toto 
to a particular position on a map but are described in terms of the features of indi-
vidual components. Each component can be described in terms of its own features 
but also of its interaction with other components. 
Secondly, the configuration model is not prescriptive but descriptive. It merely 
provides a frame within which the variety of components can be identified and 
described both as independent entities and in relation to and interaction with other 
components of the relevant methodological position. 
These advantages make it possible to avoid several deficiencies of the linear model. 
Firstly, the linear model is misleading in its presentation of individual components 
of the linear sectors. The notion the reader can be used to illustrate this point. 
In explaining the shift regarding the status of texts, the reader is seen 'as the instance 
which attributes meaning to the text' (Vorster 1988:37). It should, however, be noted 
that the reader is equated with a contemporary reader in the sense of a reader using 
an autocratic norm; a reader not interested in the original communicative event but 
in actualising (creating) the text in a present encounter with it (see Vorster 
1987:381-385; Lategan 1988b:70; Rabinowitz 1989:87). In most instances the 
reader's authority is linked firstly with the notion that a text has a life of its own and 
secondly with the death of the author. This position characteristically accepts that 
'the communication process is not simply a channel of information but the 
determinant of meaning' (Ryan 1985:20). The point to note is that the implied 
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meaning of reader is by definition ahistoricall in that the locus of meaning is 
qualified as 'not an historical first reader or any particular subsequent reader ... but 
·a contemporary reader' (Porter 1990:278). It is not suggested that all reader- or 
audience-oriented approaches are alike in every respect2 but only in the way in 
which they handle subjectivity and in their attitude to otherness (historicality). 
According to this (very common) definition of the reader/reading sector, it is not sur-
prising to find Porter (see 1990:281) arguing that Beavis (see 1987), who is inter-
ested in the first Greco-Roman readers, would not count as a reader-response critic 
despite the fact that she claims to be doing reader-response criticism. It should be 
apparent that a reader using an allocratic norm (constructing a first-century cypher 
key) to construct the historical meaning does not fit the linear model. At any rate, 
the aim of interpretation and the emphasis on the author and the datedness of the 
text do not fit. 
The decisive aspect in the description of the reader is the creation of meaning, either 
by granting authority to the text or simply by claiming that the reader provides it in 
the act of reading.3 To emphasise just one (crucial) aspect: what is not done in prac-
tice is to develop a reader-oriented approach which accounts in an integrated way 
. for the text's otherness in the sense argued in this study. Porter points out - to my 
mind, correctly - that 
[r]eader-response criticism, as well as a number of other reading 
strategies [in New Testament studies], grew up in direct and conscious 
reaction to what was perceived to be the ahistorical or exclusivistic 
1 
'Ahistorical' is used in the exploitative sense defined in the previous chapter. To recapitulate this 
definition in one sentence, approaches are termed exploitative when they lack the commitment to his-
toricality and certain built-in constraints designed to avoid mere subjectivity. 
2 Reader-response critics or 'audience critics are united more by their questions than by the direc-
tions they follow in trying to answer them' (Rabinowitz 1989:83; and see Ryan 1985:20ff). More 
accurately it might perhaps be called 'audience-oriented criticism' (Rabinowitz 1989:81), and more 
technically one should distinguish between a theory of response rooted in the text and a theory of 
reception which is more concerned with readers' judgment of texts (see Rabinowitz 1989:84). Audience 
criticism is used as an umbrella term to designate those approaches which focus on the 'text-reader 
pole'. It includes scholars such as Iser who, strictly speaking, is a reception critic (see Holub 1984:xii). 
Broadly speaking, two extremes can be identified: on the one hand those who have, 'to use a James 
Bondian phrase, license to fill - but that license is ultimately granted by the authority of the text'. The 
construe metaphor would suit this position best. On the other hand there are those who insist 'that 
readers construct the meaning of the text' (Rabinowitz 1989:87). In between the two poles, many have 
· tried to define the locus of meaning as residing neither in the text nor in the reader but either in 
'intertextuality' (that is, in the way texts find meaning in their relations with other texts) or in 
'community norms' (see Rabinowitz 1989:87). 
3 The situation of the reader in particular is emphasised (see Lategan 19848 :4; Vorster 1988:42-44). 
It should, however, be noted that, unlike a communicative approach (where constraints are built into 
the interpretive approach to avoid or restrict the reader's subjectivity) these approaches assume the 
relevance of the texts - relevance in the sense that the texts are read with the explicit aim of creating 
their contribution to the ideological point of view, be it Marxist, feminist, liberationist or something 
else. 
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characteristics of New Criticism, although it may very well be 
recorded later as simply a fine-tuning of this method ... It is not sur-
prising that so much of what is being called reader-response criticism 
is actually formalism, in other words the first step in reaction to his-
torical criticism. 
(1990:287)4 
Secondly, the linear model imposes an exploitative view on the map of critical prac-
tices. It has already been mentioned that the notion of the changing status of texts 
implies the death of the author and the creation of meaning by a contemporary 
reader. The problem such a mapping system poses is that certain methodological 
positions can very easily be misrepresented. With regard to both positive and nega-
tive features, the mapping system as such attributes particular features to particular 
positions. To keep to the example of a Greco-Roman norm for the reading of New 
Testament texts, it would probably be assigned to the author sector of the linear 
models - the reason being that the application of an author's norm would conflict 
with the idea of the contemporary reader as the locus of authority in interpretation. 
However, despite the features usually ascribed to the author's position - for exam-
ple, that of the traditional historical-critical approach (see Lategan 1984a:3)- a 
communicative methodological position would not fit the linear model.6 
Perhaps the most serious danger of this kind of mapping system is that, once a straw 
·man has been created, it is easy enough to burn it. Once a methodological position 
has been categorised in terms of an exploitative approach, it becomes almost 
impossible to do justice to it. 
The point is that the linear model is misleading in that it creates a discourse on criti-
cal practices (methodological positions) which does not take account of the variety 
of ways in which the components can be related and combined. It leads to over-
simplified generalisations on the variety of critical practices, due in part to the 
totality transfer of particular features of a sector to those methodological positions 
ascribed to the sector as a whole. The example of the reader, in contradistinction to 
the author, as the sole creator of meaning is a case in point. 
4 Holub's judgement on Gadamer is significant in this regard. In fact, he expresses the selfsame 
point argued in this study, namely that Gadamer 'seems able to admit historicality only on an abstract 
theoretical level. When he himself analyzes texts ... the potentially radical notion of being-in-the-world 
produces a philosophical criticism akin to the most ahistorical, New Critical readings' (1984:45). 
5 This is done, for example, by Herzog, who places Hirsch's application of an author's norm at this 
end of the spectrum (see 1983:110-111). 
6 Obviously some approaches do fit the features of the linear model. It is true that, despite claims 
from some quarters that they cover all the features, some approaches do in fact fail to make provision 
for all the components (see Lategan 1988b:68). 
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A final, related reason why the linear model is to be avoided is because it pretends 
to separate the inseparable.? To put it differently, the separation of elements in 
order to describe particular positions on the linear model does not account for the 
.fact that interpretation (and thus the meaning of a text) always includes other 
aspects which do not come into focus in a particular theory (see Barton 1984:20). It 
follows from the discussion in the previous chapter (and the point will be taken up 
again) that marks on paper do not have meaning prior to being construed by a 
reader. The point at issue is, which set of cypher keys are used by a reader and in 
what way - not whether a reader construes a text as having meaning. 
2.2 Accounting for paradoxical features in methodological positions 
One of the challenges in developing an analytical tool for mapping the various 
theories and methods is the almost infinite number of possible scenarios of con-
tributing elements. Rather than mapping critical practices or theories according to 
any predetermined model, I propose to explore the metaphor of configurations of 
methodological components. This does no more than provide a framework within 
which the constitutive elements (such as author, text, context and reader) can be 
identified and examined. These elements (depending on particular configurations) 
find their characteristics and definitions, fit into particular scenarios, and result in 
critical practices, none of which can readily be categorised by means of any of the 
. constituting components. Furthermore, the identity of these elements depends inter 
alia, on being part of a particular methodological configuration. 
Amid the variety of views on each component, and the variety of configurations of 
components, the objective is much rather to state what is meant in this study by 
interpretation, meaning, text and context than to get involved in either a justification 
or a defence of this position or an explication (and rejection) of all adverse views. In 
the sections that follow it will be indicated that, by mapping the social-scientific 
approach in terms of its constituting components, not only can the apparent 
paradoxical features (such as reader and author) be kept intact but also the partiC11-
lar methodological configuration can be described in such a way that as few as pos-
sible of the components are disregarded. 
My argument is that one should be explicit about as many aspects as possible. That 
is the only way in which interpretive claims can be tested and neglected elements 
brought back into play. In explicating views on interpretation, texts, mean.ing and con-
7 Botha in a recent study has underscored this argument: 'When studying ancient documents the 
researcher actually functions as both transmitter and receiver within the communicative event. In other 
words, the transmission metaphor deceives with regard to the active role that the interpreter plays 
when interpreting, "creating" the author and the auditor/audience. One does not first study the author, 
then the text and then the audience (or in any other order). One can only look at the audience with the 
help of the text - a text construed by the interpreter. We only have a text-author and a text-audience' 
(19918 :4). 
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text I hope to spell out just how a reader can also be a good listener, how textual 
in/ determinacy can be respected without falling into the trap of positivism or sub-
jectivism, how reading as a creative activity can be promoted without losing the 
other in the dialogue, how communicative context functions as one of the directive 
factors in interpretive events. 
3TIIENATUREOFIANGUAGEANDOFTEXTS 
. Given the occasional nature of Paul's letter to the Galatians, the fact that it is a first-
century communication, and this study's historical aim of interpretation, only two 
features of language and of texts will be emphasised: first, the fusion of semantic 
and pragmatic aspects of language and texts and secondly their socio-cultural 
nature. 
To state the assumption that the 'essential function of language, then, is communica-
tion' (Feldman 1977:284; and see Harrison 1979:6) is a confirmation of the his-
torical aim of interpretation to determine the communicative intent of a particular 
text. Feldman's argument (see 1977) that most (if not all) uses of language have 
communicative functions is e!'pecially true regarding letters since, as JN Vorster 
maintains, a letter 'is never W.thout its communicative function' (1991:44). 
3.1 Linguistic theories of meaning 
Broadly speaking, at least two linguistic theories of meaning can be identified: on 
the one hand the 'communication-intention theorists' and on the other the 'formal-
semantic theorists' (Feldman 1977:282; and see Harrison 1979:63-64). In the words 
·of Olson (1977:258): 'One assumption is that meaning is in the shared intentions of 
the speaker and the hearer, while the opposite one is that meaning is conventional-
ized in a sentence itself, that "the meaning is in the text"'. 
To start with the latter position, it is accepted that meaning is embedded 'in terms of 
abstract mental entities such as concepts' (Leech 1983:6). To give another descrip-
tion of such a view, 'what a sentence means is given in the sentence itself and hence 
remains the same however the sentence may be used' (Feldman 1977:285). Thus 
texts have meaning 'independently of the identity or intentions of the speakers who 
utter them, and independently of the particular contexts in which they may be 
uttered' (Harrison 1979:199). In New Criticism this idea has been formulated in the 
premise that 'a literary text is an autonomous object that can and should be analysed 
without regard to its context' (Rabinowitz 1989:82). 
Few scholars will disagree that the meaning of a sentence depends, at least in part, 
upon the meaning of the words (semantics) of which it is composed, but also on the 
grammatical structure (syntax) of the sentence (see Lyons 1981:23 Harrison 
1979:51). This includes aspects referred to as a text's static elements (see Lategan 
· 1988h:70). 
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On the other hand, the communication-intention theories have assimilated 
semantics or the meaning of language to pragmatics, that is, meaning in language is 
defined relative to the speaker or user of language (see Leech 1983:6-7); '[t]he 
essential insight of the communication-intention theorists was that meaning is a 
property not of sentences but, rather, of their use' (Feldman 1977:283). It claims 
'that sentences do not have fixed meanings but depend in every case on the context 
and purpose for which they were uttered' (Olson 1977:259). 
From various angles it can be argued that the distinction made between the two 
approaches is much too acute (see also JN Vorster 1991:40ff). Whether one agrees 
with Lyons (see 1981:193) that the theories are in principle complementary, or with 
Harrison (see 1979:200-203) that an adequate theory of meaning should attempt to 
·include insights from both sides, it is true that there is a definite attempt in the 
philosophy of language and the theories of meaning to attain a third position. What 
Leech refers to as complementarism includes both semantic and pragmatic aspects 
of meaning (see 1983:7). 
From this short introduction to the field of theories of meaning it becomes clear, at 
the very least, that the meaning of a sentence or text is not a matter of choosing 
between the meaning of the constituent words and phrases (semantics and syntax) 
and the use of the language by an author or speaker; it comprises both.8 Thus, the 
dichotomy of the polar scheme turns out to be two complementary aspects of the 
meaning of a text. Theories which locate the meaning of a text in the encounter of 
the reader with the text are left aside for the moment. 
In short: whatever else may be true of language and texts, the meaning of a sentence 
or text is seldom if ever determined by the words of the text alone, since both 
aspects (semantic and pragmatic) are usually present. Thus it would follow that 
efforts to understand language abstracted from the speaker's use of it 
are always misleading - more so for language used socially, less so for 
language used ideationally - and, therefore, that any specific claims 
made in the context of such efforts are, at best, of limited application. 
(Feldman 1977:293) 
An important principle can be derived from this. No attempt to understand Paul's 
letter to the Galatians can rely on the words of the text alone. In fact, his com-
8 This idea is very aptly expressed by Harrison: 'An adequate theory of meaning, it seems, would do 
justice both to Frege's insights concerning the objectivity and autonomy of meaning, and to the 
apparent indispensability, in the description of natural languages, of a whole family of intentional con-
cepts of which the most salient and the most intractable member is, of course, "meaning itself'. Truth 
theorists begin from Frege and run aground on the rocks of intensionality. Communication-intention 
theorists begin by taking intensionality for granted and run aground on the objectivity and publicity of 
meaning' (1979:201-202; and cf. 1979:206-207). 
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munication presupposes a speech activity which is to be understood not solely from 
the text but from the particular use of words and sentences in the text. Vorster 
cogently points out that the 
pragmatic function of language is thus one of the most important 
aspects which the reader and interpreter of the New Testament has to 
keep in mind. Most of the texts of the New Testament were not writ-
ten for the purpose of giving information, but for the purpose of con-
vincing readers and hearers to do something. The purpose of most of 
the texts was to persuade people to accept a particular point of view. 
(1988:39) 
The analysis of letters as though the grammatical semantic aspects ('only the text') 
are sufficient to decide the meaning should be avoided. 
Together with the first-century nature of the communicative event, a second princi-
ple should be acknowledged: if Paul's communicative intent is to be understood 
. properly, it should be done from within. It is of special importance in studying New 
Testament letters to take seriously not only the fact that they are not objects but 
communicative events with pragmatic functions, but also that they are (past) speech 
acts from a distant culture. 
3.2 Language and texts as cultural artifacts 
Against the positivistic view, Vorster (see 1988:36-38) convincingly argues that read-
ing is an active process of attributing meaning and that texts are no longer regarded 
as objects to be analysed. However, as argued in the previous chapter, the reaction 
to positivism both in the social sciences and in literary studies can be placed on a 
continuum between historical and nonhistorical approaches. Thus it will be 
explained in some detail what is meant, from a communicative point of view, by the 
rejection of positivistic views on texts and what language means in texts.9 Prior to 
saying what a text is and how texts communicate meaning, a brief explanation of two 
issues (from a communicative point of view) will suffice. 
Firstly, once it is admitted that reading is an active process of attributing meaning, it 
·should be remembered that 'language, unlike the physical world, is a cultural institu-
tion that developed expressly in order to mean something and to convey what is 
meant to members of a community who have learned how to use and interpret lan-
guage' (Abrams 1977:432). Thus, in order to read and interpret the meaning of any 
writing or human action - whether a road sign or a restaurant check, a religious 
activity or a biblical book - 'the reader must share with the writer a scenario of how 
the world works' (Malina 1986d:92). Unless this happens, Malina argues, 'the result 
9 To recapitulate, what distinguishes the historical from the nonhistorical approaches are at least 
two philosophical choices: the· commitment to historicality and the notion of relevance as determined 
not by present-mindedness but by understanding from within. 
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is noise, or putting words into the mouth of the sender: in other words, the result is a 
distorted message' (1986b:150). 
Thus, most speech actslO 'are culture-specific in that they depend upon the legal, 
religious or ethical conventions and practices institutionalized in particular societies' 
(Lyons 1981:187). The active process of attributing meaning is restricted by socio-
cultural contextual parameters. Unless a text is related to the socio-cultural world of 
origin, it is hardly possible to avoid misunderstanding it. As Meeks remarks: 'In 
order to determine what a given text meant, therefore, we must uncover the web of 
meaningful signs, actions, and relationships within which that text did its work' 
(1986a:179). Unless the effect of a text in its own culture can be determined, the text 
is misrepresented. 
Secondly, a text is not an object but neither is it an intentionless sequence of signs. 
To put it differently, it is indeed just marks on paper (or marks-on-blanks; a concept 
. of Abrams 1977:429), but unless these marks are taken to have been made by .some-
one, it does not make sense to read/interpret them. Even to talk about a science of 
interpretation one needs an object which makes sense, distinguishable from its 
expression, for or by a subject. It is impossible to interpret rock formations, patterns 
of driftwood on the seashore, or snow crystals as language because they lack the 
notion of a subject from whom they received meaning. Without the assumption of 
meaning imparted by a subject, such criteria as sameness and difference or 
coherence in the given pattern are arbitrary and senseless (see Taylor 1977:102). 
The implication is that 'unless we regard the text of a literary work as the record of 
someone's use of the words in question to say something, it would make no sense to 
attempt seriously to interpret it' (Juhl 1980:109). To call something a poem or even 
a text is to say, among other things, that the words, lines, or sentences of which it 
consists have not been arranged by chance but produced by a person with certain 
intentions (see Juhl 1980:84). 
What is maintained here is that marks, sounds or signs fail to be words, language or 
communication without an agent capable of intention. Nonintentional signs will 
merely resemble words or language (see Knapp & Michaels 1982:728). For that 
·reason it is impossible to have intentionless language or meaning. When meaning is 
intentionless, it also becomes meaningless (see Knapp & Michaels 1982:727f; Hirsch 
1967:23; Luckmann 1981:223-230).11 Knapp and Michaels (1987:60) argue that 
10 A speech act, says JN Vorster, is 'an utterance produced by a speaker within a context and 
addressed to a hearer with an intended effect' (1991:45). The present study is not primarily concerned 
with Paul's speech acts in the letter to the Galatians but with some (historical and methodological) 
preconditions for understanding such speech or communicative acts. Thus the phrase 'within a context' 
in this definition is of the greatest importance. 
11 When an author's intention is taken to be irrelevant to the meaning of a text, the logical con-
sequence is that the text becomes analogous to a series of physical movements which, if performed by 
an human agent, could have one of a number of meanings (see Juhl 1980:288-289). If not the author's 
intention, then the reader's intention functions to construe the marks to be more than marks: thus they 
become meaningful. 
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the dependence of meaning on context is simply another way of des-
cribing the determination of meaning by intention: because a mark 
means whatever it is intended to mean, the same mark can have dif-
ferent meanings when it is produced in different situations. 
Thus a text does not have meaning simply because it represents an unalterable 
sequence of words (see Hirsch 1960:470). 
In fact, a text does not exist 'until it is construed; until then, it is merely a sequence 
of signs' (Hirsch 1967:13); and since meaning is a matter of consciousness and not of 
physical signs or things (see Hirsch 1967:23), as a communicative event it is con-
textually determined. 
'/. In answer to the question: 'what then is a text?', two remarks can be made. Firstly, 
texts are products of human attempts at communication which bear a socio-cultural 
stamp. Secondly, they are not objects in the positivistic sense and unless taken as the 
record of someone's intention, cannot be construed to mean anything in particular. 
Thus, on the one hand, a text does not exist as an object of communication prior to 
being construed, but on the other hand, it is a past speech act which needs to be 
understood as a historical event (see Hirsch 1985a:190). 
·A final word on 'past speech act'. As already noted, meaning (whether expressed in 
language or in by human action) cannot be adequately interpreted without reference 
to the social system in which it was expressed or lived (see Malina 1986a:2). If the 
original author is disregarded, the reader acts as an 'author' of the signs by providing 
an alternative set of cultural codes and conventions by means of which the signs are 
construed. From a communicative point of view ancient texts are taken as past 
speech acts, to be understood as far as possible in terms of the system of socio-
cultural codes and conventions from which the text originated.12 The past is added 
to emphasise the fact that speech acts are pre-eminently socio-cultural products. 
It is not claimed that interpretation becomes easy once these considerations are 
acknowledged, nor that cultural context is the new magic wand in interpretation. 
The complicated nature of the interaction between text and context forbids such 
overenthusiasm. As a matter of fact, determining what people of a foreign culture or 
era do in what they say is a more complicated matter than in one's own culture or 
era. 
12 It is thus not surprising to learn that Kennedy (quoted in Hester 1991:284) defines rhetorical 
criticism in the following way: ' ... [it] takes the text as we have it ... and looks at it from the point of view 
of the author's or editor's intent, the unified results, and how it would be perceived by an audience of 
near contemporaries ... The ultimate goal of rhetorical analysis, briefly put, is the discovery of the 
author's intent and how that is transmitted through a text to an audience'. That is to say, an author's 
manuscript is to be taken as a past speech act. 
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4 TEXT AND CONTEXT: CEN1RAL ISSUES IN A COMMUNICATIVE 
"APPROACH 
The idea of context is a central but also a contentious aspect of New Testament 
studies. To some scholars context means co-text, to others historical situation; some 
reject the need for an explicitly constructed context because it leads to speculation, 
while others think interpretation without context is impossible. The inappropriate 
way in which context is dealt with in the history-of-ideas approach (mainly as back-
ground information), as well as the role social-science models play in the notion of 
context as a feeding ground, have already been pointed out. Context, as a central 
component of a social-scientific methodological configuration should still be raised 
to a conscious level. 
It is one thing to admit the value and contribution of context, 13 but it is quite 
another to make serious provision in one's methodology for giving an integrated 
account of context. My aim is not to present a new method, in the sense of an 
infallible recipe to ensure scientific results, but to present the notion of context as an 
interpretive principle of great value in the social-scientific approach. To be not only 
conscious of some of the issues concerning context but to state them explicitly con-
stitutes an attempt to play the game according to the rules of the relevant interpre-
tive aims and claims. 
4.1 Epistemological crisis: every context has a context 
The notion of context is, to say the least, a contentious matter and one of great com-
plexity. It should be noted that, from the point of view of a nonhistorical aim of 
interpretation, datedness is a nonproblem; both the context of origin and the 
determining of texts by context are minor issues. It should, however, be noted that 
although historical context is considered unimportant, it is nonetheless present. 
From the point of view of the communicative approach, context cannot be ignored. 
On the contrary, it is imperative that 'we must make the contextual study of its sur-
rounding assumptions and conventions the pivot of our interpretive procedures' 
{Skinner 1975:218). In a word, meaning is context-bound. The problem is that every 
context has a context. 
. Deconstructive and other poststructural philosophies have made the idea of context 
a suspect one. In short, (inter)textuality undermines contextualisation (see Leitch 
1983:123-163).14 With Leitch we can speak of the subversion of context (see 
13 This is done often enough in New Testament studies to make its importance clear (see, for exam-
ple, Vorster 1984:106-107, 1988:42; Lategan 19848 :8). 
14 Where a text is seen in a differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something 
other than itself (other differential traces), one encounters the concept of intertextuality (see Leitch 
1983:105; Ryan 1985:16): 'Intertextuality, like textuality, is a strategic concept whereby the intermin-
gling of all texts, including the mental texts of readers, may be accomplished' (Harty 1985:10). 
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1983:157-163) where intertextuality, 'a text's dependence on and infiltration by prior 
codes, concepts, conventions, unconscious practices, and texts' (1983:161) is in con-
flict with the old law of context.15 Culler explains why contexts are boundless. Fir-
stly, any context is open to further description in the sense that there is no limit to 
what can be included in or what might be shown to be relevant to a specific context. 
Secondly, 'any attempt to codify context can always be grafted into the context it 
sought to describe' (Culler 1982:124). 
r The epistemological given can be formulated in the following way: 
... there is no natural point where one must call a halt to the adding of 
interpretive contexts. A context neither has meaning nor provides 
meaning apart from still other contexts. But there is an infinite supply 
of contexts, of prisms refracting meanings from other prisms. 
(Barnhart 1980:504; and see LaCapra 1983:35) 
As Hernadi says, one can argue in principle that 'the proper context of anything 
written is everything written' (Hernadi 1988:7512.Jbut once a text is understood 'its 
. actual context is much more narrow and far less textual than that' (Hernadi 
1988:751). It is accepted, in everyday conversation, as in murder trials, that it is pos-
sible to determine what someone intended. If this is possible in principle and in 
ordinary life, asks Juhl, 'then why not in literary interpretation?' (1984:61). If there 
is a possibility in principle that a speaker, author or native's intentions can be 
determined, 'then we have good reason to suppose that there is a definite point at 
which the play of signifiers ends and the signified is reached' (Juhl 1984:62). Not 
only the notion of context but also its subversion in intertextuality needs to be 
placed in perspective.16 
4.2 What is this thing called context? 
Before discussing the interaction between text and context( s }, we need to address 
the question of what context is.17 
15 Context in this sense 'is figured as a constitutive moment or period in cultural history or as a 
regulated practice of interpretation or evaluation, it functions to curtail both textual dissemination and 
. interpretive free play' (Leitch 1983:161). 
16 Derrida (quoted in Culler 1982:123) writes: 'This is my starting point: no meaning can be 
determined out of context, but no context permits saturation'. A context, to Derrida, 'is never 
absolutely determinable, or rather, .. .its determination can never be entirely certain or saturated' 
(1977:174). Harty for one interprets Derrida's statement that 'meaning is context-bound, but context is 
boundless' to confirm the indeterminacy of meaning (see 1985:9). Derrida's notorious statement 'There 
is nothing outside the text' thus means that everything relevant to reading, including the context, is con-
tained within the intertext (see Harty 1985:11). It should however be said that, given his philosophical 
interests, it would be wrong to conclude that contextual interpretation is rejected by Derrida (see Cul-
ler 1982:215; Gasche 1979:190). 
17 It should be noted that this discussion does not aim at being exhaustive. Indeed, the philosophical 
and epistemological choice (aim of interpretation) of focusing on historical meaning implies that only 
certain aspects of the context of origin are considered. Since two worlds intersect one another in an 
interpretive activity, not only the levels of context of a text or text-anaiogue but also the interpreter's 
existential context should be taken into account (see LaCapra 1983:35-61; Herzog 1983). That issue has 
been discussed in the previous chapter (methodological components of a cypher key) and will be 
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Several concepts are used to designate the notion of context: context, scenario of how 
the world works, socio-cultural situation, communication situation, situational context, 
argumentative situation, mental world, the environment of a text, to name only a few. 
Since most of them are used as umbrella terms, they fail to express clearly what 
. categories are covered. A more precise description of what is meant by context will 
make it clear that in actual fact several categories of context are at stake. 
4.2.1 Categories and definitions 
The concept context was for a long time used to denote con-text - the words and 
sentences coming before and after a particular sentence (see Halliday & Hasan 
1985:6) - or, as Lyons puts it, context very often is textual context or co-text (see 
1981:206). This is what Halliday and Hasan call the intratextual context - the \3.~ 
coherence within a text (see 1985:48-49). Every part of a text, they say, is both text 
and context. 
However, context means much more than that. Fowler (see 1986:86) points out that 
at least three more meanings can be distinguished: context of utterance, context of 
culture, and context of reference. 
Context of reference has to do with 'the topic or subject-matter of a text' (Fowler 
1986:89). A remarkable feature of human communication is the relative independ-
. ence of subject matter from any other context. A device called displacement allows 
human speech to refer to things and events removed in time and space from the 
immediate context of utterance; a prerequisite for fiction and narrative. Unless 
def amiliarisation occurs, context of reference usually reflects the accepted context of 
culture. Lyons maintains that the reference of an utterance cannot be determined 
without regard to its context of utterance (1981:220). 
By context of utterance is meant 'the situation within which discourse is conducted' 
(Fowler 1986:86), which refers to the physical surroundings, the location of 
participants vis-a-vis one another, and the channel employed in communication. 
This is what Halliday and Hasan (1985:6) and Lyons (1981:217), following 
Malinowski and Firth, refer to as the context of situation or the environment of a text. 
T)le third is the context of culture:18 'the whole network of social and economic con-
ventions and institutions constituting the culture at large' (Fowler 1986:88). Various 
scholars have pointed out that 
· touched on again when the role of models in social-scientific interpretation is briefly examined. 
18 With Halliday and Hasan we can define culture as 'a set of semiotic systems, a set of systems of 
meaning, all of which interrelate' (1985:4). 
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in a conversation between two people, there is always at least a third, 
that is, the mediation of the embedded or unconscious cultural struc-
tures in language, terminologies, nonverbal codes of behavior, and 
assumptions about what constitutes the imaginary, real, and symbolic 
... Each historical period has its own assumptions and prejudices, and 
the process of communication is the engaging of the notions of one's 
period (or culture) with those of another. 
(Marcus & Fischer 1986:31) 
~specially the disciplines_ of ~~tory an~_~_!lthrop~!~gy_i~st~~!_h~-~~~re~~s-~!_~~t 
'different cultures each have their own sets of absolute presuppositions' (Stanford 
1986:92). In order to understand what has occurred or what was meant, an inter-
preter between cultures must grasp these absolute presuppositions. Stanford 
reminds us that an eavesdropper sometimes can hear every word and yet fail to 
understand the conversation. The reason is simply that, to understand another mind, 
we need to share not only the same symbolic usages and conceptual system but also 
the same understanding of the situation or context (see Stanford 1986:118-119). 
Fowler maintains that 'all discourse has a definite context of culture which may - I 
would say 'ought to' - be studied as an influence on the linguistic structure of 
literary texts and as a guide to their interpretation' (1986:88).19 While both context 
of situation and context of culture are necessary for the adequate understanding of a 
text (see Halliday & Hasan 1985:7), Lyons argues that scholars often fail to bring 
out as clearly as they should the fact that language-behaviour is 'a culture-dependent 
activity' (1981:217). The context of culture is the institutional and ideological back-
ground that gives value to the text and constrains its interpretation (see Halliday & 
·Hasan 1985:49). The concepts socio-cultural context and socio-cultural (system of) 
codes and conventions will be used in this study. 
While every speech event is in a sense unique, having its own idiosyncrasies, there 
are strong recognisable features which group utterances into clear types thanks to 
the cultural conventions (see Fowler 1986:87). For example, while it may be true 
that there is a universal definition of linguistic politeness or sincerity (see Lakoff 
1972:911), what constitutes it may differ considerably from one society to another 
(see Lyons 1981:217). Lakoff says: 'What may differ from language to language, or 
culture to culture - or from subculture to subculture within a language - is the ques-
tion of WHEN it is polite to be polite, to what extent, and how it is shown in terms 
of superficial linguistic behavior' (1972:911). Leech assures us that 'the Cooperative 
Principle and the Politeness Principle operate variably in different cultures or lan-
guage communities, in different social situations, among different social classes, etc.' 
19 Fowler maintains: '[I]t cannot be emphasised too strongly that it is not this particular text alone 
which by its own unique structure creates the opening position in King Lear. rather, it is the relation-
. ship between the textual structure and the cultural context which in Elizabethan England, and now, 
gives the text meaning' (1986:101). 
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(1983:10). Lyons emphasises that 'even if the allegedly basic act of making state-
ments, asking questions and using commands are universal, they too are regulated, 
in all societies, by more or less culture-specific institutions, practices and beliefs' 
(1981:188). 
The most significant point to note is that contexts of situation and contexts of 
reference are both dependent on and constituted by the context of culture (see 
Fowler 1986:87, 89; Halliday & Hasan 1985:46-47, 49). In a word, the locus of mean-
ing is situated in the cultural system. Meaning is culture-specific; in other words, 
·meaning is stamped by context of culture. This is exactly what has been neglected 
both by historical criticism and by literary- and reader-oriented approaches in New 
Testament scholarship (see Malina 1986C:171-176). 
4.2.2 Sets and subsets of context 
The notion of context as an umbrella term turns out to be inappropriate, since it 
embraces no single aspect of an utterance's milieu but the 'entire physical, 
psychological, social, and historical milieu in which the utterance occurs' (Hirsch 
1967:86). Thus, the concept communicative context will be used in contrast to con-
text as co-text. It consists at the very least of a socio-cultural context, which provides 
the codes and conventions within that socio-cultural milieu, as well as the com-
munication situation which is the more immediate milieu of communication. The 
codes and conventions of the latter are indeed determined by those of the socio-
cultural context. 
De Beaugrande is right when he says that theoretically 'the investigator obeying 
Hirsch's ethical mandate incurs a historical, biographical and psychological task of 
·staggering dimensions' (1983:107).20 To recover the context in any particular case, 
says Skinner, ' we may have to engage in extremely wide-ranging as well as 
extremely detailed historical research' (1988:275). LaCapra argues that for complex 
texts 'one has a set of interacting contexts' (1983:35); a more appropriate designa-
tion would thus be a set of contexts and within it a subset of contexts. If there is truth 
in the argument that the context of culture is constitutive of meaning, then a set of 
contexts would comprise at least subsets of contexts consisting of a context of 
reference and a context of utterance which are embedded in a particular context of 
culture. 
The variety and possible subsets of context should be complemented by a discussion 
of the possible relationships of these subsets to each other and within the set of 
20 He is, however, wrong in implying that, since evidence may ultimately prove incomplete or even 
contradictory, this task is impossible. The objection confuses meaning with subject matter. The subject 
matter is inexhaustible and probably much wider than the author's meaning. A reader may, for exam-
ple, know much more about the subject matter than an author, which does not imply that an author 
. may not have an intention (meaning) and that it cannot be determined (see Hirsch 1967:57ff). 
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interacting contexts. While any subset of context is situated within a context of cul-
ture, there is still a problem as to the appropriate communicative context. Which set 
and subset of codes and conventions are to be applied to interpret a particular text? 
Does a text carry clues to its communicative context? To put it differently, which has 
priority, text or context? 
· 43 The interaction between text and context: hermeneutical circle/spiral 
The interaction between text and context is not only a very complex matter but 
views with regard to it are far from clear and anything but homogeneous. Halliday 
and Hasan maintain that 'the relationship between text and context is a dialectical 
one: the text creates the context as much as the context creates the text. Meaning 
arises from the friction between the two' (Halliday & Hasan 1985:47;21 see Barnhart 
1980:504). While text and context in some way or other form part of a hermeneuti-
cal circle process, the range of possible interactions between them should still be 
explored. 
Firstly, if it is true that every context has a context, it has been argued that it is 
equally true that neither communication not interpretation can be successful 
without context. It is in fact, a basic premise - expressed in the notion of the 
hermeneutical circle (widely accepted today in hermeneutical theories) - that 
without a certain pre-understanding of a subject no communication will take place 
(see Maddox 1983:66; Rohrbaugh 1978:21-27). In the words of Hirsch's well-known 
dictum: 'All understanding of verbal meaning is necessarily genre-bound' (1967:76). 
·Let us be more specific about this pre-understanding. The point of success of any act 
of communication, Skinner argues, 
depends on at least a mutual intuiting by S [speaker] and A [audience] 
of a whole complex of conventions, social as well as linguistic, about 
what can and cannot be stated, what sorts of meanings and allusions 
can be expected to be understood without having to be explicitly 
stated at all, and in general what criteria for the application of any 
given concept (e.g. that of warning) are conventionally accepted as 
applying in that given situation and society. 
(1970:137) 
Without a pre-understanding of (socio-cultural) sets of contexts, particular socio-
cultural codes and conventions, communication is impossible. 
21 It should be noted that these remarks refer to context of situation or communication situation 
and are not necessarily true with regard to context of culture. The same is true of Lyons's argument 
that text and context are complementary. 'Texts are constituents of the contexts in which they are pro-
. duced; and contexts are created, and continually transformed and refashioned, by the texts that 
speakers and writers produce in particular situations' (1981:195). Context in this sense refers both to 
the co-text and to context of utterance and should not be taken as referring to all contexts as such (see 
Lyons 1981:206). 
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Secondly, even if these aspects of the communicative context are not explicitly 
argued in the interpretive process, they are implicitly assumed from the point of 
·view of the interpreter's world. Even in communication within a shared culture a 
reader cannot, without further ado, take an utterance literally, since even in such 
situations the speech act has to be constructed on the basis of an assumed context 
(see Fowler 1986:90). Even 'sentence-sized utterances', Lyons maintains, 'are inter-
preted on a good deal of contextual information, most of which is implicit' 
(1981:195). 
Thirdly, this point in the argument is usually the parting of ways for interpretive 
theories. The problem of the hermeneutical circle or spiral can be formulated in a 
number of ways. In the previous chapter it was done by way of the communicative 
and exploitative approaches. 
It should be noted that the circle from text to context is not disputed; 'Every inter-
preter labors under the handicap of an inevitable circularity: all his [or her] internal 
evidence tends to support his [or her] hypothesis because much of it was constituted 
by his [or her] hypothesis' (Hirsch 1967:166). Interpreters are not mistaken in claim-
ing the support of a text for their interpretations. The dilemma of the variety of 
opponent hypotheses based on the same text springs to mind. The extent to which 
· text and context presuppose one another in the circle should not be underestimated. 
If, however, it is maintained that a text cannot sponsor an unlimited number of read-
ings (or that some readings are more valid than others), conflicting interpretations 
pose a problem. 
From an exploitative point of view the notion of historicity emphasises that an inter-
preter's prior understanding prejudices interpretation (see also Maddox 1983:72) 
and the notion of tradition is introduced to restrain 'wild' interpretations. From a 
communicative point of view, certain constraints are introduced which point to the 
possibility of turning the circle into a spiral. 
At the level of text-context interaction the vicious effects of the hermeneutical cir-
cle, as well as the breaking out of it, can be dealt with by means of two more per-
spectives to the debate: the principle of validation, and the use of social-science 
models in cross-cultural research. Both are introduced into the methodological con-
figuration in order to escape the vicious hermeneutical circle in the interpretive 
process. 
43.1 Retraining and the principle of validation 
To postulate that the circle need not be vicious is not to deny the power of the 
hermeneutical circle in the interpretive process. Unless certain critical, selfconscious 
steps are taken in interpretive methodologies, there would be little hope of escaping 
the vicious effects. Because of the nature of communicative contexts, three assump-
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tions facilitate the process of breaking out of it: firstly, that contexts are brought to a j 
text; secondly, that they are human constructions of a hypothetical nature (one can \ ~ -
escape, alter or reject a partiClflar horizon); and thirdly, that a circle can grow into a / / 
spiral (see Maddox 1983:73) when the idea of prescribing communicative contexts is ~ 
replaced by the idea of validating contexts. 
Although it is true that most texts, depending on their type, carry indications of their 
context of situation (see Halliday & Hasan 1985:38), clues to a text's context of cul-
ture very seldom occur in the text (see Barnhart 1980:504). The problem is that 
clues in the text may be interpreted differently, depending not only on the assumed 
. context of situation but especially on the context of culture. The identification of 
clues in a text is determined by what we bring to the text; and what we bring, first 
and foremost, is the framework of the context of culture. 
If a text does not contain any clues - to its possible context of culture or context of 
situation - either in the text itself or in the transmission history, then, strictly speak-
ing, it cannot be interpreted. Stated in a positive way, it can then be interpreted in 
an infinite number of ways. An apparent dilemma is: how do we decide on an 
appropriate context prior to reading a text, and how do we read a text prior to con-
struing it by means of a particular cypher key (context)? Skinner rightly stresses that 
before we can hope to identify the context which helps to disclose the meaning of a 
text, we must have settled on an interpretation that suggests which context(s) may 
most profitably be explored to that end (see 1975:227). What is needed is a guess at 
the genre or cultural activity, as in a thick description. 
Communicative contexts are never given, they are construed by the reader (see 
Hirsch 1967:88). This implies that interaction across cultures or historical eras 
requires the interpreter to learn a new style of language and reasoning (see Skinner 
. 1988:252; Hirsch 1985a:196). The interpreter needs some training in the world of 
another culture (see Marsh 1967:18). The historian, Tosh (1986:116) formulates this 
principle in more general terms by saying that the historian 'before anything else can 
be achieved ... must first try to enter the mental world of those who created the 
sources'. Reading a foreign text or culture demands that a new set of codes and con-
ventions be learned and applied. 
There 'are no rules for making good guesses', only 'methods for validating guesses' 
(Ricoeur 1977:329; and see Hirsch 1967:263). A guess at the communicative context, 
whether by way of a particular social-science model or any other model, should have 
the status of a heuristic device which can be tested, extended or rejected (see Craf-
fert 1992; Maddox 1983:73). 
A double warning on the interaction between text and context seems appropriate at 
this stage. Context is no magic wand that will solve all interpretive problems (see 
Skinner 1975:227), and it is not true that once an appropriate context has been con-
structed, all that remains is to match the text with it. To be sure, no claim on the text 
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alone can settle interpretive disputes, neither does the provision of a context 
·guarantee that the meaning can simply be read off. 
Rather than basing one's interpretive claim on the text as such, it would perhaps be 
meaningful to take up the debate on the text within one's own assumed communica-
tive context as opposed to that of the opponent. Neither the idea of contextless texts 
nor the claim that only the text is used finds any support in this methodological con-
figuration. In fact, interpretive claims with regard to text can no longer be made 
without reference to the aim of interpretation and the assumed communicative con-
text - at any rate, not if one is to avoid mere subjectivism and unverifiable interpre-
tive claims. 
4.3.2 Retraining and the use of social-science models 
Since communicative contexts are constructed and brought to a text, discovering the 
appropriate communicative context is not an instance of the hermeneutical circle: 
the context is not derived from the text. This contradicts the belief of many New 
Testament scholars, which is true in a limited sense only. Petersen, for example, 
maintains that the biblical scholar 'has to reconstruct from one and the same narra-
. tive text both its contextual and its referential history' (Petersen 1985:7). While this 
may be true with regard to context of reference and context of situation (see Hal-
liday & Hasan 1985:36), it very seldom applies to context of culture. Retraining into 
the socio-cultural codes and conventions of a foreign era or culture is done by 
means of comparative material in the form, at the very least, of authors or texts 
from the same era or milieu and/ or cross-cultural models used as heuristic tools. 
Although comparative material is also approached by means of contemporary 
models, it has been argued that such models can, in the search for typical and con-
tingent elements, be turned into heuristic devices of interpretation. A communica-
tive context, consciously constructed by means of comparative material and 
(heuristic) social-science models, presents a possibility of introducing into the cirde 
some form of outside verification of assumptions. It goes without saying that con-
temporary social-science models also make it possible to raise contemporary 
prejudices and biases to a conscious level. Used as heuristic tools, such models can 
pinpoint what is different from the own. 
' In this way an important constraint is added to the ones already discussed. The 
· interaction between text and context is such that a text exists by virtue of the 
assumed communicative context, and the nature of such contexts allows debate, 
criticism and rejection (if necessary) of the assumed or constructed communicative 
context. In fact, debate on conflicting interpretive claims based on the selfsame 
document can hardly do other than delve not into the text but into the assumed 
communicative context by means of which the text is, in each instance, construed. 
The implication for opponent hypotheses and for research into the interpretation of 
the letter to the Galatians should be apparent. It is not so much the text as assumed 
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communicative contexts which engender interpretive traditions and can change such 
traditions. 
4.4 The notion: only the text 
The central role of the notion the text in several opponent hypotheses can now, to 
my mind, be seen in a different light. It applies to the notion only the text as in some 
claims, and also to claims that the text provides or confirms a particular reading or 
construction (usually in opposition to another). This point can hardly be over-
emphasised in view of the preoccupation of New Testament scholarship with the text 
- an aspect which became abundantly clear in discussing the occasion of the letter to 
the Galatians. 
Firstly, a text can sponsor different data, and each set of data will support the inter-
pretive theory or assumed context sponsored by it in the first place (the instance of 
the hermeneutical circle between text and context). That is why one sometimes 
hears that a certain interpretation does not correspond to the text (the opponent's 
interpretation), but another (one's own interpretation) is confirmed by the text (see 
Hirsch 1967:166). 
However, if a text does not exist prior to being construed, and if a text can be con-
strued by means of any number of socio-cultural systems, then the claim that only 
the text has been read is misleading if not false. Thus, the second principle is that we 
. cannot sharply distinguish between what is in a text and what we bring to a text (see 
Juhl 1980:293). If, in the case of a foreign text, a particular socio-cultural system is 
not argued, it is implicitly provided: that of the interpreter's world. 
My intention is not to deny that a text should be 'investigated with a view to 
indicators given in the text as clues for how the text should be read' (Vorster 
1984:108). On the contrary, this should merely be done in a more controlled manner 
where external measures prevent the confirmation of assumed positions. Indicators 
as well as clues are embedded and find their meaning in a socio-cultural system of 
codes and conventions. Thus clues are identified by means of such a system, and 
since different systems result in different indicators and clues identified by the 
reader, the claim that the text provides them is misleading. 
Apart from the effect of this argument on claims that only Paul's letter to the 
Galatians is read, that the text is the only source for constructing the context or that 
a particular reading is supported by the text, it also has far-reaching effects on 
claims using other ancient sources in support of an argument. An ancient text unre-
lated to the construing of the text within its own (argued) communicative context 
. cannot serve as outright evidence. Ancient sources become evidence once they are 
interpreted in the same manner. In some instances, paradoxically, a modern 
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scholar's interpretation of a particular (ancient) text may provide likelier evidence 
than a quotation from the text itself.22 
5 INTERPRETATION AS CREATION 
Unlike the linear model, where author, text and reader are separated and inter-
pretation is accordingly designated as either creation or discovery (see Herzog 1983; 
Vorster 1984:108-110), interpretation as discovery from an communicative point of 
view has a different content. If it is accepted that texts have changed from objects 
not only to reader-marks interaction but to an intricate relationship between marks, 
context and reader, then the meaning of interpretation as creation should be found 
within the boundaries of this methodological configuration and the resulting inter-
pretive practice. Interpretation as creation is constrained by a historical aim of inter-
pretation, by a new (learned) socio-cultural system of codes and conventions, and 
lately by the quest for validation of interpretive claims. Thus the nature of creation 
is not open-ended but contained within these parameters. 
Interpretation in its traditional sense (see Morgan 1988:1-5) is to make clear or to 
make sense of a text or text-analogue which is in some way unclear, vague, 
incomplete or seemingly contradictory. It aims to 'bring to light an underlying 
coherence or sense' (Taylor 1977:101; and see Skinner 1975:210-211). In this sense, 
says Collins, human beings will interpret as long as they think (see 1973:393). The 
problem, in short, is that the concept interpretation is used with a deplorable loose-
ness both by critics and by philosophers (see Skinner 1972:392), and New Testament 
studies are no exemption. 
It was argued that a text can be interpreted according to an allocratic norm, where 
the reader allocates authority to the reconstructed historical act of another person 
or community (to be referred to as interpretationa) or an autocratic norm, where the 
authority of interpretation resides in the reader's uncritically accepted cypher key 
(to be referred to as interpretationb). There need be no difference between the acts 
of creation involved, since a reader construes a text depending on the cypher key 
used. The difference is not between discovery and creation but between two kinds of 
creation: one that uses a past set of cypher keys as opposed to one that uses a con-
temporary set. The difference, in short, is between an interpretive act where two 
explicitly constructed worlds intersect and an interpretive act where the horizons to 
be fused are not made explicit but are embedded or incorporated into the inter-
preter's world. 
While the end result of interpretationa is the discovery of an author's or actor's 
meaning in saying or doing, the act itself is far from a mere discovery. A focus on the 
22 Evidence can no longer be seen as words quoted from an ancient text but rather the interpreta-
tion of these words in a responsible way. If one claims to give a historical interpretation, it should 
obviously adhere to the principles of historical interpretation. 
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original cypher key can indeed be seen as a discovery of the communicative intent of 
the author or actor, but without claiming any final authority for the text or reading, 
and without adhering to any positivistic assumptions. The aim of interpretation is to 
make clear 'the meaning originally present in a confused, fragmentary, cloudy form 
(Taylor 1977:103). The same assumption is expressed by Botha when he says that 
the purpose in interpreting a text is 'the discovery of the communicative event', since 
communication - that is, 'the making manifest of an informative intention to others, 
in the sense of producing and interpreting evidence' (1990h:60) - is a fundamental 
human activity. 
Primarily, interpretation in the sense of the exploitative approach is not only the 
creation of meaning by a reader (interpretationb) but present-minded meaning. Too 
strong a focus on creation causes a reader to read his or her own creation, since the 
words of a text are re-spoken from a new perspective and the words become an 
ownerless sequence of signs (see Abrams 1979:567). While the ideal of this 
approach (that understanding a text is like understanding a person) is acceptable, 
Wright correctly points out that understanding is primarily defined as agreement 
.with the other person (see 1984:96) or the aesthetic pleasure a text provides (see 
Juhl 1984:71). It cannot be confrontation in the sense of discovering differentness. 
Two concluding remarks will suffice. Firstly, the discovery-creation distinction is 
misleading in that creation by the reader which does not focus on the present cypher 
key is wrongly regarded as an act of discovery. Secondly, the distinction between 
interpretationa and interpretationb becomes important when interpretive claims are to 
be evaluated. In terms of the exploitative approach, this conceptual distinction 
between interpretationa and interpretationb is either neglected or rejected if not con-
sidered impossible. The meaning, significance and application of a text are neces-
sarily one and the same thing according to this view. The dangers of conceptual 
hijacking should be apparent. 
6 TIIE MEANING OF TIIE MEANING OF A TEXT 
6.1 A concept in search of content 
The words mean and meaning are used in a wide range of contexts and with several 
·different meanings (see Lyons 1981:13; Stout 1982:3). Skinner (1972:396-397) distin-
guishes at least three different meanings of the word meaning: 'what specific words 
mean' in a work (meaninga), secondly, what a work means to me (meaningb), and 
thirdly, meaning in the sense of 'What does the writer mean by what he says in this 
work?' (meaningc). 
What, then, is the rationale of pointing out the distinctive meanings attributed to the 
concept meaning? Especially in the case of texts from ancient or foreign cultures, 
the distinction is in fact significant. 
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The distinction between different meanings, or the failure to make one, strikes at 
the heart of the argument. It either allows differences to be apparent or it allows the 
hijacking of concepts and definitions to further the nonhistorical paradigm. 
Although few scholars would deny the possibility of determining meaninlf of a text, 
the concept meaning is taken over by proponents of the exploitative approach as if 
such a possibility does not exist. By claiming the concept meaning for meaningb 
exclusively, the onus of argument is placed on those who see a necessity to distin-
guish meaningb from meaningc. It is even more noticeable in that scholars who do 
. make the distinction are not judged by the standards of their own paradigm. One 
example will suffice. In comparing the viewpoints of Gadamer and Hirsch, Herzog 
(see 1983:110-111) fails to point out that the concept meaning as used by them refers 
to different entities: meaningb and meaningc respectively. Hirsch prefers meaninlf 
without denying that any other cypher key can be used in reading a text, thus, of the 
meaningb kind (see for example 1969:58). 
Secondly, interpretive claims should match interpretive aims. Suffice it to point out 
that when the historical meaning (meaninlf) is taken seriously, it has far-reaching 
effects not only on method but also on interpretive claims. Without using a historical 
methodological configuration (cypher key), no claim as to historical meaning can be 
made. 
Given the nature of Paul's letters as texts of communication and not literary works 
of art, together with interpretive claims that Paul's message is important, interpreta-
tions can hardly consist of anything other than historical claims. From a meaningb 
point of view Paul's communication is most often seen as a mere confirmation of 
tradition - perhaps one of the reasons why the opponent question keeps on haunting 
·modern interpreters. It provides a useful peg on which contemporary theological 
conflicts can be hung. Small wonder the identified opponents are so often reminis-
cent of contemporary ecclesiastical or religious conflicts. 
6.2 Meaningc, significance, and meanUq/J of a text 
It has been argued in the previous chapter (§ 5.3.2) that an emphasis on the (pre-
sent) relevance of an ancient text, a foreign culture or a distant historical era need 
not result in mere antiquarianism. In fact, it is given in the different definitions of 
what is relevant: the contribution to human discourse versus present-minded mean-
ing. The question, however, remains: in what way can.the meaning of a text still be 
of value from a communicative point of view? 
If one's aim of interpretation is to escape from a mere recreation of texts to satisfy 
the need for present relevance, and to build in some constraints against subjectivism 
- thus, to respect the datedness of texts and cultures - then at least two aspects of 
the meaning of a text (what the text means and what the author may have meant) 
become relevant (see Skinner 1988:271; LaCapra 1983:29-30). Scholars, however, 
·differ on how to deal with them. It will be argued that the distinction between mean-
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ingc, significance, and meaningb of a text creates room for interpreting a text without 
falling into the trap of mere subjectivism or objectivism. A few proposals will suffice. 
Juhl and others argue that 'to understand a literary work is, in virtue of our concept 
of the meaning of a literary work, to understand what the author intended to convey 
or express' (Juhl 1980:47; and see Juhl 1980:12).23 The difficulty with this position is 
that it can very easily be interpreted as a neglect of historical scholarship (see 
Hirsch 1983:747). Secondly, this empirical claim is open to criticism. Most critics do 
not search for the historical author's intention. 
Skinner takes another route. He argues that any text must include an intended 
meaning and 'the recovery of that meaning certainly constitutes a precondition of 
understanding what its author may have meant' (1988:271-272). Thus, while the 
meaning of a text is not to be identified with the intentions of the author, he cor-
rectly emphasises that texts may have much more meaning than an author intended 
at a specific moment.24 Hirsch and Skinner would certainly agree with Abrams that 
'[i]f we set out not to create meanings, but to understand what the sequence of 
sentences in a literary work mean, then we have no choice except to read according 
to the linguistic strategy the author of the work employed, and expected us to 
employ' (1979:587). 
Hirsch, to my mind, takes one further step to avoid not only the present-minded but 
also the antiquarian interpretations characteristic of the communicative approach. 
He provides a further category, namely the significance of a text. In short, he (see 
198Sb:17-18) distinguishes between the meaning, significance, and re-authoring of a 
text; in other words, between meaningc, significance, and meaningb (which includes 
all subsequent re-authoring of the word sequence of a text by anyone in a situation 
different from that of the author) respectively. 
Since the historical meaning (meaningc) of a text or culture is important, Hirsch 
imported the analytical distinction which functions as a heuristic device to distin-
23 The implication is that critics always do understand what the author intended. Juhl argues that 
what critics do when they interpret a text is to appeal (mostly implicitly) to the author's intention (see 
1980:45-65). This view is shared by Knapp and Michaels: ' ... what a text means and what its author 
intends it to mean are identical' (1982:731). Knapp and Michaels believe, according to Hirsch, that the 
author's intention 'is already present in every construing' (Hirsch 1983:746), since they argue that 'the 
object of all reading is always the historical author's intention, even if the historical author is the 
·universal muse' (1983:798). 
24 Skinner's difference with Hirsch on this point is a matter of strategy and not of principle. Hirsch 
would certainly agree with Skinner that it would be amazing 'if all the meanings, implications, connota-
tions and resonances that an ingenious interpreter might legitimately claim to find in a given text could 
in turn be shown to reflect its author's intentions at every point' (Skinner 1988:269). Hirsch confirms 
that the words of a given text can be interpreted in terms of almost any number of cypher keys and an 
ingenious interpreter can indeed know much more about the subject matter than an author, or detect 
much more meaning than an author intended to convey (see 1984b). 
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guish between the meaning and significance of a text or text-analogue. This distinc-
tion is inevitable if one accepts the argument that meaning is an intentional object.25 
To repeat the words from the epigraph of this chapter: 
Meaning, then, may be conceived as a self-identical schema whose 
boundaries are determined by an originating speech event, while sig-
nificance may be conceived as a relationship drawn between that self-
identical meaning and something, anything, else. 
(Hirsch 1984b:204 )26 
However much he came to amend27 his original description of the content of mean-
ing (see 1984b:210), he has not given up the analytical distinction between meaning 
and significance. He came to accept that certain present applications of a text can 
still belong to the meaning rather than the significance of a text. Thus he has come 
much closer to Gadamer's view on application, but with one clear difference: while 
Gadamer argues for the necessity of differentness of meaning in different applica-
tions of a text, Hirsch argues for the possibility of sameness (see 1984b:214). The 
real differences lie in the commitment (or lack of commitment) to datedness or his-
toricality, and the accompanied exposition (or lack) of critical standards. 
25 He bases this on Husserl's argument concerning the human ability to bracket experiences (see 
Hirsch 1960:467-469; 1975:308; 1976:3-6; 1984b:204). 'The brackets implied by the terms "meaning" and 
"significance" do in fact represent something that most of us believe we experience in verbal discourse, 
namely, an alien meaning, something meant by an implied author or speaker who is not ourselves' 
(1976:6). He finds support for it in the cognitive psychology of Piaget's research on children' construc-
tion of reality. It is concerned with the way we come 'to understand a stable self-identity of physical 
·objects, despite great variations in our perceptual experience of those objects' (Hirsch 1975:309). By 
using 'schemata' (1975:309) which we construct and which correspond to what, in our linguistic experi-
ences, we call meanings, we are able to overcome 'our infantile confusions of content and context' 
(Hirsch 1976:3). Those who deny the possibility of recognising an object or content from its context do 
not live by this view. If it were not possible, it would be impossible to know any object whatsoever or to 
identify the same object (or content) in another context. 
26 Much of the criticism against Hirsch may be due to his imprecise formulation of this distinction 
between fixed meaning and changing significance. In his initial work he relates meaning exclusively to 
what the author meant by the use of a particular sign sequence (see 1967:8). He has, however, extended 
this concept to include meaning as distinct from significance in that 'meaning is the determinate repre-
sentation of a text for an interpreter' (Hirsch 1976:79). Significance, then, is 'meaning-as-related-to-
something-else' (Hirsch 1979:80). Although the meaning for an interpreter stays the same, the sig-
nificance of that meaning 'can change with the changing contexts in which that meaning is applied' 
(1976:80). That the distinction between meaning and significance is not limited to the field of literary 
studies is argued in terms of another example, that of biography: 'everyone would agree that there is a 
difference between a man's life on the one hand, and its significance within various historical, moral, 
and social contexts, on the other' (Hirsch 1967:141). 
27 Two amendments of his original explication of the concept meaning are as follows. Firstly, some 
present applications may still be considered to belong to the meaning of a text provided the datedness 
of the meaning intent has not changed (see 1984b:217). Secondly, he allows for the provisionality of 
speech and meaning. In everyday life as in scientific language, Hirsch argues, we allow for a certain 
amount of alteration and deviation regarding datedness and sameness: 'It appears from this that mean-
. ing can tolerate a small revision in mental content and remain the same - but not a big revision' 
( 1984b:221). 
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From the point of view of a communicative approach a certain distinction between 
what an author meant and what a text means is inevitable.28 But even further, 
between a stable meaning and its application (significance) and the re-authoring of 
the words of a text by any reader by means of any other set of socio-cultural codes 
and conventions. A critic's first job however is to recover the past speech act. 
This distinction gives contemporary readers of Paul's letter to the Galatians an entry 
into Paul's world of meaning and allows the possibility of transposing it to another 
world. Lafargue expresses this aptly. He accepts the necessity of distinguishing 
between meaning and significance, especially with regard to texts from another cul-
ture (ancient texts). He prefers 'two stages of interpretation' (1988a:356), which 
implies - in the case of Mark (hence also of Paul) - a first stage where one 'can see 
reality as he saw it' and then a second stage 'in which one reflects on the relevance 
to the modern situation of this experience with Mark' (1988a:356).29 
7 A COMMUNICATIVE METHODOLOGY: TIIE HISTORICAl.r 
NONHISTORICAL CONTINUUM 
The notion has been fostered that a clear-cut black-and-white distinction is possible 
(at the theoretical level at any rate) between historical and nonhistorical interpreta-
tions (communicative and exploitative approaches), but this issue requires critical 
. consideration. In actual fact, hardly any scholar falls into any extreme position on 
the continuum. Objectors from an exploitative point of view in particular often refer 
to theoretical or potential objectives as historical (see Wright 1984:84). Thus the 
question remains whether it is possible to decide when a nonhistorical interpretation 
crosses the boundary to become historical and vice versa - in other words, what the 
exact preconditions are for a communicative approach. Evidently this question 
originates both from the variety of definitions of historical interpretation and from 
the practical situation of scholarly claims to historical interpretation.30 
28 If it is accepted that the marks on paper become a text only when it is construed by means of a 
particular cypher key, then, strictly speaking, there is no such category as the literal meaning of a text 
or 'what a text means' as distinct from what a reader construes it to mean. To put it differently, every 
construing of the marks to mean presents a literal meaning. To know whether an author was joking or 
conveying information, whether an actor was praying or threatening, holds the key to presenting or 
misrepresenting a text. Without stating it absolutely, the difficulty of bypassing the author or actor of a 
text leads to the risk of misreading and misrepresenting the source (see Morgan 1988:10). 
29 LaFargue claims to differ from Hirsch in that, according to him, Hirsch would defme meaning as 
an understanding of an author's mind (see 1988a:356 n 27). This is clearly a misrep~esentation of 
Hirsch's position. 
30 It is perfectly possible that an expert historian or anthropologist may get to a position to claim 
understanding from within of another culture or era (see Hanson & Martin 1973:206). A New Testa-
ment or a classical scholar may get to know the first-century Mediterranean world to a point where it 
becomes possible to act and operate as natives would have done. It would not, however, be fit for 
teaching purposes (see Hanson & Martin 1973:206), since the cross-cultural dilemma has to be faced 
all over again. This can only happen by means of the whole process of learning a new set of codes and 
conventions, and a new system of meaning, together with the intricate process of mediating between 
contemporary models and ancient meanings. Similarly, the claims of historical interpretations (which 
can be criticised on these methodological points) cannot escape critical testing in relation both to aims 
and to the methodological means of reaching them. 
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My answer is a matter of both principle and practice. The commitment to respect 
the historicality of texts, cultures and historical eras should, in practice, be comple-
mented by a methodological configuration which makes provision in an integrated 
and explicit way for dealing with otherness. Without this, historical interpretation in 
a communicative approach remains a mirage. 
It should be noted that, in the actual practice of interpretation and the construction 
of a communicative context, the idea of a historical-nonhistorical continuum would 
be helpful in dealing with the issue of claims to historical interpretation. In what 
sense could it be claimed that a communicative interpretation of a text or a culture 
has been reached? 
Historical interpretations of a communicative nature are in principle, always open to 
questioning, revision and even correction. Thus we need to accept the idea of a con-
tinuum of historical interpretations, which may to a greater or lesser degree resem-
ble other attempts at historical interpretation. In practice it should be accepted that, 
by means of a well-argued case, the defects of a particular interpretation can be 
indicated and alternatives proposed. In the words of Geertz (1973:29), interpretive 
anthropology 'is a science whose progress is marked less by a perfection of con-
sensus than by a refinement of debate' (italics mine). 
The basis on which an ideal communicative approach is grounded (the theory and 
philosophy of science) should be distinguished from the basis on which results (their 
epistemic status) are decided and justified. Nobody can be sure that a historical 
interpretation has been reached, but the results can be presented for discussion, 
dialogue and critique. Bernstein's ideal of 'dialogical communities' in which in 
. everyday life, we 'reconcile differences through debate, conversation, and dialogue' 
(1983:223) is an appropriate metaphor to describe it. 
In the idea of validation I find openness to dialogue and the possibility of persua-
sion. At a practical level of interpretation, what is needed is that we should seek to 
'discover some common ground to reconcile differences through debate, conversa-
tion, and dialogue' (Bernstein 1983:223). In a word, the relative objectivity of a 
hermeneutical theory of science is guaranteed by intersubjective approval by the 
scientific community - approval not of results and predictions but of procedures, 
argument and debate. One can do nothing but convince, argue for and against, and 
rely on the critical faculty of fellow scholars. The strength of a hermeneutic activity 
lies in the 'realism of continual assessment in place of the illusion of final proof 
(Richardson in Shankman 1984:275). 
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8 TIIE IETIER TO TIIE GAIATIANS AND BEING RETRAINED IN TIIE 
FIRST-CENTURY MEDITERRANEAN WORID 
This has been a long-drawn-out, but necessary exercise to justify the methodological 
configuration of the social-scientific approach to be used as a cypher key in reading 
Paul's letter to the Galatians. My aim of interpretation is to interpret Paul's com-
munication within the context of his first-century world; to make clear what answers 
he gave and what contribution he made to human discourse. Thus what St Paul says 
cannot in such an enterprise determine what Paul said, but what Paul said can and 
should influence what St Paul is saying. My plea is simply: let Paul in the first place 
be Paul before we make him St Paul. The meaning of Paul for present-day readers, 
according to the values and attitudes of a (communicative) historical interpretation, 
depends on being retrained in the socio-cultural system of his first-century world. 
·To achieve that aim, the methodological components of the social-scientific cypher 
key has been spelled out - especially in view of the deficiencies identified in a 
history-of-ideas and other nonhistorical approaches to Paul's communication. 
Basically, three issues have been argued. Firstly, a case has been made for a particu-
lar definition of historical interpretation: a definition amplified by the values and 
attitudes of a particular (historical) aim of interpretation which, to my mind, are 
closely connected to some humanistic values. It has been argued secondly, that since 
it is possible to escape one's own horizon, it is possible to devise a methodology 
which provides in an integrated way for the possibility of understanding from within 
and the commitment to respect otherness. Finally, the methodological configuration 
has been spelled out by explicating some views on central components (such as text, 
context and interpretation) in the interpretive process. 
This exercise is hopefully not without its rewards, since its effects reach into the 
realms of both the methodological and the historical components of the present 
cypher key. It provides a basis not only for justifying the social-scientific meth-
odology to be used but also for situating and criticising adverse positions and inter-
· pretive (historical) claims. Not only methodological components but also the his-
torical components of a cypher key can benefit from this discussion. This meth-
odological discussion will prove to be the silent but effective partner in interpretive 
decisions, arguments, evidence and criticism of other views in the debate on an 
appropriate communicative context for the interpretation of Paul's letter to the 
Galatians. 
Taken as an alternative interpretive strategy to a history-of-ideas approach, the con-
straints of a communicative approach will have far-reaching effects on studies of the 
conflict in Galatia. Interpretations of the letter to the Galatians which mostly rely on 
the notion of opponents as a cypher key (even the opponents in the letter and not 
the real opponents assuming a historical basis) have to engage in learning and 
.explicating the context and world of first-century Mediterranean people. In the light 
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of the developments in historical and especially interdisciplinary research, New 
Testament scholars can hardly continue to avoid or ignore the standards set for his-
torical interpretations. Claims such as that only the text is read, or the practice of 
quoting or referring to ancient documents without reference to the meaningful 
world of those documents, can hardly go unchallenged. Neither can the historical 
and cultural gap between the first-century Mediterranean world and contemporary 
worlds be ignored or else bridged by assuming commensurability - at least, not if 
historical respectability is to be claimed. What should be avoided as far as possible 
is to leave contemporary biases unchallenged not only because of insufficient his-
torical studies but also because of insufficient methodological configurations. 
Determining what Paul was doing in what he said in the first-century Mediterranean 
world is an altogether different and difficult matter. In the chapters that follow, a 
beginning will be made in challenging some of the obvious (historical) assumptions 
on the nature of the conflict. An alternative communicative context will be sug-
gested without trying to present a complete analysis of the communication. At best, 
the nature of the conflict and the occasion of the letter can be more meaningfully 
situated in the first-century Mediterranean world. 
CHAPTER4 
SOME (UNEXAMINED) ASSUMPTIONS AND PERSPECilVES: ON THE 
NATURE AND CHARACfER OF THE PAULINE COMMUNITIES 
A new understanding of Early Judaism (ca. 250 BCE 
to 200 CE) is now appearing in scholarly pub-
lications. The old view of first-century (CE) Judaism 
was simplistic ... It was monolithic, orthodox, and 




In the first chapter of this study it was indicated that a particular communicative 
context is presupposed in most opponent hypotheses. In this chapter the objective is 
to elaborate on what that communicative context consists of. That is to say, the focus 
in this chapter will shift to an examination of some of the main historical assump-
tions underlying the communicative context of opponent hypotheses.I 
The concept communicative context is deliberately used in order to avoid concepts 
such as the occasion of the letter or the situation in Galatia, which are often very nar-
rowly defined. Contrary to the notion that the occasion of the letter (or the situation 
in Galatia) can be spelled out in a paragraph or two, it will be indicated that the 
. whole cultural context - as well as the socio-cultural codes and conventions implied 
in one's construction of the conflict and accompanying construction of the nature of 
the Pauline communities - must be included in the debate. 
Although the wider communicative context is usually disregarded in discussions on 
the occasion of the letter or the situation in Galatia, at least two sets of historical 
components (subsets of context) were identified in the first chapter as determining 
most constructions of the nature of the Pauline communities: the Pauline movement 
within the expansion of the early Jesus movement and, secondly, first-century 
Judaism as a subculture for Paul's activities. The first assumes a particular view with 
regard to the expansion of the early Jesus movement; the second a normative 
Judaism from which the Pauline movement had seceded. I shall therefore proceed 
to examine the received view on the expansion of the Pauline communities and their 
setting within first-century Judaism as the subculture for Paul's activities. 
1 It should be realised that these aspects are seldom raised to a conscious level in opponent 
. hypotheses. More often than not, the aspects to be discussed function implicitly and even, sometimes, 




The reasons given for, and the consequences of, the separation between the Pauline 
movement on the one hand and Jewish Christianity or first-century Judaism on the 
other provide several arguments which form the building blocks of opponent 
hypotheses. The history-of-ideas approach to the conflict in Galatia has left its mark 
on the historical components of the assumed communicative context. Together they 
provide the framework for the early Jesus movement and for first-century Judaism 
within which the nature of the conflict is determined. If assumptions in these fields 
are rejected as outdated or inappropriate, opponent hypotheses as a cypher key can 
hardly be maintained unchanged. 
2 THE EXPANSION OF TIIE EARLY JESUS MOVEMENT 
Since the mutual relationships between the different groups within the early Jesus 
movement are focal to this study - particularly Paul and his so-called opponents in 
the letter to the Galatians - the historical expansion of the movement is of great 
concern. In fact, more than forty years ago Schubert suggested that the 'ultimate 
task of the historical student of Paul is to determine his place and influence in the 
Christian movement during its first three decades' (1947:223). However, '[v]ery diffi-
cult and still a controversial matter' Schoeps says, 'is the exact demarcation of the 
groups within primitive Christianity' (1961:63). This point should, to my mind, be 
stretched even further. Not only the maps but also the principles and criteria applied 
in drawing the maps are in question. Willis reminds us that 'since the provocative 
work of F.C. Baur ... there has developed and expanded a consensus that the earliest 
Christian church was characterized by partisan strife and dogmatic disagreement' 
(1987:265). Maps are apparently drawn on the basis of conflicting viewpoints on 
dogmatic or doctrinal matters. 
To be sure, the existence of doctrinal differences and dogmatic disagreements in the 
Jesus movement are not questioned. The issue is whether such differences and dis-
agreements should be taken as the major principle in drawing the maps of early 
Christian group formation and expansion. 
It goes without saying that an alteration in the received view on the expansion of 
early Christianity will have an important bearing on how the opponents are viewed, 
their identity determined and their relationship with other members of the Jesus 
movement described. In discussing the history of research, I shall therefore touch in 
passing on some leading views on the expansion of the early Jesus movement. 
2.1 Opposing groups in early Christianity 
Jervell roughly identifies three stages commonly accepted in scholarly circles with 
regard to the development of the early Jesus movement: 
Christianity was in the beginning (Palestinian) Jewish Christianity. 
After that came a period where we find side by side the Hellenistic 
Jewish Christianity, Gentile Hellenistic Christianity, and Paul -with 
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Palestinian Jewish Christianity somewhere in the background. In this 
period, the second one, Jewish Christianity was forced back and acted 
solely in defense. In the third period Gentile Christianity triumphed, 
whereas the Jewish Christians returned to the synagogue or lived as 
Gentile Christians or settled as an isolated and sectarian Christianity 
or Christian Judaism, half Jewish, half Christian. 
(1984b:29) 
The second phase, 'ending with the total victory of Gentile Christianity about A.D. 
70' (Jervell 1984a:l3}, is the setting commonly assumed as a context for the inter-
pretation of Paul's letters and the identification of his opponents. 
Part of the legacy of Baur, with whom the search for Paul's opponents started in 
modern New Testament scholarship, is a tradition of interpretation which still 
·determines the direction of research. Paul's letter to the Galatians is read with the 
aim of identifying the opponents, since it reflects the theological and doctrinal con-
troversy between Jewish and Gentile Christianity. Thus, in the words of Schmithals, 
since the time of the Tiibingen school our scholars have taken for 
granted as the presupposition of all their studies of primitive 
Christianity that there were weighty theological antagonisms between 
Paul and James. 
(1965:104 n 2) 
Most scholars, however implicitly and unconsciously, share the premise of Hawkins 
(see 1971:79) that at least one assumption can safely be brought to the study of early 
Christianity, namely that there were judaizers or, as he says, Jewish Christians in the 
early Jesus movement who were theologically opposed to Paul and to the Gentile 
Christian groups. In short, the argument goes, these groups originated, were defined, 
and came into conflict over theology and doctrine.2 
2.2 The legacy of Baur 
But it is the letter to the Galatians that offers us the choicest parallel 
to the polemical tendency of both Letters to the Corinthians and 
2 Hawkins aptly illustrates the influence of assumptions about the expansion of the Jesus movement 
on the search for Paul's opponents. His reliance on 'general human experience' for analogies is illumi-
nating as a general practice in many studies. He says that 'there will always be people who naturally 
believe that their version of Christianity (or of whatever might be in question) is the only valid version. 
To defend such a proposition methodologically, I suppose I would have to enter into some kind of his-
torical or sociological or psychological or philosophical discussion as to whether we can expect to find 
the same tendencies of "human nature" in all ages and climes' (1971:85). That such a task is not 
undertaken is significant in the light of the fact that his assumption is tacitly taken for granted in most 
interpretations of Paul's letters. First-century people, the assumption goes, were as much concerned 
about conceptual matters (whether theological, doctrinal or something else) as Western people are 
today. This is a perfect example of what has been designated superficial psychologism (see chapter 2 § 
2.1), which is to be avoided in a social-scientific interpretation. 
106 
107 
which throws further light on the nature of the attacks against which 
the apostle had to defend himself. The opponents whom the apostle 
attacks in the letter to the Galatians belong wholly in the same class 
with those with whom he had to do in the Letters to the Corinthians ... 
The attack on these Judaizing false teachers makes up a large part of 
the Letter to the Galatians, and here there can be no doubt about the 
matter. 
(Baur quoted by Kummel 1972:129) 
Baur identified two groups in early Christianity, namely Pauline (i.e. Hellenistic or 
Gentile) Christianity and Jewish Christianity (see Klijn 1974:419; Riegel 1978:411; 
Taylor 1990:314). The most important witnesses he used for the Petrine or Jewish 
Christian group were the Pseudo-Clementine writings (see Klijn 1974:420; 
Ludemann 1983:15-16) and Paul's letters. Jewish Christianity was the oldest group 
in the early church. They were found in the church of Jerusalem, later in sects like 
the Ebionites, and 'Paul's opponents in Galatia, Philippi and especially Corinth 
were representatives of the same group' (Klijn 1974:420; see Ludemann 1983:14, 19-
20). 'According to F.C. Baur it was the Judaizers from Jerusalem who must be held 
responsible for the violent controversies in the Pauline mission area' says Schmithals 
(1965:13) and, as is clear from Baur's quotation above, Paul developed his doctrine 
in complete opposition to that of the primitive church (see Furnish 1964/5:342). 
The legacy of Baur on Pauline research can be stated in the words of Kummel: 'die 
Argumentation des Paulus wird durch die jeweilige Front entscheidend bestimmt, 
und nur das Verstandnis dieser Front ermoglicht es, die Gedanken des Paulus voll 
zu begreifen' (1970:56). It is clear that the detail of Baur's construction is not 
accepted any more (see Wilson 1984:9; Lyons 1985:77). However, in one way or 
another his theory on the nature of the conflict has persisted. Today it is most often 
not Peter but James, Jesus's brother, who is credited with the leadership of the 
Jewish Christian group in Jerusalem (see Keck 1979:5). Schmithals points out that 
anyone who takes the usual view of the agitation of the Judaizers against Paul 
'generally attributes the responsibility for it to a separate extremist movement 
amongst the Palestinian Jewish Christians' (1965:13). 
In order to modify and tone down F.C. Baur's historical sketch it has 
today become customary to assign these opponents, or perhaps groups 
of them, to some kind of Jewish-Christian circles in Palestine with an 
ultra-Jacobean bias, who had not been sent directly by James, but who 
had a certain right to appeal to him. 
(Schmithals 1965:106) 
In final analysis, Paul's letter to the Galatians is to be understood both as the prod-
uct of theological and doctrinal disputes in early Christianity and as part and parcel 
thereof. · 
While Baur's outline is widely accepted, the particulars are vigorously debated. As 
Howard (see 1979:1) suggests, it is the influence of the Tiibingen school's perception 
107 
108 
of the problem which is still prevalent today. In the words of Meeks, it is the 'ghost 
of Baur' that still haunts us (see Meeks 1983:229 n 41; Keck 1979:5; Willis 1987:268-
269). 
At least three dimensions of the direction Baur gave to Pauline research are sig-
nificant. First of all, since the existence of opposing groups, and the assumption that 
Paul's letters are a reaction to opponents, are taken for granted (see Schmithals 
1965:103-104 n 2; Noack 1980:17), the occasion of the letter is very seldom disputed. 
·In fact, all Paul's letters are seldom if ever read without the aim of identifying 
opponents and their views. Even scholars aware of the dubious character of mirror 
reading continue to read Paul's letters (and especially the letter to the Galatians) as 
an answer to and/or attack on opponents. Even scholars who have trouble with a 
too narrow view of the occasion of the letter do not abandon the notion of 
opponents with an alternative version of the gospel as a/the significant interpretive 
key (e.g. Lategan 1988a). 
Secondly it is accepted that, if Paul did write in reaction to opponents, his perspec-
tive on events and the opponents can be unconditionally accepted. Without much 
fear of contradiction it can be said that most (if not all) scholars who write on the 
identity of Paul's opponents (and most New Testament scholars do at one time or 
another make a comment in that regard) accept that, historically speaking, Paul was 
the leading figure in early Christianity (in its expansion at any rate) and was 
opposed by deviant and malicious Judaizers. His views on other followers of Jesus 
are usually taken not only at face value but also as normative. It may be that the his-
tory of interpretation turned the traitor into the hero and vice versa. Perhaps 
Schubert's warning that to 'see in Paul the creator or even the one great figure in 
the history of the first century is a case of misplaced hero-worship' (1947:223) needs 
to be taken to heart. 
Thirdly Baur, in explicating the nature of the early Christian groups, gave promi-
nence to the doctrinal or theological disagreements between Jewish and Hellenistic 
Christianity (see Fletcher 1982:86). To put it differently, groups in the early Jesus 
movement were constituted primarily on the basis of theological or doctrinal dif-
ferences and of their respective belief systems. Other dimensions, such as social and 
cultural factors, are neglected or ignored. It is, however, a moot point whether jus-
tice is done by reading Paul's letters as if the great theologi.an is fighting for the true 
doctrine and pure theology, widely accepted in the Jesus movement and now under 
threat from malicious Jewish Christians (e.g. Du Toit 1990). 
Although Baur's construction of the communicative context is no longer taken for 
granted, his insistence on clearly circumscribed groups with theological or doctrinal 
disagreements is still widely accepted. It received a new stimulus in the work of 
Heitmuller and Bultmann especially. 
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2.3 The stimulus of Heitmiiller and Bultmann 
Although the issue of opponents cannot be detached from the Jesus-Paul debate, no 
exhaustive overview of that debate will be undertaken here. The Jesus-Paul debate 
. is strongly influenced by Baur's hypotheses, and modern scholarly debates on the 
issue usually start with Baur. I only mention some of the highlights which are still 
prevalent in much research. 3 
Meeks says that Heitmuller made a fundamental and irreversible discovery about 
·Paul. Contrary to Baur's, and subsequently Wrede's idea that Paul was the second 
founder of Christianity (see Meeks 1972:275, 440; Furnish 1964/5:350; Wilson 
1984:4-5), Heitmuller considered that the Hellenisation of Christianity had taken 
place before Paul (see Hengel 1983:32). 
Heitmuller argues that Paul probably got to know Christianity not in Jerusalem but 
at Damascus. The implication is that Paul did not receive his first impressions of 
Christianity from 'der Urgemeinde ... auf judischem Boden in Jerusalem und Judaa' 
but from 'eine bereits weiter entwickelte Form ... ein hellenistisches Christentum' 
(Heitmuller 1912:326). He concludes that it is clear that on the soil of Diaspora 
Judaism the gospel 'eine andere Nuance erhalten konnte und muBte als auf 
spezifisch judischem Boden wie Jerusalem' (1912:329). The character of this kind of 
Christianity we see 'aber auch ganz deutlich und sicher an der Gestalt des "Hel-
lenisten", d.h. des griechisch redenden Diasporajuden' (1912:329). According to 
Heitmuller, the external and internal development of early Christianity can best be 
perceived from this construction. What is commonplace today as the line of devel-
opment from Jesus to Paul (see Jervell 1984a:13; Willis 1987:265) was expressed by 
. Heitmuller as 'Jesus - Urgemeinde - htllenistisches Christentum - Paulus' 
(1912:330; see also Furnish 1964/5:359). 
Heitmiiller's influence not only on the Hellenist hypothesis in general (and with it 
the popularisation of the existence of Hellenistic Christianity and its domination of 
Jewish Christianity) but especially on Bultmann should not be underestimated (see 
Bultmann 1960:185; Furnish 1964/5:365-366; Marshall 1972/3:271-273). Says Bult-
mann: 'Geschichtliche Voraussetzung fiir die paulinische Theologie ist einfach das 
Kerygma der Urgemeinde, vielmehr das der hellenistischen Gemeinde, durch deren 
Vermittlungjenes erst an Paulus gelangte' (1980:66). 
In a sense Bultmann in his Theologie des Neuen Testaments (1980), first published in 
1948, popularised the idea of the role of the primitive Hellenistic community in the 
3 
'The Jesus-Paul debate can be divided conveniently into two main stages: from Baur to Wrede, 
and from Bultmann to the present' (Wilson 1984:3). For that convenient reason I only mention Baur 
and Heitmiiller /Bultmann when focusing on the prevalent construction of opposing groups in early 
Christianity. For a useful review of the Jesus-Paul debate, see especially Furnish (1964/5). A more 
·recent discussion of some of the issues involved occur in the studies by Wedderburn (1985 and 1988). 
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life of Paul (see Goppelt 1970:63). In the very early stages of the Jesus movement he 
finds clear evidence of Das Kerygma der Urgemeinde which was changed considerably 
by das vorpaulinische hellenistische Christen/Um (see Bultmann 1980:34-186). The 
work of Hahn expanded this two-stage hypothesis to a three-stage hypothesis com-
prising at least three distinguishable positions in the pre-Pauline Church: Palestinian 
Jewish-Jewish Hellenistic - Hellenistic Gentile (see Marshall 1972/3:272; Hengel 
1983:35). 
Unlike Baur, who saw in Paul the deviation from the original Jewish Christianity, 
they succeeded in leaving behind the idea of Paul as influenced by a Hellenistic 
Christianity which was not interested in the historical Jesus (see Wilson 1984:4-5). 
The perception of the domination of Hellenistic (or Gentile) Christianity over 
Jewish Christianity was established by these founders and fathers of modern New 
Testament research on Paul. Furthermore, this basic scenario of conflicting wings 
·within the Jesus movement provided the milieu for speculations about the identity 
of Paul's opponents. 
The point is that Heitmuller, and later Bultmann, perpetuated an interpretation 
tradition - to be referred to as the traditional or received view - which to this day 
functions as one of the cornerstones upholding the idea of opposing forms of 
Christianity and hence as the breeding-ground for opponent hypotheses. In this line 
of argument the Hellenistic wing dominated the Jesus movement from very early on. 
The group around Stephen, the Hellenists, plays an important part in the arguments 
(see Heitmuller 1912:329-333; Bultmann 1980:67f), and one can hardly accept the 
Hellenist hypothesis without accepting the assumption that the Jewish Christian 
church in Jerusalem declined in power and influence. With this line of argument the 
scene was set for opponent hypotheses to flourish in New Testament research. 
2.4 Keeping a tradition on track: Von Harnack 
Without suggesting that there was a unified approach to the construction of the his-
tory of early Christianity, the predominant history-of-ideas approach can be pointed 
out as common denominator. Harnack, a near contemporary of Heitmuller, fiercely 
objected to the history-of-religions view (which was predominantly concerned with 
religious ideas: see Kummel 1972:206-225, 310). Harnack rejected notions of con-
flict in the early Jesus movement which imply religious influences from the environ-
ment on the early Jesus movement (see Kiimmel 1972:178). He maintained that 'it 
was the atemporal message of Jesus, understood rightly by Paul alone, that was at 
the center of the growth of Christianity' (White 1985/6:99). 
In opposition to other views on the expansion of the early Jesus movement he held 
that on clearly theological grounds Christianity was superior to all other religions 
(see Kummel 1972:310). His line of argument focuses on the internal theological 
reasons for the expansion of early Christianity in almost complete isolation not only 
from social and cultural processes but often also from the historical realities. The 
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·expansion of the Christian movement (even up to the present day) is powered by the 
atemporal, constant essence of the Christian message (see White 1985/6:99). Doc-
trinal, not historical or cultural reasons are given for the expansion of the early Jesus 
movement. 
The significance of Harnack's contribution lies in the subsequent separation, in 
many scholarly works, of religious ideas (theological or doctrinal) from the socio-
cultural and historical realities of the first-century Mediterranean world. In a dis-
tinct sense he confirmed the notion that the expansion of the Christian movement is 
to be described by means of the theological or doctrinal differences which may have 
existed. 
2.5 An emerging picture of early Christian expansion 
By way of summary we may list several (unexamined) assumptions which have 
developed to the status of received facts in many contemporary studies. 
First of all, not only the Pauline movement but also the other wings of the early 
·Jesus movement were constituted and typified primarily by dogmatic or doctrinal 
issues. 
Secondly, scholarly constructions assume that both the conflict between and the 
interaction within these groups were based on such matters. 
Thirdly, the distinction between Jewish and Hellenistic Christianity is taken as self-
explanatory. 
Finally, what is meant by Jew /Jewish in opposition to Gentile or Hellenistic is taken 
for granted. 
2.6 Paul's missionary practice and the assumed nature of the Pauline communities 
The contribution both from Acts and from Paul's letters forms an unmistakable part 
of most scholarly constructions of Paul's missionary practice. According to the 
generally approved view in scholarly circles, the contribution from Acts usually con-
sists of the notion of God-fearers and the argument that Paul started his missionary 
activities in Greco-Roman cities in Jewish synagogues (e.g. Malherbe 1983:64). 
Paul, on the other hand, provides the scholarly community with letters which 
apparently deal with doctrinal or dogmatic matters. 
Since all these issues will be discussed in greater detail in the course of this study, 
they are merely mentioned here for their contribution to the assumed social condi-
tions in which Paul carried on his activities. Notions about the nature of the Pauline 
communities, about the expansion of the Jesus movement, about the existence of 
conflicting groups, about Paul's missionary practice and about the assumed nature 
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of the Pauline communities all contribute to the received communicative context. 
However, they are rarely subjected to critical examination. 
While most of these issues will be addressed in the course of this study, the notion of 
Jewish Christianity will serve to challenge some of the facts about the existence of 
opposing groups in the early Jesus movement which are taken for granted in many 
scholarly circles. 
3 JEWISH CHRISTIANS: ARCHETYPE OF PAUL'S OPPONENTS 
The search for the opponents in the letter to the Galatians, as Fletcher points out, is 
most often done 'within the framework of a larger picture of the history of the early 
church' (1982:85). Crucial to that historical construction is the existence of Jewish 
and Hellenistic (or Gentile) Christianity. Jewish Christianity in most instances forms 
the dark backdrop against which the conduct of the opponents is described (see 
Klijn 1974:420). In the words of Schmithals: 
Whoever takes the usual view, when dealing with the agitation, 
whether great or small, of the Judaizers against Paul, generally 
attributes the responsibility for it to a separate extremist movement 
amongst the Palestinian Jewish Christians. 
(1965:13) 
Of the many issues discussed in scholarly circles to indicate the possible expansion 
of, and relationship between, the assumed groups within the early Jesus movement, 
Jewish Christianity is picked out as a test case. The Jerusalem conference, the 
Antioch incident, or the narratives in Acts about the Hellenists may also be 
examined in this regard. Jewish Christianity will be used as an example to 
demonstrate that the received view of the expansion of the early Jesus movement 
creates rather than solves problems. 
3.1 The received view of Jewish Christianity 
The received view of Jewish Christianity, although not unanimously accepted, at 
least contains most of the following elements. During the first few years after Jesus's 
death, the community in Jerusalem did not have a definite structure. The disciples 
who fled after his death probably returned to Jerusalem and established the circle of 
the 'Twelve'. At the time, round about 35-50 CE, the leaders of the Jerusalem com-
munity (Peter, John and James) were probably known as the 'pillars'. When Paul 
returned to Jerusalem somewhere between 55-60 CE, 'Jesus' brother James was 
alone the uncontested leader of the church' (Koester 1982:87; see Conzelmann 
1973:55). Prior to the Jewish war, just after the martyrdom of James in 62, they 
probably fled to Pella on the Jordan (see Koester 1982:87), but it is uncertain 
whether they ever returned to Jerusalem. Although there were Christians in 
Jerusalem after the war, it is generally accepted that the original community dis-
appeared during the war (see Conzelmann 1973: 111). 
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Many factors indicate 'that at first the Christians in Jerusalem understood them-
selves as a special group within the Jewish community' (Koester 1982:87; see Con-
zelmann 1973:43-44). Although they participated in the temple cult, practised cir-
cumcision and observed the dietary laws, they were radically different from the 
.other Jews in that they saw themselves as possessing the Spirit. Very early there 
must have been tensions and controversies in the Christian community at Jerusalem. 
3.2 Defining Jewish Christianity: basic characteristic 
'Jewish Christianity is, to be sure, a complex thing' (Strecker 1971:243). The concept 
Jewish Christianity4 is used for several separate entities; the term has been variously 
defined and there is no agreement on terminology (see Riegel 1978:410). If it is true 
that separate entities are represented by the selfsame concept while their definitions 
vary, obvious dangers are the problem of illegitimate transfer between them or else 
a vagueness that refers to no historical entity. 
Longenecker (see 1970:1-3) indicates that the history of research provides at least 
four different sets of criteria used in defining the concept: divisions on the basis of 
nationality, doctrine, imagery and chronology. 
In an ethnic sense the concept would refer to 'der jenigen Mitglieder der christliche 
Gemeinde, die Juden sind' (Ludemann 1983:54 ). Since almost all the missionaries 
·of the first generation were Jews, even if some (such as Paul and Barnabas) came 
from the Diaspora (see Koester 1982:198; Hengel 1983:40), such a designation 
would hardly be meaningful. Furthermore, it is much too wide a definition of the 
first Christian century, for that is 'to make Jewish Christianity synonymous with 
almost the entirety of the New Testament, with only the Lukan writings as possible 
exception' (Longenecker 1970:2). 
The first studies of Jewish Christianity were largely based on doctrinal criteria. They 
include the studies of Baur and Schoeps (see Riegel 1978:414). The variety in this 
field includes those who see Jewish Christians as people who, along with their 
Christian beliefs, held fast to the Mosaic law; or in terms of christology they were 
those who held that Jesus was God's promised Messiah, but he was not divine (see 
Longenecker 1970:2; Riegel 1978:414; Liidemann 1983:54). Taylor, however, argues 
that there is 'no sure way of defining the Christian Jews from the Gentiles on 
theological terms' (1990:314). 
In its chronological sense some wish to limit Jewish Christianity to the period prior 
to 70 CE while others want to speak in heterodox terms and date it after 70 CE (see 
4 According to Klijn, the modern study of Jewish Christianity began with FC Baur (see 1974:419; 
Longenecker 1970:5; Riegel 1978:411). For an overview of the history of research subsequent to Baur, 
see especially Klijn (1974:419-426), Velasco and Sabourin (1976) and Ludemann (1983:13-57). 
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Longenecker 1970:2-3; Riegel 1978:414). Chronological demarcations, says 
Longenecker, can even be included in any of the other definitions - as is the case in 
some studies focusing on the Ebionites and related heterodox groups in the second 
century (see Schoeps 1969:18-19; Kraft 1972:87; Klijn 1974:425). 
According to Ludemann, the use of Jewish conceptual imagery and terminology to 
define Jewish Christianity enjoys the greatest support (see 1983:53). Danielou and 
his student Longenecker use it as an umbrella term to designate 'a type of Christian 
outlook - the expression of Christianity in thought forms borrowed from 
· "Spatjudentum"'(Kraft 1972:87). Longenecker uses the concept Jewish Christianity: 
1. Ideologically, with reference to early Christians whose conceptual 
frame of reference and whose expressions were rooted in semitic 
thought generally and Judaism in particular. 2. Geographically, with 
reference to early Christianity which was either centred in Jerusalem 
or looked to the church in Jerusalem (whether actually or ideally) as 
its 'Mother Church', and sought to continue its ministry'. 
(1970:5) 
In the search for Paul's opponents this definition (accompanied by approaches 
focusing on doctrinal features) is arguably the predominant one.5 
However, 'as soon as we become aware of the fact that Christians of Jewish as well 
as those of Gentile descent can be called Jewish Christians since their ideas were 
taken from Judaism' (Klijn 1974:421), this turns out to be much too broad to facili-
tate historical understanding. Even Paul can be considered a Jewish Christian within 
this broad definition (see Velasco & Sabourin 1976:8). Kraft is even more critical of 
Danielou's construction of Jewish Christianity: 'It seems to me legitimate to ask 
whether any historically identifiable and self conscious entity (person or group) ever 
·existed behind Danielou's "Jewish Christian theology"' (1972:87; see also Strecker 
1971:243 n 5). 
Given the state of affairs (by the time he wrote), Klijn concludes that 
[i]t is impossible to isolate the Jerusalem Church, Palestinian or Syriac 
Christianity from the rest of the Church in the Graeco-Roman world. 
We are dealing with one Christian movement in which the Jewish 
ideas and practices and the Jews themselves played their part in 
Jerusalem and Rome, Ephesus and Alexandria. For this reason it is 
impossible to define the term 'Jewish-Christian' because it proved to 
be a name that can readily be replaced by 'Christian'. 
(1974:426) 
5 In this wider perspective the concept is used by many scholars concerned with Christianity as such 
in the first century (e.g. Riegel 1978:415; Hartin 1991:40). 
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. Several scholars have tried to escape the definitional deadlock by refining defini-
tions and terminology (see Riegel 1978:414-415;6 Murray 1982:198-208;7 Malina 
1976;8 Brown 1983:77-78;9 Taylor 199010). In the light of the discussion that follows, 
it is, however doubtful whether the problem can be solved more meaningfully until 
some of the basic assumptions underlying these definitional approaches have been 
reconsidered. 
3.3 Dogma and doctrine: criteria for demarcation 
Fletcher argues that 'the religi,onsgeschichtliche approach has been determinative for 
the exegesis of Galatians in the last century' (1982:6). That was also indicated in the 
remarks on Baur, Heitmuller, and Bultmann earlier on, as well as in the definitional 
disputes regarding Jewish Christianity. The basic assumption is that the groups were 
formed, and functioned, on a theological or doctrinal basis (see Fletcher 1982:86-
87). At least one methodological and two historical problems haunt an approach 
which assumes that the divisions (and conflicts) in the Jesus movement can be 
attributed to such causes. 
·The methodological problem concerns the (undue) circularity of the argument while 
the historical problems include: (1) that there were, at that stage, groups with fully 
developed conceptual systems, and (2) that theological and doctrinal issues played 
an important part in the self-definition of first-century people and in their drawing 
of group boundaries. 
6 What Riegel tries to prevent is the transfer of concepts over time (from the second century to the 
first). He proposes that Judaeo-Christianity be used in the broad ideological sense to refer collectively 
to many Jewish-Christian ideas. Jewish Christianity, then, is restricted geographically and chronologi-
cally to Jerusalem prior to 70 CE. The question remains on what basis Jewish Christianity is then con-
stituted. 
7 Murray suggests that a distinction be made betweenJewish and Hebrew, where the former refers 
to all groups who wish to identify themselves by relationship to Jerusalem and the temple while HebTef 
is reserved for those hostile to Jerusalem (see 1982:199). Thus, the diversity of first-century Judaism is 
dealt with in a specific way which does have some potential. He realises, however, that the 'whole "map" 
of early Christianity, in all its forms and connexions, calls for more sociological analysis, and that of the 
greatest possible perceptiveness and command of relevant detail' (1982:207). 
8 Malina proposes a hypothetical distinction between Jewish Christianity and Christian Judaism by 
focussing on ideology, by which he means 'the views and values produced by any social group to legiti-
mate and reinforce their present order of things and protect that order against competing groups' 
· (1976:49). His definitions, quite apart from the question whether such groups ever existed, are 
determined solely by the theological or doctrinal convictions of the participants. 
9 Brown identifies at least four different types of Jewish/Gentile Christians in the New Testament. 
For that reason the concept of Jewish Christianity is considered theologically meaningless. He uses a 
combination of ethnic and doctrinal/imagery criteria to describe the variety within the Jesus move-
ment. 
lO Taylor maintains that Jewishness had nothing to do with heterodoxy, referring instead to Jewish 
praxis (see 1990:318). The distinguishing mark of Jewish Christianity, she maintains, was the upholding 
of Jewish praxis and only that (see 1990:327). Within the parameters of religious activities only, 
orthopraxis cannot escape doctrine. 
116 
3.3.1 The circularity of the argument 
·Barclay's remark (1988:43) that we have 'a certain amount of information about 
Jewish Christianity in Jerusalem, not only from Paul (Gal 1-2) but also from Acts 
(see esp. Acts 15, 21)' is very typical of research on the history of the early Jesus 
movement (see Schoeps 1969:18-19; Goppelt 1970:56-60; Conzelmann & 
Lindemann 1980:404-405). On the other hand, for a description of Jewish 
Christianity in the early phases (which is no easy task) it is necessary, according to 
Koester, to begin with the Jerusalem community: 
There is some specific information from the early history of 
Christianity which demonstrates that particular criteria for the faith-
fulness to the Jewish law could lead to the identification of a clearly 
defined group as "Jewish Christian": the controversy of Paul with 
Jerusalem about the question of circumcision, and the subsequent 
fight against the Judaizers in Galatia. 
(1982:199) 
A curious feature is apparent in the above two quotations. The identification of the 
opponents presupposes the existence of a separate Jewish Christian group in the 
Jesus movement, while the identification of a clearly defined group of Jewish 
·Christians is based inter alia on evidence concerning the opponents in Galatia.11 
The circular nature of the studies both on the opponents and on Jewish Christianity 
certainly crosses the accepted boundaries of scholarly research. 
Historical investigation, says Kraft, 'must by its very nature frequently involve cir-
cularity of argument', but the question, he says, is 'what "controls" exist by which to 
regulate the argument as adequately as possible' (1972:82). With regard to a partic-
ular Jewish Christian theology, he doubts whether it is possible to break out of the 
circularity of the argument whereby the reconstructed theology provides the primary 
evidence for the existence of Jewish Christianity while the supposed existence of 
11 The construction of Jewish Christianity is largely dependent on arguments related to the 
opponent question. Koester's argument on the Apostolic Council confirms it. In order to understand 
the so-called Apostolic Council, it is important to reconstruct the situation in early Christianity at the 
time. At that stage there were two different centres of Christianity, namely Jerusalem and Antioch; and 
the latter, because of the Hellenists (see Acts 7), consisted for the most part of uncircumcised Gentile 
Christians who did not regard the law as binding. The sole reason for the Council was the disagreement 
between the Christians in Antioch and those in Jerusalem concerning the law. Since Jewish Christians 
·were raising objections against Gentile Christians regarding the law, the community at Antioch sent a 
delegation to Jerusalem to clarify their position. According to Pau~ the independence of the Gentile 
mission and their freedom from the law was acknowledged by the leaders of the Jerusalem community 
(see Koester 1982:105). Many scholars agree that it was the question of a large number of Gentile 
Christians who were not bound to the law which gave rise to the Apostolic Council (see Conzelmann 
1973:83). It is argued that the Apostolic Council provides evidence for the existence of a clearly defined 
group named Jewish Christians, but in order to interpret the event correctly it is necessary to assume 
the existence of a group of Jewish Christians who raised a dispute at Antioch (see 1982:105). 
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Jewish Christianity makes it possible to reconstruct Jewish Christian theology (see 
1972:87). The same argument applies to the circularity of constructions concerning 
opponents and assumptions of the existence of a specific brand of Jewish 
Christianity. It will become quite clear in my argument that not only is there no such 
external control but also very difficult to introduce one, one of the reasons being 
that the theoretical framework of the question does not readily allow such external 
control. 
3.32 The danger of anachronism 
·Kraft asks whether Danielou's abstraction Jewish Christianity is any help in 
understanding what was happening among the early Christians. 
Does it not, in fact, tend to blind me to the problems of which the his-
torical participants were conscious in their own times, by viewing 
them from later perspectives quite foreign to them (e.g. Semitic-
J ewish, hellenistic, Latin)? 
(1972:89) 
The doubtful assumption behind such attempts is that such well-formulated belief 
systems existed in the first century (see Schoeps 1969:2; Meeks 1983:33). Further-
more, given the fact that first-century people were much less concerned about 
theological and doctrinal orthodoxy than those of later periods when the canons of 
the Jewish and Christian sides had been established, theological or doctrinal motiva-
tions become even less plausible (see also White 1990:61). 
Anachronism in a different guise is found in the projection of second-century 
Jewish-Christian constructions onto the first-century situation. 
It is often assumed that the construction of Jewish Christianity from second-century 
(and later) sources sheds some light on Jewish Christianity prior to 70 CE (see 
Schoeps 1969:18-19; Koester 1982:200). That was one of Baur's arguments (see 
Klijn 1974:420) but, as Schmithals says, no-one today would use the Clementine lit-
erature and apocryphal gospels as the Tiibingen school did (see 1965:13, 105). 
3.3.3 The danger of theological reductionism 
It is a moot point whether the search for the identity of Jewish Christianity is not an 
example of the theological reductionism to which the social-scientific approach 
objects. It was said at the beginning of the chapter that the description and demarca-
tion of groups in the Jesus movement is a difficult problem. Can the demarcation 
and mapping of groups be done meaningfully in this way unless it is accepted that 
theological or doctrinal aspects were the sole criteria? 
Groups are by definition social abstracts, and social, political and cultural aspects 
always contribute to their formation, legitimation and maintenance. Conflicts of all 
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sorts are rarely untouched by personal attributes such as class, status and position or 
social attributes such as socio-cultural codes and conventions - be it in con-
temporary society or in first-century Mediterranean society. Part of the challenge is 
to ascertain these attributes, codes and conventions in first-century society. It is in 
this regard that the present study is intended to contribute to the description and 
understanding of groups, and the conflicts in the first-century Jesus movement. 
3.4 Jewish Christianity and the development of the Pauline movement 
Since the focus of this debate is not Jewish Christianity as such but the assumption 
of its existence in describing the nature and character of the Pauline movement -
and especially that of Paul's opponents - some of the issues to be settled may be 
highlighted by way of a summary. 
Jewish Christianity was a multiple phenomenon or, more correctly, scholars refer to 
a variety of phenomena as Jewish Christianity. In the light of the variety of 
phenomena named, together with the variety in definitions, Klijn concludes that 
it is impossible to compile 'a' or 'the' theology of Jewish Christianity ... 
We are dealing with isolated phenomena and can, therefore, only 
speak of the Jewish Christianity of a particular writing or of a particu-
lar group of Christians. 
(1974:431) 
If this argument holds, the assumrtion of Jewish Christianity as opposed to either 
Pauline or Gentile Christianity should be reconsidered. In fact, the assumption of 
Jewish Christianity in the maintenance of opponent hypotheses becomes highly 
dubious. While one hypothesis cannot uphold another and vice versa, several indi-
vidual components of both tend to overlap. 
The Jewish in Jewish Christianity and in opponent hypotheses poses a problem. Paul 
is a case in point. He claims to be a Jewish follower of Jesus who had the right to 
present his brand of Judaism to Jew and Gentile alike (see Rm 9:1-5, 11:1; 1 Cor 
. 9: 19-23; and cf Riddle 1943:241; Stowers 1984:64 ); opponent hypotheses, however, 
assume that Paul was opposed by Jewish Christians or Judaizers for not being Jewish. 
One issue to be settled is precisely what constituted Jewishness in the first-century 
world. 
Secondly, opponent hypotheses and constructions of Jewish Christianity alike focus 
primarily on dogmatic and doctrinal matters. Even if it is accepted that such matters 
played a significant part in constituting groups in the early Jesus movement and in 
the conflicts in Galatia, it still needs to be ascertained what is meant, in that context, 
by a conflict over the 'true gospel'. In theoretical jargon (that of the sociology of 
knowledge), the relationship between social and symbolic structures needs to be 
settled. In this regard the nature of religion and of Jewish religion in the first-
century world need to be examined. 
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Thirdly, describing the expansion of the Jesus movement in terms of fixed and well-
established groupings with clearly developed belief systems not only assumes that 
the Jesus movement seceded from Judaism but also that it consisted of Pauline 
Christianity as distinct from Jewish Christianity. A further issue to be settled is what 
constituted groups, especially religi.ous groups, in the first-century world. 
·While opponent hypotheses fit neatly into the received interpretive tradition on the 
expansion of the early Jesus movement in general and the assumption of internal 
conflicts between different wings or factions of the Jesus movement in particular, 
the above questions as to the viability of most constructions of Jewish Christianity 
places a question mark over the existence of this particular faction. If an identifiable 
Jewish Christianity did not exist as a particular faction against which Paul reacted, 
and which provided the backdrop to opponent hypotheses, then the received view of 
expansion along such lines becomes improbable. Too many indicators point to an 
interpretative tradition which maintains itself by means of mutually supporting 
hypotheses. It calls for an alternative view of the expansion of the early Jesus move-
ment and particularly of the nature and character of the Pauline communities as 
part and parcel of it. 
4 FIRST-CENTURY JUDAISM: A SUBCULTIJRE FOR TIIE PAULINE 
MOVEMENT 
The second field of research identified as significant in opponent hypotheses is the 
assumption of a separation between the Pauline movement and first-century 
Judaism. In this regard several factors (such as circumcision as an identity marker, 
and the character of first-century Judaism) fundamentally determine all views on the 
nature of the Pauline communities. That is to say, opponent hypotheses thrive on 
particular features of scholarly constructions of the Pauline communities which are 
determined by a preconceived idea of first-century Judaism. 
Perhaps more than any other component of the received interpretive tradition, the 
notion of a separation (in its very early stages) between the Pauline movement and 
Judaism creates the milieu and provides the basic assumptions on which many 
opponent hypotheses develop. 
4.1 The relationship between the Pauline movement and first-century Judaism 
The majority of New Testament scholars today, as Sanders points out, accept that 
Paul was creating a new religion independent of Judaism, especially Rabbinic 
Judaism (see 1977:9). He identifies three positions in current research on Paul's 
relationship with Palestinian Judaism: 
Paul should be seen as essentially a Rabbi who thought that the Mes-
siah had come (Davies); that in spite of some agreements in detail, 
Paul's religion is basically antithetical to that of Palestinian Judaism 
(probably the majority view); and that Paul had little relationship to 
Palestinian Judaism one way or another (Sandmel). 
(Sanders 1977:11) 
120 
My intention is not to review the scholarly debate and all the different positions on 
the relationship between Paul and the Pauline movement on the one hand and first-
century Judaism on the other,12 but to point out what is typical of the majority view. 
Or rather, it is to point out (by means of a few examples from leading scholars in the 
field), that the enterprise is compromised from the start by the way in which the 
issue is dealt with. To phrase it differently, the way in which the question of the rela-
tionship is posed predetermines the answer. 
Paul (the Pauline movement or Paulinism) is compared to Judaism (or Jewish reli-
gion/organisations) in order to determine the dis/similarities. From the differences 
it is usually concluded that they were indeed separate movements. In doing so, the 
received view of the Pauline movement as a separate religion is confirmed without 
adducing any arguments as to whether they should indeed be separated. The crucial 
question, What would have counted as separation from first-century Judaism? is con-
veniently left aside. Sanders is a case in point. 
In comparing Paulinism to Judaism, Sanders does not consider whether Pauline 
. Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism are separate religions; rather, he considers what 
the elements of dis/agreement between the two separate religions are (see Sanders 
1977:11, 19). Compared to covenantal nomism, Paul's arguments are not typical of 
it, nor do they constitute a new covenantal nomism (see Sanders 1977:514, 543). The 
basic difference is that Paul's type or pattern is described as 'participationist 
eschatology' (Sanders 1977:549). For that reason Sanders can say in his now famous 
dictum (1977:552): 'this is what Paul finds wrong in Judaism: it is not Christianity' 
(italics EPS).13 
He compares two patterns of religion and unless it is accepted that a deviation from 
covenantal nomism (as in Paul's case) would have implied a break with Judaism, it 
cannot be decided what, sociologically speaking, the relationship between them was. 
In other words, the question of whether the Pauline movement, which had a dif-
ferent pattern of religion from Palestinian Judaism, was still part of Judaism cannot 
be decided on the basis of a comparison of the different patterns unless it can be 
clearly demonstrated (or is assumed) that a deviation from the pattern of covenantal 
nomism would have disqualified a movement from being considered part of 
Judaism. A second example will confirm the entrenched position of the received 
. construction. 
12 For extensive overviews of Paul and Judaism in New Testament research, see Sanders (1977:1-
12), Davies (1955:1-16) and Schoeps (1961:13-50). 
13 This is confirmed by his arguments in a later work (see Sanders 1983) where he is more out-
spoken: not only does Paul's pattern of religion not accord with the Jewish pattern, but Paul himself 
argues against the traditional doctrine of election and against faithfulness to the Mosaic law (see 
Sanders 1983:207-208). In his own words: 'What is wrong with the law, and thus with Judaism, is that it 
does not provide for God's ultimate purpose, that of saving the entire world through faith in Christ, and 
without the privilege accorded to Jews through the promises, the covenant, and the law' (Sanders 
1983:47). 
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Although Dunn proposes a correction to what he finds unacceptable in Sanders' 
position, he does not escape the assumptions of the very same position. 
According to him, Sanders too readily replaces the 'Lutheran Paul' with an 
'idiosyncratic Paul who in arbitrary and irrational manner turns his face against the 
glory and greatness of Judaism's covenant theology and abandons Judaism simply 
because it is not Christianity' (1983b:l01). Dunn argues that early Christianity was 
not yet separate and distinct from Judaism; although they had some peculiar beliefs 
about Jesus, 'their religion was the religion of the Jews' (Dunn 1983a:S). What 
caused a problem was that more and more Gentiles accepted this belief, and this 
raised the question of what requirements were necessary for them to worship the 
one God who had sent his Messiah, Jesus (see Dunn 1983a:S). 
Dunn apparently does not presuppose that the Pauline movement stood outside 
Judaism, but sees it rather as a struggle by the 'Christians' about how to relate their 
·Jewish beliefs of covenantal nomism (their 'works of the law') to their new convic-
tion concerning Jesus as the Christ (see Dunn 1983b:113). The covenant is not 
abandoned but broadened to transcend the racial or nationalistic restrictions placed 
on it by the Jews and to include those other than circumcised Jews (see Dunn 
1983b:114-116). Dunn sees these works as having become a too narrowly nation-
alistic and racial concept of the covenant; 'they had become a badge not of 
Abraham's faith but of Israel's boast' (Dunn 1983b:120).14 
According to Dunn, Paul redefined the identity markers of Judaism when he added 
faith in Jesus as Messiah. Paul accepts that alongside other identity markers 'faith in 
Jesus as Christ becomes the primary identity marker which renders the others super-
fluous' (Dunn 1983b:113). He concludes that in effect the seed had been planted of 
a faith which sooner or later must break away from Judaism (see Dunn 1983b:115). 
Theologically or, in Dunn's phrase (see 1983b:113), salvation-historically, covenantal 
nomism was redefined from Paul's point of view to include the most important 
identity marker, namely faith in Jesus as Messiah.15 So far so good . 
. To my mind, however, Dunn does not exploit to its logical consequence the insight 
that the Jesus movement was basically still part of Judaism. In his analyses of 'works 
14 The major difference from Sanders is that the latter takes 'works of the law' as equivalent to 
'doing the law', and that led Sanders to the conclusion that Paul had disparaged the law as such, which 
amounts to a break with Judaism (see Dunn 1983b:120). 
15 In terms of Paul's self-understanding and his exposition of the self-understanding of the Jesus 
movement at that time, GI 2:16 might very well represent a basic turning point 'from a Jewish Mes-
sianism to a faith which sooner or later must break away from Judaism to exist in its own terms' (Dunn 
1983b:l15). 
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of the law,'16 his analysis of the incident at Antioch, and his exposition of the letters 
to the Romans (see 1988a)17 and the Galatians (see 1988b), he follows a particular 
interpretive frame. A frame which adds to the notion of normative Judaism a second 
assumption, namely a fixed idea on Jewishness and Jewish identity symbols. 
If it is true that Paul redefined the identity markers of Judaism (and it seems to me 
a sound description of what, sociologically speaking, he was doing), how is that act 
of redefinition to be interpreted? From one perspective it might be interpreted (as 
Dunn does) to mean that he was separating the Jesus movement from Judaism; but 
·from another perspective he was not separating but simply defining (the true) 
Judaism as he saw it. The first is an act of redefining Judaism, the second of defining 
it. The first presupposes a normative Judaism, the second an open variety of 
Judaisms. 
To be sure, the difference between the two lies not in the data and evidence but in 
the interpreters' frame of mind and the interpretive categories applied in order to 
understand the evidence. When Gordon, for example, maintains that Jewish identity 
symbols are at the centre of the dispute in Galatia (see 1987:40), he perfectly 
expresses this second sentiment in Pauline studies which is most often taken for 
granted. The notion of normative Judaism, together with a fixed idea of the content 
of Jewish identity markers, constitutes the interpretive framework. 
A final example from a different angle highlights the tendency to compare (the 
Pauline movement and first-century Judaism) without arguing the criteria for sepa-
ration from first-century Judaism. Despite his use of social-science models (such as a 
sect model), Meeks confirms rather than questions or adjusts the assumptions of the 
received view on the nature of the Pauline movement. He points out that, socially, 
·'the Pauline groups were never a sect of Judaism' (1985:106). At several levels he 
finds traces that indicate a clear break between the two. 
16 Dunn maintains that the identity markers for a Jew living in the pattern of covenantal nomism 
were circumcision, purity and food taboos, and the Sabbath. This is what Paul refers to as 'works of the 
law' (see Dunn 1983b:107). What are antithetical opposites for Paul are justification by works of the law 
and justification by faith in Jesus. Paul is thus attacking the basic self-understanding of the Jews when 
he denies the possibility of 'justification by works of the law' (Gl 2:16). 
17 Dunn interprets the letter to the Romans as if the church and Judaism were already separate 
movements. The sociological position accepted in his construction of the context is, however, one of 
separation between the synagogues (Jewish communities) and the Pauline movement (house churches). 
It can best be seen in his argument that Paul was writing primarily for Gentiles. In principle that issue 
cannot be settled by simply accepting 'what Paul is saying' if those words are read a priori in a context 
which presupposes that the two movements were already separated. To state it anachronistically, Dunn 
reads Romans as if the church and Judaism were already separate religions. I refer to his argument 
that Christianity probably first emerged in Rome within the Jewish communities (see 19888 :xlvi) and 
consisted of both Jews and God-worshipping Gentiles (see 19888 :xlviii). Their meetings in each others' 
homes were initially not seen as a break with or as opposed to the wider Jewish community. But when 
the Jews were supposedly expelled from the city in 49 CE the Christians were untouched (see 19888 :xlix 
and 19888 :liii). Paul wrote primarily to Gentiles because the Jews were expelled in 49, which resulted in 
·the house churches becoming largely gentile (see 19888:liii). 
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The first is the organisational level. When comparing the Christian household to 
voluntary associations (such as clubs), synagogues or philosophical or rhetorical 
schools (see 1983:75-84; 1986h: 108-119), he concludes that the Pauline household 
was, organisationally speaking, unique. Although all present significant analogies, 
none of the models capture the whole of the Pauline E:KKAflOUx (1983:84). 'Some-
thing new was emerging in the private homes where believers in "Jesus the Christ" 
gathered' and therefore, according to Meeks, we have to tum to the primary sources 
left behind by the Pauline movement itself to determine its structures, 'which may 
after all have been unique' (1983:84). The organisational uniqueness of the Pauline 
congregations depends on a distinctive social organisation. It is, however, a question 
whether a distinct organisational structure, even with idiosyncratic features, can be 
taken as an 'indication of independence or separation from Judaism. Meeks assumes 
. that groups were defined and the boundaries between them determined by means of 
such organisational differences or similarities. More to the point, his argument goes, 
separation from Judaism could be achieved by means of organisational and struc-
tural independence. 
Since they had an independent organisation, he argues, secondly, that the Pauline 
congregations had an identity distinct from that of other Jews. Says he: 'In order to 
persist, a social organisation must have boundaries, must maintain structural 
stability as well as flexibility, and must create a unique culture' (1983:84). So far so 
good. The topics Meeks deals with in the development of this unique culture of the 
Pauline Christians are related to aspects of language, practice, ritual, patterns of 
belief, group cohesion and leadership, conflict management, to name only a few. 
They are, however, an indication of separation only if it is true that they were the 
preconditions for group formation and group boundaries. Only if Jewish identity 
markers and symbols were generally defined or taken as fixed would deviation have 
meant independence from Judaism. Judaism is taken to have been well defined and 
its features well established . 
. Thirdly, at a theological/ideological level Meeks maintains that 'the scriptures and 
traditions of Judaism are a central and ineffaceable part of the Pauline Christians' 
identity. Socially, however, the Pauline groups were never a sect of Judaism' 
(1985:106). However, it is meaningless to state that one group is theologically 
indebted to another and socially distinct unless that information is related to the 
way in which the groups were constituted, perceived each other, reacted to one 
another, reacted proactively in view of what they expected, and perceived their co-
existence within the same society. If theological/ideological indebtedness did not 
count as a legitimate claim of Jewishness, on what basis then was Jewishness 
defined? 
The point I am trying to make is that many New Testament scholars deal with the 
issue of Jewish- Christian relations (in Paul's lifetime) in terms of much later devel-
opments. One result is that Paul's view of, for example, circumcision is interpreted 
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within the setting of conflicting perspectives (usually between himself and other 
Jews) on identity markers. Thus the conflict was constituted by the larger setting of 
opposing religions. 
The history-of-ideas assumption (that ideas basically determine social realities) is 
especially powerful when it comes to the comparison of religious systems or patterns 
of religion, to use Sanders's concept (see 1977). It is not denied in this study that 
ideas do indeed play an important part in self-definition and exposition; even in the 
creation of groups and the maintenance of boundaries. My objection is to the notion 
that such ideas are themselves unattached to particular social realities such as, for 
example, that of the first-century Mediterranean world or contemporary Western 
societies. What needs to be determined is the appropriate criteria for deciding, 
within a first-century world, what constituted Jewishness and what would accordingly 
have counted as separation from Judaism. 
In short, the interpreter's frame of mind moulds the evidence and shapes the argu-
ments. In Pauline studies - and in opponent hypotheses in particular - at least two 
. features clearly mark that frame with regard to the relationship to Judaism: a fixed 
idea on what constituted Jewishness, and a view of normative Judaism (mostly of a 
rabbinical brand) as the main characteristic of first-century Judaism. In the pages to 
follow an attempt will be made to examine both in view of recent studies on first-
century Judaism. 
4.2 Conceptual and terminological clarity 
In the pages that follow there is no claim to original research as to the sources18 but, 
thanks to the work of others, an attempt to summarise the findings of those who 
have done the research. As Charlesworth cogently states it (see the epigraph to this 
chapter), a new understanding of early Judaism is now appearing in scholarly pub-
lications. The challenge facing New Testament scholarship is to abandon the picture 
of Judaism in the first century, pre-70, that never existed (see also Neusner 1989:18) 
and consequently the interpretation of New Testament documents (opponent 
hypotheses) that was built on it. 
In this final section of the present chapter my intention is to report some of the most 
·significant findings on first-century Judaism that have a special bearing on the 
nature of the Pauline movement and especially the nature of the conflicts 
encountered. In the subsequent chapter this line of argument on the new 
understanding of first-century Judaism will be extended even further when, amongst 
18 It is accepted in this study that the problem cannot be sol~ed by a simple return to the sources. 
The methodological framework within which the ancient sources are understood and interpreted is just 
as important as the sources themselves. As Judge says, 'What we lack is not good first-hand sources, 
but a good secondary tradition and an adequate context' (1972:20). 
125 
others, the nature of religion in the first-century Mediterranean world is brought 
into play. The first step in dealing with the new understanding of first-century 
Judaism would be to attend in passing to some conceptual and terminological diffi-
culties. 
The 'conventional categories' used in describing first-century Judaism 'suffer from 
vagueness, anachronism, and inappropriate definition' (Meeks 1983:33; and see 
Murray 1982:196 and Smith 1983). It will be pointed out that the insufficient use of 
categories and terminology in this case is related to another (more serious) problem, 
namely that of conceptualising ancient society. A new set of concepts will lead to a 
re-conceptualisation not only of first-century Judaism (and the Pauline movement as 
part of it) but also of its place in the organisational and social structures of the first-
century world. 
42.1 Taxonomy and concepts describing the 'other' 
The theoretical difficulties of understanding the other have been dealt with 
extensively. To press home the principles that relate specifically to first-century 
Judaism and the Pauline movement, some aspects may be highlighted. 
The theory of the other expresses the sense of self. The lines of struc-
ture mark out, to begin with, insider from outsider ... So, in all, in the 
heart and center of the study of humanity we take up the divided 
heart, the uncertain vision, the off-center perspective, that, in the eye 
of the beholder, tells a person who is like, and who is unlike. 
(Neusner & Frerichs 1985a:xi) 
Some principles that need to be kept in mi11d in studying Paul's interaction with 
first-century Judaism will be deduced from the illuminating article by Smith: What a 
difference a difference makes (1985). 
Otherness, says, Smith 'is not so much a matter of separation as it is a description of 
interaction' (1985:10), and it is 'a matter of relative rather than absolute difference' 
(1985:15). Thus a theory of otherness is, in this sense, a political category that func-
tions within relative modes of relationships where there are degrees of difference. 
The distinctions are found to be drawn most sharply between near neighbours. Sec-
ondly, he deals with the concept of otherness as a linguistic category (see 1985:15-
44 ). He concludes that otherness is neither a descriptive category nor the result of 
the determination of biological descent or affinity; not an ontological category, not 
some absolute state of being (see 1985:46). 'Something is "other" only with respect 
to something "else"' (1985:46). Thus, whether the concept is used politically or 
linguistically, Smith argues that otherness 'is a situational category' (1985:46). 
Otherness matters in situations where the self is in question or in dispute. For that 
reason otherness has to do with the self and with the way the near-self has been 
defined. 'A "theory of the other" requires those complex political and linguistic pro-
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jects necessary to enable us to think, to situate, and to speak of "others" in relation 
to the way in which we think, situate, and speak about ourselves' (1985:48). 
The implications for our understanding of what Paul was doing are numerous.19 
Paul was not concerned with the other because they were intrinsically important or 
interesting but because they were close to him. He struggled with fellow Jews and 
near-Christians in his attempt at self-definition. Rather than describing Paul in con-
tradistinction to first-century Judaism, it follows from this discussion that Paul 
should be described in interaction with first-century Judaism. 
A second implication may be referred to as perspectivism. If interchange with others 
is situational, accounts of such interaction can very seldom be taken as a true repre-
sentation of the relationship. It is often one-sided, emphasising those aspects con-
sidered important from the author's point of view. If this is true with regard to Paul, 
then he described the others - that is, the Jews and Gentiles, followers of Jesus and 
non-believers, members of his fictive kinship group (the households) and members 
of the larger fictive kinship group of Jesus followers - in language and terminology 
which reflect his struggle at self-definition. His presentation of social and historical 
realities is biased and one-sided (not in a pejorative sense), and an acknowl-
. edgement of this fact can preserve many arguments in New Testament studies from 
making absolutist claims. Paul's views are as situational as those of his con-
temporaries. 
Thirdly (and still part of the issue of perspectivism ), if something is other only in 
respect of something else, there is an obligation on contemporary scholarship to be 
as clear as possible as to which aspect of the other is at stake. Since I shall return to 
this issue, suffice it to say that sociological and theological categories (for example) 
cannot be mixed in support of each other.20 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the theory of the other implies that a concept 
is only a means by which a specific person in a specific situation classifies other 
people or groups. The meaning of concepts such as Jews or Israel in the first-century 
world is not a fixed one: it depends on who uses it in what situation. This is well 
expressed by Neusner when he says that 'as everyone now recognizes full well-
Jews' histories yield not one but many Judaisms, not one but many theories of who, 
and what, is (an) "Israel"' (1987:333). If it is true that the description of the other is 
in the eye of the beholder (especially with regard to first-century Judaism), then 
. universal definitions and clear-cut concepts and terminology should be used with 
great caution. 
19 Not all the implications may be intended by Smith. To my mind his argument opens up many 
possibilities and when read together with insights from other quarters, can be very useful in trying to 
understand Paul's communication situation. 
20 For an excellent example, see the discussion of Cohen (1989:18) on a related topic. Also the dis-
cussion below on the conceptlew. 
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4.2.2 Palestinian and Hellenistic/Diaspora Judaism 
A distinction is very often drawn in New Testament research between Palestinian 
and Hellenistic Judaism (see Marshall 1972/3:274; Borgen 1983:75). Even before 
the time of Alexander, however, Palestine was increasingly affected by the 'all-
pervasive cultural influence of Greek language and education' (Murray 1982:202). 
·Not only the regions of Galilee and Samaria but even Jerusalem and the surround-
ing countryside did not escape the Hellenistic influences (see Murray 1982:202). 
Even Jews in Rabbinic circles were not untouched by Greek influence for, as Smith 
says, 'many Jews in Rabbinic circles not only knew Greek, but read the Bible in it 
and prayed in it' (1956:70). His conclusion is that 'Palestine in the first century was 
profoundly Hellenized' and 'the Hellenization extended even to the basic structure 
of much Rabbinic thought' (1956:71; and see White 1987a:135; Judge 1972:29). 
Not only the above distinction but also the one between Palestinian and Diaspora 
Judaism is fraught with serious problems. Smith maintains that the concepts both of 
Hellenistic Judaism and of Diaspora Judaism are unfortunate. He warns against the 
'common in toto distinction' (1983:300) between Palestinian and Diasporic Judaism. 
What is 'diasporic'? 'Does "Palestine" include Ptolemais, Sepphoris, Sebaste, 
Tiberias, Scythopolis, Caesarea, Appolonia, Antipatris ... to mention only the bigger 
places? Was the Judaism in these places "Palestinian" or "diasporic"?' (Smith 
1983:299). Of the so-called 'hellenistic Jewish authors' he says, 'half a dozen ... have 
plausibly been assigned to Palestine' (1983:299). Were the translators of the Sep-
tuagint, who reportedly went from Palestine to Alexandria for the translation, 
· diasporic? 
Kraabel (1979:477-479) demonstrates that at the levels of building structures and 
organisation it may be useful to distinguish between such categories as Palestinian 
and Diasporic. In more concrete terms: though it might be insufficient to distinguish 
between Palestinian and Diaspora Judaism in terms of ideological/theological 
categories, that distinction might be very suitable for structural or organisational 
categories. 
The point is that the in toto comparison between Palestinian and Hel-
lenistic/Diaspora Judaism cannot be upheld. The distinction between Jewish and 
Hellenistic Christianity on the basis of Hellenistic influence or the absence of it, or 
even on the use of Greek language, hardly carries any weight. Distinctions between 
them should be demonstrated and can no longer be assumed a priori. 
4.23 Admitting some limitations and possibilities 
This is as good a place as any other to admit some further limitations and con-
straints of this enterprise. 
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Firstly, students of Christianity have 'inflated the Christian part of the canvas 
beyond all reasonable proportion. The historian of Christianity has given the 
impression that the rest of the canvas is simply background for the closeup' (Wilken 
1984:xiv). The oversimplification of complex phenomena, societies, and events to 
confirm contemporary interpretive results is something to be avoided. First-century 
Judaism should rather be seen in all its complexity than in an oversimplified form 
that distorts rather than improves understanding. 
Secondly, it is often forgotten that for almost a century 'Christianity went unnoticed 
by most men and women in the Roman Empire' (Wilken 1984:xiv). Most of the 
archaeological evidence from what is today known as the state of Israel comes from 
the early Rabbinic era, while the evidence for synagogues in places outside the Holy 
land comes mainly from the second to the fourth centuries (see Kraabel 1979:477-
479; 1981h:79-80). Thus from both the Jewish and the Roman sides one has to rely 
on sources from a much later date, when Christianity was in all probability already a 
movement separated from Judaism. 
Thirdly, some consequences of these remarks should be kept in mind. Any construe-
. tion of first-century Judaism is necessarily precarious and preliminary. As in most 
other historical fields of research, we have to rely on conjecture and often fanciful 
guesswork. As Smith (1977:45) says, 
it is fashionable among the stupid to attack explanations they don't 
like as "conjectural". Such attacks show that the men who make them 
either do not understand the problem, or are deliverately [sic] trying 
to conceal the state of the evidence. You may take it as a rule that 
anyone who attacks a work on these subjects [first-century Judaism] as 
"conjectural" is either stupid, or ignorant, or a fraud. 
Finally, on the other hand, much more evidence is available than is often acknowl-
edged. Once the perspective changes from 'the study of various canonical 
anthologies made from it - i.e. the different Old and New Testaments' (Smith 
1983:305) to the study of the literary remains of the various forms of Judaism prior 
to 70, more information is available than to historians in many other fields of 
research. Comparative materials in the form of contemporary social-science studies 
too, are abundantly available on many aspects of the first-century Mediterranean 
world. 
4.3 A new understanding of first-centwy Judaism 
Charlesworth (1990:37) provides a striking description of the received view on first-
century Judaism: 
The Jewish religion was centered in Jerusalem, with the Temple as 
the magnet of world Jewry. From this citadel emanated the proper 
interpretation of the Torah (the embodiment of God's will, Law). The 
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Jewish religion was affirmed to be immune from pagan influences. It 
was monolithic, orthodox, and normative; and diversity in the system 
was expressed through four sects, two of which (the Sadducees and the 
Pharisees) belonged to "normative Judaism". 
There is however widespread agreement (e.g. Sanders 1977:426; Davies 1978; Neus-
ner 1983:2-3) when Morton Smith (see 1956:81) claims that the scholarly picture of 
first-century Judaism is today far different from that conceived by earlier students. 
4.3.1 Rabbinic Judaism in the first century? 
Although Rabbinic Judaism had not yet developed by 70 CE, it is commonly 
accepted that 'something very like it was the common form of the religion, at least in 
Palestine, and all groups are to be seen as divergent from this primitive stock' 
(Smith 1983:304). Alongside the idea that there was a normative Judaism in the first 
century and that it was very similar to what later became Rabbinic Judaism, the idea 
exists that Judaism in the first century was very much a unified movement. This is 
assumed both for Palestine and for the cities of the Roman Empire. 
For Palestine the idea is that there was a main body of Judaism (some form of 
Pharisaic or Rabbinic Judaism) with several smaller sects. The sects (which, apart 
from Pharisees, included the Essenes, Sadducees, and Qumran group) did not, 
however, have much of an effect on the average man in the street, since they were 
for the greater part isolated as sects. For the cities in the Diaspora the assumption is 
that these Jewish communities were similarly organised, had the same basic struc-
ture and basically shared a Rabbinic or Pharisaic theology. 
What is hardly disputed in scholarly circles is that the destruction of the Temple in 
70 CE brought a change to pre-70 Judaism (see Neusner 1984:47-48). One of the 
effects was the rise of Rabbinic (a normative) Judaism (see Neusner 1984:35-45; 
Cohen 1987a:124-173). The symbols united in the rabbi-figure were distinct in the 
time prior to 70 CE when there still was a temple. A first response in describing the 
features of first-century Judaism would be to conceive a Judaism distinct from Rab-
binic Judaism. To be more precise, try to imagine Judaism in the first century not 
only without but also before a unification of the different symbols in the figure of 
the rabbi. 
Judaism which emerged subsequent to the destruction of the Temple 'would unite 
the ethics of wisdom, the ethos of the priesthood, and the social focus of mes-
sianism, into the peoplehood of Israel' (Neusner 1983:60). The central symbol was 
the rabbi, so Judaism became rabbinic: 'the entirety of Judaic existence, from 
remote past to yearned-for future, sustained a process of rabbinization: the reread-
ing of everything in terms of the system of the rabbi' (Neusner 1983:60). It is impor-
tant to realise that the court at Jamnia (if there ever was such a meeting) did not 
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simply continue the traditions of the Pharisees21 but should rather be seen as 'the 
result of an effort to find a moderate legal position acceptable to the largest number 
of survivors from the wrecks of the earlier parties' (Smith 1977:55; and see Cohen 
1987a: 154 ). 
4.32 The case of nonnative Judaism 
A response to the question, 'What actually were the beliefs and observances of "the 
average Palestinian Jew" - if there was any such animal - before 70?' (Smith 
1983:304) should be complemented by a second one: 'What about the beliefs and 
practices of Diaspora Jews?' In that way something of the nature of first-century 
Judaism might begin to appear. 
During the past few decades there has been such a constant flow of new information 
from recently discovered sources (new realia ), as well as a fresh approach to the 
sources (see Kraabel 1982:446; Nickelsburg & Kraft 1986:11; White 1985/6:103), 
that it is hardly surprising that scholars in the field claim that they cannot share the 
views of many of their predecessors. The uncritical and biased use of the sources in 
former approaches, especially those of New Testament scholars,22 (see Sandmel 
1979:138; Sanders 1977, 1985) has led to a description of first-century Judaism- as 
Rabbinic Judaism - far removed from the real situation (see Neusner 1977; 1983; 
Cohen 1987a). Furthermore, the biased perspective of many of the post-70 sources 
has misled scholars about the real character of Judaism pre-70. 
Several features of the new understanding of first-century Judaism are emerging all 
the more clearly. 
4.3.2.1 Nonnative Judaism: an impossible construct 
During this period, 'no such thing as "normative Judaism" existed, from which one or 
another "heretical" group might diverge' (Neusner 1984:29). Rather, a fresh study of 
the sources has revealed that culturally, socially, and theologically, early Judaism 
was 'a complex and variegated phenomenon' (Kraft & Nickelsburg 1986:11; see 
Judge 1972:22; Neusner 1983:88). There just was no 'uniform "Judaism" to which all 
evidence attested equally well' (Neusner 1983:4) and Judaism was in what we might 
call 'an experimental stage' (Schiffman 1981:147). 
21 During the first century a great deal of Palestinian Judaism was not Pharisaic (see Smith 
1956:77). It would therefore in principle be a mistake to equate the later Rabbinic Jewish perspective 
with the real pre-70 situation. The natural prejudice of the Rabbinic material for the Pharisees should 
never be forgotten (see Cohen 198'73:154; Smith 1956:74). Smith names, as a second reason why tradi-
. tion made the Pharisees the dominant group, the role of Josephus, who attributed to the Pharisees the 
dominant influence over the people (see 1956:74). 
22 What is not addressed at all in this study is the anti-Judaist bias of many New Testament scholars 
- many of whose writings are still regarded as standard works on first-century Judaism (see especially 
the discussion by Klein 1978:15-38). 
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If it simply is no longer possible to sustain the impossible construct of a normative 
Judaism, we should rather conceive of 'a variety of early Judaisms, clustered in vary-
ing configurations' (Smith 1982:14). This variety in first-century Judaism reveals a 
deeper-lying characteristic, namely a general dissatisfaction with what was presented 
on the religious market together with the possibility that each and everyone could 
start his or her own movement, call on the Jahweh traditions and symbols, and 
define itself as the true Israel or as a messianic movement. There was as yet no 
voice calling for unity in Judaism; each group or sect, although a minority, argued 
for its own primacy and superiority (see Smith 1957:125-126; Freyne 1980:100; 
Schiffman 1981:148). Cohen remarks that 'no other ancient society was so torn by 
religious strife' (1986:48). A distinctive characteristic of first-century Judaism was, in 
brief, a common claim to Israel's traditions and symbols coupled with varying inter-
pretations thereof. 
43.2.2 The sects in first-century Judaism 
The origin (and existence) of different sects23 or groups is one of the main features 
of first-century Judaism. As Smith says, 
the appearance of these sects within Judaism is not a mere accident, 
but draws its origins from the same sources as did that (originally sec-
tarian) Pharisaic side of the religion which ultimately prevailed, 
namely, from the prophetic tradition, from the codification of that 
tradition in a sacred Law, from the conception of piety as the learning, 
interpretation and practice of the sacred Law, and from the identifica-
tion of the individual learned in the Law as, in the last analysis, the 
final religious authority. 
(1961:359) 
When the different interpretations of the law were also 'fixed by the entrance of the 
members into special covenants' (Smith 1961:360), a superb recipe for the formation 
of a variety of sects was established. 
The latter part of the second Temple period, which started with the Maccabean era 
(164 BCE), marked the rise of sects (Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, the Qumran 
community, Christians, Sicarri, Zealots, and others) and with it 'sectarian literature' 
(Cohen 1987a: 17) - various apocalypses speculating about the rule of God, the end 
of time, and so on. The rejection of the legitimacy of the priesthood and their 
authority to mediate between the people and God is clearly reflected in the 
attempts of the different groups to argue their own case as a replacement for the 
23 The concept sect is often used in a very loose and undifferentiated way (see Elliott 1990b:l-5). 
Following the trend in current research (see Smith 1956; Rofe 1988:39) it will, in this section, be used 
in that sense to designate the Jewish groups mentioned by Josephus. 
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Temple and the priests. The creation of new social organisations (synagogues and 
sects) with a non-sacrificial form of worship consisting of prayer and the ceremonial 
reading of the Torah was one of the strongest forces facilitating the formation of 
small, private cultgroups which even the poor could afford (see Smith 1961:351). 
The scribes and sages became the new social elite that took the place of the priests 
(see Cohen 1987a:160-161). 
The existence of the sects and the tradition which attributed a leading role to the 
Pharisees so blurred perceptions that first-century Judaism is thought to be all 
Pharisaic. However, the man in the street (the average Palestinian Jew, who was not 
without religion) was not part of any of the groups24 (see Smith 1956:73). The draw-
back of an approach which focuses on these groups or 'sects' is that 'it tends to focus 
primarily on a very limited sub-section of the overall picture' and 'it ignores the 
great masses of the people who do not seem to have been "card-carrying members" 
of any formal group' (Kraft 1975b:189). 
4.3.2.3 A variety of Judaisms 
If, in its formative century, Rabbinic Judaism had a 'sectarian character' which 'in 
no way achieved the normative status later on accorded to it' (Neusner 1977:217), 
then if there was an orthodox or normative Judaism 'it must have been that which is 
now almost unknown to us, the religion of the average "people of the land"' (Smith 
1956:81; see Isenberg 1974:42 n 10). They had their own synagogues and legal tradi-
tions (see Smith 1963: 171 ). The people of the land were not the outcasts and lowly 
classes. Their leaders 'seem to have been the well-to-do landholders and business 
. men who probably had more Greek education than the average Pharisee' (Smith 
1963:172; and see Neusner 1988:175). The principal elements of what can be 
described as normative Judaism in the time prior to the fall of the Temple are 'the 
Pentateuch, the Temple, and the 'amme ha'arez, the ordinary Jews who were not 
members of any sect' (Smith 1961:356; and see Cohen 1986:47).25 
But still that does not cover the whole spectrum of first-century Judaism. There 
were also the 'worldly Jews - the Herodians, tax gatherers, usurers, gamblers, 
shepherds, and robbers (by the thousands) who fill the pages of the Gospels, the 
Talmuds, and Josephus' (Smith 1956:74). In addition there were large differences 
24 It is often forgotten that the major 'philosophical sects' as identified by Josephus represented a 
very small proportion of the Jewish population. The largest and probably most influential group, the 
Pharisees, in all probability numbered only 6000, whereas the number of the Essenes was allegedly not 
more than 4000 (see Lohse 1976:79, 85; McEleney 1973:23). That was when the total number of Jews 
was round about four and a half million (see Lohse 1976:122), of which the numbers outside Palestine 
exceeded those inside (see Stern 1974:122). 
25 Even so it should not mistakenly be assumed that there was any general agreement as to any of 
these symbols. Symbols such as Temple and Torah 'were open for debate: Which Torah? Consisting of 
·how many books? In which translation? Interpreted from what standpoint? Which temple? Run by 
which priesthood?' (Johnson 1989:427). 
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between the various parts of the country, and between different areas in the 
Diaspora, not to mention local differences between the special sects, each devoted 
to its own tradition (see Smith 1956:81). 
In conclusion, what then was first-century Judaism? Smith (1983:304) suggests that 
we 'had better think of pre-70 Judaism simply as the sum of its parts, plus other ele-
ments of which we know little more than that they existed, plus yet more elements of 
which even the existence is now unknown'. In the words of Charlesworth (1990:37): 
There were not four sects, but at least a dozen groups and many sub-
groups. We should not think in terms of a monolithic first-century 
Palestinian Judaism; perhaps we should attempt to contemplate a 
post-70 Pharisaic type of Judaism and a variety of pre-70 "Judaisms". 
4.3.3 Diversity amo~t Diaspora Judaism 
While studies on Palestinian Judaism make it clear that Rabbinic Judaism was nei-
ther normative nor the major force in first-century Palestine, recent studies on the 
Diaspora remind us that there were vast differences among Jewish groups: not only 
from city to city in western Asia Minor but also within specific cities (see Judge 
1972:22; White 1988:18). Kraabel notes, as one of the questionable assumptions on 
Diaspora Judaism research, that it is 'seen to be monolithic, inter-connected and 
even directly controlled from Palestine' (1982:453). Neither ideologically not 
organisationally were these communities directed or controlled by any mother 
organisation. 
If first-century Judaism in Palestine was not monolithic, 'much less [was it so] in the 
diverse and alien environment of the Diaspora' (White 1985/6:108). As far as is 
known, the diversity of Judaism in Palestine was not typical of Jewish communities 
in the Greco-Roman cities of the Empire. The two Jewish revolts (66-70 and 132-
135), for example, had little effect on the Diaspora Jews, who offered almost no 
direct support to the revolutionaries (see Kraabel 1981h:86; Meeks 1983:38). 
Instead, they displayed a diversity more variegated and depending on local circum-
·stances. 
Current evidence suggests that the Judaism of the synagogue communities of the 
Roman Diaspora is best understood 'as the grafting of a transformed biblical "exile" 
ideology onto a Greco-Roman form of social organization' (Kraabel 1987:49). Segal 
maintains that the period 586 BCE - 70 CE 
produced an enormous variety of Jewish communities, adapted to the 
plethora of new and different social, political, and economic environ-
ments brought about by the dispersion of Jews throughout the ancient 
world. In each place where Jews sought to dwell, the meaning of the 
covenant seemed different. 
(1986:12) 
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It should further be remembered that in the first century more Jews lived outside 
the borders of Palestine than inside (see Meeks 1983:34; Stern 1974:122). It is 
known that there was often, even in the same city, more than one synagogue or 
Jewish community (see White 1985/6:109; 1987a:154) - a circumstance that caused 
'considerable diversity from place to place and network to network, just as much in 
Christian communities as in diaspora synagogues' (White 1985/6:120). If the Jews of 
the Diaspora outnumbered their compatriots in Palestine, were the real Jews of the 
first century not living outside the land of Israel, asks Johnson (see 1989:427). 
The nature of the Pauline movement and of synagogue communities in the cities of 
the Roman Empire will be considered again in a subsequent chapter. Suffice it to 
say that while the heterogeneous character of Diaspora Judaism makes gener-
alisations extremely difficult, if not impossible, it has the advantage that it is at any 
rate impossible to project some form of normative Judaism (Rabbinic Judaism) 
. onto them. If there was no normative Judaism at the time, even in Palestine, much 
less should such a Judaism be assumed in the areas where Paul operated. In fact, the 
notion of a/the Judaism in Paul's lifetime (filled out in doctrinal jargon) had best be 
abandoned, at least in respect of the Diaspora. 
43.4 The Jesus (Pauline) movement as part of first-century Judaism 
It may seem strange to some that the Jesus movement is included in a discussion of 
the character and identity of first-century Judaism. As Smith says, 'it is rare to find 
an account of first-century Judaism which recognizes that Christianity was one of its 
most important forms' (1983:301). Just as easily is it forgotten in discussions of 
Pharisaism that besides Josephus the only Pharisee about whom we are really 
informed is Paul (see also Saldarini 1988:134). However, the Jesus movement is in 
all probability the best-documented section of first-century Judaism. 
While the Jesus movement is dealt with as Christianity,26 other groups - such as 
baptist groups in the Jordan valley (John "the baptizer") and the group around 
Simon "the magician" (Simon Magus) - are treated as 'peripheral figures of 
·"Christianity"' (Smith 1983:301). However, argues Smith, no one would exclude 
Judas of Galilee and his followers from a discussion of first-century Judaism. Why 
then exclude Jesus of Nazareth? As Charlesworth remarks: 
Since they have the same parent, we must again stress that the origins 
of Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity must not be studied in 
isolation ... In a profound sense both Rabbinic Judaism and Earliest 
Christianity not only preserve but are part of Early Judaism. 
(1990:42; see also Segal 1986:1) 
26 Even some Jewish scholars adhere to this viewpoint. Christianity which began on the first Easter 
is absolute in the reading of its circumstances and context and therefore Christianity 'is not a kind of 
Judaism. It is wholly other' (Neusner 1989:19). 
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It goes without saying that the details of this view still need to be filled in - some-
thing that will be partially attempted in the course of this study. In fact, much of the 
rest of this study will be concerned with locating one section of the Jesus movement 
(namely the Pauline movement) as part of the subculture of first-century Judaism.27 
There is no apriori reason why a separation between two religions, Judaism and 
Christianity, should be assumed in Paul's lifetime (see Johnson 1989:423, 427). Such 
a case would have to be argued. Given the abovementioned characteristics of first-
century Judaism, the opposite should rather be assumed. To emphasise the point: 
sociologically speaking, it should not be assumed apriori that the Pauline movement 
was separate from Judaism. H Paul did what many other Jews did (namely to claim 
the traditions and symbols of Israel for the definition and self-definition of his con-
gregations) then the interaction with Judaism may be seen as an insider's struggle. 
If there is truth in this argument, the assumptions in Pauline research of a normative 
Judaism and the monolithic character of first-century Judaism have fallen apart -
not to mention the assumption of a separation between the Pauline communities 
and first-century Judaism. In fact, the changing picture of first-century Judaism 
should bring about a revolution in Pauline studies, which have operated mainly on 
the notion of either normative or Rabbinic Judaism or else both. 
4.4 Jewish identity markers and self-understanding 
Both the theoretical principles and the new understanding of first-century Judaism 
suggest that several assumptions taken for granted in opponent hypotheses should 
be re-examined if not be abandoned. While the collapse of the received construction 
has been indicated in the previous section, the new features are still very much an 
unknown quantity. Only a few will be touched on. 
If it is true that there was such a diversity of Judaisms (rather than a normative 
Judaism) in the first-century world, it goes without saying that the notion of what 
constituted Jewishness has to be reconsidered. It includes elements such as the 
meaning of the words Jew and Judaizer, coming in and staying in, the way in which 
identity markers such as circumcision functioned, and the assumption that God-
fearers were the link between Jewish and Pauline communities. 
What constituted Jewishness, Neusner says, is a small question about a large prob-
lem. However, he formulates the question differently and therefore falls short of 
what seems to me the main issue. He wants to know 'how a religious system brings 
to concrete and vivid expression a definition of those who live within that system, 
27 In the light of the diversity identified within first-century Judaism, not only in Palestine but also in 
the Greco-Roman Diaspora, it should not be forgotten that the Jesus movement 'was quite literally a 
new invention every place it appeared' (Johnson 1989:425). 
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how it characterizes its members as a distinctive sort of social entity' (1987:331). His 
aim has to do with the how of the process, while to my mind the what of the social 
facts28 in the world out there is present in his final hypothesis but not explicitly 
argued.29 
He argues that the system-builders' social (including political) situation 'defines the 
generative problematic that imparts self-evidence to the systemically-definitive 
logic, encompassing its social component' (1987:353). Thus the 'particular 
politically-generative crisis' (1987:355) in each case (that of Paul, the Essenes of 
Qumran and the sages of the Dual Torah) determines the system's construction and 
content. The question is, how does Neusner determine Paul's particular generative 
crisis? He simply falls back, says he, onto the 'consensus of learning at this time' 
(1987:344 n 5) while the logic of his whole argument is that the use of a metaphor 
such as the concept Israel can only be grasped once it is related to the generative 
crisis as well as to the larger interest of the system (see 1987:343-353). What needs 
to be argued in Paul's case - namely the driving force of the social facts and the gen-
erative crisis - is unfortunately presupposed as a point of departure. 
While to my mind his application fails to do justice to the socio-historical setting 
which in each case generated the crisis demanding a response, the distinction 
between the symbol system and the generative crisis is a useful one.30 An especially 
helpful insight is the perception that different politically generative crises created 
different systems of Judaism within Judaism. 
Taking an analytical cue from Neusner, my aim will be to concentrate on the what of 
the social system (facts) that underlies the differences between various systems of 
Judaism and definitions of Jewishness - especially the particular crisis underlying 
Paul's letter to the Galatians. That is another way of expressing the importance of 
the communicative context in understanding the communicative message. 
28 A typical social fact N~usner maintains, is that a village exists or that extended families exist (see 
1987:323). 
29 Neusner is more interested in how social facts are metaphorised in a specific system to shape the 
meaning and promote the interests of the system builders. Social facts can be seen as something more 
than the mere here and now of their existence. An extended family can be transformed into the 'mythic 
"Israel'" (1987:323) so that the social unit adopts for itself and adapts for its purposes the social entity 
of Scripture. The social group is dealt with as something other than it actually is, for example as 'the 
body of Christ' or the 'true Israel'. Such a transformation of a social fact into something more entails 'a 
metaphorical reading of the social entity' (1987:332). Neusner uses the concept systemopoeia, a sym-
bolic transaction worked out in the imagination (see 1987:351) to describe the out-there in the world 
. where system-builders are confronted with a (theological) crisis which they try to explain (see Neusner 
1987:353). He argues furthermore that there is a dialectical relation between system-change, and 
social-change with symbol-change as the primary partner and system-change as the consequent event 
(see 1987:356). 
30 The same principle has been argued in the previous two chapters: that ideas bear a socio-cultural 
stamp, and unless such socio-cultural and historical realities are explicitly and consciously taken into 
account, the chances are that the ideas will be misinterpreted. 
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Also Jewish identity markers and self-understanding come under fire during such 
crises. Without returning to every single point of disagreement on the received com-
municative context, some aspects of first-century Judaism will be introduced with a 
view to subjecting such assumptions to critical examination. The particular aim is to 
explicate some of the components which, in view of the new understanding of first-
century Judaism, form part of the different systems of Judaism. It should be kept in 
mind that the discussion of individual aspects is hallmarked by their entrenchment 
in either the new understanding or the received view of first-century Judaism. 
4.4.1 The disappearance of the Jews from some scholarly quarters 
Not only in opponent hypotheses but in Pauline studies in general, the concepts 
Judaizers, Jewish Christians and Gentile Christians are frequently used and their 
meanings are taken to be well established. It is accepted that Jewishness and Jew 
refer to the religious identity markers such as circumcision, food laws, Sabbath, and 
. Torah. That is to say, the features of normative Judaism are taken for granted. 
A different picture is, however, beginning to crystallise. The variety of meanings 
assigned to the word Jew not only perfectly illustrates the principles of the 
abovementioned theory of otherness but also serves as a warning against the 
dangers of conceptual confusion. As a description or self-definition, what then does 
the word Jew refer to? or: who were referred to as Jews in the first-century world? 
According to Lowe there are at least three different meanings of the word 
'Ioooatol: members of the tribe of Judah as opposed to members of other tribes; 
Judeans as opposed to people living in other areas; and Jews as opposed to mem-
bers of other religions (see 1976:102-103; Kraabel 1982:455). Besides the ethnic, 
geographic, or religious usages, Kraemer adds a fourth usage. The word was also 
used by 'non-Jews who affiliated with Judaism' (1989:52), who used the word either 
as self-designation or as a proper name for their children. 
Lowe indicates that 'any nationality-word has a variety of stronger and weaker 
senses' (see 1976:107). (Think of all the different meanings of the word Afrikaner.) 
. The word 'Iov&x'im shares all the characteristics of this word - and more, since it 
was not only an ethnic or cultural but also a religious and geographical indicator.31 
A closer look at the word in its different senses would be illuminating. 
In its religious sense it is commonly used to refer to all adherents of the Jerusalem 
or Judean cult or, as Murray says, for all 'heirs of ancient Israelite Yahwism' 
31 To a large extent, due to the assumption of a nonnative Judaism in the first century, is it often 
assumed that the meaning of the concept 'Iou&xlot is perfectly clear. Since it is commonly taken for 
granted that Rabbinic Judaism or some normative Judaism close to it existed pre-70, 'Iou&xlot refers 
to a Rabbinic Jew or something very close to it (see Smith 1983:304; Lowe 1976:119; Kraemer 1989:35). 
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(1982:198).32 However, that does not help us much: who would be included under 
that epithet? The Hasmonean High-Priesthood, for example, considered even the 
Samaritans eligible to bring their sacrifices to Jerusalem (see Smith 1983:301). Fur-
thermore, the distinction suggested by Murray (see 1982:199) between Jews and 
Hebrews carries the implication that acceptance or rejection of the Jerusalem 
temple and its scribal establishment was one of the major dividing factors between 
Jewish groups.33 He argues that many issues raised in Christian texts can be 
understood as part of the stream of 'disaffected Judaism' which, in opposition to the 
Jewish establishment which( controlled the Temple cult and its surroundings, did not 
want to be called Jewish (see 1985:276). Smith adds the additional ambiguity of the 
term (in its religious sense) in the fluctuation between references to Temple 
adherence and to general religious patterns (see 1983:303). 
In the ethnic sense, too, the issue can be complicated. Jews, says Smith, were never 
identified by physical appearance (see 1983:302). He cannot recall one reference to 
a Jew being identified on this basis - not even circumcision, since Arabs and Egyp-
tians also practised circumcision. Another fact of which we can be reasonably sure is 
that in the Greco-Roman period the followers of the Jerusalem or Judean Jahweh 
cult 'had been so diversified by intermarriage, adoption, conversion, and adherence, 
that its spread cannot be considered as that of a single genetic stock' (Smith 
1983:302). 
In the geographical sense 'Iou&xUx can refer to at least three distinctive entities: 
Judea in the strict sense meaning the area west of the Jordan between Samaria and 
Idumea, the procurate of Pontius Pilate, or the kingdom of Herod the Great (see 
Lowe 1976: 103). Similarly 'Iou&x'lot can be used for inhabitants of any one of these 
. areas; it may have had a wider or narrower application depending on speaker and 
context (see Lowe 1976:106-107). Lowe suggests that, in the Diaspora, 'Iou&x'lot 
may mean either the inhabitants of Palestine or Jews in general (see 1976:129-130). 
According to him, the geographical sense of 'Iou&x'lot 'formed the primary meaning 
of the term in the New Testament times' (Lowe 1976:105).34 Even if it is true that 
the geographical sense was the primary indicator, it is still not really known which 
32 According to Smith, the one thing common to all forms of the cult was 'the god called Yahweh, 
Y ah, Iao, etc., who was often associated with various titles and epithets - Elohim, Adonai, Sabaoth, He 
who hears prayers, He whose name is blessed, etc.' (1983:302). 
33 Murray traces the distinctions in Israelite families to the period when exiles under the Persians 
returned from Babylon. They forced their revision of the Jewish religion onto those who remained in 
Palestine. Among the matters he mentions as revisions are: a new way of thinking about the powers in 
heaven and on earth, a change from the older calender to the lunar-solar calender brought back from 
Babylon, other forms of ideological oppression which include the breaking up of marriages and the dis-
qualification of people as Levites, rejection of the Temple and its cult (see Murray 1985:2ti6-279). 
34 He assumes that the Gospels represent a Palestinian usage, as opposed to the rest of the New 
Testament books which represent a Diaspora usage of the concepts. He argues that the translation for 
'Iou&x'loi in the vast majority of cases in the Gospels should probably beludeans and not Jews (see 
1976:128). 
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criteria were used and who used the concept to refer to whom. It is certainly confus-
ing to call people Jews who did not wish to answer to the name (see Murray 
1982:199). 
Above all, the different viewpoints are subject to the reality of perspectivism. From 
whose point of view is someone or some group seen as Jewish, be it in an ethnic, 
geographical or religious sense? Cohen (see 1989:23) argues that a Gentile who 
destroyed his ancestral gods and declared his exclusive loyalty to the god of the Jews 
would have been regarded as a Jew by his neighbours but not by the Jews. Different 
sets of criteria are applied. Here is another example to demonstrate the dilemma of 
perspectivism. To inhabitants of Palestine the strict geographical sense would be 
important whereas to people in the Diaspora it would make little difference. On the 
other hand, the exact opposite would be true of the religious meaning (see Lowe 
1976:104). Finally, to the Roman government and possibly to most Roman citizens 
the most important fact about the Jews of Palestine was a 'military fact: these Jews 
were located at a crucial point on the eastern frontier, and their attitude toward 
Rome had had much to do with the security of the eastern end of the Empire' 
(Kraabel 1982:454 ). 
At least one point should be clear. The concept 'IouOO:tot is a situational category 
which did not refer to a general identifiable group in the first-century Greco-Roman 
world: there were no Jews except from a specific point of view and in terms of a very 
specific setting. Who is a Jew, Johnson says (1989:427), 'was an open question, 
debated fiercely and even violently by rival claimants'. 
To adopt an argument used by Grabbe (see 1977:152) on a similar point: the defini-
tion of a Jew is in the eye of the beholder. The exact content of identity markers and 
symbols which were, in each particular case, central to a group's self-definition, is a 
matter of argument and cannot merely be assumed. A diversity of people in the 
Roman world were referred to as Jews by their neighbours and came to call them-
selves so. It would be a gross error to go on using a single formula to cover all the 
instances - especially if the later Rabbinic idea of identity markers provides the con-
tent of the formula. Thus Smith advocates the need for a study of the ancient defini-
tions of Jew and Judaism 'with careful attention to the different users of the terms 
and the circumstances of the usage' (1983:303). 
Finally, a few remarks on the word touOO:·{~nv (e.g. Gl 2:14). The received view that 
its meaning is self-evident ('to live like a Jew'), turns out be a mistaken assumption. 
Like the notion of God-fearers (to be discussed shortly), Cohen argues that if 'we 
seek to produce a single definition of a "judaizer" ... and if we limit that definition to 
the realm of Jewish practices alone, we labor in vain' (1989:33). 
What is beginning to emerge in some scholarly circles is an attempt to avoid the 
stock phrases and clear-cut definitions of groups and entities within first-century 
Judaism. The issue of Jewishness was, at least in Paul's lifetime, a highly disputed 
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and anything but established matter. If one theoretical pointer in the debate can be 
emphasised, it is that identity markers and self-definition function within the realms 
of a group's socio-cultural setting. 
4.4.2 The case of the so-called God-fearers 
There can be no doubt that the existence of the category of God-fearers is important 
in the arguments of many New Testament scholars on how to interpret Paul's mis-
sionary practice and the identity of the opponents. In the words of Harvey: '[T]he 
story of Paul's mission, and indeed of the influence of Judaism on the pagan world 
generally, would be unintelligible without the existence of some half-way stage 
. before becoming a full proselyte' (1985:94 n 14; and see Malherbe 1983:64). For the 
moment one, and only one, aspect concerns us. 
Some would immediately point out that the evidence for the existence of God-
fearers as a group attached to Judaism is well attested (see Levinskaya 1990:315; 
and cf Rajak 1985:257-258). A great deal of the debate concerned the issue whether 
there ever was such a group (see Collins 1985:180ff; Gager 1986). The description of 
a God-fearer by Reynolds and Tannenbaum is significant in that it presents one side 
of the debate. 
He is someone who is attracted enough to what he has heard of 
Judaism to come to the synagogue to learn more; who is, after a time, 
willing, as a result, to imitate the Jewish way of life in whatever way 
and to whatever degree he wishes (up to and including membership in 
community associations, where that includes legal studies and prayer); 
who may have had held out to him various short codes of moral 
behaviour to follow, but does not seem to have been required to fol-
low any one; who may follow the exclusive monotheism of the Jews 
and give up his ancestral gods, but need not do so; who can, if he 
wishes, take the ultimate step to convert, but need not do so, and is, 
whether he does or not, promised a share in the resurrection for his 
pains. 
(1987:65) 
Contrary to this idea, several scholars have questioned the existence of an identifi-
able class of Gentiles attached to Jewish communities, especially in the Diaspora 
(see Kraabel 1981a; 1985; 1986). If Kraabel's argument on the disappearance of the 
God-fearers (that they were an invention by the author of Acts) was overstated, his 
overall argument is sound. Perhaps his objection should be adjusted slightly so as to 
admit the existence of God-fearers 'in some meaningful and official sense' (Gager 
1986:98) as members of the Jewish community. We shall now touch briefly on to 
what is excluded from this meaningful and official sense in which Gentiles were 
attached to Jewish communities. 
The question is: In what way were Gentiles attached to Jewish communities? And 
how can such an attachment be described in appropriate terms? On the one hand, 
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the objection is not so much against the existence of Gentiles attached to Jewish 
communities; it is against the identification of such a group in the singular terms of 
religious attachment. There is a persistent tendency, according to Kraabel, to see 
Judaism in antiquity first of all as a religion that makes it hard to understand open-
ness towards Jews in any but 'religious terms' (1982:454; and see Kraabel 1985:231; 
Cohen 1989:33). A study of White indicates that 'designation by Jews of non-Jewish 
members of the collegial association as "god-fearers," however, would not have 
required them to be attracted actively towards Jewish worship, though some surely 
were' (1990:89). 
A closely related factor, on the other hand, is the general, illusory impression that 
both Jews and Christians lived in 'total apartness' from their pagan neighbours in 
the cities of the Empire (Rajak 1985:250). It should be realised that, despite all the 
reservations on the part of Jews and Christians against taking part in festivals and 
pagan sacrifices (which contributed to the impression), to be outside these activities 
would have meant, in effect, to be outside the city (see Rajak 1985:252). Despite 
such reservations, both the New Testament (see Harvey 1985:81) and archaeological 
·evidence on Diaspora synagogues (see Kraabel 1978:20-21) provide evidence of 
intimate contact of Gentiles with Jewish institutions (see Kraabel 1982:452; White 
1990:92). The notion of God-fearers is indispensable when such contact is limited to 
Gentile interest in the Jewish religion. Collins argues that 'we find a broad range of 
degrees of attachment, not a class with specific requirements or with a clearly 
defined status in the synagogue' (1985:184). 
Thus, errors to be avoided are, firstly, defining God-fearers in exclusivistic religious 
terms and, secondly, letting one's definition of God-fearers be influenced by the 
incorrect impression of restricted interaction between Jews and Gentiles. Both the 
nature of religion in the first-century world and the embeddedness of Jewish com-
munities in the social network of that world need to be taken into account. 
If God-fearers in any meaningful way formed a bridge between the pagan and 
Jewish worlds of Paul's ministry, then their proper place within the appropriate 
socio-cultural networks should be established. One should also avoid defining God-
fearers in Pauline studies in exclusively religious terms - especially modern religious 
terms. 
4.4.3 Circumcision: the sign of a Jew? 
It has been indicated in chapter 1 that, while it is widely accepted that circumcision 
is the crisis that occasioned the letter to the Galatians (see § 3.3), it is not 
immediately clear what exactly is meant by circumcision (see Cosgrove 1988:7). 
Even so (in popular opinion at least) circumcision is seen as a major identity marker 
of Judaism (see Collins 1985:179). A few scholarly positions will confirm it. 
According to the Tannaitic literature, the minimum requirements or identity 
markers of a Jew were 'ancestry through the mother or conversion including circum-
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cision for males, immersion, acceptance of the Torah, and sacrifice' (Schiffman 
1981:147). The identity markers for a Jew living in the pattern of covenantal 
nomism, Dunn maintains, were circumcision, purity and food taboos, and the Sab-
bath. This is what Paul refers to as 'works of the law' (see Dunn 1983h:107-108). He 
argues that 'we know that just these observances were widely regarded as character-
· istically and distinctively Jewish' (1983h:l07, italics JDGD). Cohen argues that the 
central symbol that indicated one's status as a Jew was circumcision. 
In the second century BCE circumcision achieved prominence, for 
Jews and gentile alike, as the Jewish ritual, and in subsequent 
centuries many gentile writers (e.g. Tacitus and Juvenal) confirmed 
Josephus's (and Paul's!) view that the acceptance of circumcision is 
the acceptance of Judaism. 
(Cohen 1989:27) 
According to him, no Jewish community in antiquity accepted male proselytes who 
were not circumcised. 
Supporting the remarks by Dunn and expressing the view of the majority of New 
Testament scholars, Collins says that 'circumcision was widely perceived by Gentiles 
as a symbol of Judaism's otherness' (Collins 1985:163). It is further widely held that 
Paul's rejection of circumcision as a requirement for Gentiles to enter the covenant 
fellowship 'was surely a significant factor in emergent Christianity's "breaking away" 
from its Jewish matrix' (Collins 1985:163). 
However, not only is there no agreement on what was meant by those Jews who did 
adhere to circumcision, but more and more evidence points to the fact that many 
Jews from different locations and different forms of Judaism did not consider cir-
cumcision necessary for salvation (see Collins 1985:179). Not only Paul but also 
Philo and other Jews in the Diaspora did not regard physical circumcision as a pre-
requisite for salvation or membership of the community (see also Borgen 1980; 
1985; McEleney 1973/4). In fact, Neusner maintains: 
For his taxic indicator of "Israel," Paul appeals to circumcision, a con-
sideration we have not found commonplace at all. It is certainly 
implicit in the Torah, but the Mishnah's laws accommodate as "Israel" 
persons who (for good and sufficient reasons) are not circumcised, 
and treat as "not-Israel" persons who are circumcised but who other-
wise do not qualify. So for the Mishnah's system circumcision forms a 
premise, not a presence, a datum, but not a decisive taxic indicator. 
(1987:344) 
Even if it is true that circumcision was widely perceived by Gentiles as a symbol of 
. the otherness of Judaism (see Smith 1982:10; Collins 1985:163), it seems that 
idiosyncratic interpretation or even rejection of this notion was the order of the day. 
Apart from the example of Paul, Smith points out that it was possible for a group of 
Jews 'to define themselves as Jews without circumcision' (Smith 1982:13; and see 
Gilbert 1991). 
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Two observations seem appropriate. At least circumcision, taken as a prime identity 
marker, did not have a fixed content and application in Jewish circles. Secondly, 
with the new understanding of first-century Judaism came a new appreciation of the 
role of identity markers. While they indeed distinguish insiders from outsiders -
define Jewishness - they apparently did not function to constitute such groups. 
Identity markers described Jewishness, but Jewish groups were apparently con-
stituted on some basis other than these religious identity markers. Thus neither 
·Paul's rejection of circumcision as an identity marker nor his reinterpretation of it 
would necessarily have resulted in excommunication from Judaism. In fact, while 
some Jews did take it as the prime identity marker, it was not a universal sign of 
Jewishness. 
4.4.4 Orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy 
A final feature emphasised in the new understanding of first-century Judaism, is its 
concern with orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy. In fact, it is commonplace in New 
Testament circles nowadays (see McEleney 1973:19) to claim that first-century 
Judaism was much more concerned with orthopraxy (accepted practice) than with 
orthodoxy (right beliet).35 In opponent hypotheses this description is expressed in 
arguments that the conflict in Galatia was about proper conduct and not so much 
about beliefs (e.g. Harvey 1985). While the value of this insight should not be 
underestimated, neither should it be overestimated. 
The burning issue, says Aune, 'lies in the necessity of making a balanced assessment 
of the relative structural significance and function of the belief system vis-a-vis ritual 
practice and ethical behavior within the Judaism of the Graeco-Roman period' 
(1976:3). Based on the interpretative principle of avoiding the 'blatantly 
anachronistic subjectivities of modern scholars', he claims that the 'belief system was 
definitely subordinate in both a functional and structural way to Jewish traditions of 
ritual practice and ethical behavior' (1976:10).36 Orthopraxy and not orthodoxy 
reigns supreme, since first-century Judaism 'had an intentional-behavioral rather 
than intellectual focus' (Aune 1976:5). 
35 Grabbe correctly draws attention to the need to distinguish between the question of 
orthodoxy/orthoproxy and what constituted Jewishness. If such a thing as normative Judaism existed, a 
denial of some of its central elements would have resulted in unorthodoxy but not necessarily in 
unJ ewishess. It should be noted that McEleney in this debate takes the issue of orthodoxy to be a ques-
tion of Jewish identity also (see 1973; 1978). It should furthermore be remembered that the current 
debate about orthodoxy stems from the assumption that Pharisaic/rabbinic Judaism was the normative 
orthodox form of Judaism in the first century (see Grabbe 1977:150). 
36 The anachronistic dilemma scholars are facing is well exemplified in McEleney's question: 'What, 
then, is the meaning of doctrinal disputes even in the earliest days of Christianity? To what were new 
adherents converted?' (1973:20). A less anachronistic approach would be to ask what was the character 
. of the disputes, and what part did doctrinal elements play in the disputes. As will be argued, the 
assumption of an outright doctrinal dispute in a first-century context is highly unlikely. 
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However, as Phillips (see 1984:289) cogently emphasises, it should not be forgotten 
that a religious system without beliefs is a self-contradiction. We should guard 
against the fallacy that someone could maintain proper praxis without holding some 
belief about it (see also McEleney 1978:86). For example, excommunication on 
account of idolatry cannot be a deviation in a matter of ritual or ethics unless it was 
believed to be a doctrinal or theological deviation as well (see Aune 1976:4-5; 
McEleney 1978:86). 
Thus, the point at issue is to describe the interface between the belief component 
and the ritual component in the first-century religious world. Whether the orthodoxy 
. - orthopraxy distinction sufficiently accounts for it is to be doubted. 
The difficulty, says MacMullen, is that 'we who stand inside the Judeo-Christian 
heritage and study the Greco-Roman are forever (though quite unconsciously) 
defining the latter in terms of the former. We are continually looking for what is not 
there, namely, philosophy' (MacMullen 1985/6:71).37 It causes a problem in that 
both orthodoxy and orthopraxy are viewed from the point of view of a particular 
structure of religion. Both belief systems and ritual actions should be situated within 
the framework of the first-century world and religious structure. 
Some clues are to be found in the study of ancient paganism. De Ste. Croix points 
out that all Greco-Roman paganism 'was essentially a matter of cult acts and not of 
beliefs' (1972:61). That, however, does not imply that someone might not be mis-
taken about such acts. It was indeed possible to be wrong about one's conduct; as 
MacMullen puts it, 'there were suitable, just as there were unsuitable, forms of 
address' (1985/6:72). Essentially, however, the structure of belief was not to accept 
a belief system but to adhere to beliefs which were part of social behaviour (see De 
Ste. Croix 1972:64). Although it was possible to be mistaken as to what is suitable 
·conduct in paganism, such ideas were not about what was thought to be true about 
the gods (see MacMullen 1985/6:72).38 It is important to notice that a different 
definition of religion is at stake; not only other beliefs but different structures of 
belief (see MacMullen 1985/6:76). Claims to be right or wrong seem to have had 
very particular functions. 
37 McEleney fits well into this frame. He maintains that the 'present separation of Judaism and 
Christianity is explicable historically only if one recognizes that there existed a firmly accepted Jewish 
orthodoxy in the first century and that this was even then a definable belief ... which was accepted by all 
who called themselves Israelites' (1973:20). The problem as pointed out by MacMullen is that, when 
looking for such orthodox beliefs, one will at least find some hints - which are then blown up out of 
proportion (see 1985/6:71). As argued in a previous chapter of this study, a text can sponsor more than 
one reading, and often it is not difficult to fmd in the evidence support for some theory or another. 
38 Searching for some identifiable set of beliefs or some mythology or god-story woven around the 
deities just was not the point of worship (see MacMullen 1985/6:72; De Ste. Croix 1972:69). 
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Thus, not only is it necessary to abandon the (erroneous) assumption that first-
century Judaism was primarily concerned with a 'belief system' (Aune 1976:5), but 
·religious beliefs and practices need to be described within their first-century con-
texts. In this regard the new understanding of first-century Judaism needs to be 
elaborated in order to encompass the insights obtained from comparative studies on 
religious activities. 
Apparently, to be part of the Jewish community was not at all analogous to slipping 
in or out of a contemporary parish church - either as regards belief or as regards 
practice. Religious allegiance was more than adhering to certain cultic or ethical 
practices, as some proponents of the idea of orthopraxy would have us believe. It 
involved membership of a social network. Along that line the argument on the new 
understanding of first-century Judaism will be further developed in a next chapter. 
5 11IE NATURE OF 11IE PAULINE MOVEMENT, OPPONENT 
HYPOTHESES AND 11IE RECEIVED COMMUNICATIVE CONTEXT 
Several assumptions taken for granted in opponent hypotheses cannot be main-
tained any longer. They include several of the historical components and the social 
conditions of the received communicative context, derived primarily from assump-
, tions from two related fields: the nature (and expansion) of the early Jesus move-
ment, and first-century Judaism. The notion of conflicting groups (which were 
responsible for the expansion of the movement along certain lines) in the early Jesus 
movement can no longer be taken as a secure basis when describing the nature of 
the Pauline communities. Furthermore, the new understanding of first-century 
Judaism contributes to the dismantling of categories describing the nature of the 
Pauline communities. For too long, New Testament studies have considered 
Judaism in religious terms only (see Kraabel 1982:454). 
If the received view on the expansion and organisation of the Jesus movement is 
placed in doubt, it goes without saying that the received view of the nature of the 
Pauline communities too, will have to be changed. It has become clear that the 
expansion of the early Jesus movement was more strongly influenced by socio-
cultural factors in the first-century Mediterranean world. In describing the nature of 
the Pauline communities we should accordingly adopt a social perspective. 
Consequently the nature of the Pauline movement and of first-century Judaism were 
_inferred from the sphere of religion. Symbolic and social structures are totally 
detached, if not ignored, in the sense that doctrinal and dogmatic disputes are dealt 
with as though no other social and cultural factors were involved. 
However, it also became clear that the new understanding does not go far enough in 
providing a first-century context for the understanding of religious activities. While 
this initiated a process by which first-century Judaism was freed from the distortions 
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by dogmatically focussed glasses, it also needs to be freed from anachronistic views 
on other historical components such as the structure of first-century religion.39 
Perhaps the truth of the matter is that 'dogmatically focussed glasses' (Schoeps 
1969:4) are distorting our view, not only on the expansion of the Jesus movement 
and the very nature of first-century Judaism but also on the very nature of the 
Pauline movement - to such an extent that it became impossible to obtain a clear 
view of the issues at stake. 
If my argument is sound, then the changing view on first-century Judaism, together 
with an awareness of the problems that surround the received view on the expansion 
of the early Jesus movement, warrants a suspension of opponent hypotheses built on 
that foundation. It calls, first of all, for an alternative construction as regards the 
nature of the Pauline movement (Pauline communities) within the early Jesus 
movement as well as within the subculture of first-century Judaism. Secondly, my 
·suggestion is that we shift the focus of the opponent question from their identity and 
viewpoint to an enquiry as to what may have triggered conflict where both the 
Pauline movement and first-century Judaism were embedded in the larger matrix of 
the first-century Mediterranean world. 
39 As argued in the previous chapter, thwretical and methodological components are not only 
essential in any cypher key but often determine social, cultural and historical components. This point is 
eloquently stated by Kraabel: 'The other novum in the understanding of ancient Jewry is as important 
as the new material evidence: it is a new point of view, new presuppositions and new methodology' 
(1982:446). 
CHAPTERS 
TIIE FIRST-CENTURY MEDITERRANEAN WORID AS TIIE SETTING FOR 
TIIE PAULINE CORRESPONDENCE AND CONFLICT IN GAIATIA 
While words and sentences do, in fact, need to be 
understood, interpretation requires fitting the whole 
text into some larger frame of reference. If we are 
seeking historical meanin& and meaning derives 
from and constitutes the social system, then this 
larger frame for New Testament texts is first-century 
Medite"anean society in general, and a given, con-
crete audience in particular. 
(Malina 1986c:176) 
lINlRODUCTION 
While the aim of this study is to provide an alternative cypher key for interpreting 
the letter to the Galatians and dealing with the conflict, it inevitably includes a study 
of the nature and character of the Pauline communities and consequently the nature 
of the conflict. These are to be constructed in first-century Mediterranean terms 
since, true to the methodological presuppositions of this study, it is accepted that 
Paul's words and acts are embedded in the social and cultural script of his world. 
The more we succeed in determining that script, the better our chances are of 
understanding what he was doing in what he was saying. 
If the first-century Mediterranean world provided the larger frame for an 
understanding of the Pauline movement (and there can be no doubt about this), 
·then it goes without saying that the socio-cultural system - that is, the social 
networks, the socio-cultural codes and conventions and the cultural features of that 
society - provided the general matrix for an understanding of the nature and charac-
ter of the Pauline communities and the nature of the conflicts encountered within it. 
To paraphn:.::e the epigraph of this chapter in terms of the conflict: while some kind 
of conflict was encountered by Paul in Galatia (and reflected in his letter), it was 
embedded in the socio-cultural system of first-century Mediterranean society. To do 
justice to the conflict, its nature should be described in terms of this social system: a 
cultural system designated in this chapter by the concepts agrarian society or agrarian 
world. 
In addition to a broad overview of the general features of the first-century Mediter-
ranean world as an agrarian world, two special features significant for an 
understanding of the nature of Paul's correspondence will be discussed in some 
detail. The first is the pre-print nature and the second the structure of first-century 
religion as substantive religion. Historical interpretation of first-century texts can 
hardly refrain from taking into account their pre-industrial and pre-print origin. The 
task of contextualising Paul's communicative act within the first-century Mediter-
. ranean cultural system is, however, no easy task. 
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At several levels the interpretive principles argued in this study will appear in the 
discussion to be indispensable to an understanding of the argument. In the first 
place, the importance of relying on comparative material from the social sciences 
should not be underestimated. To avoid projecting merely anachronistic and eth-
nocentric biases from a Western world into Paul's communicative context, the basic 
nature and structure of that socio-cultural system should be thoroughly examined. 
As many aspects as possible should be explicitly stated, and social-science models 
used in the process should be consciously applied. It should not be forgotten that a 
neglect of these aspects does not prevent the interpreter from projecting common-
sense models and views onto the first-century world. Thus it is not a question of 
accepting a whole set of assumptions regarding the Greco-Roman world as a cypher 
key when reading the letter. The question is whether these assumptions belong to 
the first century (conscious and explicit) or the twentieth century (unconscious and 
implicit). 
In terms of the received view on background knowledge, most of the issues dis-
cussed in this chapter have no immediate application to an understanding of the let-
ter. However, the gist of my theoretical argument is that we cannot wish to construe 
the letter as a first-century letter unless we have been retrained to a different style 
of language and reasoning. Being retrained to the first-century Mediterranean world 
serves a double purpose: it creates an awareness of the differentness of that world in 
comparison to a twentieth-century industrial world, and it induces a cautious atti-
tude towards one's own cultural biases. 
2 SOCIAL LOCATION VERSUS SOCIAL CONDIDONS 
Fundamental to the argument in this study is the assumption that the meaningful 
experience of people should be understood in terms of the socio-cultural system 
within which they lived. In discussing the emic - etic dilemma in a previous chapter 
(chapter 2 § 6.1), one of the problems identified was how, on the one hand, to 
determine the meaning of the concepts used by participants (actors or natives), 
while on the other hand avoiding a projection of one's own concepts onto another 
world. This dilemma is acute when it comes to notions such as group or conflict, 
which are apparently very straightforward concepts. When not only the application 
of concepts but the concepts themselves become the object of interpretation, a dis-
tinction between different levels of interpretation is inevitable. 
The distinction between social location and social conditions will prove useful in 
doing just that. Social location of thought is a sociology-of-knowledge problem. One 
of the working principles of any sociology of knowledge is that 'thought is a social 
act. Thus all sociologists of knowledge assume that there is a relation between 
thought and the social conditions under which it occurs' (Rohrbaugh 1987b: 104 ). 
While the organisational structure and other social conditions focusing on the 
organisational networks and institutions in society might be clear, it may not be 
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immediately apparent what is meant by the social location, which deals with the 
symbolic media and structures of interaction. Rohrbaugh gives a helpful description: 
It is what Peter Berger calls a 'plausibility structure', a socially con-
structed province of meaning. It is not reducible to the material condi-
tions of life because it is itself a mental construct, a socially produced 
and maintained picture of the world. This means that the social base 
is not the cause of other ideas, but the context in which other ideas 
are interpreted and understood as realistic possibilities. 
(1987h:113-114) 
Social locations are heuristic constructs and not explanatory ones. However, as 
Rohrbaugh says: 
It is not that certain experiences produce certain beliefs~ but that 
given certain experiences a limited range of beliefs should be 
plausible options for most of those who share the social location. Even 
if rejected for other alternatives, a given belief within that range 
should be understood by those who share the common location. 
( 1987b: 114-115) 
Translated to the question of groups in the first-century Mediterranean world, the 
social location deals with the question: 'What is a group?' while the social condition 
question would be, 'What constitutes this group?' It is just as important to know the 
preconditions of group formation in the first-century Mediterranean world as it is to 
know what constituted a particular group. The same argument pertains to any other 
aspect of that world. 
While remarks about the social context (e.g. the Pauline movement as a group) are 
common in New Testament studies, the social location of groups as such is very 
seldom explicated. Information regarding a group is meaningless without reference 
to the social structure and social system of which it is a part. Thus, what social loca-
tion adds to the description of the nature of the Pauline communities is an openness 
to the social system underlying particular social conditions. 
The lack of vision concerning the social location has a twofold consequence. It does 
not account for the different cultural contexts within which concepts, words and 
institutions find their meaning, nor does it account for the transfer of contemporary 
contents to the first-century world. This is true not only of the notion of groups but 
applies equally well to aspects such as preaching or missionary activities and the 
notion of conflict. Part of the affirmative action of rescuing the discussion on the 
nature and character of the Pauline movement from anachronistic and ethnocentric 
interpretations would be to address both sides of the issue. 
3111E FIRST-CENTURY MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY AS AN AGRARIAN 
SOCIETY 
While nobody would seriously dispute the fact that the first-century Mediterranean 
world was the setting for Paul's communication, or even that Paul's world (and that 
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of his opponents) was a pre-industrial and pre-print world, these facts have been 
consistently disregarded by Pauline scholarship. To avoid any misunderstanding, let 
us put it this way: while scholars may claim to have taken seriously the fact that 
Paul's world was the first-century Mediterranean world, it has been argued in this 
·study that such claims cannot be taken seriously unless they are supported by an 
integrated methodology dealing with the otherness of that world. The assumption of 
commensurability between modern and first-century Mediterranean societies and 
the disregard of a historical aim of interpretation simply amount to a common-sense 
construction of the first-century Mediterranean social world. 
In this study some important assumptions about the first-century Mediterranean 
world will be raised to an explicit and conscious level. This is not to claim assured 
knowledge of the Greco-Roman world. On the contrary, it is a way of explicitly deal-
ing with the differences - apparently not a bone of contention in the received view, 
where such matters are rarely raised to a conscious level. 
What is typical of the first-century Mediterranean world, says Malina, 'is that it is a 
nearly perfect example of what anthropologists call classic peasant society: a set of 
villages socially bound up with the preindustrial city' (1981:71).1 Prior to a general 
description of an agrarian society, some remarks will suffice to put into perspective 
both the significance and the dilemma represented by this insight for a description 
of the matrix as well as the nature the Pauline movement. 
At the outset it is necessary to exorcise a misunderstanding that often arises in con-
nection with generalisations at this level. The notions of first-century Medite"anean 
and Greco-Roman world/people/religion are not the only ones used in this study. 
The common objection that there never was such an entity as the first-century 
Mediterranean world or person need not be taken seriously if that objection is 
intended to nullify the level of generalisation. It goes without saying that such a level 
of generalisation should also be based on the historical particularities of specific cul-
tures or eras. However, just as scholars today often refer to African religi,on, Western 
politics or capitalist economy, or industrial/pre-industrial society, generalisations such 
as Greco-Roman or first-century Medite"anean are possible and inevitable.2 As long 
as different levels of abstraction are kept separate, it is not only possible but neces-
sary to distinguish between them when analysing any particular society (see Malina 
1981:1-24). The paramount objective of this kind of exercise is to avoid what 
Rohrbaugh calls sociocentrism: 'the tendency to see things the other side of the 
industrial revolution as if that revolution changed nothing in our patterns of social 
perception' (1987b:113). 
1 Scholars use different concepts to describe the same phenomenon. Peasant (Malina 1981), 
agrarian (see Rohrbaugh 1978:116 n 4; Saldarini 1988:35) or traditional pre-industrial (Carney 1975:83) 
are synonyms used to describe the same kind of pre-industrial societies, which stand in sharp contrast 
to modern industrialised societies. Agrarian will be used in this study. 
2 For a treatment of the history of Western religion see, for example, Smith (1962:15-50). 
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3.1 The interconnectedness of agrarian societies 
It should be realised, first of all, that agrarian societies probably differ fundamen-
tally from contemporary Western industrialised societies in almost every single 
respect (see Carney 1975): not only with regard to economic structures (which were 
changed by technological developments and industrialisation) but also with regard 
. to social, political, military and cultural features. In short, the change from pre-
industrial to industrial societies entails a change of whole cultural systems (see 
Rohrbaugh 1978:30). In fact, even the dominant system of values, attitudes and per-
sonality structures and the perception of human existence underwent a change. 
At an ontological level nobody can seriously dispute the otherness of such societies. 
However, the description of this otherness presents serious theoretical and practical 
difficulties. 
Secondly, as in any other society, an underlying system of values and attitudes 
determines the broad spectrum of a society's institutions (see Carney 1975:102, 106-
111 ). Different facets of society are all mutually related and interconnected, which 
means that - to take one example - the level of literacy cannot be divorced from 
basic economic circumstances, the level of technological development, psychological 
attitudes towards words, and the predominant values in a society (this example will 
shortly be discussed in more detail). Carney refers to this interconnectedness as the 
'inter-locking traditional trap' (1975:108) or the realisation that traditional society 
(or, for that matter, any society) is 'a system, seamless web, or whatever else one 
.wishes to term the intermeshing institutions and practices' (1975:111). The point to 
stress is that assumptions at one level of society should take into account the 
accompanying conditions in that society. The cultural system should be taken as a 
whole and each part as embedded in this cultural system in a meaningful way. 
We shall now proceed to touch on some of the more general features of first-century 
Mediterranean society. 
3.2 Some general features of an agrarian society 
Perhaps the best starting point, from a twentieth-century Western industrial per-
spective, in setting out to grasp the otherness of agrarian societies3 is to realise that 
social institutions so well known to us did not exist as independent institutions. 
There were 'only two significant and discernible social institutions in the first-
century Mediterranean world of the New Testament: kinship or family and politics 
or government' (Malina 1986a:85). Other social institutions (religion, education, 
3 For the discussion that follows I am indebted to several scholars who have discussed these issues 
more extensively (see Malina 1981; Saldarini 1988; and especially Carney 1975 and Rohrbaugh 1978). 
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economics, and the like) did not function independently but were embedded in 
either kinship or politics.4 
Economically speaking, agrarian societies are fundamentally dependent on agricul-
ture (see Meeks 1986b:38). Saldarini estimates that 90 percent of people in antiquity 
were involved in agriculture (see 1988:51). Agricultural and fishing villages linked to 
pre-industrial cities were the predominant environment where someone in the first-
century Mediterranean world would be born (see Malina 1981:71). Such pre-
. industrial cities contained not more than ten percent of the total population, which 
implies that the majority of people were living in villages or rural areas surrounding 
the cities. Unlike modern market economies, the majority of the population were 
not free to grow and sell their produce for their own benefit (see Saldarini 1988:39). 
Most of the peasants living in these villages were in fact engaged in subsistence 
farming (see Carney 1975:102). 
Economic activities embedded in other institutions are called substantive economics 
whereas an independent economic institution represents formal economics. Eco-
nomics in the first-century Mediterranean world was embedded in either kinship or 
politics. 'There was a political economy and a householding economy but no formal 
economy with special rules and theories' (Malina 1986a:85). The 'dominant eco-
nomic unit in ancient society was not the firm but the extended household with its 
estates and household economy' (Carney 1975:149). 
The pre-industrial city should not be confused with anything referred to as a city 
today. In antiquity, Saldarini points out, a city was nothing but 'an administrative 
center' and what would today be called a 'large village or town'. It qualified as a city 
because the majority of people in it did not work directly at agricul-
ture and because the activities of the city dominated the cultural, reli-
gious, political and economic life of the empire, region or society. 
(Saldarini 1988:46) 
One of the most striking features of the traditional societies of antiquity, as com-
pared to modern industrialised societies, is the lack of technological development, a 
fact which influenced almost every other aspect - from the levels of literacy to the 
world view to the economic and power structure of society (see Botha 1990a:35).5 
Such cultures were locked into a developmental trap where the dominant values 
enhance an anti-technological climate (see Carney 1975:106). Although it was tech-
nological innovation which (at least in part) brought about the industrial revolution 
4 If this is true, its importance for an understanding of the nature of the Pauline communities 
should be obvious. The different structure of religious activities in such a world, as compared to con-
temporary Western religious structures, is immediately apparent. 
5 This is not to say that they lacked any technology, but in comparison to contemporary industri-
alised society they did indeed lack a great deal of technology (see Rohrbaugh 1978:41). 
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in Western Europe, this revolution did not take place in isolation from a change in 
the predominant cultural and value system. 
Agrarian societies, in contrast to industrial societies, consist of two major classes 
which are widely separated. A very steep hierarchy and great inequality between 
classes are the outcome of power and wealth concentrated in the hands of a very 
few. Military power plays a dominant part in maintaining the steep social pyramid 
which results from this political and economic dispensation. Everybody in the 
Empire came under the general jurisdiction of Roman authorities (see Stambaugh 
& Balch 1986:31). In terms of control and power, the most significant role player in 
agrarian societies is the military. To talk about 'the economic, political or social 
thought of antiquity without emphasizing the overriding military preoccupations of 
·the ancients is grossly to distort one's picture of their world' (Carney 1975:245-247). 
On the basis of these criteria, scholars argue that in the Greco-Roman world the 
wealthy and powerful constituted less than two percent of a population of round 
about 50 - 80 million people. Members of these families made up the local councils 
and filled the magisterial positions in the more than one thousand towns and cities 
of the Empire (see Holmberg 1990:22). Consequently, noble birth was the passport 
to social success (see Carney 1975:93). While the elite group were not directly 
involved in agriculture, they controlled agricultural activities in at least two ways: by 
owning the land6 and by controlling the markets. 
Following Lenski, Saldarini (see 1988:39-45) presents a stratification system of such 
agrarian societies in terms of nine classes, five within the ruling group and the 
remaining four in the lower group. The peasants made up the bulk of the lower 
group (see Saldarini 1988:43). These classes represent functional differences rather 
than politico-economic power (although they had different levels of access to such 
power). Even within the urban sectors people of different classes were very much 
stratified (see Malina 1981:72-73). Talking about urban life, most urbanites (not 
more than five to ten percent of the total population) were in administrative func-
tions serving the needs of the ruling class. Most of the artisans (a small percentage 
of the population) were grouped together in voluntary associations where they 
gained some social importance (see Verner 1982:54). 
The divide between the pre-industrial city and the rural village is clearly implied in 
the above picture (see Meeks 1983:13-15). The cultural distance between city and 
village (city and country) was enormous. Indeed, it led some to speak of a 'plural 
society', which means that 'different sectors of the populations of such societies each 
6 Wealth in the ancient world, says Rohrbaugh, ultimately came from the owning of land. Yet the 
critical distinction is not between those who owned and those who did not own land but rather between 
those who owned enough to be freed from the necessity to work and those who owned only enough to 
make farming a necessary occupation (see 1983:541). 
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hold completely different, and mutually unintelligible, pictures of their "world" and 
life space' (Carney 1975:100). This difference is expressed by the terms little tradi-
tion, which was scorned and little understood by the men of the great tradition - that 
is, the body of classical writings which formed the common education of the tiny lit-
erate elite of gentlemen? (see Carney 1975:100). 
As already stated, social status was marked by citizenship and family. Wealth was 
necessary to an upper-class person, but its possession did not secure a position in the 
upper class; in contrast to modern capitalist societies, where wealth is often a means 
to power, power was the means to wealth (see Rohrbaugh 1983:542). Thus 'status 
and power were more important then wealth in ancient society' (Saldarini 1988:28). 
·The importance of this view is also reflected in two more cultural presuppositions of 
the first-century Mediterranean world, namely that 'all goods are limited,' and the 
'debt of gratitude' (see Malina 1988b:5 n 7). The latter will be discussed in due 
course. 
A pivotal value expressing the life experience of the first-century Mediterranean 
world is expressed in the concept of limited goods. Most probably the experience of 
powerlessness contributed to the perception, quite typical of agrarian societies, 'that 
all goods available to a person are, in fact, limited' (Malina 1981:75). As a result, 
individual and group advancement always entails detriment to others (see Malina 
1987:362). Social or material benefit could only be obtained at the expense of 
others. 
In an intricate and complex way, the concept of limited goods expresses something 
of the predominant cultural values of first-century Mediterranean society. Neither 
the social power base nor the value system of elites was ever seriously challenged 
(see Carney 1975:97). Together with an authoritarian political structure (1975:118) 
dominated by the military, and the political economy8 it engendered, it 'generates a 
slaveholder psychology, with deep-rooted authoritarian beliefs about innate supe-
riority and high valuation of conspicuous consumption together with disdain for 
manual labour' (1975:103). Faced with this potent cultural reality, the majority of 
people in an agrarian society could not hope to experience abundance. In fact, land, 
food, honour, and status 'were all seen (accurately) as in short supply' (1975:100). 
7 It is sobering to recognise that they are the ones we know best, since they produced the majority 
of surviving literature and their picture of the world has survived (see Verner 1982:47; Meeks 
1986b:33). As Malina says, they were the 'bearers of the culture's "Great Tradition"' (1981:73), who also 
controlled the majority of the priestly class in Palestine (see Saldarini 1988:43). They could read and/or 
write, or knew somebody who could (see Camey 1975:100). It would be wise not to take their view as 
representative of the Greco-Roman world as a whole. 
8 Political economy is an economy where relationships centre on power and status rather than the 
maximisation of profit (see Carney 1975:102). 
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Since money could not change one's social class nor secure power, as it can in 
modern capitalist systems, different attitudes regarding money were the order of the 
day. One way in which first-century people could survive in a world of limited goods 
was by means of dyadic relationships, especially patron-client relationships (see 
Malina 1981:80), because the emphasis on honour produced a situation where 
money served the purpose of building up patron-client relationships and led to the 
system of reciprocity. Since the accumulation of wealth as such was seen as inflicting 
loss and injury on someone else, hence as a dishonourable step, wealth was a means 
to engage in reciprocal relationships conducive to honour (see Malina 1981:82-85; 
1987). In the words of White: 'the display of one's wealth through benefaction was a 
sign of status' (1990:145). Unlike the situation in the Western world, however, a 
token of gratitude was never seen as a free gi,ft. Gifts implied obligation towards the 
patron and were made 'culturally with strings attached' (Malina 1988h:5 n 7). 
An explicit statement of the differences between first-century agrarian society and 
contemporary Western industrialised societies brings into focus the distance 
between two cultural worlds. Besides, recognition of the interconnectedness of vari-
ous components of first-century Mediterranean society makes it even more impor-
tant to establish an alternative communicative context for Paul's letter to the 
Galatians. 
The otherness of first-century Mediterranean society, to put it bluntly, is not cos-
metic or artificial but strikes at the heart of New Testament stµdies. Overall features 
may serve to establish at a general level the dis/similarities between two cultural 
worlds: a first-century Mediterranean culture and a Western industrialised culture. 
However, historical conclusions require the elaboration of generalisations in each 
context in its entirety and uniqueness. In the pages that follow, an attempt will be 
made to elaborate, expand and alter, to add and to link some of the historical com-
ponents relevant to an understanding of Paul's communicative context as a first-
century context. Two aspects of special significance to Paul's social environment are 
the oral features of first-century society and, secondly, the substantive nature of reli-
gion in that world. 
4 COMMUNICATION IN A PREDOMINANTLY ORAL CUL1URE 
A definite fact about the audience Paul was writing for is that it lived in an oral cul-
ture - that is, his letter constituted communication in a pre-print world. Since first-
century people lived in a pre-print world, where the need for and application of 
reading and writing were arguably different from those of a predominantly literate 
society, it seems appropriate to ask about the nature of such communication and the 
conventions and attitudes which accompanied it. This may help to limit modem 
biases. Botha justifiably warns that 'interpretation of New Testament texts which 
fails to take cultural differences seriously when it comes to concepts like texts, tradi-
tion and even writing can only misrepresent those texts' (1990a:36). 
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Again, Achtemeier warns that the New Testament documents originated in 'a cul-
ture of high residual orality' and such 'a predominantly oral environment presented 
a situation almost totally different from that within which we currently operate, even 
though they had written documents as do we' (1990:3). It goes without saying that, 
when it comes to the differences between oral and literary cultures, New Testament 
scholarship is deeply indebted to comparative studies in the social sciences. 
4.1 The first-century Mediterranean world as a predominantly oral world 
While it is a truism to state that the ancients lived in a pre-print world, the sig-
nificance of this observation for an understanding of Paul's letters is seldom 
grasped. In fact, anachronistic (if not downright fallacious) assumptions on the 
nature of literary activities and the level of literacy in the first-century Mediter-
ranean world hamper balanced assessments of both aspects in New Testament 
studies. It needs to be pointed out that both literary activities and the level of liter-
. acy in the first-century Mediterranean world are either misinterpreted or over-
estimated in New Testament studies. 
Since a variety of movements went into the making of modernity, the technological 
and industrial revolutions were accompanied by the printing revolution. The first 
point to grasp is that the printing revolution contributed to a cultural change of 
great significance (see Botha 1990a:37, 41; Achtemeier 1990:4). Both literacy and 
orality are embedded in specific cultural contexts. They do not refer to the in/ability 
to read and write as such. Spoken discourse is not yet orality and the ability to 
read/write is not yet literacy (see Botha 1990a:39-40; 1991h:4). Botha suggests that 
orality, 
as a condition, exists by virtue of communication that is not dependent 
on modern media processes and techniques. It is negatively formed by 
the lack of technology and positively created by specific forms of 
education and cultural activities. 
(1991h:5) 
On the other hand, 'literacy is about an ideologically laden social activity which is 
part of a cultural system' (Botha 1990a:41) rather than a simple familiarity with 
·reading and writing. 
On the orality - literacy continuum, Botha (1990a:42) maintains that the first-
century Mediterranean world can best be depicted as a scribal culture: 
culture familiar with writing but in essence still significantly, even 
predominantly, oral. In scribal culture reading is largely vocal. and 
illiteracy the rule rather than the exception ... Though no one will 
deny that orality was part of the Greco-Roman world, we need to 
realise to what extent orality was the norm. 
Orality, together with the other features of agrarian society, presents us with modes 
of communication largely dissimilar to those of post-print industrial societies. To 
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avoid projecting literary biases onto a pre-print world, the cultural phenomenon of 
orality embedded in an agrarian world must form part and parcel of the construction 
of Paul's communicative context. If the medium is the message (see the arguments 
in Botha 1991b:3), great care must be taken in establishing scribal modes of com-
munication in Paul's world (in the section to follow, some of the special features will 
be pointed out in more detail). 
The second point to note is that the assumption of mass literacy is one of the fal-
lacies created by the great tradition of late Western antiquity. Not only the explicit 
(but problematic) assertion that 'Christianity emerged in a Mediterranean culture 
that was not illiterate' (Talbert quoted by Botha 1989:39), but the all-pervasive 
'literate bias' (Botha 199()a:43) which dominates New Testament studies is disquiet-
ing from a historical point of view (see also Achtemeier 1990:25-27). 
·Literate biases contribute to fallacious assumptions of a high level of literacy in the 
Greco-Roman Mediterranean world. Notions that there was a large reading public, 
and that a thriving book trade existed, are common but arguably a misrepresenta-
tion that keeps cropping up in New Testament studies (see Botha 1992a:l-2 for 
some examples). 
Since 'literacy is a technology with a history' (Botha 1992a:3), there are several argu-
ments against mass literacy in the first-century Mediterranean world. The assump-
tion of a high level of literacy - in a culture which had little use for reading and writ-
ing; which lacked the technological and especially the economic basis for a literate 
culture; and where both the day-to-day lifestyle and the facts of demography would 
militate against it9 (see Carney 1975:109-110; Botha 1992a:7-8)- seems to reflect a 
modern bias in favour of literacy that is unaccountable in the context of the first-
century Mediterranean world. Botha concludes: 
The possibility of widespread literacy, and the probability of a literate 
culture cannot be very great with regard to Greco-Roman antiquity; 
as a society the major factors creating literacy were absent and many 
factors making it unlikely were fully present. 
(1992a:8) 
Says Carney: 'So mass literacy did not exist; indeed, probably only the elite and local 
subelite, a tiny fraction of the total population, could read and write' (1975:110; and 
9 The interconnectedness of cultural phenomena should once again be kept in mind. Schooling is 
expensive in any society but even more so in pre-industrial societies. With a high mortality rate among 
children in agrarian societies, barely 40 percent reach the age of 16, and few of those live out a long 
working life (see Carney 1975:111). The economic demands in such a society would have been too 
costly. 'Mass literacy is impossible without mass education' (Kenney quoted by Botha 19928 :9). Add to 
that the low demand for reading and writing (see Botha 19928 :7), especially in an economic world of 
limited goods, as well as the subsistence economy of the majority of people, which would not allow such 
luxuries as leisure-time reading. The high cost both of writing material and of the act of writing should 
be interpreted within the economic context of mainly subsistence economic activities - all in all, not 
conditions conducive to a high level of literacy. 
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see MacMullen's estimate 1984:21). In view of the fact that even some slaves could 
read and/ or write, it is better to rephrase this remark: only a small fraction of the 
population had a real need for reading and writing. Still, in interpreting this evi-
dence one needs to take into account the overall socio-economic and cultural con-
text of the first-century Mediterranean world. Most likely the texts of the small elite 
group, which had little relevance for the situation and culture of the majority of 
people, mislead us into mistaking the part for the whole. 
4.2 Some special features with regard to oral worlds 
If it is true that Paul's world was a predominantly oral world, then some important 
features need to be discussed in order to avoid projecting onto his communication 
the literate biases that are so common to our world. 
Firstly, the fact that letters were written documents does not negate the fact that 
Paul's le~ters, as first-century letters, communicated first of all within a scribal cul-
ture. It should, however, be noted from the outset, as Botha insists, that they 
'facilitated and served oral communication ... Letters create appearance in the expe-
rience of the recipient(s) by evoking the physical presence of the author(s)' 
(1992a:14). Stowers emphasises that ancient letters largely consisted in the literary 
expression of social situations 'where two or more people interacted, usually in face-
to-face encounters' (1988:79). The letter to the Galatians, as an example relevant to 
the present study, was not merely a literary artifact which conveyed some cognitive 
information: it presupposed a social relationship for its successful communication of 
a message. 
Secondly, the spectrum of orality - literacy represents a continuum of mindsets or 
attitudes towards reality and experience (see Botha 1992h:9). The printing revolu-
tion which accompanied the technological and industrial revolutions of Western 
Europe in the seventeenth century brought with it a new culture, referred to as mod-
ernity or the modern era; aspects such as 'control over one's own life', the possibility 
of critical thinking, different states of mental health and illness - in short, different 
experiences of reality (see Botha 1990a:38) - became part of the cultural package. 
Thirdly, the human experience of words in pre-industrial traditional societies differs 
from the equivalent experience in modern societies. The former are, as Carney says, 
'still largely at the word-magic stage' (1975:110). The magic power of words to affect 
people is widely experienced in these societies (see Botha 1992h:15). Whatever else 
they are, to such people words are at the very least (and probably to a significant 
degree) means and tools of power. In a short letter such as Galatians, where Paul 
uses bewitchment language (Gl 3:1) and curses those who do not agree with him (Gl 
1:8-9), the content of the letter may well be subordinate to a power struggle in which 
the magical power of words plays a decisive role. 
This point is supported, fourthly, by research on predominantly oral cultures which 
indicates that such cultures 'can believe themselves traditional no matter how far 
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they stray from the past, because they gradually adjust their myths without knowing 
it, and no text will disabuse them' (Hirsch 1985a:26). The principle should be 
. apparent. In predominantly oral cultures there is no question of a belief system 
which can be checked independently from the persons in authority. Tradition and 
truth reside in authoritive leaders. The situation in the Pauline communities can be 
better pictured in terms of Johnson's description: 'The earliest Christians in his 
churches heard Paul viva voce (and met other Christians also), remembered some 
things, and misheard and forgot others' (1975:106). Truth was not exclusively (nor 
even primarily) linked to correspondence with a manuscript but to the authoritative 
figure behind the words and to the people who transmitted them. 
Finally, the difficulties (both economic and technological) of producing the writing 
materials and written manuscripts should be kept in mind when presupposing 
widespread literary activities (see especially Achtemeier 1990). According to 
Saldarini, it is doubtful whether small villages in Palestine 'had their own Torah 
scroll or a teacher learned in more than the basics of the law' (1988:53). Was this 
also the case in the cities of the Greco-Roman world? It is unlikely that each city 
(town or village) had, to put it in anachronistic terms, a standard version of the 
Bible (Old Testament). And even if they had (which manuscript version?), it should 
be remembered that traditions (religious traditions) are kept alive in dn oral world 
·in a way that presupposes neither a fixed dogma or doctrine, nor a set of manu-
scripts against which it can be checked. Tradition was linked with authority figures. 
This aspect highlights the importance of the bearer of the letter. Such a person in all 
probability performed the letter on delivery (Achtemeier 1990:25), and the act of 
communication was as dependent on the carrier of the letter as on its content (see 
Botha 1992h:8-9). Communication in a scribal world does not depend primarily on 
manuscripts, even when these were involved in the communicative process. A 
closely related observation is that the body of ancient letters is not merely informa-
tion to be communicated. Rather, as Stowers points out, it is the 'medium through 
which a person performs an action or a social transaction with someone from whom 
he or she is physically separated' (1988:85; and see Stowers 1986:15-16). 
43 First-century letters, communication and authority 
Since first-century Mediterranean society was, by definition, pre-print, hence 
predominantly oral, this finally brings us to the issue of authority and the 
accompanying personality structure in such societies. 'Authoritarian thought-ways 
·were pervasive in this hierarchically ordered and power-ridden society' (Carney 
1975:61). In fact, it affected most spheres of life. Within the steep pyramid of politi-
cal culture - which was authoritarian (1975:118) - one finds a society of little 
pyramids, the extended families headed by autocrats (1975:90); the political econ-
omy was structured in such a way that authority ran vertically downwards 
(1975:102); the 'personality structure produced by such a background largely tended, 
inevitably, to be authoritarian' (1975:92). The authoritarian pyramid, Stowers main-
tains, 
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was replicated countless times on a smaller scale in all sorts of institu-
tions and relationships. Religious groups, estates, workers guilds, and 
families were organized hierarchically. 
(1986:28) 
Socialisation tends to foster and reinforce an anti-individualistic pattern of 
behaviour. Group norms and traditional prescriptions, which were predominantly 
determined by authority figures, were much more important than individualistic 
·concerns. 
An appropriate concept to describe such a personality complex is dyadic personality. 
The term is used to describe people who are brought up not to be individuals in the 
first instance or to think and act accordingly but to be members of a group. Thought 
and behaviour are collectively determined and controlled (see Malina 1981:51-60; 
1989).10 In this regard Carney (1975:118) remarks: 
In his family a youth was thoroughly socialized to regard autocratic 
paternalism and hierarchical relationships as the norm for behaviour 
between senior and junior, superior and subordinate, male and 
female. Schooling was a matter of acquainting oneself with author-
ities. 
Given these cultural particulars, social networks of patronage (as well as systems of 
honour and shame) take on a special significance (both aspects are to be discussed 
shortly). For the moment the spotlight is on the importance of centralised authority 
for tradition and the written word. 
·Although the written word, according to MacMullen, 'naturally implies authority, 
doctrine, and all that sort of thing', all that sort of thing 'strangely did not follow as a 
necessary consequence of writing' (1985/6:72). That is especially the case in cultures 
which were/are predominantly oral. 
To bring these insights to bear on Paul's letters, their authority lay not in the fact of 
being written (for the illiterate majority written words, in any case, had no meaning) 
but in being recognised as words of authority by a group or community. Their 
authority derived not from being written but from a prior, recognised position of 
authority. Authority was embedded in the context of a recognised authority network. 
In other words, the authority of Paul's gospel, as expressed in the letter to the 
Galatians, could not have resided in its being recognised as Scripture or as one ver-
sion of the salvation message, but rather in his social credentials. His social standing 
10 It should be kept in mind that individuality and communality should not be pictured as clear 
opposites. Although modern Western cultures put a high premium on individuality, this does not 
negate the fact that such cultures share a clear community perspective. It also does not invalidate the 
·claim that the spectrum individuality- communality was different in a first-century agrarian society. 
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and honour underwrote the authority of his gospel. If the latter was in dispute, he 
had no choice but to defend his honour. In a society structured along authoritarian 
lines, the credentials of the sender of a message and of the messenger are much 
more important than the message itself. This insight places the dispute over Paul's 
(apostolic) authority or gospel on a totally different plane. 
If the conflict in Galatia was over Paul's authority, argues Botha, then the oral pre-
sentation of Paul's story and that of his opponents must have contributed sig-
nificantly to it (see 1992b:13-14). According to his scenario, the Pauline cor-
respondence can be situated in the context of Jewish missionary activities, where the 
Judaizers presented Jewish communities with oral performances. Paul was losing 
. some of his support to them because of their more adequate or convincing perform-
ances. 
To connect the cause of the conflict with oral performances is, to my mind, to make 
too much of such performances. It furthermore underestimates the socio-cultural 
setting of authority. Could authority and loyalty have been shattered so easily - by 
an alternative oral performance? I suggest that authority was embedded in a social 
network, and if Paul's authority was imperilled, the conflict started within that social 
setting, although other factors could have contributed. The emphasis on Jewish mis-
sionary activities (see Georgi 1971:124) on which Botha bases his argument over-
states the theological or doctrinal aspects of the message and underestimates the 
social network along which, I believe, the missionary practice and expansion of 
Jewish and Christian communities primarily took place (see following chapter).11 
If Paul's authority was at stake in Galatia (which, it will be argued, was indeed the 
case), then I would suggest that the dispute was embedded in first-century social 
networks. (Authority and honour as important cultural phenomena in the first-
century Mediterranean world will be discussed in the next two chapters.) Like liter-
. acy, which was embedded in specific cultural conditions, authority existed under 
similar preconditions: it was embedded in specific socio-cultural conditions. Thus, 
while oral performances could have contributed to the conflict (and especially to the 
build-up and resolution of it), surely the power and authority linked with such per-
formances were derived from existing lines of authority. This is not to deny that oral 
performances might have played a part in household worship - provided such 
activities are seen within the parameters set by the nature of household com-
munities, and the occasion for such meetings is not reduced to a purely theological 
or doctrinal affair - missionary activity, in other words.12 Opponents could not have 
11 It is furthermore a questionable assumption that Judaism in the first century was an aggressively 
missionary affair (see Kraabel 1982:451; 1985:227-229). 
12 The nature and character of Pauline household-based communities will be discussed in the sub-
sequent chapter. Suffice it to point out that the nature of these communities is, to my mind, the chief 
matrix in which to locate any conflicts that arose. 
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challenged Paul's message by means of alternative performances without at the 
same time challenging his honour and position of authority in the community. 
4.4 Contribution of studies on oral cultures to Paul's communicative context 
If the special features attributed to oral cultures can withstand critical investigation, 
and if they can be applied with a reasonable degree of certainty to the situation in 
Galatia, some interesting conclusions can be drawn. 
Firstly, if Paul wrote his letter to rectify or oppose an alternative version of the Jesus 
message (gospel), then the conflict was by definition social in nature. If truth and 
tradition resided in authoritive persons (persons of honour), then a dispute over the 
appropriate gospel can be nothing other than a challenge to honour. 
·The intricate relationship between authority, truth and written texts warrants a sec-
ond conclusion. If the truth of a tradition was linked to persons in authority (and not 
to correspondence with a text), then the content of a belief system is of less impor-
tance than membership of the community who share the belief system. If so, and if 
Paul was defending his gospel, it is likely that he was not so much giving an exposi-
tion of (his version ot) the Jesus gospel as justifying the truth (that is, authority) 
thereof. 
Thirdly, if the validity of Paul's gospel was in dispute in Galatia, it probably started 
with a dispute over his authority or honour. In such a setting oral performances 
could have contributed to the tension. The exposition of his gospel in the letter 
could easily have been a means of protecting his honour. The features of oral worlds 
and communication suggest the implausibility of a primarily theological or doctrinal 
type of conflict in Paul's world - that is, a conflict primarily concerned with conflict-
ing convictions. 
The authority as well as the dogmatic or doctrinal features associated with written 
texts in literary societies can easily blind us to the nature and function of written 
·texts in scribal cultures. Certain literate biases and assumptions can, at any rate, be 
ruled out on the basis of these studies. These conclusions should, however, be com-
plemented by an investigation of several other aspects of Paul's world (such as the 
networks of social interaction). 
Together with the particular nature of religion in the first-century Mediterranean 
world (which is to be considered next), the oral culture provides some of the socio-
cultural parameters outside which Paul's communication cannot be perceived -
unless one is content with an anachronistic and ethnocentric reading. 
163 
5 RELIGION IN TIIE FIRST-CEN1URY MEDIIBRRANEAN WORID 
Few New Testament scholars see fit to make religi.on the object of serious reflection. 
In New Testament studies, Judge warns (even the History of Religion School is 
guilty in this regard): 
Too many questions were begged about the nature of religion, and the 
New Testament tended to be consigned in advance to a place defined 
according to the conventions of comparative religion, without suffi-
cient regard to its historical singularity. 
(1972:23) 
The absence of any real debate in New Testament studies on the topic of religion 
confirms this viewpoint. 
More often than not, a definition of religion is taken for granted in opponent 
hypotheses. In fact, one of the central historical components of opponent hypotheses 
is a definite assumption on the nature of religi.on, the Pauline movement as a reli-
·gious movement, the conflict as a religi.ous one and the religi.ous nature of first-
century Judaism. 
It will be argued that all interpretations of Paul's letter to the Galatians that wish to 
avoid outright anachronistic and ethnocentric biases have to take account of the 
first-century nature of the religious component of his communicative context. From 
a kaleidoscopic perspective on religion, religious activities and the structure of reli-
gion in the first-century Mediterranean world, one can better understand what Paul 
was doing in what he was saying. Was he, after all, explicating a belief system as 
assumed in most opponent hypotheses? 
5.1 Posing the problem of religious phenomena 
Western man, Carney maintains, 
tends to equate the Judaeo-Christian definition of religion with the 
essence of religious experience. Until relatively late in antiquity, 
however, most of its peoples lived in a religious world which was 
vastly different from this. 
(1975:125) 
Smith points out that we cannot uncritically presume that other peoples' and other 
ages' 'meaning for words are the same as ours' (1962:16). This is true regarding the 
concept religi.on which, he further argues, is a concept which (because of its 
ambiguities) should be disregarded, since it cannot readily be translated into lan-
guages outside of Western civilisation (see 1962:18; and see Judge 1980:212; Segal 
1986:3). Like other social and cultural products, religion is historically and culturally 
produced and shaped (see Asad 1982:238). 
MacMullen, for example, presents a striking cultural shock when he confronts his 
students with some cult group passing wine around a table and actually getting 
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drunk while at worship. The reaction is: 'That's not religion'. To Western students, 
religion is 'all the things you never do except inside the walls of some place of wor-
ship' (MacMullen 1985/6:81). The point is not simply that what is called religion in 
Western twentieth-century society is slightly different from what is called religion in 
other societies: it is something totally different. MacMullen's timely warning is to 
the point: 
It serves as a reminder that we who observe long-distant periods on 
their own terms, freeing ourselves of theological presuppositions, must 
be ready to recognize and to treat as religious history an almost 
unmanageable broad range of psychological phenomena, of which the 
most historically significant need not have been at all intense or com-
plicated intellectually. 
(1984:5) 
When it comes to the specific definition of religion as something to do with a belief 
system, Asad's criticism of anthropologists' use of universal definitions of religion is 
also applicable to New Testament scholars: 
Thus what appears today to be self-evident, namely that 'religion' is 
essentially a matter of meanings linked to ideas of general order 
(expressed in either or both rite and doctrine) and that it has universal 
functions, is in fact a view which has a specific Christian history. 
(1982:245) 
What has been argued with regard to the interpretation of texts is true of cultural 
phenomena. Just as a text can support a variety of readings, MacMullen warns that 
. if one is looking for what is not there, such as orthodox beliefs in first-century reli-
gion, hints will often be found but blown out of proportion (see 1985/6:71). What is 
needed in this regard is a historical aim of interpretation with the accompanying 
interpretive constraints which attempt to escape the hermeneutical circle of con-
firming what is presupposed about religion. The outside control of cross-cultural 
studies is indispensable. The historical aim of interpretation should be, in the words 
of Ogilvie, that 'we must try to get under the skin of the Romans, see how their reli-
gion worked and appreciate how they thought about it' ( 1969: 1 ). 
Three related issues have been brought to the fore. Firstly, without a clear and con-
scious reflection on the nature of religion, too many questions are simply begged in 
favour of an anachronistic definition. Secondly, religion in many cultures is, unlike 
contemporary Western religion, not exclusively concerned with a belief system. 
Thirdly, religion and religious activities are not easily separated from their socio-
cultural matrixes. In short, different structures of religion fit into and are part and 
parcel of different cultural systems. These aspects pose not only a serious practical 
(historical) but also a theoretical problem in defining and grasping the nature and 
structure of religion in the first-century Mediterranean world. I begin with the 
. theoretical dilemma. 
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5.2 Cross-cultural definitions of religion 
If every aspect of society changed at the time of what are termed the industrial and 
technological revolutions (accompanied by the print revolution) from the sixteenth 
centuries onwards, it is highly unlikely that religion escaped the cultural rearrange-
ment. The way in which social scientists deal with the emic - etic distinction in 
definitions of religion may provide valuable clues to grasp the nature of religion in 
the first-century world. 
5.2.1 Functional and substantive definitionsl3 
As a folk category of discourse, the concept religion is used with relative ease in 
popular speech.14 Most scholars, however, find it much more perplexing to postulate 
such a universal definition when comparing views on religion from different cultures 
and societies (see Wax 1984:6). As I have already pointed out, the concept religi,on is 
culture-specific to Western societies and what is referred to as religion did not exist 
in that form in the first-century world.15 How, then, do social scientists generalise 
beyond a specific culture by drawing comparisons with other cultures (see Guenther 
1979:122)? 
According to Berger there are two predominant approaches to the definition of reli-
. gion in the social sciences: 'Religion has been substantively defined, in terms of the 
meaning contents of the phenomena. And it has been functionally defined, in terms 
of its place in the social and/or psychological system' (1974:126). No one definition 
of religion has, however, commanded a wide acceptance in recent decades (see Wax 
1984:6; O'Toole 1984:39). On the other hand it is also true that in the theory of reli-
gion the functionalist approach16 is the chief theoretical approach adopted by con-
temporary anthropologists (see Guenther 1979:114) as well as in other social 
sciences (see Berger 1974:126). For a number of years it 'attained the status of 
orthodoxy in the fields of anthropology and sociology', but a highly effective sub-
13 The methodological discussion in chapters two and three is highly relevant to the present argu-
ment. 
14 Stark and Bainbridge take pride in the fact that their definition of religion 'parallels what the 
term religion has always meant in everyday speech' (1985:8). As New Testament scholars we should, 
however, not only be aware of their commitment as sociologists (and not anthropologists) to the study 
of contemporary Western religious movements but should also be sceptical about what the term has 
always meant (see Barnhart 1975:128; Wax 1984:16). 
15 The term religion, Wax maintains, 'is a valid term of popular and administrative discourse within 
the United States and the English-speaking world; it also may be useful as a term for designating a 
·societal universal, but with most definitions the overlap between the two ranges of discourse is so mini-
mal as to lead to severe distortion' (1984:16). 
16 In functional definitions of religion 'religion is defined in tenns of what it does - be it for society, 
for the individual, or for both' (Berger 1974:127); its focus can thus be either sociological or psychologi-
cal (see O'Toole 1984:24-25). Functional definitions of religion are very broad (see Berger 1974:127). 
They can be as broad and inclusive as that of Luckmann, to include systems of belief and practice such 
as communism, nationalism, Americanism, humanism or psychoanalysis (see O'Toole 1984:25). 
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· stantivist17 reaction has emerged 'to challenge the functionalist definitional monop-
oly in the sphere of religion' (O'Toole 1984:27). 
The usefulness of functional definitions of religion for anthropological study is 
widely questioned (see for example, Goody 1961; Spiro 1966; Berger 1967:176-177, 
1974:127-128; Koepping 1977:126-128; Guenther 1979:115-119; Asad 1982; O'Toole 
1984:24-27). One should not, however, be misled by the criticism, since (as O'Toole 
points out) the pitfalls of vagueness and circularity threaten the substantivist no less 
than the functionalist definitions (see 1984:30). 
The theoretical dilemma argued with regard to the emic and etic distinction is appli-
cable to the historical dilemma presented by the above arguments. The functionalist 
(etic) definition of religion is confronted with the dilemma of fitting culture-specific 
phenomena into an etic definition. Such definitions either function imperialistically 
to incorporate other cultures and societies into that of the researcher, or they func-
tion as Wax says, like 'the chaplain's prayer before the opening of the sessions of the 
Congress: it has no effect on what subsequently occurs' (1984:15). 
·Substantive ( emic) definitions pose the problem of clearly grasping and recognising 
what specific cultural phenomena are about. The interpretive principle, as argued in 
this study, is that etic viewpoints should be used heuristically to facilitate a grasp of 
the language game (of first-century religion). The challenge of a communicative 
approach is to attempt a thick description which brings into dialogue the meaningful 
world of the participants and the inquisitive mind of the interpreter. On the other 
hand, scholars should avoid falling back on popular discourse - that is, on the views 
of religion taken for granted in their own, usually Western, cultures which are then 
projected onto foreign cultures. 
5.22 Mapping the area of religion 
The otherness of foreign cultures or historical eras, as well as the inevitability of 
using models and concepts foreign to them, should simultaneously be kept in 
mind.18 Spiro quite correctly argues that no inquiry into religious phenomena can 
proceed without a minimalist definition of religion. If it is not explicitly stated, it is 
implicitly supplied (see Spiro 1966:90; O'Toole 1984:35). In Spiro's words: 'It is 
17 The 'classical substantive definition of religion' which, according to O'Toole, inspired the sub-
stantive reaction to the functionalist monopoly in the definition of religion is the description by Tylor of 
religion as 'belief in Spiritual Beings' (O'Toole 1984:27). 'Whatever its merits or faults, this definition 
focusses clearly on the substance of religion as a particular kind of belief that might be readily 
apprehended in the social world' (O'Toole 1984:27). 
18 The position taken by two eminent anthropologists of religion, Goody (1961) and Spiro (1966), is 
'that it is impossible to escape from the fact that the category of magico-religious acts and beliefs can 
be defined only by the observer and that attempts to see either this or the sacred-profane dichotomy as 
a universal part of the actor's perception of his situation are misleading' (Goody 1961:160). 
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. obvious, then, that while a definition cannot take the place of inquiry, in the absence 
of definitions there can be no inquiry' (1966:90). Furthermore, 'when the term "reli-
gion" is given no explicit osfensive definition, the observer, perforce, employs an 
implicit one' (1966:90). A minimalist definition does not remove religi.on from the 
arena of definitional disputes, 
but it does remove it from the context of fruitless controversy over 
what religion 'really is' to the context of the formulation of empirically 
testable hypotheses which, in anthropology, means hypotheses suscep-
tible to cross-cultural testing. 
(Spiro 1966:91) 
However, the proof of the pudding lies in the eating, for the other aspect to be 
emphasised is the culture-specific and idiosyncratic nature of religion. Spiro 
(1966:87) remarks that an 
examination of the endemic definitional controversies concerning reli-
gion leads to the conclusion that they are not so much controversies 
over the meaning either of the term 'religion' or of the concept which 
it expresses, as they are jurisdictional disputes over the phenomenon or 
range of phenomena which are considered to constitute legi.timately the 
empirical referent of the term (italics mine). 
In this situation Barnhart's map metaphor proves useful in manoeuvring between 
the Scylla of being captured by one's minimalist definition (the essence of religion) 
and the Charybdis of not taking into account the culture-specific nature of religion. 
He suggests that definitions are like maps: 'It would be as foolish to boast that one 
has the definitive definition of "religion" as to claim that one has drawn up the final 
and absolute map of an area' (Barnhart 1975:122). Certain maps may indicate the 
area in which the tunnels of underground mines may be found without giving any 
detailed information. The function of such maps is merely to direct one to certain 
areas. A minimalist definition of religion may function in the same way. Since a min-
imalist definition is unavoidable, such a definition should be a working definition 
.and not one that tries to capture the so-called essence of religion. It should function 
as a heuristic tool and not an iron matrix. Such a 'preliminary definition ... isolates 
the core-concern around which a variety of other concerns, rituals, scriptures, 
prayers, beliefs, experiences, etc. tend to cluster' (Barnhart 1975:125).19 In short, a 
map facilitates the breaking down of the phenomenon into its manageable smaller 
parts (see Segal 1986:3). 
19 I find Guenther's definition of religion similar to Barnhart's core-concern (see 1975:125-128): in 
its 'essence ... religion is utterly symbolic, intensely affective and consequently fundamentally irrational' 
(Guenther 1979:124). As a broad working definition religion can be distinguished from other cultural 
activities, for 'unlike the "real" things of technology, the "real" commodities of economics, and the "real" 
people of social and political relationships, supernatural phenomena exist only within the imagination 
of man, who postulated them and who believes in them' (Guenther 1979:123). It should be noted that 
he does not use essence in the pejorative sense. 
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Just as a map-maker has to study the territory, the drawing of mental maps of 
cultural phenomena requires us to be alert to the 'interchange of communication in 
the appropriate field of inquiry' (Barnhart 1975:122). Drawing the map of religion in 
a particular cultural milieu is perhaps more like drawing a geological map. Not only 
what is apparent but also what is underneath has to be mapped. Not only the social 
conditions but also the social location of these phenomena should be expounded. 
This has been a long but in no way fruitless attempt to create an awareness of the 
challenge facing New Testament scholarship- a challenge which is rarely raised to a 
conscious, critical level. The exercise of drawing a map, pointing out the 
dis/similarities and introducing a dialogue on models and data, is needed with 
regard to the field of first-century Mediterranean religion. Only in that way can 
Paul's activities and communication be located within and properly related to the 
context of his first-century cultural system. The dissatisfaction with the functionalist 
style (assuming a similarity in structure between the religion of the first-century 
Mediterranean world and that of the contemporary Western world) is a dissatisfac-
tion with the imposition of a particular structure of religion on the evidence. 
53 The outline of a first-century Mediterranean religious map 
Malina argues that 'if people today see first-century Mediterranean' religion as 
though it were just like religion in our society, it is possible they may be suffering 
.from an optical illusion' (1986b:92). Thus the objective of this section is to map reli-
gion within the life-experience and cultural system of first-century Mediterranean 
people in such a way that the optical illusion is avoided.20 
First, the most significant observation on the structure of first-century religious 
phenomena is that prior to the Christian church of the Middle Ages there was 'no 
clear compartmentalization between religious and other institutions in society' 
(Carney 1975:126) and no groups 'formed solely for and based on religious 
activities' alone (Malina 1986b:97). Broadly speaking, in contemporary Western 
society it is assumed that 'there is in human life and society something distinctive 
called "religion"' (Smith 1962:15). During most of human history that was not the 
case (see Carney 1975:125-126; Guenther 1979:126; Wax 1984:6). It has been 
pointed out that one of the striking features of agrarian societies is the lack of dif-
ferentiation between social institutions. One single system performed a greater vari-
ety of functions than is possible in contemporary Western societies (see Goody 
1961:155-156). 
20 It goes without saying that the level of abstraction at which religion is dealt with should be 
acknowledged. Despite the obvious problems already discussed, the need to supplement generalisations 
by means of historical and cultural particulars cannot be avoided. It should also be noted that there is 
no pretension to research into the original sources. Scholarly findings on the nature of first-century 
Mediterranean religion, compiled into a comprehensive argument, are presented and introduced to the 
field of New Testament studies. 
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Secondly, religious denominations in a Western society are instances of formal reli-
gion.21 In contrast to formal religi.on, which describes religion in a modern Western 
·context, the concept substantive religi.on22 will be used to designate first-century reli-
gion. Unlike industrialised Western societies, religion in the first-century world was 
embedded either in politics or in kinship relations (see Malina 1986h:95). Religious 
groups depended for their operation on existing social relations and not on personal 
convictions as to the truth of some belief system or other. The functioning of reli-
gious activities included other motivations than pure belief (see Judge 1980:213; 
Momigliano 1985:13). As a result, there were 'multiple religions used for special 
ranges of meanings and behaviors' (Malina 1986b:95) - depending on whether 
people were concerned chiefly with kinship or with political matters. 
Thirdly, hardly any human activities in antiquity were devoid of religious elements. 
Says Ogilvie: 
To drive a nail into a piece of wood required not only a good nail, a 
good hammer and good co-ordination of hand and eye but also a well-
tried ritual: otherwise the nail might bend or the deity concerned see 
to it that you hit your thumb. 
(1969:20) 
Thus, by and large, 'if "man" in antiquity was anything he was a religious man' 
(Carney 1975:109). 
Fourthly, it should be noted that 'Classical Greek has no word which covers religion 
as we use the term' (Nock 1952:10). 
It could speak of a particular system of rites (a cult or an initiation), 
or a particular set of beliefs (doctrines or opinions), or a legal code, or 
a body of national customs or traditions; but for the peculiar synthesis 
of all these which we call a "religion," the one Hellenistic word which 
came closest was "philosophy". 
(Smith 1956:79)23 
21 For a detailed description of the differences between formal and substantive religion, see espe-
cially Malina (1986b:95-97). 
22 This term was coined by Malina in analogy to substantive economy as used in economic 
anthropology (see 19868 :86-87; 1986b:94). It means religion embedded in other institutions. The term 
should however not be confused with what amongst others Berger (1974) calls a substantive definition 
of religion. With that Berger advocates a return to a perspective which views the phenomenon from 
within and does not focus on the social or psychological functions in a society (see 1974:128-129). 
23 There is widespread acceptance of this argument as expressed by Smith. It is endorsed by, for 
example, De Ste. Croix (1972:62-63), Aune 1980; Kraabel (1982:454), Collins (1985:175), MacMullen 
(1985/6:71), Malina (19868 :85) and Neusner (1988:175). However, for lack of a satisfactory alternative, 
the concept religion and religious activities will still be used to refer to those spheres of life to which we 
refer as religion - bearing in mind all the differences and the fact that religion to them was something 
else. A modern concept or theory of religion should thus function heuristically and probably evokes 
more differences with first-century society that it will actually illuminate in a positive way. 
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Rather than one distinct socio-cultural phenomenon called religi.on, at least three 
types of phenomena can be identified: (1) state cults, (2) mystery cults and (3) 
philosophical sects or schools (see Aune 1980:1520). 
Finally, in any city in the Greco-Roman Empire 'the religious landscape was 
dominated by monumental public temples' (White 1990:26) which served as social 
centres, banks, markets, and centres of public welfare. Apart from this, and the 
Emperor worship which could hardly be ignored by any citizen, there developed 
more privately-oriented cults.dedicated to Isis, Serapis, Mithras and some other 
gods. Eventually, according to White, these cults 'took their places alongside the 
·classical temples of old Rome' (1990:26). Religion embedded in political relations 
will receive less attention. It has been pointed out by Winslow that it was a civic duty 
to worship the Roman gods (see 1971:240), but also that neither in Rome nor in the 
Empire as a whole 'was the major thrust of religious life politically oriented' 
(1971:239). What we are currently concerned with are the non-religious spheres or 
religious activities related to a lower level of polity (see Malina 1986h:95). Malina 
points out that Jesus represents a focus on the political sphere whereas with Paul 
the focus shifts from the polity to the fictive kin group (see 1986h:96). 
5.4 Some landmarks on a map of first-century substantive religion 
Firstly, there is no point in ignoring the great diversity of religious practices in the 
first-century Mediterranean world. ·It is well expressed by Wilken: 
Religious practices among the many people of the Mediterranean 
world were as sundry and heterogenous as a meadow bursting into 
bloom in spring. Some people, for example, worshipped crocodiles, 
others honored birds, some considered the goat divine, and others 
adored the calf. Some people sacrificed children, others abstained 
from certain foods, and yet others worshipped fire. 
(1986:382). 
Despite these differences, scholars point out that 'the same basic understanding of 
the gods' (Marcus 1988: 144) was to be found throughout the Empire. 
A second landmark for anyone brought up in a twentieth-century Protestant world, 
is the high degree of religious tolerance in the Roman Empire. Different kinds of 
religious practices were tolerated 'so long as they do not endanger public order or 
infringe upon common decency, and so long as they seemed to have some ancient 
pedigrees' (Meeks 1985:104). Membership of one cult furthermore did not preclude 
participation in another, and the multiplication of cults in the Empire (especially of 
Oriental origin) did not cause major upsets (see Ogilvie 1969:3; Winslow 1971:241; 
Marcus 1988:145). One result of this state of affairs was that religious life was highly 
syncretistic (see Winslow 1971:243). 
MacMullen argues that all had the right to say or believe anything they wished to 
about a deity, as long as it was not aggressively hostile to other beliefs (see 1984:8 
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and 1985/6:72). 'A Roman was free to think what he liked about the gods; what 
mattered was what religious action he performed' (Ogilvie 1969:2). In the same vein 
Momigliano (1985:11) points to the 'strange absence of information about religious 
education' (except perhaps in Judaism), something that casts doubt on the existence 
of any strong emphasis on dogma or doctrine. Malina provides us with a useful sum-
mary: 
As in most systems of substantive religion, so too in the first-century 
Mediterranean world the close calculation of "truth," dogma, credo, 
ideological deviance, and the like was often impossible or simply 
irrelevant. 
(1986b:98) 
Not only was religion separated with difficulty from other social activities (especially 
politics or kinship), but religious activities in the first-century Mediterranean world 
were, thirdly, not primarily concerned with doctrine or dogma. One did not speak of 
"'believing in the gods" but of "having gods," just as a city might "have laws or 
customs"' (Wilken 1984:58). Religion was part of one's civic or familial duty (see 
Freyne 1980:23; Ogilvie 1969:21). As Wilken says: 
Religion was less a matter of holding beliefs than of observing annual 
festivals or public rituals, less concerned with conversion than 
adherence, of participating in local cults without, however, excluding 
others, of identifying with the traditions of the city in which one lived. 
Seldom did it require conscious choice. 
(1986:380) 
Religious festivals, which were simultaneously civic festivals, were occasions of pub-
lic charity. The distribution of money and sacrificial meat generated trade, stimu-
lated the flow of money from a community's benefactors and created opportunities 
to accord honour to one's benefactors (see Rajak 1985:252). 
A fourth landmark. In contrast to Western religiosity with its emphasis on one 
ultimate All, people in the first-century Mediterranean world shared the belief that 
demons of va1ious sorts (both good and evil), angels and spirits all contribute to the 
misfortune or well-being of human beings.24 Religion was a battle against the 
powers of sickness, poverty, hunger, misfortune, failure of crops; a particular Greek 
influence on the New Testament environment was to create an atmosphere of 
universal anxiety in the face of impersonal forces (see Freyne 1980:28). While 
24 The monotheistic faith (at least in our modern sense of the word) of the Jewish/Christian tradi-
tion becomes suspect once one realises that although they believed in 'one God, a spiritual being, 
supreme and transcendent' they also recognised 'many lesser gods, or intermediary beings'; Christians, 
in particular 'in this early period thought of Christ as a "second god'" (Wilken 1986:383). The notion of 
monotheism is subject in every case to world view and cultural specifics (see Malina 1981:27). The 
adoption of monotheism (in its radical sense of taking away power from all other subordinate gods) 
would have resulted in 'obliterating everything in the pyramid save the top. To have done so would 
have involved the destruction of their whole culture' (MacMullen 1981:88). 
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demons were responsible for sickness, negative weather patterns, death and the like, 
good demons were responsible for positive aspects such as insight and dreams (see 
Malina 1986b:95; Smith 1978b:4, 107).25 The way to manipulate these powers, com-
bat misfortune and ensure good fortune was by means of mysteries and magic (see 
Ogilvie 1969:105; Carney 1975:126; MacMullen 1984:13, 40).26 The true importance 
of these remarks becomes apparent when the cultural values in a pre-industrial 
society are recognised. Superstition and magic rather than technology or science are 
highly valued (see Carney 1975:93, 250). 
Fifthly, both first-century and contemporary Western religions offer their adherents 
rescue ( O'W'tllf>la = salvation) from some overwhelmingly difficult situation. Salva-
tion cults, of which the early Christian movement was one (see Noack 1980:25), 
were popular among the lower classes. In the Western world the subject of rescue is 
'the individualistic achiever' whereas the threats to well-being in the first-century 
Mediterranean world were 'loss of honor' (Malina 1986b:96), or physical dangers 
such as illness or crop failure. Honour was achieved or lost by virtue of the individ-
ual's acceptance into or rejection from a group (see Malina 1981:25-50). 'The ongo-
ing growth and social acceptance within the larger cultural setting for any given reli-
gious group often depends on the important and conspicuous practice of patronage 
and benefaction' (White 1985/6:117). 
On the physical side, Nock argues that O'W'tllf>la and related words 'carried no 
theological implications; they applied to deliverance from perils by sea and land and 
disease and darkness and false opinions, all perils of which men were fully aware' 
(1952:9). In fact, saviour and salvation very often 'had to do with health or other 
matters on this earth, not of the soul for life eternal' (MacMullen 1981:57). To be 
healed, to achieve power, to find patrons and clients, to have a proper funeral, to 
take part in weekly communal meals would all count as reasons why people would 
join religious activities or a salvation cult (see Malina 1986b:97). Within household 
and kinship relations people could ensure participation in these activities. The 
extended household offered the structures and means to fulfil many of these socio-
religious needs. Anyone who claimed to be a messiah and offered salvation could 
_.obtain power over others (see Georgi 1971:125-126; Smith 1978b:114ff; Malina 
1986b:97-98). Regarding concepts such as faith and hope,27 Momigliano argues that 
25 Ogilvie (see 1969:9-23) offers many more examples. The object of religion was, inter alia, to dis-
cover the correct procedure for securing the goodwill of the gods in all day-to-day activities, both the 
personal ones and those of the community at large (see also Wilken 1984:62-67). 
26 Underscoring this point, Smith argues that mysteries and magic cannot always be sharply distin-
guished (see 1980:249; Winslow 1971:243-245). The same applies to the distinction between magic and 
religion (see Aune 1980:1510-1516). The goals of magic in Paul's world may be characterised as 'provid-
ing protection, healing, success and knowledge for magical practitioners and their clients, and harm for 
their opponents' (Aune 1980:1518). 
27 Wilken points out that 'piety (eusebeia in Greek,pietas in Latin) was the word used most fre-
quently to designate religious acts and feelings, but it was not used denominatively (i.e., to designate "a 
religion," a particular form of piety' (1986:380). Smith furthermore points out that the word nicri:u; is 
very often mistranslated as faith, while it should rather be confidence or trust in supernatural powers 
(see 1978b:205). 
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there is not necessarily a connection between these concepts and the gods, that they 
were not specific terms of classical religious language (see 1985:3; Nock 1952:10). 
Together with power (ouvaµu;), they very often appear in association with miracles 
(see MacMullen 1984:4-5, 123 n 10); someone came to faith (ni.cnu;) when rescued 
from a difficult situation (see Malina 1981:80) by some supernatural act. 
Finally, a leader in religious affairs functioned as a broker mediating between the 
·man in the street and the gods. In most agrarian societies, and particularly in the 
first-century Mediterranean society, Malina argues, 'religion dealt with respect for 
those who controlled human existence, hence the non-human and human persons 
above us to whom we owe a debt of honor and respect' (1981:88). Access to persons 
(human and non-human) who controlled or had contacts to control social, political, 
economic, agricultural, and other matters was a key to success and respect (see 
1981:26-27). Malina provides clear pointers to the social network of first-century 
Mediterranean society when he says: 
The key to success, then, is to get to know the power of the person 
with whom an honorable man can actually or potentially interact and 
to use those persons for one's own ends, for salvation from a difficult 
situation ... In other words, for the first-century Mediterranean person, 
nearly all the social realities singled out in our modem textbooks and 
courses on sociology, social psychology, and the natural sciences 
would be perceived as "religious" phenomena. 
(1981:87, 88) 
Generally speaking, religious leaders in Paul's world never became religious author-
ities for that world as a whole outside their own communities (see Armstrong 
1986C:xvii). 
As a general background picture this is of great significance for grasping the nature 
of the Pauline communities (and other Diaspora Jewish groups) in the first-century 
world. Starting from these three elements (religious phenomena closely intertwined 
with a variety of social and human factors, the non-existence of a separate religious 
institution, and the specific embeddedness of religion in political and kinship rela-
tions), will bring us closer to the experiential world of Paul and his contemporaries. 
Belief systems and programmes of salvation, such as the one propagated by Paul, 
formed part of intricate networks of social and human interaction. 
If these features are applicable to Paul's religious world, that world was character-
ised by a lack of scripture and creed and was created by the need for salvation and 
the provision of protection on a variety of levels. If Paul shared the world of first-
century religion, magic and miracles must have played a significant part in his mis-
sionary activities (see furthermore chapter 7 § 4.1). His authority as a man of piety 
was established and maintained to the extent that he could provide protection 
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against evil and misfortune, play a powerful part in ensuring salvation, and be recog-
nised for his control over human beings (and demons). According to this perspec-
tive, Paul's religious activities can no longer be reduced to the level of a creed and 
belief system but should be described in terms of the variety of functions and com-
ponents associated with first-century religion in general. 
In short, these insights provide an alternative approach to Paul's activities. The 
socio-religi,ous matrix in which Paul founded religi,ous communities cannot be seen in 
isolation from the cultural system of the first-century agrarian world. We should 
think about first-century religion, and for that matter all other aspects of that 
society, not in terms of compartments but in terms of configurations. If this is true, 
then serious reflection on the nature and character of the Pauline communities as 
first-century religious communities remains to be done; and indeed the Jewish sub-
. culture of Paul's activities is in the same boat. That is to say, many more elements of 
his socio-religious environment need to be examined and brought into play when 
constructing the communicative context of the letter to the Galatians. 
6 WHERE IS IllE FIRST-CENTURY MEDTIERRANEAN MODEL TAKING 
US? 
The discovery of the agrarian nature of Paul's world, and in particular its oral cul-
ture and substantive religion, places the communicative context of the letter to the 
Galatians clearly in focus. In fact, both contribute to a retraining in the values and 
conventions of Paul's distant cultural system. 
The world of oral cultures opens our eyes to see the letter as part and parcel of a 
network of social interaction where authority figures and social relations contribute 
much to communication. The letter was not intended as creed or Scripture but as 
communication in an environment where the letter and its words were subject to a 
first-century social interaction. 
·Tue world of first-century religion, on the other hand, creates the awareness that 
religion and religious activities were firmly embedded in the social networks and 
core values of Paul's society. Belief systems were part of, but also interconnected 
with a variety of socio-religious activities. Therefore Paul's exposition of matters of 
belief in the letter should be seen in relation to their place and function within the 
overall system. 
Given the insights of the present chapter, it appears that a portrayal of the Pauline 
communities and the conflict in Galatia as primarily theological or doctrinal may 
well be a misrepresentation. I am suggesting the exact opposite of the view that the 
Pauline communities came into existence as a result of preaching and that the 
founder's theological ideas were seminal (e.g. Malherbe 1983:11-13). The discussion 
of only two special features of the first-century agrarian society (oral culture and 
substantive religion) already makes it possible to present a rather different setting 
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for Paul's activities. The importance and content of their theology and theological 
views should be evaluated in terms of the concrete social network and accompany-
ing codes and conventions·- as far as these can be reconstructed today. 
In answering the question as to whether Paul's opponents in Galatia were a 'clearly 
defined unified movement with its own well-formulated doctrine and message', 
Koester expresses a clear warning. He maintains that 
it must be understood first of all that we can presuppose neither firmly 
formulated doctrines nor unified organizations for the early Christian 
missionary movement. A fixed body of doctrines (creed and canon) 
and a generally accepted ecclesiastical organization (episcopate) were 
developed much later and over many generations, especially in the 
course of the ongoing controversies with the heretics. 
(1982:117) 
Following up the above portrayal of the first-century Mediterranean world, I would 
argue that this insight should be stretched much further. The theological or doc-
trinal tail should not wag the first-century dog. That is to say, the apparent exposi-
tion and discussion of Paul's belief system (theology) should find its true place 
within the structure of religion as substantive religion. In other words, the dog of the 
social network should wag the tail of dogma and doctrine (theology and belief 
system). 
Given the interconnectedness of first-century Mediterranean social institutions, the 
predominantly oral nature of that society and the substantive nature of religious 
activities, a different framework for dealing with the letter to the Galatians can 
already be visualised. Though some constructive points can be noted after a first 
introduction to Paul's Mediterranean world, several fields have been identified 
which need further examination. 
On the nature of Paul's communicative context my suggestion, to be argued in the 
pages that follow, is that it can best be determined as a particular configuration of 
first-century social interaction. Within this general matrix of first-century Mediter-
ranean society, the network of social interaction can (for the sake of argument) be 
divided into socio-cultural relations and socio-cultural organisations constituting 
such networks. The first are the codes and conventions which direct individual and 
group relations; the second, the network of structures and organisations within a 
society. 
CHAPTER6 
THE NATURE OF THE PAULINE HOUSEHOID COMMUNTI1ES IN 
.GALATIA: ONE CONFIGURATION OF 1HE NE1WORKS OF FIRST-
CENTURYSOCIO-CULTURALINTERACilON 
To understand early Christian letters more nearly as 
ancient writers and readers would have understood 
them requires some understanding of the typical 
social contexts of letter writing in the Greco-Roman 
world. Three sets of social relations were central to 
that culture. First are hierarchical relations between 
subordinates and superordinates, best exemplified by 
the social institutions of the patron-client relation-
ship. Second are · relationships between equals 
epitomized by the Greek and Roman institutions of 
friendship. Third are the social relations of the 
household, which combine characteristics of both 
hierarchical relations and relations between equals. 
(Stowers 1986:27) 
lINTRODUCilON 
The picture of Paul's first-century Mediterranean society as an agrarian society sug-
gests the greater environment within which it is to be determined what Paul did in 
what he was saying. To get closer to his communicative context, however, at least 
two areas of that socio-cultural system which regulated socio-religious interaction in 
Paul's world need to be examined more closely. They are, firstly, the network of 
socio-cultural organisations and, secondly, the network of socio-cultural relations. 
The first has to do with the organisational structure of the first-century world, which 
forms the basis for group formation and also for understanding the Pauline com-
munitiesl as groups; the second with the codes and conventions regulating social 
relations. 
It goes without saying that it is impossible to discuss, in a study such as this, the total 
network of socio-cultural organisations or social relations in the first-century world. 
For that reason the discussion is limited to a few aspects relevant to an understand-
ing of the Pauline communities: that is to say, determining the socio-cultural codes 
and conventions constituting social groups in the first-century Mediterranean world 
. and consequently trying to determine on what basis the Pauline communities were 
constituted. 
1 Just as the concept communicative context is preferred to occasion of the letter, the concept Pauline 




There is a strong tendency nowadays to accept that Paul's mission took place along 
the 'natural networks of relationships in each city and between cities' (Meeks 
1983:28). Of these, the household setting is acknowledged as the primary one. Thus 
the household setting, together with the socio-cultural networks of codes and con-
. ventions associated with that institution, will be examined as the specific com-
municative context of the letter to the Galatians. In this enterprise the sets of social 
relations mentioned by Stowers in the epigraph to this chapter, together with 
insights from other fields (such as the oral nature and substantive religion), will turn 
out to be of great significance for an understanding of Paul's letter to the Galatians. 
While the network of socio-cultural organisations (groups) and the network of socio-
cultural relations (codes and conventions) operative within society can be distin-
guished for analytical purposes, it should be remembered that they presuppose each 
other and are in fact closely connected. 
This chapter will demonstrate the full force of a social-scientific approach to the 
New Testament as a historical enterprise. Most of the studies and findings to be pre-
sented are a product of the interface between studies in the social sciences and a 
historical study of the first-century Mediterranean world. By constructing social-
system scenarios I shall try to achieve a clearer perception of the communicative 
context and of the shared social system between the Galatians and Paul. It should be 
emphasised that the letter to the Galatians need not provide the clues as to which 
·codes and conventions should be applied. They were, given the agrarian nature of 
first-century Mediterranean societies, probably implicit in the communicative act.2 
The first step will be to investigate the organisational structure of the first-century 
Mediterranean world: social groups and the household institution as focal points. 
This will be complemented, secondly, by a discussion of some of the central codes 
and conventions of socio-cultural interaction in Paul's world. 
2 SOCIAL GROUPS IN TIIE FIRST-CENTURY MEDITERRANEAN WORLD 
In addition to the social conditions in the first-century Mediterranean world, which 
have already been discussed, the organisational setting of Pauline communities 
within and alongside other social groups should be considered. To be concrete: in 
addition to the new understanding of first-century Judaism, the Pauline communities 
as an integral part of first-century Judaism, the agrarian and oral nature of that 
world and the substantive nature of first-century religion, the organisation of the 
Pauline household communities should be taken into account. If these communities 
2 Neither is it suggested that Paul must have adhered or agreed to those conventions. Whatever his 
position might have been, however - whether operating within the framework or rejecting those values 
- it is equally essential to spell them out and get their parameters quite clear. To know whether he 
rejected them, it is just as vital to establish what they were as to know whether he acted within the con-
fines of the specific codes and conventions. 
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were the setting for Paul's activities, then their nature as first-century groups and 
institutions should provide us with the appropriate codes and conventions for estab-
lishing the cause and nature of the conflict and consequently a proper communica-
tive context for the interpretation of the letter to the Galatians. 
What, then, was the nature of the Pauline communities within the social networks of 
the first-century world? To answer this question, let us first take a brief look at the 
received view on the organisation of the Pauline communities. 
2.1 The received view(s) on the organisation of the Pauline €1cdTpial 
There is no single scholarly perception of the organisation of the Pauline com-
munities. Indeed, there are at least two approaches. The first is to compare the 
Pauline communities to other groups which have family resemblances; the second is 
to use some of these models (comparable groups) to describe the nature ~f the 
Pauline communities. The theoretical assumptions that govern these comparative 
activities should be carefully noted. 
On the one hand, the Pauline EKKAflO'Uxl are compared to groups· and organisations 
in the Greco-Roman world (philosophical schools, voluntary associations, the 
synagogue, and the household) to which 'they bear at least a family resemblance' 
(Meeks 1983:74; see also Stambaugh & Balch 1986:138-143). The generally 
approved conclusion is familiar: none of these models offers an exact parallel, 
although all present significant analogies. Meeks, for example, finds that none of 
them 'captures the whole' of the Pauline EKKA11criat; the structures worked out by 
the Pauline communities 'may after all have been unique' (Meeks 1983:84; see also 
Stambaugh & Balch 1986: 138). At the very least Meeks thinks that 'something new' 
(1986h:119) was emerging in the private homes where the followers of Jesus 
gathered. It is difficult not to take this new as unique, since he continues to define 
the newness: it was 
all the old things that observers in the first century might have seen in 
it: a Jewish sect, a club meeting in a household, an initiatory cult, a 
school. Yet it was more than the sum of those things, and different 
from the mere synthesis of their contradictory tendencies. 
(Meeks 1986h: 120) 
He compares different entities from the first-century world without arguing why and 
in what way they were different kinds of groups - that is to say, without taking into 
account what really constituted the differences between them. To justify a conclu-
sion that the Pauline communities were unique, one either has to point out that (and 
why) the identified features were taken in that world as typifying different groups; or 
else one has to take the same road as, for example, Meeks - in other words, to 
presuppose that the dissimilarities identified at the level ofparticular features point 
convincingly to a difference in nature. This way of comparing the groups implicitly 
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assumes a particular social location of groups (see following subsection), namely 
that groups were formed on the basis of features such as social functions.3 
On the other hand, a rather different approach results in the same type of shortcom-
ings. The model either of a philosophical school or of a voluntary association is 
taken in isolation to describe the nature of the Pauline communities. In these 
instances (which will be referred to when these models are discussed) those aspects 
of the Pauline communities that resemble features of either of the two models are 
highlighted in order to press home the point that the Pauline communities should 
indeed be seen as either a voluntary association or a philosophical school - depend-
ing on the model that is used. 
While the evidence in these instances is scrutinised for similarities to whichever 
model is used, the interesting thing is that the similarities become the constituting 
features of the Pauline communities. In other words, a particular social location of 
groups is once again presupposed in that the formation of groups is subject to the 
features of the model used for the comparison (in most instances the philosophical 
school). 
However, several issues remain undecided. With regard to the first approach used 
by scholars, it has to be asked anew: were the Pauline communities indeed unique, 
and if they were, in what way? As regards the second approach: if the Pauline com-
munities are identical with any one of the models, what about the evidence 
identified when other models are used? 
To my mind, both roads end in one-sided views which simplify complex phenomena 
and consequently misrepresent the nature of the Pauline groups. What is too seldom 
. taken into account is the social location of groups in the first-century Mediterranean 
world. 
2.2 The social location of groups in the first-century Mediterranean world 
It is hard to tell whether the Pauline communities were indeed groups in the first-
century world and, if so, what kind of groups. It is commonplace to take an 
impressionistic guess and describe these communities as a conglomerate of Jew and 
Gentile, slave and free, locals and foreigners, men and women, and people from 
varying social strata, without paying attention to the social location of such groups. 
But was there room for such social engineering and if so, in what way? If they were a 
group, which conventions applied? 
3 In comparing the different models to the Pauline communities, several of the reasons why the 
Pauline communities differed from the models will support this view. The point is not to deny the dis-
similarities but to question the assumption that the dissimilarities are a sufficient basis to decide the 
nature of the Pauline communities. 
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The example of Meeks is instructive in a context where the question is mostly 
ignored. He is not unaware of the question, 'What makes a group a group?' (see 
1983:74) but to my mind answers it in a way unlikely to do justice to the social loca-
tion of groups in the first-century Mediterranean world. His answer to the question 
is twofold. 
On the one hand he provides a theological explanation for the formation of the 
Pauline communities. They held to a particular set of beliefs which constituted their 
groups and maintained the cohesiveness and boundaries needed for any group to 
survive (see 1983:84-110).4 As was argued in the previous chapters, this reason has 
long been traditional in New Testament studies as a rationale for the formation of 
·the Pauline groups (see also Rohrbaugh 1987b:118 n 28). Apart from the problem 
created by Meeks's presentation of the Pauline communities as atypical (see 
Rohrbaugh 1987b:110), the question remains whether the theological factors 
actually were responsible for the formation of the groups. If so, what type of group? 
On the other hand, Meeks maintains that a group needs a social structure. No group 
can persist without patterns of leadership, differentiation of roles by members, or 
ways of dealing with conflict, to mention only a few aspects (see Meeks 1983:111). 
This unfortunately does not answer the question of what constitutes a group: it 
merely explains the measures taken to maintain a group once it is formed. To put it 
differently, the Pauline communities were not a group simply because they had 
boundaries and so forth - they had all these things because they were a group of 
some sort. 
This lack of reflection on what constituted groups in the first-century Mediterranean 
world, hence the social location of groups, is one of the reasons why so many 
scholars jump onto the bandwagon of the uniqueness explanation when it comes tO 
the Pauline communities. Given all this, the question still needs to be answered: so 
·what constituted a group in the first-century Mediterranean world? That question is 
directed at the overall social system and tries to find out something about group 
formation in a particular socio-cultural system. 
Given the agrarian nature of first-century society, it is necessary to establish the 
facts of group formation in such societies. A distinction between corporate and non-
corporate groups is fundamental to the theory of group formation and should prove 
useful for an understanding of the early Christian groups in the Greco-Roman 
4 Another example speaks for itself in demonstrating the failure to account for the social location of 
groups in the first-century world. Koptak maintains: 'A Burkean approach has shown that Paul also 
depicts a community created by a common response to the gospel. The community remains intact as 
long as its members seek to please God on the basis of the revealed, circumcision-free gospel rather 
than seeking to please other humans' (1990:109). 
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Empire. For a better understanding of non-corporate groups it is necessary to know 
what corporate groups are. 
The corporate group ... might be defined as a collection of people 
forming a corporate body with a permanent existence, recruited on 
recognized principles, with common interests and rules or norms 
giving the rights and duties of the members in relation to each other 
and to these common interests. If property is very broadly defined as 
the right to something or someone in some exclusive way, then the 
common interests can be called property interests. Obviously such 
property interests are sacred by definition, and therefore are per-
ceived as divinely sanctioned. The resultant structure is rightly called 
a hierarchy. 
(Malina 1988h:19-20) 
The non-corporate group, most often called a coalition, 'is at home in non-
individualistic societies where values and experience do not match' (Malina 
1988h:19). Thus they are typical of agrarian societies and probably also of the first-
. century Mediterranean world. 
Corporate structures predominate 
where the community as such can provide security and thus can pro-
tect individuals as well as their enterprises. Such protection is 
accorded in societies with a high level of integration, such as certain 
small-scale societies and some highly industrialized Western societies. 
(Boissevain 1974:203) 
Malina adds, societies 'with greater homogeneity of values and integration of institu-
tions, and with smaller differences of relative power' (1988h:19). Such conditions, 
according to him, did not apply in the first-century Mediterranean world except for 
'minuscule ruling elites' (1988h:19). Coalitions or non-corporate groups thrive 
where security cannot be guaranteed by the community at large. This 
is the case in fragmented plural societies or highly stratified societies, 
such as peasant societies, frontier areas and colonies, where a 
heterogeneity of values and great differences in relative power exist 
between social groups. 
(Boissevain 1974:203) 
Non-corporate groups, such as voluntary associations offering protection from 
psychological as well as physical threats, predominate where other means of pro-
tection (such as kinship or political groups, or other corporate entities such as the 
state) do exist but do not guarantee protection to individuals, a certain group, or a 
portion of the community (see Boissevain 1974:203; Saldarini 1988:59-60). Very 
often non-corporate groups mimic kinship groups and are therefore called fictive 
kinship groups. 
Coalitions or non-corporate groups, 'though present in all societies, play a more 
important part in organizing activities in some than in others where formal associa-
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tions rather than coalitions organize the same activities' (Boissevain 1974:170).5 
. This apparently has to do with the degree to which a nation state or community of 
interests has developed within a society. 
It would be misleading to equate group formation in Paul's world with the formation 
of predominant corporate groups. It would, however, be just as misleading to lose 
sight of the matrix of Paul's cultural systems at large and specifically of the role of 
non-corporate groups, such as coalitions and factions, which dominate agrarian 
societies. An awareness of the role of non-corporate groups in the cultural systems 
of Paul's world opens up some new avenues for dealing both with the Pauline com-
munities and with the comparable groups from the environment. As will become 
perfectly evident in the rest of this chapter, an acceptance of them as non-corporate 
groups within the context of the first-century Mediterranean world explains their 
nature in a more meaningful way. 6 
While the discussion of this issue is suggestive rather than conclusive, we should not 
make the mistake of seeing it as unimportant. In fact, the whole issue of group 
formation is closely linked to other social dimensions such as people's experience of 
space, their view of the individual, and the effect (at least in the first-century 
. Mediterranean world) of the dominant role of the kinship institution (see Malina 
1989 for a discussion of these aspects). 
23 Configurations of social networks 
Rather than an uncritical acceptance of the principles of group formation implicitly 
assumed in the received view, the discussion suggests that non-corporate groups as a 
dominant route to group formation in agrarian society should be seen as a heuristic 
tool to explore the nature of the Pauline communities (and of other models from the 
environment). Indeed, in terms of the social location of groups in the first-century 
agrarian society it makes perfect sense to describe both the Pauline household com-
munities and the comparable models from the environment as non-corporate groups 
- a suggestion supported, to my mind, by White's significant observation that the 
watertight compartments between these groups can no longer be maintained. These 
four models are 
variations on organizational networks which overlap, especially at two 
key points of social structure: (1) they use and adapt private, often 
domestic, settings; and (2) they depend on patronage for ongoing 
5 Boissevain further remarks that 'factions are conflicting units formed within a larger encapsulating 
social entity such as a village, association or even another coalition, which had previously been united' 
(1974:195). Factions operate simply as alternative social mechanisms where the encapsulating or corpo-
rate body fails to provide protection. Malina argues that the Jesus faction 'fits within the polity of Israel 
with its embedded religion and economics' (1988b:25). 
6 The question of the formative force constituting the Pauline communities as non-corporate groups 
will be addressed in the next chapter (see§ 4). 
183 
expansion (including numerical growth, architectural elaboration, and 
public acceptance). If the house church is related to these models it is 
because it, too, was operating within similar social networks. 
(1985/6:120) 
These groups are characterised not so much by their idiosyncratic features as by 
·their connectedness to the basic structure of the social organisation of the first-
century Mediterranean world. Each group is one configuration of the first-century 
social network. All were particular configurations of first-century non-corporate 
groups constituted on a household basis and consisting of components from a variety 
of social networks. That is to say, they were similar in nature but different in charac-
ter. 7 
White did not, as far as I can see build on this insight in constructing a com-
prehensive picture of the Pauline communities. To my mind he provides us with a 
very promising idea for dealing with a variety of problems regarding the nature of 
the Pauline communities. This is already clear when we consider the advantages of 
the configuration model. 
2.4 Advantages of a configuration metaphor 
To be sure, a configuration of components is different from a mere combination of 
components; it is also more than a combination of special features from the dif-
ferent components. The configuration metaphor starts off from a different basis, 
·namely the social location of groups, which means that the contributing elements 
are not merely added up to form a group. This calls for some explanation. 
The configuration metaphor can, at least, (1) account for the broad spectrum of 
components which contributed to the making of Pauline household communities, (2) 
open up the possibility of interpreting all these components in connection and inter-
action with the other components as well as with the social location of groups in 
first-century Mediterranean society, and (3) provide a different structure for the 
investigation. 
First, like the spokes of a wheel, a whole range of factors contributes to the constitu-
tion of, say, the Pauline household communities as non-corporate groups. Even the 
general features of agrarian societies suggest that a Western, individualistically 
oriented perspective is inappropriate when considering first-century groups and 
institutions. Institutions and human activities do not lend themselves to com-
partmentalisation. It is more likely, given the fact that clear-cut distinctions and 
separations between different institutions (which underlie attempts to focus on these 
models in isolation) did not exist, that these groups were all different in character 
7 By nature is meant that they were of the same kind (that is, non-corporate groups), while character 
refers to the fact that they were different instances of such groups. 
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. and self-definition but similar in nature. Their uniqueness did not influence their 
nature as groups, only their character. 
Secondly, each component can be described in terms of the social location of non-
corporate groups, but taking into account the other components also. It is not 
denied, that for analytical purposes one needs to identify different categories and 
components. Neither should it be supposed that the description of any side of the 
Pauline communities (e.g. the philosophical aspect) is being rejected. On the con-
trary, the objection is that analytical perspectives tum into explanatory ones when 
interpreting Paul's letters. That is when, say, the philosophical aspect operates in 
such a way that the evidence is read as though the Pauline communities were 
(purely) philosophical or scholastic communities. The point of the configuration 
metaphor is that the relative weight of each component is decided and described in 
terms of the overall picture. 
Thirdly, viewed in terms of the configuration metaphor, these models from the 
environment serve a different purpose. No longer are they being examined in order 
to identify dissimilarities from the Pauline communities. Firstly, they are studied for 
. the sake of a better understanding of Paul's activities. Secondly, each of them con-
tributes a significant emphasis to particular components which went to the making 
of the Pauline configuration of elements. As different exponents of the selfsame 
type of group (nature: non-corporate) they displayed the possible variety within it 
(characteristics). 
When these models are presented in this way (see subsequent section), it necessarily 
follows that several of the generally approved notions have to be rejected. Those 
which arguably helped to present the Pauline communities as unique were in fact 
misrepresenting these communities in the first-century environment. Contrary to the 
received view, which scrutinises the evidence for dissimilarities, the configuration 
metaphor focuses on the constituting elements. In this way the Pauline communities 
are seen as one configuration of first-century social networks. 
3 COMPARABLE GROUPS IN TIIE NE'IWORK OF SOCIO-CULTURAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
As we have seen, it is customary to compare the Pauline communities to other 
. institutions in the Greco-Roman cities with which they share a family resemblance. 
These are: the household, the Jewish synagogue, the philosophical school, and 
voluntary associations. Leaving aside the household model (which will be discussed 
separately), the other three will be introduced in this section. 
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3.1 Greco-Roman clubs and voluntary ~ations 
The term voluntary association is used as an umbrella term to describe what is 
referred to in the literature as clubs, private cults, collegia, or burial societies.8 There 
were all kinds of associations - groups for artisans and merchants, interest groups of 
all sorts, burial or dining associations, mutual aid societies (see Kraabel 1987:53). 
They can, according to Wilken, be divided into three main types: 
(1) professional corporations, as for example, a guild of shipowners, 
fruit merchants, wool-workers, or plasterers; (2) funerary societies 
whose chief purpose was to provide burial expenses for deceased 
members and to insure that each member received a decent burial; 
(3) religious societies composed of the worshipers of a particular 
deity, such as the devotees of Bacchus or Isis. 
(1984:36) 
Seldom, however, were the activities of an association limited to one of these func-
tions. Most combined several if not all of them (see Wilken 1984:36). This state of 
affairs led to the growth of hundreds of voluntary associations, many of which did 
not have more than twenty-five members (see Saldarini 1988:68). These voluntary 
associations complemented the political and familial spheres (which provided 
.politeia and oikonomia) in bonding together people from different backgrounds, 
races and legal positions. The shared principle was koinonia, i.e. 'a voluntary sharing 
of partnership' (Banks 1980:16). 
Such voluntary associations held regular meetings in private homes. Wilken's des-
cription of a typical meeting gives some idea of the part they played in first-century 
social networks.9 
The regular meetings were occasions for eating and drinking, con-
versation, recreation. These meetings not only provided relief from 
the daily round of work; they also provided friends and associates for 
mutual support, an opportunity for recognition and honor, a vehicle 
by which ordinary men could feel a sense of worth. The society also 
gave people an opportunity for religious worship in a setting that was 
supportive, personal, and familiar. 
(1984:39) 
Entry into voluntary association would be marked by an initiation ceremony (see 
Tidball 1983:87); usually baptism as the initiation rite, followed by ceremonial meals 
8 Although it is almost impossible to find a consistent technical meaning for the terms used to des-
cribe voluntary association in both the Greek and the Roman periods (see Malherbe 1983:87-90; 
Saldarini 1988:67-68), such terminological disputes do not affect the main argument. The intention is 
not to argue that the different kinds of voluntary association were in all respects the same. The gist of 
the argument is to point to their common nature and not to elaborate on the differences in character. 
9 It should be noted that most of the information about these voluntary associations comes from the 
third and fourth centuries. This limiting factor applies to everything that is said about them, whether 
the received view or some alternative viewpoint. 
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or fasting. They often made provision for burial needs also (see Judge 1960b:47). It 
should be noted that most of these functions are perfectly commensurate with the 
needs and structures of the first-century agrarian world. Some of these will be listed 
briefly. 
First, non-corporate voluntary associations are a basic feature of agrarian societies. 
Voluntary associations were not marginal to mainline society but constitutive of the 
network of social organisations in the cities of the Greco-Roman Empire, especially 
the Greek areas. Although they lacked official legal and political recognition, this 
made them not so much illegal as unincorporated (see Judge 1960b:43) into 
mainstream political and power structures. In part they supplied what the individual 
had lost in the Empire, namely a sense of belonging (see Banks 1980:16; Meeks 
1983:31; Wilken 1984:35-36).10 They furthermore fulfilled community needs such as 
·education, wealth, politics and power at almost all levels of society (see Kraabel 
1987:52-53; Saldarini 1988:66). Sampley remarks that the atmosphere of the time 
was such that it could aptly be called an era of voluntary associations (see 1980:6-7). 
Their non-corporate nature perhaps constituted their strongest appeal and reason 
for existence. In a political system where the majority of citizens were excluded from 
power and the means to power, voluntary associations provided a channel for sig-
nificant communal participation. While such voluntary associations are nowadays 
classified as economic, ethnic, cultural, social or religious, they were in actual fact 
attempts to create a small cosmos or social unit. The temptation should be resisted 
to equate them with clubs and associations in contemporary industrialised societies 
(see Saldarini 1988:61).11 
Secondly, voluntary associations were structured along the lines of the social 
networks intrinsic to the first-century Mediterranean world. They were located for 
the most part in private homes, linked to household conventions and dominated by 
patron-client relationships and the system of honour and shame (see Malherbe 
1983:88; White 1990:44-45). New voluntary associations, say for immigrants, entered 
·the social mainstream by way of conventions such as patronage and benefaction 
related to household networks (see White 1990:59). 
Thirdly, few associations were primarily religious in nature although, like most other 
activities in that world, they were not totally divorced from religion. 'They all wor-
10 Voluntary associations were very popular and extremely varied in their concerns. However, the 
bulk of them were designed to meet the social, charitable and funerary needs of their members, of 
whom there could be any number between ten and a hundred, the average presumably being 10-35 
members (see Banks 1980:16-17; Saldarini 1988:68). 
11 Those who were excluded from political and economic power in the Empire had to protect their 
wealth and provide for their own security. Voluntary association provided the social structures where 
patron-client relationships could be built up and where and could be maintained. The conventions of 
friendship in particular provided the necessary symbolic culture (see Kraabel 1987:53). 
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shiped some god. The professional, social, and burial societies all adopted a patron 
·deity, to whom sacrifice was made as a central ceremony of the regular (usually 
monthly) meeting' (Stambaugh & Balch 1986:140). Most associations had a patron 
deity (see Kraabel 1987:52; Tidball 1983:86). 
There are, however, examples of small cults, both foreign and local, organised as 
voluntary associations (see Kraabel 1987:53; White 1990:37, 46). Some consisted 
entirely of members of one household (see White 1990:45) while others were linked 
to a particular profession (e.g. the cultic association set up by Tyrian merchants in 
the city of Puteoli in 79 CE - see White 1990:32). Even if a public or official cult 
already existed in a city, private cultic associations were often dedicated to the same 
deity (1990:59). Other features of these cults were communal dining and the 
accepted practice of adopting a household setting (see 1990:46-47). The Jews in the 
Diaspora likewise formed their own communities (voluntary associations?) in the 
Greco-Roman world (see § 3.3). When the early Pauline communities are discussed 
shortly, it should come as no surprise that in the cities of the Roman Empire they 
appeared, to the casual observer at any rate, very similar to these voluntary associa-
tions (see Wilken 1984:44). As will be pointed out in the discussion of Jewish 
synagogues, they were explicitly referred to (e.g. by Josephus) in terms of concepts 
·commonly used in the sphere of voluntary associations. 
Fourthly, the most significant feature is the discovery that these voluntary associa-
tions can hardly be described in terms of any central binding characteristic such as 
occupation, religion or social function. Saldarini (see 1988:68) warns that, given the 
variety of voluntary associations, no generalisations can confidently be applied to 
any one of them in the first-century Mediterranean world. This claim is supported by 
the recognition that often there is very little evidence for scholarly portrayals of typi-
cal voluntary associations (see Judge 1960h:42-44). 
In terms of the feature mentioned above, however, several factors do point to a 
similarity between these associations. As voluntary associations they operated as 
non-corporate groups in search of power and koinonia. Fundamental features were 
their integration into household structures and the various conventions, such as 
patron-client relationships and systems of honour and shame, that directed social 
interaction and social structures. They were all, in short, different configurations of 
social networks. These features suggest that although the various associations dif-
. fered in character, they were very similar in that they all had their roots in the social 
organisational networks of the first-century world. In so far as they did share typical 
traits, voluntary associations derived their character from any one or more of the 
different features such as occupation, patron deity or interest group. They all shared 
the same nature - that of non-corporate groups - in that they were situated within 
household structures and shared the socio-cultural codes and conventions operative 
within that setting. 
It is commonplace to argue that the Christian groups did not consciously model 
themselves on the voluntary associations (see, for example, Meeks 1983:79). 
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However, it is just as easy to demonstrate that most individual voluntary association 
on which we have any information did not model themselves on what scholarly 
handbooks describe as typical voluntary association. If each was a configuration of a 
variety of elements, it may well be worthwhile to reconsider the approach which 
compares Pauline communities and voluntary associations and, by calculating the 
·dis/similarities, decides whether the Pauline communities were indeed typical 
voluntary associations. In view of the configuration metaphor it seems likely that this 
is the type of group and the kind of social networks that should be assumed in order 
to describe the nature of the Pauline communities. They were different exemplars of 
household groups. 
3.2 Philosophical school or scholastic community 
There can be no doubt that Paul, like other leaders in the early Christian move-
ment, carried on teaching activities. For that reason a second model of comparison 
for the Pauline communities - the philosophical school - has attracted scholarly 
attention. The configuration metaphor is especially valuable when it comes to the 
'academic' or philosophical side of the Pauline communities. Judge (to my mind, 
quite correctly) observes: 
Indeed it is owing to this academic character of the Christian mission 
that we are so much better informed about it than about other reli-
gious movements, and the Christian literature itself is devoted almost 
entirely to this aspect of its affairs. We know less about the religious 
practices of the Christians than we do about their arguments over 
points of ethical and theological doctrine. 
(1961:125) 
The fact that we are so well informed about this aspect of the Pauline communities 
should not prevent us from examining their relative value and position within their 
first-century setting. The configuration metaphor allows us to pull the whole picture 
into focus by supplying a frame for it. 
A first step would be to establish what we are talking about. Secondly, some 
scholarly proposals in this regard should be evaluated, and finally the contribution 
of the philosophical-school model to an understanding of the Pauline communities 
should be pointed out. 
3.2.1 The problem of philosophy in Paul's world 
As Freyne points out, the variety of philosophical systems in the first-century world, 
to some degree 'took on the role that religion previously played in the city-state' 
(1980:28).12 Philosophy in the first-century world was concerned not so much with 
12 Both Philo and Josephus describe synagogue activities as a devotion to philosophy (for 
references, see Malherbe 1983:54). 
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metaphysics as with morals; with the search for an acceptable way of life (see 
Wilken 1971:272; Stambaugh & Balch 1986:142). '[S]alvation was at stake' (Johnson 
1989:429), which means that philosophy as a way of life meant giving up vice and 
pursuing virtue. Ethics was central. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that 
all philosophical schools were alike. A wide variety of philosophical or scholastic 
activities can be found in the first-century world.13 
As was argued in a previous chapter, Judaism in the ancient world closely resembled 
philosophy; conversion was impossible, except in the realm of philosophy (see also 
Wilken 1971:272). Several scholars suggest that, since they were without temple, 
cult, statue or ritual, they belong to the realm of philosophy rather than religion (see 
Judge 1980:212); the closest point of comparison with the activities of the Pauline 
communities they maintain, is philosophy (see Banks 1980:22; Johnson 1989:429). 
Given the wide diversity, together with the emphasis on morals and the apparent 
religious differences in that world, it is inevitable that there should be scholarly per-
ceptions of the Pauline communities as resembling philosophical schools. 
32.2 Some scholarly proposals on Paul the philosopher 
Visiting professional preachers, who resembled the itinerant teachers of philosophi-
cal movements (see Judge 1961:125), played an important part in establishing and 
maintaining the early Jesus groups. Thus, what Paul referred to as the preaching of 
his gospel can easily be seen as the actions of a philosopher (see Meeks 1983:82-83). 
But it is not immediately apparent with what trend in contemporary philosophical 
and scholastic activities Paul should be compared. It is obvious that when entering 
one of the Greco-Roman cities, Paul must have 'carried on his activities under the 
umbrella of some accepted social convention or institution' (Judge 1972:32). To 
resolve this dilemma, Judge proposes the model of the sophist: 
As a Roman citizen he belonged to the social elite of the Hellenistic 
states. He found that the most effective way of countering the opposi-
tion of the synagogues was to create an alternative platform on the 
strength of this connection. His mission now has the patronage of 
eminent persons; he preaches under their auspices; they provided him 
with a retinue of assistants and with an audience, including their social 
dependents. 
(1961:127) 
What makes Paul a sophist like Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides was, according 
to Judge, that 'they were all travellers, relying upon the hospitality of their admirers, 
all expert talkers and persuaders, all dedicated to their mission and intolerant of 
criticism' (1961:126). 
13 Philosophical schools range from Stoics and Epicureans to Cynics (see Freyne 1980:28-35; Lohse 
1976:243-252). Some scholars lump them all together under the heading sophists (see Judge 1961:126). 
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Malherbe supports this general picture (see 1983:47-59). He maintains that the kind 
of philosophers with whom Paul should be compared 
were not metaphysicians who specialized in systematic abstractions, 
but, like Paul, were preachers and teachers who saw their main goal to 
be the reformation of the lives of people they encountered in a variety 
of contexts, ranging from the imperial court and the salons of the rich 
to the street corners. 
(1989:68) 
There is, however, a point of divergence. While, according to Judge, Paul entered 
the household of some wealthy patron and acted as the resident intellectual, Mal-
herbe (following Hock) prefers the workshop setting for Paul's intellectual activities. 
At the level of Paul's provision of his own livelihood in the workshop, Malherbe 
finds some similarities between Paul and contemporary philosophers (see 1983:24-
. 27). Since Hock was the one who worked out this position in greater detail, we shall 
turn to his discussion on Paul's activities as an artisan. 
Hock (see 1980:52-59) argues that, unlike philosophers who begged, charged fees or 
entered the household of a rich and powerful patron (as Judge would have it), Paul 
opted to earn his keep by working as an artisan (tentmaker). In that way he stayed 
financially independent, but still had access to members of households where he 
could continue the preaching of his message. Hock's objection to Judge's view is that 
the latter neglects the workshop setting. Interestingly enough, this viewpoint does 
not affect Hock's estimate of Paul's social standing.14 
Malherbe argues that as a maker of tents, 'Paul plied his trade in a workshop, prob-
ably within the setting of a household of artisans, and there offered his practice as 
an example to be imitated' (1989:69-70; and see Hock 1980 for more detail). Paul's 
philosopher-like act in relying on his craft for a livelihood, finds a counterpart in the 
philosophical traditions. Paul adapted this Greco-Roman philosophical moral tradi-
tion to express his theological understanding and to form communities of believers 
(see Malherbe 1989:71). Hock argues that the artisan's workshop was a conven-
. tional social setting for intellectual discourse and philosophical discussions (see 
1980:41). 
Since this point of disagreement does not affect their respective views on Paul's 
social status, the choice between the household setting and the workshop should not 
be overemphasised. In both instances the household setting served as the basis for 
Paul's philosophical activities. 
14 Hock maintains that Paul's action in working at a trade confirms his elite status. The main evi-
dence is that Paul shared the aristocratic view that working as an artisan was 'slavish and demeaning' 
{Hock 1978:562). 
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. 3.23 Reconsidering the model of the philosophical school 
Meeks (to my mind, justifiably) warns that it is 
useful to know that there was a strong scholarly, academic, and 
rhetorical element in the activities of the Pauline groups, but it will 
not do to make those elements constitutive of the movement. 
(1983:84) 
Judge, it should be acknowledged, clearly states that when he presents Paul as a 
sophist, he is not excluding other aspects such as cultic or welfare activities (see 
1960a:8). Even so both Judge and Malherbe fall short in two respects. Firstly, the 
other components of the philosophical school (e.g. the household setting) are not 
dealt with in an integrated way. The portrayal of philosophical schools as primarily 
institutions of learning and academic activity does not do justice to other equally 
important components. Like other groups, many philosophers and philosophical 
schools made use of the private homes of patrons (see Stowers 1984:66) and further-
more shared many features with voluntary associations (see Wilken 1971:279; 
Meeks 1983:83-84). Secondly, Paul's academic activities are not interpreted in con-
junction with the other components. For example, the fact that Paul took either the 
. workshop or the household of a wealthy patron as his headquarters must have 
influenced his academic activities. 
Academic activities based on the household setting were subject to household con-
ventions and the implied social relations, such as patron-client relationships. That is 
to say, Paul's philosophical activities were subject to the social conditions of his 
world. The occasional nature of his teaching activities highlights the embeddedness 
in the conventions of the household (be it that of a wealthy patron or of a fellow 
artisan) where he must have been a client. 
Thus, although more is known of Paul's teaching activities compared to the cultic or 
religious side of his ministry, his teaching must be interpreted within the social set-
ting in which it took root. While a great deal is known about Paul's teaching 
activities, very little is done to interpret it within the overall context of his social 
situation. In fact, much of the argument in this study has been devoted to pointing 
out that several anachronistic assumptions have for a very long time been imposed 
on the text in question. As a result, opponent hypotheses for the greater part assume 
that the issue in Galatia was a theological or doctrinal conflict over conflicting con-
· victions. Despite the fact that Paul's letters apparently deal with the exposition of a 
belief system, it should be borne in mind that these theological, doctrinal or moral 
discussions may have had another function - they were subordinate to and 
embedded in social conditions. In fact, this letter should be construed in terms of 
the insight that academic activities were part of first-century social interaction. 
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3.3 The Diaspora synagogue prior to 70 CE 
The third model from the environment to be compared to the Pauline communities 
is the Jewish synagogue. It is commonplace to assert that since Christianity is an off-
shoot of Judaism, 'the urban Christian groups obviously had the Diaspora synagogue 
as the nearest and most natural model' (Meeks 1983:80). Nonetheless, the Pauline 
household communities were still, according to the received view, significantly dif-
ferent from the Jewish synagogues. At least three aspects may be pointed out: the 
organisational terminology of the synagogues is not used, the role of women is dif-
ferent, and the Pauline communities were not bound by the ethnic community (see 
Stambaugh & Balch 1986:142; Meeks 1983:81). 
It would furthermore not be far off the mark to say that, according to the received 
view, the synagogue in the first century was a building set aside for cultic and reli-
gious purposes where people met once a week on the Sabbath for worship, scripture 
reading and prayer. Within this sphere one would find the proselytes and God-
fearers who are regarded as the bridge between the Jewish synagogue and the 
Pauline communities. Finally, the synagogues provided the setting for Paul's initial 
preaching activities in the cities of the Greco-Roman Empire. Are all these insights 
entirely correct? 
While most of these aspects are being questioned today (especially in view of the 
configuration metaphor, together with the new understanding of first-century 
Judaism) it would be helpful to obtain a better understanding of the received view. 
3.3.1 The received view of Jewish synagogues 
Both the nature of the Jewish synagogue in the first century CE and the relationship 
between Paul, the Pauline groups and the Jewish synagogues come under the spot-
light. Without an elaboration on some of these aspects, the arguments concerning an 
alternative view would be more difficult to understand. 
First, it is maintained that in the cities where Paul founded congregations 'the Jews 
had already advanced to the stage of possessing buildings used exclusively for the 
community functions' (Meeks 1983:80; and see Banks 1980:18). 
Secondly, the synagogue was basically a place of cultic and religious assembly- thus 
of prayer, worship and scripture reading (see Meeks 1983:80; and cf Kee 1990:5; 
White 1990:87). In fact, scholars more often than not use clerical language when 
referring to the Jewish synagogue.15 Part and parcel of this view is the undisputed 
assumption (undisputed, at least, in many New Testament studies) that the origin of 
15 Georgi is a case in point. Someone 'attending' a synagogue 'service' (1971:124) sounds all too 
much like a modern churchgoer who can attend services at random. 
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the synagogue lies several centuries in the past during the Babylonian exile when 
Jews began to gather out of a need to read the Law and pray together in a foreign 
country (see, for example, Lohse 1976:158-160; Banks 1980:18; Neal 1988:18, 21). 
The giveaway can be found in something along the lines of Neal's statement 
(1988:1): 'The first Christians were primarily Jewish believers who had grown up 
worshipping in the synagogue' (italics mine). 
Thirdly, according to the received view women in the Pauline household com-
munities were much more equal to men than in contemporary Judaism (see Meeks 
1983:81). In this regard the much later situation-where, under the tyranny of Rab-
binic Judaism, women were practically excluded from the synagogue activities - is 
·often invoked to illustrate the differences from the Pauline communities (see, for 
example, Banks 1980:128-129; Tidball 1983:85). 
Fourth, the synagogue provides a handy basis to project the God-fearers as the 
necessary link between the synagogue and the Pauline movement. Malherbe (see 
1983:64), for example, maintains that Paul usually preferred synagogues as a venue, 
since there he would have encountered the God-fearers who were vital to his mis-
sion (see also Stowers 1984:64). 
Finally, Stambaugh and Balch go so far as to maintain that '[ s ]ocially and religiously, 
the existence of Jewish synagogues in Greco-Roman cities was crucial for the suc-
cess of the early Christian mission' (1986:141). The locus of Paul's preaching activity 
is identified as the synagogue. It is often taken for granted that Paul must, at least in 
some cities, have started in the synagogue and only moved elsewhere when he 
encountered opposition. His remark in 2 Corinthians 11 :24 (that five times he had 
received forty lashes less one at the hands of the Jews) support this view (see, for 
example, Stowers 1984:64; Harvey 1985). 
· 332 An alternative view of Jewish synagogues 
An alternative perception of the nature of Jewish synagogues in the pre-70 era is 
developing in some scholarly circles. Together with the new understanding of first-
century Judaism, this alternative view of Jewish organisations in the Greco-Roman 
Diaspora points to a rather different view of the relationship between the Pauline 
communities and synagogues before 70 CE. 
It should be noted, first of all, that the term avvaywyfl can refer to a place of 
assembly (building), a group of people (assembly), a community or a congregation 
(see Stambaugh & Balch 1986:48; Kee 1990:8). However, the notion that the word 
refers to a building set aside exclusively for community functions cannot be derived 
from the literary sources (as is done, for example, by Neal 1988:8). White points out 
that, while references to synagogues are common in late first-century sources, 
it does not appear that there was a formerly ordered rabbinical 
institution as such prior to the second century C.E. Moreover, there is 
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no archaeological evidence for exclusively synagogue buildings in the 
Homeland dating to the first century. 
(1990:61) 
Since archaeological evidence can rarely be found for any place of assembly prior to 
70, 'a synagogue could well have been nothing more than a large meeting room in a 
private house or part of a larger structure set apart for worship' (Meyers & Strange 
1981:141). Amongst other arguments, this leads Kee to maintain that it would be 
more accurate to say that synagogues met in homes and public spaces (see 1990:9). 
Secondly, synagogues, suggests Gutmann, were Pharisaic institutions which did not 
fully develop as important meeting-places for worship and instruction until after 70 
CE (see 1981h:3-4; Hoenig 1975:69-70). The construction history, together with the 
epigraphic and other archaeological evidence, suggests that synagogue buildings 
which were primarily places of worship and instruction did not exist until the third 
century (see Kee 1990:10). As Cohen points out, only from the second century 
onwards did writers refer to the presence of sacred scrolls in the synagogue (see 
1987h:164). 
It is significant that these developments probably coincided with a subtle change in 
religious self-definition among Jewish communities; the rabbinisation of Judaism 
affected the symbolic as well as the material culture of the Jews (see White 1990:61, 
90). Prior to the destruction of the Temple and the Rabbinic reconstruction of 
Judaism, the synagogue as the central institution in the life of Jewish communities 
should not be confused with the institution of later centuries (see White 1987a:154). 
One of the consequences of this view is that room should be left for a subtle change 
in religious self-consciousness among the Jews. In the third to fourth centuries a 
. more restrictive definition of synagogues, as religious institutions as opposed to col-
legial or voluntary associations, could have accompanied the changing circumstances 
under rabbinisation. Thus a synagogue during Paul's lifetime must have been quite 
different from a synagogue in the Rabbinic era that lay ahead (see White 1990:87, 
90; Kraabel 1979).16 
Thirdly, analyses of the construction history of several synagogue buildings in the 
Diaspora suggest that there were great divergences in organisation and theology due 
to varying degrees of adaptation to local cultures. Of the eleven synagogue com-
munities identified in ancient Rome, epigraphic remains suggest that they differed 
widely in respect of such features as language, social standing and organisation (see 
White 1990:61).17 
16 It is important to realise that the rise of an institution such as the synagogue 'must be rooted in a 
determinate historical reality for historical silence is hardly sufficient proof for the existence of an 
institution, such as the synagogue' (Gutmann 1981b:3). In this regard it is meaningful that the term 
synagogue never appears in Paul's letters (see Kraabel 1985:228 for a discussion of the issue). 
17 Information about the alleged eleven Jewish synagogues in Rome on which data are available 
. suggests that they were constituted along social and status lines. The spectrum varied from 'the virtually 
illiterate funerary inscriptions from the Synagogue of the Hebrews' (White 1985/6:110 n 61) to the 
Synagogue of the Augustasians, which apparently owed allegiance to the Emperor. 
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Kee's conclusion as regards Jewish synagogues in the Homeland is probably truer of 
the situation in the Diaspora: 
Thus there is simply no evidence to speak of synagogues in Palestine 
as architecturally distinguishable edifices prior to 200 C.E. Evidence 
of meeting places: "Yes", both in private homes and in public build-
ings. Evidence of distinctive architectural features of a place of wor-
ship or for study of Torah: "No". 
(Kee 1990:9) 
These three features should, however, be explored in greater detail. They are: the 
household setting of synagogues; the fact that in Paul's lifetime they were not yet 
Pharisaic institutions; and, thirdly the fact that they were highly diversified as 
regards both organisation and theology. 
3.3.3 Jewish synagogues and/as voluntary associations 
Several clues, both archaeological and literary, point to the adaptation by Jewish 
communities in the Diaspora of 'a Hellenistic gentile social form, the private 
organisation, to its particular social and religious purposes' (Kraabel 1987:54). 
The first clue has already been mentioned. There is widespread evidence that many 
new or imported religious and ethnic associations made use, at least initially, of pri-
vate homes (see White 1990:39). The renovation history of the Delos synagogue, the 
oldest known synagogue building either in the Diaspora or in the Homeland, sug-
gests, that it probably had this kind of background.18 It dates from the late second 
century or mid first century BCE and was probably a private house at first (see 
Kraabel 1979:493). Since it has no permanent Torah shrine or Jewish symbols, the 
chances are that it was used primarily as an assembly hall and community centre 
(see Kraabel 1979:493). White adds that the nature of the renovations (which sug-
gest similarities to the collegial halls of other foreign groups on the island) gives 
some indication of the nature of this synagogue establishment: it was a kind of guild 
-or voluntary association (see 1987a:153, 1990:66). 
A second clue comes from Caesar's ban on all collegia with the exception of 'certain 
long established groups' (Meeks 1983:35). The synagogues were one of those 
explicitly exempted. 
A further clue comes from Josephus's references to the Jewish community at Sardis. 
Responding to an appeal by the Jews of Sardis, the proquaestor and propraetor of 
the province of Asia, Lucius Antonius (49 BCE) said (according to Josephus) that 
18 Whether this particular building really was a synagogue is hotly debated (see Kraabel 1979:491; 
White 198'78). 
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Jewish citizens of ours have come to me and pointed out that from the 
earliest times they have had an association of their own in accordance 
with their native laws and a place of their own, in which they decide 
their affairs and controversies with one another; and upon their 
request that it be permitted them to do these things, I decided that 
they might be maintained, and permitted them so to do. 
(Jewish Antiquities 14.235) 
On another occasion the city council and citizens of Sardis, according to Josephus, 
decided as follows: 
Whereas the Jewish citizens living in our city have continually 
received many great privileges from the people and have now come 
before the council and the people and have pleaded that as their laws 
and freedom have been restored to them by the Roman Senate and 
people, they may, in accordance with their ancestral customs, come 
together and have a communal life and adjudicate suits among them-
selves, and that a place be given them in which they may gather 
together with their wives and children and offer their ancestral 
prayers and sacrifices to God, it has therefore been decreed by the 
council and people that permission shall be given them to come 
together on stated days to do these things which are in accordance 
with their laws, and also that a place shall be set apart by the 
magistrates for them to build and inhabit, such as they may consider 
suitable for this purpose, and that the market-officials of the city shall 
be charged with the duty of having suitable food for them brought in. 
(Jewish Antiquities 14.260-261) 
These references are significant for several reasons. First, Josephus calls the 
synagogue a synodos, which is one of the most common and general terms for a club, 
guild or voluntary association. For legal purposes, says Meeks (see 1983:35), the 
Romans classified the Jewish synagogues in each city as collegia (or associations). 
Secondly, it sheds light on some community practices. The participation of women 
(and children), the sorting out of legal disputes, and communal meals were often 
features of voluntary associations also. 
The Jews, like other groups, established ethnic associations by means of community 
gatherings since before the first century (see Gutmann 1981h:3; White 1990:66). 
·Furthermore, the occurrence of npouruxcxi (houses of prayer) do not automatically 
guarantee the existence of the synagogue as a separate institution (see Gutmann 
1975a:xi; 1981h:3). What needs to be examined is the precise nature of these gather-
ings. Kraabel suggests that 
the synagogue Judaism of the Roman Diaspora is best understood as 
the grafting of a biblical Diaspora theology onto a Greco-Roman 
social organization. The shift to minority status in places outside the 
Homeland led to the abandonment of many elements of the ancestral 
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religion, a new emphasis on others, and the adoption of the new 
environment's iconography, architecture, and organisational form. 
(1987:58) 
This picture can be filled out in more detail by focusing on some aspects only: the 
·role of patrons and the position of women in Jewish synagogues.19 The excavations 
at Delos and especially the inscriptions found there, amongst other indications do 
much to establish the nature of the Jewish synagogue at Delos as a kind of a 
voluntary association. 
'Honoring pagan benefactors (both men and women) in a synagogue' White main-
tains, 'reflects on both the internal order of the Jewish community and its social 
place within the larger environment' (1987a:154). More precisely, dependence on 
the benefaction of patrons reflects something of the nature of Jewish communities 
in the Diaspora as well as their gatherings. Meeks mentions the synagogue of the 
Augustesians in Rome which honoured the Emperor, either as a patron or for his 
general policy of favouring Jewish rights (see 1983:206 n 161). In addition to many 
Jewish patrons - in all probability wealthy members of the community who, by 
virtue of their generosity, were accorded leadership roles and honoured accordingly 
- a number of non-Jewish patrons fulfilled the same role (see White 1987a; 1990:78-
85; Meeks 1983:206 n 161). It seems likely that 'leadership roles in the synagogue, as 
in other religious associations, entailed benefactions' (White 1990:81). Two exam-
ples will suffice to demonstrate the significance of this point.20 
At Acmonia in Roman Phrygia, a certain Julia Severa - also known to have been a 
priestess of the imperial cult- donated a building to the Jewish community (see 
White 1990:81). She was duly honoured. A second woman, Tation, at Phocaea in 
Roman Lydia (during the reign of Nero) built an edifice and court and donated it to 
the Jewish community. The inscription honouring her reads: 
Tation, wife of Straton son of Empadon, made a gift to the Jews of the 
house and the walls of the (peristyle) court, which she had built from 
her own resources. The Congregation of the Jews has honored Tation, 
wife of Straton son of Empadon, with a gold crown and a seat of 
honor. 
(translation in White 1987a:143) 
The position of women in the synagogue organisation is noteworthy, while the posi-
tion of patrons as such discloses something about the adaption by Jews in the 
Diaspora from the domestic cultures. 
19 Several other features, such as providing for burial needs and communal meals, were very typical 
of voluntary associations as well as Jewish synagogue communities (see for example Meeks 1983:35; 
Stambaugh & Balch 1986:49). 
20 The fact is often overlooked that even the New Testament mentions a non-Jew as a benefactor in 
connection with the building of a synagogue. Luke, (7:3-6) towards the end of the first century, men-
tions a Roman centurion as the benefactor who sponsored the building of the synagogue. 
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The role of women was evidently different in earlier times (at least the first century) 
from their role during the time of Talmudic supremacy. The segregated place for 
women in the synagogue is a feature of Galilean synagogues only from the fourth 
century onwards (see White 1990:80). 
The great diversity in Diaspora Judaism prior to the fall of the Temple, together 
with the open attitudes between Jews and non-Jews, probably point to a less rigid 
demarcation in some places. Non-Jews may even have been allowed access to the 
assembly and worship (see White 1990:92). The role of benefactors to the synagogue 
community, especially non-Jews, undoubtedly left its mark on local conditions. 
Perhaps the most significant conclusion to be drawn from the levels of social inter-
action in Jewish synagogues, as reflected in the above discussion, is that although 
ethnicity was important, the distinction between Jew and non-Jew was drawn in dif-
ferent ways. Neither purely ethnic nor clearly religious reasons should be singled out 
as the touchstone of Jewishness. The important role of social and organisational 
links in Jewish synagogue communities should deter us from using unilateral 
categories for these distinctions. In particular, the question of who was a Jew and 
what were God-fearers as already discussed (see chapter 4), will patently be 
elucidated if these aspects are taken into account. 
These conditions rather than the Rabbinic ones should be pictured as the first-
century backdrop to Paul's activities. If Paul did go to synagogues, he did not go to 
them as institutions in the Talmudic sense. What he encountered would most proba-
bly have resembled other voluntary associations, with an ethnic colour and Jahweh 
worship, which fulfilled a variety of social functions rather than some exclusively 
religious ones. The social organisation was modelled on conventions of social inter-
action rather than on purely ethnic or religious markers. Furthermore, membership, 
leadership and entrance requirements were largely dependent on social networks. 
It should come as no surprise that scholars, especially those defending the notion of 
uniqueness and adhering to the received view, have tried to minimise the similarities 
between Jewish synagogues and voluntary associations and by and large neglected 
the social conditions in which synagogues were situated. However, some of the argu-
ments raised to minimise the similarities do need to be reviewed - especially since 
this could contribute to uncover some further features of Jewish synagogues. Three 
arguments only will be mentioned in passing. First, unlike other voluntary associa-
tions, the Jews attempted to extend their network across national boundaries (see 
Judge 1960h:44; Meeks 1983:80, 108). Secondly, there was a central body in each 
city representing all the Jews (see Meeks 1983:35; Applebaum 1974:478). Thirdly, 
membership was automatic by virtue of Jewish birth. 
As regards the first argument, Georgi points out that Judaism and Christianity were 
not the only cults with a worldwide mission or international fraternity. The mysteries 
of Dionysus 'were the first Greek mystery cult to conduct a world-wide mission, to 
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form mystery fraternities everywhere, and to keep them in some sort of contact with 
each other, not least by wandering preachers working as missionaries' (1971:128). In 
fact, Freyne points out that several philosophical traditions (especially that of the 
Stoics) arose in reaction to the downfall of the city state. Instead, the whole world 
was now to be perceived as one huge city state (see 1980:28-29). 
The second objection can hardly be maintained in view of the meagre evidence for 
such central bodies. It would be dangerous, given the lack of evidence, to assume a 
central body like the one in Alexandria for every other city (see K.raabel 1981h:87; 
White 1990:91). It should furthermore be noted that the Pauline group(s) are distin-
guished from the Jewish synagogues as if all synagogues were identical. Seen in 
terms of the configuration metaphor, the question should read: on what basis could 
the different synagogues as well as the Pauline communities in the same city be dis-
tinguished? 
·Thirdly, since it is accepted that Paul 'considered himself a Jew with the right to pre-
sent his brand of Judaism' (Stowers 1984:64), many New Testament scholars uncriti-
cally accept Luke's viewpoint as trustworthy: Paul presented his message in 
synagogues and only after rejection went to the Gentiles via a God-fearer (see also 
Meeks 1983:35). 
In view of the above discussion, only a few remarks need be made. First of all, the 
disregard for the social network and the social location of groups in this third argu-
ment is remarkable. The argument that the conceptlew was a situational term (see 
chapter 4) can, in view of the, social conditions of synagogues, be filled out in more 
detail. Jewishness was embedded and defined within the parameters of a particular 
social network: the synagogue institution. Thus Jews were indeed automatically wel-
comed, but it would be stretching it too far to assume a universal recognition of 
Jewishness. The notions of Jewishness and God-fearers urgently need to be revised 
from the point of view of the social conditions provided by synagogue communities 
(see furthermore chapter 7 § 3). 
4 TIIE HOUSEHOID SETTING IN TIIE FIRST-CENTURY MEDITER-
RANEAN WORID 
As has been argued, the household is one of the central social institutions in 
agrarian societies. That the private household was the centre of Paul's activities in 
the cities of the Greco-Roman Empire is confirmed by several indicators (see fur-
ther chapter 7 § 2.1 ). 
While household institutions are emphasised as the basis of the variety of non-
corporate groups, the realia about housing in the first-century Mediterranean world 
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. are rarely perceived at a conscious level.21 In addition the socio-cultural conventions 
related to that part of the cultural system are almost totally neglected. 
4.1 Houses and housing 
If the excavations at Ostia and Ephesus are any indication of the general pattern of 
housing in the first-century Mediterranean world, housing conditions were far from 
convenient for the majority of people who did not own a proper house. These condi-
tions obviously have to be kept in mind when the household institution is taken as a 
matrix for the Pauline movement. 
Two basic types of houses occurred (see Verner 1982:57): private mansions (domi) 
and multi-storeyed apartment houses (insulae).22 Most of the population lived in 
one- or two-room apartments and must have done most of their eating, drinking, 
and socialising in public places. Many lived in single-room apartments on top of 
their workshops. A high percentage of people were not even in a position to obtain 
such apartments. They slept in and around public buildings and other structures (see 
Verner 1982:57-58; Stambaugh & Balch 1986:109-110; White 1987h:6-10). Given the 
·high population density in an average city of the Greco-Roman Empire (see Meeks 
1983:28), it follows that privacy was rare and much of a person's social life was lived 
on the street and sidewalks and in public places. 
Bearing in mind those features of cities in the first-century Mediterranean world 
that have already been discussed, the attitude towards space and the planning of 
residential quarters is a noteworthy one. Despite the high population density, even a 
small town might, in the perception of its residents, have had thirty to forty neigh-
bourhoods or quarters (see Malina 1989:134). Given the lack of walls and space to 
separate and differentiate people, social barriers in the form of social conventions 
played an important part (see Stowers 1984:82). Furthermore, people from the 
lower levels were dependent on patrons not only to satisfy intangible needs (see 
patron-client relati.onship, and honour and shame) but also for tangible needs such 
as household space for socialising and public meetings. If the meeting-place of the 
Pauline communities was a private house, it goes without saying that the physical 
conditions contributed immensely to the social structures (see for example Murphy-
O'Connor 1983:153-161). Household institutions would necessarily have left their 
mark on such meetings in the form of social codes and conventions. 
21 Information on the social institution of households is abundant (see, for example, Meeks 1983:75-
77; Stambaugh & Balch 1986:123-124, 138-140; Tidball 1983:79-86). 
22 A domus was built on the traditional Roman plan, with a number of rooms clustered around a 
central atrium. A few apartment houses were more luxurious in that they included rooms for slaves and 
perhaps a room large enough for social gatherings (for more detail see Verner 1982:56-59). 
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42 Households and hospitality 
At this point the focus shifts from organisational and physical structures to symbolic 
and social structures. 
It should be realised that in the first-century Mediterranean world the household, 
with its social networks, was not an optional structure but a fundamental social 
phenomenon. It has even been termed the 'primary structure of the Empire' (Tid-
ball 1983:79; and see Stambaugh & Balch 1986:123) or 'a basic political unit' (Mal-
. herbe 1983:69). Although it provided the basic channel of political movement by 
way of patronage and benefaction, household structures were subordinate to the 
political power in the Empire. Thus one should first of all avoid thinking of the 
extended household in the first-century world as a bigger but otherwise not very dis-
similar version of the contemporary Western household. It was something quite dif-
ferent: an important economic, political and religious unit. 
Family in the first-century Mediterranean world was primarily defined not by 
kinship but 'by the relations of dependence and subordination' (Meeks 1983:30). 
Families consisted of extended families which constituted a household (see Carney 
1975:90). Thus the household often included 'the entire circle of relatives, slaves, 
free workers lodged on the premises, dependents and their families' (MacMullen 
1984:107) and even included business associates (see Malherbe 1983:69 and Neus-
ner 1987:332). 
These extended households were the dominant economic units in ancient society 
(see Carney 1975:149). Such households acted as resource bases, economically and 
in terms of intangible needs, for the extended household connected to them. The 
patron was responsible for the household but he also expected a certain degree of 
respect and obedience. 
The household was furthermore a religious unit (see Verner 1982:28): 'The 
household, like the republic, expressed its solidarity in a common religion' (Judge 
1960h:35). Everyone who became part of it passed into the service and under the 
protection of the god of the house. Because of the clear hierarchy of authority cul-
minating in the patron, the religion of the household - chosen by the patron - was a 
way of expressing household solidarity (see also Tidball 1983:81, 84). The god of the 
household was the god of the individual member, and this happened freely without 
coercion. 
A household was, in a real sense, a community (see Tidball 1983:79). As already 
pointed out, not only various cult groups and Jewish communities but also private 
clubs, voluntary associations, and philosophical schools used the household as their 
organisational basis. Thus it makes sense when Banks calls the gospel a communal 
affair; to 'embrace the gospel, then, is to enter into community' (1980:33). It would 
. perhaps be more correct to say: to enter a Christian household community was to 
embrace the gospel. 
202 
To be part of a household was to be part of an intricate network of relations. At 
least two sets of social networks (not always clearly distinguishable) should be 
identified: the ties of friendship (equals) and patron-client relationship (unequals). 
The organisation of households and the terminology used both in households and in 
voluntary associations very often resembled that of the greater Empire (see, for 
example, Judge 1960a:6-7). Within the household, 'a vertical but not quite unilinear 
·chain' (Meeks 1983:30) connected unequals. Apart from the bond between the 
paterfamilias and his next of kin, the predominant relationship was a patron-client 
relationship with inferiors (clients) in the household setting. This intricate set of 
social networks can be explained in terms of the practice of hospitality. An insight 
into the rules of hospitality typical of first-century Mediterranean culture sheds 
some light on the importance of this social practice for an understanding of Paul's 
travelling (and that of his co-workers) as well as his letter-writing.23 
In the household context, 'the primary mechanism of social organization and lead-
ership (and even missionary expansion) was the practice of hospitality' (White 
1987C:216). Hospitality in the Mediterranean world, then and now, has nothing to do 
with the contemporary Western usage of entertaining relatives and friends; it has to 
do with 'the problem of how to deal with strangers' (Pitt-Rivers 1977:94). In fact, it 
might be defined as 'the process by means of which an outsider's status is changed 
from stranger to guest' (Malina 1986c:181). Hospitality was, first and foremost, 
closely tied up with patron-client relationships. Through their patrons, for instance, 
clients gained protection from local laws and gods (see Pitt-Rivers 1977:96). The 
status of a guest - halfway between a stranger and a community member - clearly 
·indicates the precarious nature of patron-client relationships and the risk of over-
playing one's hand. In this regard letters of recommendation played a significant 
role: they could spare a stranger the ordeal of a test or even help to convert a 
stranger into a guest. 
It should furthermore be emphasised that the relationship between benefactor and 
beneficiary was a reciprocal one.24 Mott points out that 
in ancient Greek and Roman society reciprocity was at the heart of 
benevolence. An important societal bond in the Hellenistic and 
Roman periods was the relationship between benefactor and 
23 To be sure, the notion of hospitality is another field (although related to the other aspects) where 
current anthropological research and relevant models may serve as heuristic tools for a historical study 
of the first-century Mediterranean world. In terms of social-science research, the notion of hospitality 
should be classified under the heading· of a category such as rites of inc01poration (see Pitt-Rivers 
1977:96). 
24 Especially in a world where one's social position was not determined by a universal norm or 
hierarchical status (e.g. by economic potential or the ability to obtain status and power by economic 
·means), status positions could not be transferred between communities (see Pitt-Rivers 1977:97). 
Status was closely linked to patron-client relationships and positions of honour inter alia. 
203 
beneficiary. The formal obligations of rendering appropriate honor 
and gratitude to one's benefactor at once motivated and controlled 
personal, political and diplomatic conduct. 
(1975:60) 
The principle of reciprocity is closely bound up with patronage and obligations of 
honour (see Malina 1988b:5 n 7; Mott 1975:69), which will be discussed shortly. By 
contrast with the custom of free gifts in some societies, giftexchange in the first-
century world (as in many other cultures) was a reciprocal action; 'no one gave any-
thing in goods, services, or honors without proper recompense to himself or his kin' 
(Mott 1975:68).25 I have already indicated, social relationships operated on the 
same reciprocal principle. Gifts 'implied obligations and were made culturally with 
strings attached' (Malina 1988b:5 n 7). But, as Judge indicates, refusing a gift was no 
easier, since such refusal incurred the burden of enmity (see 1980:214).26 The prin-
ciple of benefaction was widespread and inherent in both patron-client relationships 
and relationships of enmity. 
As White points out, letter-writing itself was part of the social fabric of securing and 
maintaining social conventions. Letter-writing served not only to transmit informa-
tion but to secure hospitality for the writer or a protege (see White 1990:106). Both 
travel and the formation of communities were dependent on the social conventions 
of hospitality. In fact, 'house church hospitality also establishes the context for letter 
writing' (White 1987c:216; see also Meeks 1983:109; Malherbe 1983:94-103).27 A 
technical vocabulary was developed in letters of recommendation by means of which 
a traveller was introduced and recommended to a patron with a view to securing 
hospitality (see Malherbe 1983:102; Malina 1986C:187; White 1987C:217).28 
In the context of the Pauline household communities, patronage was the model for 
hospitality extended by the householder to the community (see White 1987C:217). A 
household patron provided an extended household with tangible and often 
25 Malina argues that the vocabulary of grace often found in the New Testament derives from the 
{avouritism of patronage: 'I suggest charizomai refers to showing patronage, charis to willingness to be 
a patron, and charisma to the outcomes of patronage. This is what Paul (and the rest of the New Testa-
. ment) mean with this set of terms' (1988b:5 n 7). 
26 Judge's description of friendship relationships makes it clear that even friendship in Paul's world 
was different from friendship in our world: 'One made friends by money. In accepting it, the 
beneficiaries acquired also an inescapable train of obligations, enforced by the threat of renunciation of 
friendship' (1980:214). 
27 The importance of the conventions of hospitality for the writing of letters and the ability to travel 
is argued by Malherbe (1983:95-%). However, he fails to bring out adequately the social obligations 
and conventions to which hospitality committed people. This is demonstrated, for example, in his fail-
ure to explain clearly the rules of hospitality typical of that culture (see criticism by Malina 1986c:179-
181). 
28 Paul was very much aware of the practice and even made use of it - as can be detected, for exam-
ple, in 1Cor16:3, 15-16, Phip 2:29-30, 1Th2:29-30, Rm 16:1-2. 
204 
·intangible benefits for which he (in exceptional cases, she) in return received honour 
(see Meeks 1986b:lll). 
If Paul entered into the social network of household institutions in the cities where 
he travelled, then it can be taken for granted that a significant part of his social 
interaction was regulated by the above conventions of hospitality. 
5 NE1WORKS OF SOCIO-CULTURAL REIATIONS IN PAUL'S WORID 
5.1 Patron-client relationships 
On the one hand, patron-client relationships were a supplement to class and status 
categories (see Saldarini 1988:57), and on the other hand they were regulated by the 
values of honour and shame (see Moxnes 1988b:62). While class structures defined 
vertical differences between people, patron-client relationship filled out the 
'horizontal dimension based on interpersonal loyalty, commitment and influence, 
both within and across class boundaries' (Saldarini 1988:57). Ancient society, 
according to Saldarini, had a 'very strong horizontal dimension based on inter-
personal loyalty, commitment and influence' (1988:57) as compared to modern 
industrialised societies. This is reflected especially in the high value that was 
attached to honour (see following section). 
Patron-client relations, Elliott points out, 'played a key role in Roman public and 
private life' (1987:46) and have survived in the Mediterranean world, in various 
forms, to the present day (see Eisenstadt & Roninger 1980).29 Since the focus in this 
study is on the private and not the public political spheres, emphasis will be placed 
on the function of patron-client relationships in the household setting. Patronage 
and benefaction were furthermore the pillars of the extended household social 
structure in the Roman world (see White 1986:260). As one of the sets of social 
networks in the first-century Mediterranean world, it played an important part in 
establishing social relations. The hierarchically based social structure fundamental 
to the Greco-Roman Empire was replicated countless times, on a smaller scale, in 
all sorts of personal relationships; religious groups, estates, workers' guilds, families 
and even friendship ties were organised hierarchically (see Stowers 1986:28). 
Patron-client conventions lay at the root of these relationships. 
The basic features of a patron-client relationship, as described by Elliott, include the 
following: 
29 Following the interpretive principle that models from contemporary anthropological studies 
should serve as heuristic tools for a cross-cultural interpretation of first-century Mediterranean world, 
patronage in contemporary Mediterranean societies fits perfectly. To this day Mediterranean societies 
are 'all undercapitalized agrarian civilizations. They are characterised by sharp social stratification and 
by both a relative and absolute scarcity of natural resources ... There is little social mobility. Power is 
highly concentrated in a few hands' (Gilmore 1982:192). Such conditions are conducive to patron-client 
ties. The parallels with the first-century Mediterranean world should be apparent. 
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It is a personal relationship of some duration entered into voluntarily 
by two or more persons of unequal status based on differences in 
social roles and access to power, and involves the reciprocal exchange 
of different kinds of 'goods and services' of value to each partner. In 
this relationship of binding and long-range character designed to 
advance the interests of both partners, a 'patron' is one who uses 
his/her influence to protect and assist some other person who 
becomes his/her 'client,' who in tum provides to this patron certain 
valued services. 
(1987:42) 
Patrons and clients exchanged favours; while patrons most often intervened on 
behalf of clients to provide physical protection, financial help, support in legal cases 
and the like; clients in return were obligated, inter alia, to enhance the 'prestige, 
reputation and honor of his patron in public and private life, favor him with daily 
early-morning salutations, support his political campaigns, supply him information, 
refuse to testify against him in the courts, and give constant public attestation and 
memorials of his patron's benefactions, generosity, and virtue' (Elliott 1987:43; and 
see Judge 1960a:6-7; Saldarini 1988:57-58; Malina 1988b:3-8). These patron-client 
relationships of which friendship was a part, formed the basis of political activities; 
access to power and security ran along the lines of a relationship with a social supe-
rior. 
Where central institutions in a society are weak and do not fulfil the basic needs of 
social inferiors, patron-client relations are used to remedy the inadequacies (see 
· Saldarini 1988:58; Malina 1988b:7-8). Given the social conditions of the first-century 
Mediterranean world, it is hardly surprising that patron-client relations played such 
a significant part not only in voluntary associations and Jewish synagogue com-
munities but also in the social interaction of the Pauline communities.30 
The quest for public honour in support of one's status will be discussed shortly. Suf-
fice it to say that patronage was encouraged and expected of the wealthy, to support 
the social structure; 'Giving money to others was not a mark of subordination but of 
superiority' (Judge 1982:26). The fact of patron-client relationships becomes all the 
more real when viewed in the light of the socio-economic structure of first-century 
societies, where the vast majority of people had virtually no access to power. 
Obviously the social conditions surrounding houses and social space have to be 
included. A patron-client relationship was an indispensable access route to honour 
and status. As will be indicated in the following chapter, patrons saw in Paul's house 
churches opportunities to extend their power bases. 
30 Without implying that patron-client relationship are always and everywhere the same, the basic 
· point holds that in each case the particular manifestation needs to be determined (see Gilmore 
1982:193). In cases where the evidence is insufficient, a guess along the lines of the typical probably has 
more value than ignoring the point altogether. 
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5.2 Honour and shame as pivotal values in the first-century world 
In an honour culture, honour plays a crucial part in establishing a sense of worth 
and social standing. It presumes that people are community-oriented, that com-
munity values and esteem are highly regarded (see Moxnes 1988b:62; Saldarini 
1988:56). In fact, people perceive themselves first and foremost as community mem-
bers who are in a relationship to other people and groups. One of the major dif-
ferences between twentieth-century people and first-century Mediterranean people 
lies in the honour system. Significant others have to recognise one's claim to honour, 
or the result is shame (see Moxnes 1988b:63). 
The personality structure which corresponds to honour and shame cultures is 
described as a dyadic personality (see Malina 1989: 128-131 ). While most Westerners 
are brought up as individuals, children in the first-century Mediterranean world 
were brought up to be primarily members of the community. While individualism 
was rare in that world, self-perception was very much determined by the perception 
of others (see Malina 1981:53-60). First-century people, as Malina points out, knew 
other people socially in terms of gender-based roles, in terms of the groups they 
were embedded in, and with constant regard to public awards of respect and honour 
(see 1989:127). 
These social networks, which form part of the landscape of socio-cultural interaction 
in Paul's world, all help to open the door to a world where the nature of Paul's con-
flict in Galatia can be described in terms relevant to his socio-cultural system. That 
Paul adhered to the conventions of honour and shame is convincingly argued by 
Moxnes (see 1988a, 1988b). 
6 THE NATURE OF TIIE PAULINE HOUSEHOID COMMUNITIES IN 
GAIATIA: A PROPOSAL 
There can be no doubt that valuable information and insights are gained by compar-
ing the Pauline communities to models from the environment. However, the social 
location of groups cannot be established either by accepting one model to the exclu-
sion of all others or by arguing the uniqueness of the Pauline communities.31 As a 
conclusion to this chapter it will suffice it to draw some of the loose ends together. 
31 It should be noted that, contrary to the conclusion that the Pauline communities were unique 
when compared to models from the environment, some scholars did propose alternative combinations. 
Wilkens suggests that the 'combination of "philosophical school" and "association" suited the Christian 
community remarkably well' (1971:287). Judge argues for a kind of 'national community' (1980:213) 
which is a combination of at least cultic, welfare and scholastic activities (see 196Qll:8). All these 
proposals have the same shortcoming: they ignore the fundamental issue of the social location of 
groups. The Pauline household communities did have features of voluntary (private) associations and 
'way of life' (philosophical) schools, but were not simply a combination of some of their special fea-
tures. 
207 
In the very first chapter (see § 3.2) it was stated that we are concerned with the 
social location of groups in the first-century Mediterranean world - not with the 
geographical location of the addressees ( EKKAflcri.cxu; i;Tl<;; lcxA.crr:ioo;;). Unless it can 
be argued that the specific geographical location will in any sense alter the picture 
presented, it is not essential to include it. In other words, unless it can be indicated 
that the specific geographical location of addressees has a bearing on or will alter 
the social location of groups in the first-century world, it is in a sense immaterial 
where they were located. As far as I can see, such evidence is not yet available. 
It is therefore assumed that, broadly speaking, those addressed in this letter shared 
the basic features of non-corporate groups in the agrarian society under Greco-
Roman rule. It is also assumed that the social location of groups, the socio-cultural 
codes and conventions associated with such groups, and the basic features operative 
in institutions such as the Pauline household communities were also present in the 
Galatian communities. It is assumed, furthermore, that the new understanding of 
first-century Judaism - together with the setting provided by the Jewish synagogue, 
which is taken as a subculture for the emergence of the Pauline communities (move-
ment) in general- also applies in this case. It goes without saying that these assump-
tions should be measured against those pointed out as tacitly assumed in the 
received view. 
The Galatian communities may be described as typical Pauline communities, if such 
a thing ever existed. Whether the EKKA.11cri.cxu; i;Tl<;; lcxA.cxi;i.cxc; were different 
household communities in the same city, or different ones in different cities, it does 
not really detract from the point that it is more plausible to proceed from the codes 
and conventions linked to the household setting than (as in the received view) from 
those operative in modern church settings. After all, the whole thrust of this study is 
to provide an alternative cypher key, consisting at the very least of a definite first-
century Mediterranean communicative context, for reading the letter to the 
Galatians. 
In a broader sense, the Pauline household communities were non-corporate groups. 
Such groups were a central feature of the first-century Mediterranean world and 
were constituted primarily on the basis of the household institution and the 
household communities assembled around a patron. As household institutions they 
formed the backbone of Greco-Roman social, cultural, economic and political life -
at least in so far as the household institution was, alongside the Roman Empire with 
its military politics, the major social force in that world. 
As non-corporate groups the Galatian household communities were probably con-
stituted under the supervision and protection of a patron and provided in a variety 
of social and economic needs. They provided salvation - that is, protection and 
relief from these needs. They ensured benefits for the clients who participated in the 
Galatian households and provided the setting in which patrons received honour. 
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The patron god was the Jewish God, and the patron religion of the Galatian 
household communities was a specific brand of Jewish messianic and apocalyptic 
thought. The Galatian household communities, in short, were particular configura-
tions of a variety of first-century Mediterranean social networks. The specific 
character of these communities will be discussed in the next chapter. Paul gained 
entry to these households in some way or another. From the point of view of the 
household institution he could have been nothing more than a client under the pro-
. tection and authority of the household patron. He was, however, involved in a more 
complicated network of social interaction in that he acted as a typical wandering 
philosopher, which added a second dimension to his social interaction in Galatia. 
He furthermore claimed divine authority in apparent disregard of other forms of 
authority, especially that of the household institution on which he depended. 
CHAPI'ER7 
.A FIRST-CENTURY MEDITERRANEAN COMMUNICATIVE CONTEXT 
AND TIIE CONFLICT IN GAIATIA: A QUESTION OF SOCIAL 
AUTHORITY 
To detect and understand religious phenomena in 
the ancient world it is necessary to analyse the 
totality of social and cultural phenomena and the 
manner in which symbols considered sacred 




It has been indicated in the first chapter of this study that conflict in Galatia (that is, 
the situation which caused Paul to write the letter) is a crucial element of the com-
municative context assumed when reading the letter. In view of the alternative com-
. municative context suggested thus far (that is, the alternative methodological and 
historical components) it is necessary to return to the issue of the conflict in Galatia. 
However, an attempt will now be made to understand the nature of the conflict and, 
consequently, the communicative context assumed when reading the letter in terms 
of the constructed first-century Mediterranean setting. 
Since particular socio-cultural codes and conventions regulate social interaction, it is 
assumed in this study that the best place to discover the nature of the conflict would 
be the household setting, together with the Jewish subculture in the first-century 
Mediterranean world. Paul's academic activities as a philosopher-like prophet took 
root within the broader setting provided by these two fields of research at the very 
least.1 Within that context, the proper codes and conventions for analysing the com-
munication and the reflected conflict may be looked for. 
It should be noted that the focus of this study will shift from a primary concern with 
the cause of the conflict to the issue which should be addressed first, namely the 
nature of the conflict in Galatia.2 In view of the first-century Mediterranean com-
1 It should again be kept in mind that the setting within which Paul operated was not divided in this 
artificial (analytical) way between his Jewish traditions and the conventions of the household institu-
tion. What is needed is, by way of imaginative construction, to visualise (with all its shortcomings) a 
possible configuration of the Pauline household communities in Galatia. 
2 This shift should be seen in the context of, and in contrast to, the received view on opponent 
hypot,heses, where the debate focuses on the cause of the conflict in Galatia. The nature thereof is, 
given the history-of-ideas approach and the received communicative context, generally taken for 
granted (see chapter 1). 
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municative context, as well as the methodological components argued in this study, 
·it is inevitable that the shift should have taken place. The communicative context 
suggested in this study provides room for redefining the conflict which was 
apparently the basic occasion of the letter. 
Thus, in this chapter an attempt will first of all be made to be more precise about 
the character of the Pauline household communities in Galatia. Secondly, the 
Diaspora Jewish subculture, as it probably existed in Paul's lifetime, will be sketched 
as a part of Paul's mental world. Thirdly, Paul's academic activities as a philosopher-
like prophet will be placed in perspective. Taking these points of view into account, 
the nature of the conflict in Galatia will be redefined as a socio-religious one. 
Finally, in view of the redefined nature of the conflict (using a few examples only 
from the letter to the Galatians), an indication will be given that some clues in the 
letter (when read in terms of this alternative cypher key) do indeed support the sug-
gestion of a socio-religious conflict. 
2 HOUSEHOID S1RUCTURES AND TIIE CHARACfER OF TIIE PAUUNE 
COMMUNITIES IN GALATIA 
·The previous two chapters dealt with the historical components of the cypher key -
that is, with the construction of a concrete communicative context for the com-
munication. The nature of the Pauline household communities has been identified, 
but we still need to be more precise as to the exact character of the Pauline con-
figuration of first-century Mediterranean non-corporate groups. 
2.1 The central role of household institutions in Paul's activities 
Household structures have been pointed out as central to voluntary associations and 
Jewish synagogues as well as philosophical schools. In fact, the household institution 
with its accompanying social conventions was identified as the central location of all 
these groups. But what about the Pauline communities? 
There is widespread agreement nowadays that the members of Pauline communities 
assembled in private homes. At least five times in Paul's letters specific households 
are designated by the phrase (or derivatives of it) tjl Kerr' otKov airt@v EKKAflO'i{x ( 1 
Cor 16:19). The other instances are Philemon 2, Romans 16:3 (only in a text-critical 
. variant, see Nestle-Aland26), Romans 16:5 and Colossians 4: 15 (if taken as authenti-
cally Pauline). Several other remarks indicate that Paul's congregations met in the 
home of a wealthy member of a community (e.g. Rm 16:3ft). That the followers of 
Jesus in the cities of the Greco-Roman Empire assembled in the houses of members 
from the earliest times is supported by evidence from Luke (e.g. Ac 2:46; 5:42; 
12:12). 
Paul furthermore mentions that he baptised the household of Stephen (1Cor1:16), 
which certainly implies that the whole household was converted to the religion 
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accepted by its head (1 Cor 16:15). Although Acts cannot be taken at face value, 
·Luke attributes to Paul as a typical missionary practice that he converted whole 
households (e.g. Acts lO:lff, 16:15ff, 31ff.; 17:6; 18:1-8). Given the basic features of 
the first-century religious structure as well as the central position of households in 
the Greco-Roman social structure, the following comment by Judge makes perfect 
sense: 
Not only was the conversion of a household the natural or even the 
necessary way of establishing the new cult in unfamiliar surroundings, 
but the household remained the soundest basis for the meeting of 
Christians. 
(1960h:36) 
The household setting, one might say, was basic to the social fabric of the expansion 
of the Pauline communities and was also the centre of assembly and worship within 
the local group (see White 1990:107). 
Taken together, all the evidence suggests that the household structure provided the 
basic social setting both for the expansion and for the assembly of the Pauline com-
munities in the cities of the Greco-Roman Empire (see also Banks 1980:33-42; Mal-
herbe 1983:60-70; Meeks 1983:75; Stowers 1984:68; White 1987C:215; 1990:103). 
·Existing households served as nuclei for the expansion of the movement as well as 
for the assembly of these communities. 
The social conditions under which the majority became members of the Pauline 
communities have far-reaching consequences for our estimate of the character of 
these communities. Our current focus of interest is the role and relevance of belief 
systems and the authority structures in Paul's world. 
Although it is often mentioned, the implications are seldom spelled out of the fact 
that whole households were converted. It clearly reflects, even in the Pauline com-
munities, the practice of the time - that the religious choice of the paterfamilias was 
genuinely followed by the household. Once the individualistic lenses of modern 
society are replaced by a community-oriented point of view, the conversion of 
households suggests that the social convention of following the choice of one's 
household patron was more important than an individual's change of allegiance with 
regard to his or her belief system. If this was the case, it can be stated with a certain 
degree of certainty that the members of Pauline household communities were not 
just converted to a belief system but were recruited to a definite socio-religious 
network Embeddedness into the social network of a household community 
apparently weighed more heavily than individual (religious) preferences. 
Generally speaking, becoming a member of a parish nowadays would not decide 
one's political affiliation, economic welfare and the primary education of one's chil-
dren. In Paul's world the grip of household structures and conventions on the parti-
cipating members was much stronger. In view of all this, it is not at all far-fetched to 
say that acceptance of the gospel was very often the consequence and not the 
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precondition of entering a community. Accepting or rejecting Paul's gospel was very 
much a community affair, and one for which we should develop some sensitivity. It 
resulted in inclusion or exclusion from community affairs and could even be dis-
astrous if it disrupted the social order. Perhaps the emphasis on social arrangements 
·in Paul's letter reflects something of the precarious nature of their social networks. 
The benefits of a household religion in assuring salvation, and protection from and 
access to power, should be kept in mind as central values in the socio-religious 
system of the first-century world. Religion as a means to power, as discussed in a 
previous chapter (chapter 5 § 5.4), needs to be included in our estimate of the role 
of belief systems in that world. This will shortly be linked to the cultural codes and 
conventions pertaining to Paul's scribal culture. 
2.2 Paul and patronage: a reversal of conventions? 
The possible influence of patron-client relationships in the Pauline communities can 
be distinguished on at least two levels. The first is the relationship between Paul and 
the household patrons who extended hospitality to him or his co-workers. The sec-
ond is the patron-client relationships as one of the basic social conventions con-
tributing to the household setting. 
As many as forty persons have been identified by Judge as actually having sponsored 
Paul's activities, or as having been prepared to do so had the occasion arisen (see 
Judge 1961:129-130). Paul supported especially the system of patronage in that it 
provided a platform for his preaching (missionary) activities. Judge argues that 
'Christianity was a movement sponsored by local patrons to their social dependents' 
(1960a:8); Paul depended on them privately rather than upon the church as an 
organised group to sponsor him (see Judge 1961:130). 
The exact nature of Paul's relationship to his hosts is difficult to determine.3 The 
important point to grasp is that the conventions of patronage (see Marshall 
1987a:144), which implied benefits and obligations on Paul's part, were fundamental 
to his relationships with household patrons. On the one hand Paul on occasion 
acknowledges his debt to his hosts for the lengths to which they went in order to 
extend hospitality to him (e.g. Rm 16:4; Phlp 2:25-30). On the other hand, the 
notion of reciprocity is at stake in his request to Philemon to accept his runaway 
slave Onesimus. Paul's appeal is based on Philemon's obligation (that of a 
household patron) towards him, Paul (v 19). 
3 Marshall suggests that 'patronal friendship' as a particular expression of the patronage system is 
the most appropriate social context for understanding Paul's relationship to the household patrons (see 
19878 :145). It should be remembered that the conventions of patronage applied to relationships 
between equals and unequals (see chapter 6 § 4.2; 5.1). 
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Generally speaking, Paul deliberately entrusted himself to the patronage of social 
equals or superiors (see Marshall 1987a:145) in accepting household hospitality 
from them. While it is difficult to know how these relationships started,4 it is not 
unlikely that Paul used the workshop setting as his point of contact when entering a 
new city. That he initially stayed at an inn or public place when entering a city is 
possible (see Hock 1980:29). It seems likely, as Hock (see 1980) argues, that he 
sometimes followed the practice of making contact with fellow artisans in the same 
craft and even found lodgings with them (e.g. Ac 18:3). As against the idea that he 
. went to the local synagogue, the argument runs that wherever he went - whether to 
the household of a Jew or to a Gentile who served as a patron - he entered into a 
social relationship. He gained entry not by virtue of membership credentials (in 
other words, as a Jew), but by virtue of the credentials gained by entrusting himself 
as a client (and later as a friend) to a local patron. 
An important feature is the mutual responsibilities and obligations created by the 
patron-client relationship as a reciprocal relationship. If Paul was involved with the 
communities in Galatia in such a way, it is reasonable to assume that the basis of 
their interaction was patron-client relationships that carried obligations. Judge's 
summary is to the point: 
I think it would be fair to say that the persons in the Greek cities who 
protected him [Paul] and promoted his activities were from the social 
point of view occupying positions of elevated status and conferring 
benefits on Paul and upon the others who came to his meetings that 
should have created obligations. 
(1974:196) 
In acting as patrons who met Paul with household hospitality, they did indeed obtain 
·a position of status and superiority over Paul. He, on the other hand, was placed in a 
subordinate position and left with the obligation to honour his benefactors. Some 
scholars have drawn attention to the possibility that the Pauline communities pro-
vided yet another social platform for household patrons to extend their social bases. 
The particular nature of the Pauline household communities allowed access to 
power and status for people who would otherwise not have had it (e.g. Meeks 
1983:73). While such patrons extended hospitality, they did so for a prize - a reward 
of honour. 
That the household patrons had authority over the Pauline communities - even in 
the eyes of Paul - is confirmed by Paul's own admonitions. In commending 
Stephanas he urged the community to subject themselves to Stephanas's authority (1 
Cor 16:15-16; and see 1Ts5:12-13). Taken in conjunction with the emphasis in his 
letters on other relationships, it might provide a clue as to the constant threat of dis-
ruption of the social order and authority structures. 
4 This issue will be discussed soon (see§ 4.1). Suffice it to say that our estimate of Paul's way of 
·entering household communities should also conform to typical household conventions. 
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One indication in the letter to the Galatians of the relationship between Paul and 
the Galatians, interestingly enough, is a confirmation that they extended a hand of 
friendship to him when he first came to them in his illness (Gl 4:13-15). They nei-
. ther despised ( €~ou0€VEtV) nor rejected ( EKITTUElV) him. Both terms have 
demonological connotations (see Betz 1979:225). On the contrary, they accepted 
him as a messenger of God and were willing to pluck out their eyes and give them to 
Paul (Gl 4:14-15).5 Their friendship, however, has turned into enmity (see Marshall 
1987a: 154-155). 
Given these clues, it may be concluded at the least that a patronal relationship of 
some kind existed on account of their hospitality towards Paul and he must have 
been indebted to them. A certain mutuality of attitudes must have accompanied this 
relationship. Is it possible that he did not respond to their gratitude with honour? 
A second set of clues to Paul's relationship with household patrons is very interest-
ing in this regard; that is, the strange and idiosyncratic way in which Paul refers to 
the household patrons. As a rule Paul underplayed the authority of the household 
patrons. He used terms deliberately drawn from the language of servitude and sub-
ordination rather than from that of patronage when referring to the household 
patrons (see Judge 1974:196-197; Meeks 1983:79-80). He refers to them as co-
workers, but more often as slaves or co-slaves or even servants (see Marshall 
· 1987a:133 for detail). 
2.3 Some concluding remarks on the character of the Pauline household com-
munities 
In view of Paul's idiosyncratic terminology in describing his hosts (see Judge 
1974:196), a second sphere of his cultural system needs to be taken into account in 
constructing his communicative contexts - that is, the Jewish subculture and specifi-
cally Paul's academic activities as a philosopher-like prophet. He acted in 2.n 
idiosyncratic way, and part of the challenge of determining the communicative con-
text of the letter to the Galatians would be to combine the insights from the dif-
ferent spheres of first-century Mediterranean cultural systems. Given the different 
sets -of social networks and the social fabric in which the household communities 
developed, a great deal of tension could easily develop with regard to authority -
especially if the social conventions of that fabric were disrupted. As will be argued 
shortly, Paul's idiosyncratic way of referring to the household patrons is not, to my 
mind, a matter of a reversal of conventions, but was typical of Paul's apocalyptic and 
charismatic orientation (see furthermore§ 4). 
5 Marshall argues that the acr8E:v€tcX does not simply signify a physical illness but alludes to Paul's 
status - that is, a 'socially debilitating disease' (19878:153). For a discussion of some of these issues in 
more detail, see § 5.4.3. 
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Since Paul's activities were carried out under the umbrella of some kind of social 
organisation and socio-cultural conventions, the household setting appears to be the 
main contender. This institution, with its values and conventions, should be seen in 
contrast to the customary notion of a Christian community or congregation (in the 
modern sense) in each city where he operated.6 In view of the location of 
households in the first-century Mediterranean social networks (which were funda-
mental to both the expansion and the assembly of the Pauline communities), it is 
difficult to see what kind of social entity is implied by these descriptions. Perhaps 
these concepts are used in an attempt (consciously or unconsciously) to avoid taking 
.into account the influence of household conventions on Paul's activities.7 
The unique-syndrome (see chapter 6 § 2.1) is widespread when it comes to Paul and 
the Pauline communities.8 Banks (see 1980:49-50) maintains that Paul had a 
'decided advantage' over his first-century competitors. Psychologically and socially 
he combined three elements - voluntary associations, household characteristics, and 
supranational and supratemporal elements - into a distinctive institution.9 The tacit 
assumption, clearly, is that these aspects were separated in other groups. What has 
not yet been mentioned is the biased ideological evaluation by New Testament 
scholars (which has been traditional for a long time) as expressed, for example, by 
Banks: 'the ekklesia is not merely a human association, a gathering of like-minded 
individuals for a religious purpose, but a divinely-created affair' (1980:37).10 
6 Although Theillen is well informed about the household setting of Paul's activities, he postulates 
such a vague (Christian) community or congregation in Corinth, for example (see 1982:54ft). This 
Christian congregation was furthermore divided into several groups. Holmberg is even more explicit: 
'Through Paul every local church has a direct relation to the whole Church and to salvation-history and 
·is incorporated into a movement with universal dimensions' (Holmberg 1978:72). The difficulty of pic-
turing the Pauline groups is also seen in Betz's rather vague description of the Galatian communities as 
'clusters of Christian congregations' (1976:102). These are but three examples of the received view 
which describes the location of the Pauline communities in such unhistorical terms. 
7 Unlike Theillen, who maintains that the overarching bond was membership of the congregation or 
Christian community in a city such as Corinth (see 1982:56), I think that different house community 
cells were more loosely linked (see White 1990:105). That is to say, given their embeddedness in social 
networks, different household communities existed first and foremost within the confines of these 
networks. Thus Paul's converts were members of a specific socio-cultural unit and not of the Christian 
community in, for example, Corinth or one of the cities in Galatia. 
8 It should come as no surprise that scholars very often claim the same uniqueness for the Jewish 
synagogue. Cohen, for example, maintains: 'In their philosophical schools, the Greeks and Romans 
studied the definition of virtue and the knowledge of their gods; in their temples, they offered prayers 
on various occasions. They had, however, no institution that approximated the synagogue. Many 
modern writers ... have observed the uniqueness of the synagogue ... .' (1981>:160). 
9 Meeks maintains that the notion of a 'universal people of God' (1983:108) which came from 
Judaism, distinguished the Pauline communities from other clubs and cults. 
lO If we want to be fair to the historical and social realities of Paul's world we should at least avoid 
such biased, if not outright faulty, arguments. Note Banks's conclusion: 'Only Paul's understanding of 
ekklesia embraces all three ideas of community to which people gave their commitment in the ancient 
world at the time' (1980:49). 
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It should, however, be noted that the arguments as to the uniqueness of the Pauline 
communities are based on dissimilarities which do not touch the constitution 
(nature) of any of these groups. The recognition of the social location of groups (see 
chapter 5 § 2; chapter 6 § 2.2) gives us, at the very least, an opportunity to argue a 
definite set of criteria in terms of which group formation and interaction in the first-
century Mediterranean world can be dealt with. Assuming the existence of non-
corporate groups is one way of limiting wild (or nonhistorical) guesses as to what 
constituted the Pauline groups. If my arguments on these issues are valid, then the 
'unique' tag only fits the specific character of Pauline household communities and 
not their constitution (nature) as groups. 
One example will suffice to make it clear that, apart from scholarly prejudices, there 
are hardly sufficient reasons for holding onto the notion of the uniqueness of the 
Pauline communities. 
Judge maintains that the Christians were unlike other associations drawn from the 
·broad spectrum of social stratification. Other associations 'were generally socially 
and economically as homogeneous as possible' (196Qh:60; and see Meeks 1983:79). 
If they were all configurations of the household setting, then both could include 
members from a broad spectrum of the social stratification. Conversely, a specific 
Pauline household community could just as easily have been formed around a par-
ticular occupational group and Jhus qualify as socially and economically 
homogeneous. This could have been the case with the household community in the 
home of Aquila and Prisca, who were also tentmakers (see 1 Cor 16:19; Rm 16:3-5; 
Ac 18:2-3). Such a household community could easily have included clients who 
worked as day labourers in their workshop, even slept in the workshop, and were in 
that way part of the household. 
In view of the foregoing discussion, the received communicative context assumed in 
most opponent hypothesis can hardly be maintained. The apparent social conditions 
and cultural setting of the Pauline communities present us, in fact, with a totally dif-
ferent set of historical components to be taken into consideration when dealing with 
Paul. 
3 FIRST-CENTURY DIASPORA JUDAISM ANDTIIE HOUSEHOID SET-
TING 
While there hardly can be any doubt that the household setting was central to both 
the expansion and the assembly of Pauline communities in the cities of the Greco-
Roman Empire, the precise configuration of Pauline household communities in 
these cities still needs some refinement. At the very least, the backdrop of the 
Jewish subculture, together with the preaching (academic) activities of Paul in the 
context of the urban centres of the agrarian and oral worlds where religious 
activities were substantively embedded in the household setting, needs to be taken 
into account when considering Paul's communicative context in Galatia. 
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The word backdrop is used not in the traditional sense of background knowledge but 
rather in the sense that a clear picture of Jewish activities in the Diaspora will help 
us to grasp what Paul was up to. Several clues may be garnered from the practices of 
other Jewish groups in the Diaspora for a proper understanding of Paul's com-
municative context. 
While the new understanding of first-century Judaism did a great deal to bring into 
focus the subculture of first-century Judaism,11 an important link still needs to be 
made: that between the new understanding of first-century Judaism (especially 
Jewish identity markers) and the Jewish synagogue as the social setting where 
Judaism took root. To indicate the direction in which research should develop (on 
. the issues of Jewishness, who was a Jew, and circumcision as an identity marker in 
Paul's letter to the Galatians), it is necessary to reopen the file on these aspects as 
they functioned in first-century Diaspora Judaism. 
If the Jewish synagogue was the pivot of Jewish community life in the Diaspora, then 
it certainly was the place where Judaism took root, where identity markers func-
tioned and where Jewishness was determined and defined. The first issue to be 
examined is that of membership of Judaism. 
3.1 Membership of first-century Judaism: conversion or recruitment? 
The special case of conversion and excommunication in first-century Judaism 
provides an excellent opportunity to examine some components present in the con-
stitution, membership and self-definition of Jewish communities. 
The concept conversion can be used in at least two different ways. It can be defined 
as the reorientation of the individual soul from an earlier form of piety to another, 
as is the case in prophetic religions (see Nock 1952:7). This may be referred to as 
. conversion in a narrower sense, namely as an 'individualistic psychological choice 
and/or transaction between religious groups' (Malina 1986b:99). However, this 
definition reflects a modern cultural prejudice expressed in the individualistic choice 
resulting from cognitive or psychological factors, where ultimately a change of 
allegiance with regard to belief system or doctrinal matters is at stake.12 In a broader 
11 An important reservation has, however, been spelled out: the new understanding still deals with 
matters such as identity markers, circumcision, and Jewishness in isolation from the concrete social 
conditions in the first-century world (see chapter 4 § 4.4). That is to say, first-century Judaism is 
primarily dealt with as an entity in itself without linking this entity to the social and historical conditions 
of the first-century world - very much the same condition that governs assumptions on the Christian 
community. 
12 This point is underscored by research into the characteristics of oral cultures. Botha argues that 
'a society with a heavy oral residue will lack the experience of "religious conversion"' (19908:40). This is 
not surprising, since (as has been argued) the means of controlling dogmatic or doctrinal aspects of a 
belief system are absent in predominantly oral (scribal) cultures. Indeed, it was often impossible or 
irrelevant (see chapter 5 § 4). The fact that the conditions in early Christianity and Judaism have 
changed from the second and especially from the fourth centuries onwards can be ascribed to a variety 
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sense conversion can refer to a change of worlds.13 In this sense it is perhaps more 
useful in dealing with first-century phenomena. 
In first-century Mediterranean religion, however, it does not make sense to talk 
about conversion in the sense of someone turning on the basis of a rational decision 
to embrace a certain creed, doctrine or way of life (see Wilken 1984:64). The 
rationale for crossing from one religion to another, especially cross-ethnic conver-
sion, would include several factors apart from particular beliefs (see Malina 
1986b:95). In fact, conversion was often closely linked to demonstrations of super-
· natural power to bestow benefits (that is, salvation) on the convert (see MacMullen 
1984:4; 123 n 10). A change of religion resulted from other factors. It can hardly be 
expressed more eloquently than it is by Malina when he says that conversion in the 
first-century Mediterranean world 
resulted from the operation of the system of kinship (e.g. marriage, 
adoption, remarriage, householding, slaveholding) and fictive kinship 
(e.g. friendship, group affiliation, voluntary association groups, 
patronage) rather than through individualistic psychological choice 
and/ or transactions between religious groups. 
(1986b:99) 
In terms of the argument that religion in the first-century world was basically a sub-
stantive type of religion embedded in kinship (and polity) relations, a change of reli-
gi.ous allegiance involved and presupposed these (kinship or polity) social networks. 
The common custom of household conversions is a case in point. MacMullen (see 
1984:5) points out that in terms of the modern meanings of the concept conversion, 
few members of the Jesus movement in Paul's area were really converted. Some of 
the Pauline followers who became members of households 'were not really con-
. verted at all'; as a matter of fact, 'in the whole early church, more than a trivial por-
tion at any given moment can have been Christian only in name' (1984:107). 
Referring to first-century Judaism, Cohen mentions different ways in which Gentiles 
could become members of the Jewish community: conversion of a household, the 
acquisition of a Gentile slave by a Jew, conversion for the sake of marriage and by 
intermarriage. Regarding the conversion of a household, he maintains that it can be 
assumed that 
involuntary members of the household ( oikia) had substantially less 
enthusiasm, at least at first, for the new religion than did the chieftain 
of factors. Not the least would be the development of different canons as well as the development (at 
least in Christian circles) of particular dogmas and the necessary ecclesiastical structure to administer 
dogma and doctrine (see Frend 1979). 
13 This is the sense in which conversion is used by Berger and Ludemann. I have discussed their 
model of conversion in another study (see Craffert 1989). It was argued that in the sense of a change of 
worlds it is quite appropriate to refer to Paul's Damascus experience as a conversion experience. 
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who initiated the conversion, but all alike became members of the 
new community. 
(Cohen 1989:24) 
First-century people, as I have said, were not converted to a belief system only but 
were recruited into a socio-religious network. It should be realised to what extent 
Jewish groups were similar in this regard to other religious groups in the first-
century world. Religion was embedded in prior social and kinship structures which 
precluded the possibility of a quick change of denomination, so to speak. 
Falling out is arguably no less bound up with social factors. In Judaism, neither 
heresy nor apostasy in itself could lose people their status as Jews; not even for 'the 
most heinous offences against Jewish law and doctrine' (Schiffman 1981:147). Har-
. vey supports this by arguing that 'a Jew was free to understand the Old Testament as 
he wished' (1968:327). Aune (see 1976:5) points out that deviation in matters of 
ritual practice and ethical behaviour were the only known causes for expulsion from 
Judaism. This tendency clearly corresponds to the nature of religion in the first-
century Mediterranean world as well as the attitudes in a scribal culture, where doc-
trine and dogma were only marginally important. 
Despite all attempts to link the idea of conversion and excommunication exclusively 
to dogmatic or doctrinal matters, it simply will not do. Something more is needed, 
and that something more is to be sought in the socio-cultural setting within which 
these dogmatic or doctrinal disputes took place. 
32 Merging the new understanding and the synagogue setting of first-century 
Judaism 
The new understanding of first-century Judaism (that is, rejection of the notion of a 
normative Judaism discussed in chapter 4) can be pressed a few steps further by 
bringing into play the synagogue setting discussed in the previous chapter. The lack 
.of a unified belief system in Judaism during Paul's lifetime (chapter 4 § 4.4) finds 
support in the alternative view of Jewish synagogues which is starting to emerge in 
scholarly circles (see chapter 6 § 3.3.2). If a common denominator can be identified, 
it is the fact that there was no worldwide Judaism with a universally accepted mem-
bership. Both symbolically and organisationally, a variety of Judaisms can be 
identified, all of them subject to local conditions. 
Thus, contrary to the assumptions in Pauline research (as found, for example, in the 
argument that Paul, by virtue of being a Jew, had the right to appear and speak in 
synagogue assemblies in the cities where he happened to travel), no worldwide 
Judaism with a universally accepted membership existed. Two features of Jewish 
synagogues, already discussed, support this viewpoint. 
Firstly, if Jewish synagogues were basically formed around the household institution 
of a wealthy (Jewish) patron, then entry into a synagogue (not to speak of member-
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ship) depended largely on social structures. Secondly, the existence of different 
synagogues in the same city, constituted on the basis of social stratification, suggests 
that membership was not an open affair but was decided along the lines of social 
status and stratification. If this was the case, then membership of Jewish com-
munities was very much a social affair. Taking into account, furthermore, the variety 
of definitions of a Jew already pointed out (see chapter 4 § 4.4.1) as well as the vari-
ety of Judaisms in the first-century world, it becomes all the more likely that mem-
bership of Judaisms in the Diaspora was locally determined. 
If that was the case, as I think it may have been, then Jewish identity markers, tradi-
tions and symbols did not serve to constitute Jewish synagogues communities but 
were afterwards applied or called on as labels for the purpose of self-definition.14 
It would be fair to say that Judaisms in the Jewish Diaspora existed by virtue of the 
synagogue institution. At an organisational level, local conditions and particular 
social circumstances gave birth to Jewish synagogue communities which are to be 
·seen as the bedrock where Jewish symbols and traditions were applied, adopted and 
adapted. If so, then a reversal of membership conditions as well as the role of 
identity markers can be put to test, since these aspects would then have been 
determined by being part of a community - that is, a household community. 
If this reversal of conditions for membership is trustworthy, it may prove a sig-
nificant factor in our estimate of Paul's exposition of matters of belief. While it is 
impossible to discuss in full the results on first-century Judaisms of the overlapping 
and merging of these two planes, it constitutes sufficient reason to explore it as a 
possible setting for the one exemplar of Judaism that concerns us here: the Pauline 
household communities. The main point is that Paul's activities in a broad sense 
(such as preaching, teaching, letter-writing) should be interpreted not against the 
background of these activities in first-century Judaisms but in terms thereof. Thus 
the character of Paul's academic activities can, from the point of view of this exposi-
tion, be placed in some sort of perspective as typical of his world. 
If we thus merge the perspectives of the new understanding of first-century Judaism 
and the social matrix of Diaspora Judaism, it arguably shifts the battlefield of dis-
pute in respect of several generally approved assumptions in Pauline studies. Some 
suggestions will now be highlighted. 
14 After formulating this thesis I discovered that Borgen argues along the very same lines with 
regard to Philo and Hillel: 'Philo's and Hillel's understanding has thus been that bodily circumcision 
was not the requirement for entering the Jewish community, but was one of the commandments which 
they had to obey after having received the status as a Jew' (1983:67). This reflects the same reversal of 
conditions that I have in mind (see also Gilbert 1991). 
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33 A different role for Jewish identity markeTSy especially circumcision 
It is not uncommon in New Testament studies to learn that in the first-century world 
the boundaries of the law were the boundaries of Judaism (see for example Theillen 
· 1982:35), or that circumcision15 was the central identity marker distinguishing Jews 
from non-Jews (see chapter 4 § 4.4.3). In opponent hypotheses one often hears that 
in giving up circumcision in particular, Paul gave up the most effective way in which 
the Jewish community had maintained its separate identity in the pagan world (see 
Meeks 1983:97). That is generally recognised as the practical point at issue in 
Galatia. The assumption, clearly, is that adherence to the law, or circumcision, as 
identity markers functioned somewhat like a universal membership ticket which 
ensured worldwide or universal entry into and membership of Judaism. In view of 
the merging of perspectives, however, the way in which identity markers functioned 
should be reconsidered. 
Given the social conditions under which Jewish synagogue communities were con-
stituted, it seems likely that identity markers were applied subsequently as a label 
rather than as identity tickets which ensured entrance. Although nowadays circumci-
sion is widely regarded as the sign of a Jew, it was not in itself sufficient to ensure 
entrance and membership - neither to a particular Jewish synagogue community nor 
to a worldwide movement. Circumcision was not a worldwide mark of membership 
of Judaism, but it was acknowledged worldwide as an identity marker in Judaism. 
Thus it was universally recognised as an identity marker, but it did not secure mem-
bership all over the first-century Mediterranean world. 
If this is so, it explains the diverse ways in which different Jewish groups in the first-
century world invoked the traditions, symbols and identity markers of the Jahweh 
religion, especially circumcision, as label for their own self-definition. As in the case 
of synagogue architecture and social organisation, local conditions contributed 
greatly to the adaptation of tra.ditions and identity markers within particular com-
munities. Given the local conditions together with the absence of a controlling body, 
and taking into account the predominantly oral culture, a variegated interpretation 
of the symbols and traditions of Israel is hardly surprising. 
That Paul could claim to (re)present the true Israel (e.g. GI 3:21-29), without circum-
cision as an identity marker, was different but not new - different in the selfsame 
sense in which some of his contemporaries interpreted the Jewish symbols and tradi-
tions for their own advantage (see also Gilbert 1991:303-305), but not new in the 
sense of a breaking away from Judaism(s). This happened, firstly, because there was 
. as yet no normative Judaism and consequently no uniform identity marker such as 
15 It goes without saying that the section on circumcision in chapter 4 is especially applicable to this 
discussion. All the arguments and evidence for the variety of views on circumcision will not be 
repeated. 
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circumcision (the new understanding of Judaism has already provided this insight). 
Secondly, given the social organisation of Jewish communities as household 
synagogues, there could have been no worldwide membership of Judaism. 
In view of this suggestion the issue of circumcision, which in all probability was a 
bone of contention in Galatia (or part of it), takes on a totally different status. Per-
haps the dispute about circumcision in Galatians (see 2:3-10; 5:2-12; 6:12-16) should 
be reinterpreted as a means used in the conflict and not an end in itself. Paul, on 
this view, was not rejecting Judaism per se and neither was he discussing circumci-
sion as such. Indeed, in view of the overall function of circumcision within the set-
ting of household communities, Paul's discussion of it should be seen as part of his 
way of expressing a conflict that existed on a social issue.16 
3.4 Jewishness and who was a Jew 
. Generally speaking, to say that membership of first-century Judaism was open to all 
Jews is stating the obvious. It should be admitted that in theory membership was 
open to all Jews - as was the case with other voluntary associations and mystery 
cults where initiation was theoretically open to all (see Tidball 1983:87). However, 
the real issue turned out to be: who was a Jew? Who possessed the required creden-
tials which, according to the above argument did not consist of a worldwide 
accepted membership ticket but was socially determined? 
It has already been indicated (see chapter 4 § 4.4.1) that Jewishness and the ques-
tion, who was a Jew? were (on account of the great variety of definitions) situa-
tionally and locally determined - something not at all surprising in view of the basic 
features of the first-century agrarian cultural system. Prior to the process of rab-
binisation, the oral nature of first-century culture - together with the features of the 
social networks - contributed to this state of affairs, where a fixed or normative 
definition could not be propagated. 
This insight can be stretched even further. First-century Judaisms were not much 
concerned with a definition applicable to all Jews. Claims to uniqueness and claims 
·to absolute truth should all be seen within the framework of the nature of Jewish 
synagogue communities (see also the notion of divine revelations, to be discussed 
shortly). In the absence of ways and means to support a claim such as 'the worldwide 
people of God', or 'a universal fraternity', such claims should be evaluated for what 
they are worth- given the factual situation in first-century Judaism.17 
16 Perhaps circumcision (as well as other Jewish identity markers) should furthermore be examined 
as a token in a magico-religious sense. 
17 Where ways and means exist (such as a controlling body, international communication lines, the 
mentality of a nation state, social structures) to support the idea of a worldwide movement with a 
universal membership, the claim 'a worldwide people of God' seems quite common. Without such sup-
port, however, it should be read as nothing more than religious legitimation in terms of a very old 
Jewish tradition. 
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Since different societies lived, in a sense, in different worlds (cities were, in a sense, 
worlds apart) they were for a large part content to live with the idea that their inter-
pretation and application of the tradition was normative. Prior to the development 
of a unifying and controlling body, each community could believe its definition to be 
normative. In fact, outsiders - not only in Judaism but in the first-century Mediter-
ranean world in general -were treated accordingly. 
In view of these developments, the assumption that Paul had the right to propagate 
his message in the synagogue needs to be reconsidered. An alternative criterion -
the possession of the appropriate social credentials - would allow entry and 
eventually membership.18 The argument that God-fearers would easily have 
changed their allegiance from the Jewish synagogue to Paul is well known but 
equally improbable. People who were or became members of a household com-
munity were connected by a variety of cultural strings - they were partners in a com-
munity. If this is taken into account when dealing with the notion of God-fearers, 
Kraabel's argument becomes all the more convincing (see chapter 4 § 4.4.2). 
It should be obvious that a rather different picture of the Jewish subculture in Paul's 
time is emerging (as opposed to the received view). While it is not the object of this 
study to reread the letter to the Galatians in terms of the alternative cypher key (but 
only to present such a key), it goes without saying that several new vistas are opened 
up by this perspective on first-century Judaism. 
4 PAUL'S RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES IN GAL-\TIA: TIIE PROPAGANDA OF A 
DIVINEMAN 
Although proportionally much better informed about Paul's academic activities, the 
warning was expressed that the tail should not wag the dog. Paul's academic and 
religious sides should therefore also be seen as part of the first-century religious fab-
ric. Two aspects only will be touched on: Paul's missionary practice, and the letter to 
the Galatians as an instance of religious propaganda. Both help to provide a more 
authentically first-century communicative context for the interpretation of the letter. 
4.1 Paul's missionary practice: a man of magic and miracle 
The questions concerning the formative force of the Pauline household communities 
and what kept them together have been partly answered by postulating the 
household setting. However, an important facet of Paul's missionary practice (which 
18 The point is that it was not impossible for Paul to have preached in synagogues, but then such 
activities were subject to the conventions operative in the patronage relationships implied by such an 
invitation. It is, for example, possible that Crispus (the patron of a synagogue in Corinth - see Ac 18:7-
8) provided Paul with such an opportunity. 
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is closely linked to the general features of first-century religion) needs to be added 
to the equation if we are to arrive at a better understanding of the academic 
activities reported in Paul's letters. 
The all-pervasive presence of magic and miracles19 in the first-century religious 
world has already been pointed out (see chapter 5 § 5.4). Indeed Georgi argues that 
wandering preachers who propagated their various schemes of salvation in the city 
streets and marketplaces of the Greco-Roman Empire set out to demonstrate the 
exceptional character of their messages by exceptional means (see 1971:124-125). 
·They sought to attract the attention of their audiences by means of miraculous 
deeds and forceful speech (see Fiorenza 1976h:10). A rather lengthy quote from 
Georgi will press the point home: 
The divine power exhibited in the performance of the messenger had 
to extend clearly into the realm of the supernatural, in knowledge of 
nature and the universe and in supreme mastery over the forces at 
work in these fields. Only in this way could the offer made by the par-
ticular form of propaganda carry any conviction, the offer of this par-
ticular scheme of salvation to change human fortune to eternal bless-
ing, peace, and well-being. So the missionaries tended, because of 
their profession, to become 'god-men'. 
(1971:125) 
A tradition widely acknowledged is that a truly wise man (god-man) 'was a divine 
man whose wisdom was proved by his miraculous powers' (Smith 1978a:344). Magic 
was not only widely practiced on all levels of first-century society, it was also widely 
believed to be effective (see Smith 1980:241). 
So what do we learn about Paul? It is not impossible, given the general features of 
·religion in Paul's world, that he gained entry to household patrons by means of 
miracles or other pneumatic activities. In a world with a high demand for salvation, 
where an honourable man was continuously in search of people who had access to 
power (see chapter 5 § 5.4), Paul's attributes as performer of healing miracles (2 
Cor 12:12; Rm 15:19; Gl 3:5), his claims to gifts of prophecy (1 Ts 3:4; 1Cor15:51) 
and his power of glossolalia (1 Cor 14:18) were certainly impressive recommenda-
tions. As a matter of fact, Paul admits that he relied on signs, marvels, and miracles 
(see 2 Cor 12:12; 1 Cor 2:4) and 'not ... his skills as a preacher' to convince people 
(see Smith 1980:249). The world of the magical power of words (see Carney 
1975:110, 112, 126), magic, curses and Evil Eye accusations imply a magico-religious 
world-view (see Elliott 1990a:263) in which access to power and protection against 
threats were considered important. (It will shortly be argued that Paul did indeed 
19 Since it is very difficult to distinguish the category of miracle from that of magic in ancient litera-
ture (see Fiorenza 1976b:12; Aune 1980:1521), no serious differences should be read into the expression 
magic and miracle as used here. According to Aune's definition (see 1980:1518) of magic accepted in 
this study (see chapter 5 § 5.4), magic typically has to do with magical practices or miracles such as 
. healing, protection, power over demons and the like. 
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believe in and even practised magic as a way to power; see§ 5.4.3). The goals of 
magic and religion in the Greco-Roman world were very similar 'as providing pro-
tection, healing, success and knowledge for magical practitioners and their clients, 
and harm for their opponents' (Aune 1980:1518). 
It is furthermore interesting that the traditions in Luke's Acts portray Paul as a 'vi-
sionary, charismatic preacher, healer and miracle worker' (Jervell 1984C:71; see also 
Fiorenza 1976h:8-20). Even the Pauline worship as reflected in his letters, argues 
Smith (see 1980), suggests features of magical rites. 
In view of the evidence on missionary practices and the traditions regarding Paul's 
missionary activities it seems reasonable to conclude that one factor (possibly the 
major one) in the formation of Pauline household communities was Paul's practice 
of magic and his performance of miracles (accompanied by powerful oratory and 
even glossolalia). 
Given the oral nature of Paul's world, it was argued (see chapter 5 § 4.3) that his 
social standing and honour underwrote the authority of his message. If the present 
argument is sound, it supports that view that Paul's gospel was subject to his honour 
and authority. In view of his missionary practices it may be suggested that Paul's 
authority was closely linked to his magical and miracle activities. In other words, his 
standing among the Galatians was fundamentally determined by (among other 
social conventions) his position as a divine man who propagated salvation. 
42 The letter to the Galatians as religious propaganda 
Paul, the follower of Jesus who displayed a remarkable number of similarities with 
contemporary moral philosophers, stood in the tradition of prophetic or charismatic 
wisdom - not unlike Jesus and the prophets. Stendahl remarks that in Galatians 
(1:13-16) Paul describes the experience of his call 'in terms of a prophetic call 
similar to that of Isaiah and Jeremiah' (1976:8). Furthermore, a (Jewish) apocalyptic 
world-view shaped much of Paul's thinking and provides currently an important con-
text for comprehending his thinking. Paul's offer of salvation should be seen within 
its apocalyptic setting (e.g. Gl 1:4).20 Like his contemporaries in Judaism, Paul 
believed that salvation basically depends on membership in the in-group - that is, 
the people of God (see Sanders 1983:5, 111). The imminent expectation of the king-
dom of God and the salvation of the people of God were central to his theological 
convictions. 
So far, so good - as long as Paul's exposition of this apocalyptic message in the letter 
to the Galatians is not taken primarily as a definition of his gospel. Piety in Paul's 
20 That apocalyptic language and an apocalyptic world-view formed part and parcel of Paul's pack-
age cannot be doubted (for a discussion of these topics, see Meeks 1983:171-180; Beker 1980:16-19, 
135-138; Branick 1985). 
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world was without creed and Scripture, and it took several decades before Paul's let-
ters were declared to be Scripture (see Armstrong 1986C:xvii). Thus the letter to the 
. Galatians, at the time of writing, represented something else; it was, I would suggest 
in view of the above discussion, part of Paul's propaganda. In fact, his gospel and 
preaching as such should be seen as part of the socio-cultural fabric - especially if it 
is further remembered that (even as an exposition of a belief system) it could not be 
compared to t~e Galatians' existing (or any other) set of beliefs, because- apart 
from the memories of household members and especially of the authority figure(s)-
their belief system was non-existent. 
The notion that Paul, in the letter to the Galatians, was conveying his gospel (mes-
sage) should, in view of the social conditions, be turned on its head. He had a posi-
tion to defend (I would suggest his authority and honour were at stake) and he used 
every means at his disposal to do so - including some elements of the belief system, 
traditions interpreted in a particular way, and especially calls on divine revelation. 
What he possessed was not so much the true gospel as truth. 
Revealed secrets, speaking in tongues, magic and miracles, and a capacity for 
rhetoric are all mentioned by Georgi (see 1971) as methods of religious propaganda. 
Most of them are amply attested to in Paul's writings (some even in the letter to the 
.Galatians). I do not wish to repeat (or to get involved in the debate on) the different 
interpretations of the o .. totXElo: i:ov K6aµov (GI 4:3, 8-9). However, if Paul shared 
the view expressed in Ephesians 6:12 (that their struggle was against powers and 
demons), it is possible to read Galatians 4: 1-11 as part of his attempt to outlaw the 
magic practised among the Galatians (see Hawkins 1971:247) in favour of his own 
magical and salvific package. The downplaying of others' magic was nothing new in 
religious propaganda (see Fiorenza 1976h:13). 
Although we shall shortly turn to the nature of the conflict which prompted Paul to 
define his gospel of salvation, it is important to see the letter to the Galatians not as 
the exposition of a creed or doctrine but as part and parcel of his socio-religious 
propaganda. 
43 Charismatic authority and patronal honour 
One consequence of the above mentioned features of Paul's missionary activities is 
his claim to authority. There can be no doubt that, due to his access to power and 
salvation, Paul's authority was recognised by his communities - except when he 
·came into conflict with them. In Paul's self-designation, two features are of special 
importance: firstly, his charismatic authority and secondly, his claim to be the found-
ing patron of the Galatians. 
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Holmberg argues: 'Paul exercises charismatic authority in his churches' 
(1978:154).21 That is to say, he claims authority which was derived not from a 
human source but directly from the revealed Christ (see Best 1986:14). Even when it 
is not specifically mentioned, it seems that Paul always expected it to be present. 
Nowhere did Paul claim prophetic authority or a divine commission for his preach-
ing activities more clearly than in the letter to the Galatians. He received his gospel 
and apostolic commission by way of divine revelation (GI 1: 11-12, 16; 2:2). Accord-
ing to his own account (GI 2:11ff) this revealed gospel brought him into conflict with 
other apostles. 
The claim to divine revelation, as Nickelsburg points out, is a feature of many 
Jewish literary texts: 'Outsiders are damned because they lack or reject the revela-
tion that enables them properly to observe divine Law and to read the signs of the 
times' (Nickelsburg 1985:89; and see Meeks 1983:92). Paul's access to power was 
direct (see GI 1:11-12), for he curses anyone who proclaims a message contrary to 
his own (see GI 1:12, 15-16), even in the face of counterclaims of angelic revelation 
(see also Kraft 1975a:49; Isenberg 1975:47-51; Phillips 1986:2736). He fully 
identifies his interpretation of the gospel with the truth of the gospel (GI 2:14). He 
demands recognition for himself and his own message - a respect which he con-
spicuously fails to accord to the apostles in Jerusalem (see Shaw 1983:44). The point 
is, he claims for himself ultimate (divine) authority by identifying his view with the 
divine viewpoint. 
Paul's charismatic authority in relation to the household communities should not, 
however, be overemphasised to the point where only one source of authority is 
recognised. The assumption that in Paul's lifetime 'his churches are not autonomous 
with an independent leadership worth mentioning' (Holmberg 1978:158) is an exam-
ple of current scholarly disregard for the social conditions under which Paul pre-
sented his claims to authority. Paul's disregard of or failure to mention the 
household patrons as leaders may be due to his self-perception as the 'founding 
father' (Best 1986: 17) of the communities. 
It is noteworthy that Paul often describes his relationship with his communities by 
means of a parent-child metaphor. He perceived himself as their parent (most often 
their father) and the converts are his children (e.g. 1 Cor 4:17; 2 Cor 6:13, 12:14; 
Phip 2:22; 1 Th 2: 11; Phlm 10). By calling himself the 'father' (or 'mother') of his 
churches, Paul conveys, according to Holmberg, 'the fact that he has begotten them 
or given them life by the transmission of the Gospel of Christ' (1978:78). 
Paul's use in Galatians 4:19 of the image of a mother suffering birth pangs until 
Christ is formed in them does not necessarily mean that their relationship was not 
characterised by a parental authority. The way in which he addresses them indicates 
21 I follow Holmberg in his definition and description of charismatic authority (see 1978:137-154). 
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that Paul considered himself the lawful founding patron (see 4: 11) of the Galatian 
.communities. Indeed, the call to imitate him (Gl 4:12) is a consequence of the 
father-child relation (see Holmberg 1978:78). 
It should be realised that the social values assumed by these metaphors are those of 
patronage in the extended household relationship, which should be characterised by 
patronal authority and, on the other side, the debt of gratitude and honour. 
In view of the foregoing it would be profitable to examine the possible nature of the 
conflict in Galatia by taking into account the variety of authority structures at work 
in the social interaction between Paul and the Galatians. 
511IE NATURE OF 11IE CONFLICT IN GAIA11A FROM 11IE POINT OF 
VIEW OF A SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC CYPHER KEY 
Given the constructed communicative context, it is time to turn to the crucial issue 
regarding the occasion of the letter: the conflict in Galatia which moved Paul to 
write this letter. Although we today possess only a part of the discussion (actually 
only a part of one side of it), many attempts are made to discover the probable occa-
. sion of the letter. It has already been suggested that the debate should be shifted 
from the cause of the conflict (which was the focal point of the situation) to its 
nature. 
The first step will be to point out, in terms of the first-century communicative con-
text, why the nature and not the cause of the conflict should form the starting point 
of the debate. Secondly, I shall pause to consider why the received view of the 
nature of the conflict (as consisting of conflicting theological or doctrinal convic-
tions) can no longer be maintained. Thirdly, the conflict will be examined in the 
light of the authority structures in the Pauline communities. Finally, it will be indi-
cated by means of a few examples from the letter that a socio-religious conflict 
about Paul's authority in the letter to the Galatians makes perfect sense when the 
• letter is read through a first-century lens. 
5.1 The question as to the nature (not the cause) of the conflict in Galatia 
What Elliott, in the epigraph to this chapter, maintains to be true of religious 
phenomena in the first-century Mediterranean world (that they should be seen 
·within the totality of social and cultural phenomena) is actually true of all other 
human activities. Applied to the conflict in Galatia, it means that the notion of con-
flict in the first-century Mediterranean world as such should be subjected to critical 
examination. In particular, the conflict encountered by Paul in Galatia should be 
understood in terms of the totality of the social and cultural phenomena contribut-
ing to the setting - especially in view of the one-dimensional theological or doctrinal 
nature of the conflict assumed in the received view. This one-dimensional perspec-
tive should be replaced by a recognition of the complexity of the socio-cultural com-
ponents contributing to the conflict. 
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In view of some of the methodological principles it will become clear why the shift 
·in focus from the cause to the nature of the conflict is inevitable. 
The first principle is that the social conditions for conflict - that is, the socio-cultural 
codes and conventions which served as preconditions and parameters for conflict in 
that world - should be in the forefront. Instead of simply assuming some kind of 
conflict about 'conflicting convictions', to use the concept of Du Toit (1992:1), the 
nature of the conflict should itself be subjected to interpretation. The socio-cultural 
codes and conventions prerequisite for conflict in the first-century Mediterranean 
world should be argued and cannot be assumed. 
Secondly, the nature of the text should be kept clearly in mind. It was argued (see 
chapter 3) that it is rather futile to debate whether the text does or does not support 
a given interpretation (unless it is done in terms of an explicit communicative con-
text). In fact, the claim that only the text is read has been pointed out as a fallacious 
one. A text is always construed with a particular communicative context in mind. In 
the case of the letter to the Galatians the components of a first-century Mediter-
ranean communicative context can no longer be left out of account if any claim is 
made to a historical valid interpretation. It goes without saying that from such a 
·position the debate on the conflict cannot start with the cause but has to revert to 
the nature of conflicts in the type of communicative context in which Paul was 
involved. Only as a secondary step would it be necessary to determine whether the 
text yields any clues which support such a typical conflict. 
It was argued that the apparent theological or doctrinal conflict (a conflict about 
conflicting convictions) in the letter to the Galatians, for which many pieces of evi-
dence are put forward in well-reasoned scholarly works, is the product of the inter-
pretation of textual clues arising from the received communicative context. The 
clues in the text obviously have to be reinterpreted from the point of view of an 
alternative communicative context. The aim of this study is to provide such an alter-
native cypher key. In view of the alternative (social-scientific) communicative con-
text, it is to be suggested that the conflict Paul encountered in Galatia was probably 
due to a rejection of his authority - thus it was of a socio-religious nature. The letter 
to the Galatians provides a rather different picture of the conflict once we learn to 
look at it from a first-century Mediterranean viewpoint. 
It is, however, necessary to return briefly to the assumed nature of the conflict in the 
received opponent hypotheses. 
5.2 Conflicting convictions: a question of cultural values 
It has been pointed out (see chapter 1) that in most opponent hypotheses it is taken 
for granted that the dispute in Galatia concerned conflicting convictions. It is 
believed that circumcision especially, but also the salvation of the Galatians in gen-
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eral, were in one way or another in dispute between missionaries with a different 
message. Meeks's formulation of the conflict in Galatia is in many respects typical of 
the hypotheses which assume a theological or doctrinal type of conflict: 
In Paul's absence other Christian missionaries had appeared in the 
Anatolian cities, seeking to persuade Paul's converts that their faith 
was imperfect and their salvation in question unless they were circum-
cised and observed at least Sabbath and Jewish festivals (kashrut is 
not specifically mentioned). Paul sees this as a direct attack on his 
own authority as apostle and founder of the Galatian churches and as 
a perversion of the one gospel. 
(1983:115) 
The assumption of a theological or doctrinal conflict overlooks, firstly, the networks 
of socio-cultural organisations within which the Pauline communities took root, sec-
ondly, the networks of socio-cultural relations, and, thirdly, religion in the first-
century Mediterranean world. A few examples will demonstrate the point. 
The notion that missionaries could spread a different gospel disregards the 
household setting with its first-century Mediterranean networks of social interaction. 
Missionaries needed social credentials to present their message within these 
household communities. Without a position of honour, or the protection and 
privileges of patronage, such missionaries could not have had access to (not to men-
tion membership of) the Pauline household communities. 
A recognition of the importance of Paul's references in the letter to his gospel and 
his apostleship has led to a variety of suggestions that either his gospel or his apost-
leship, or both,22 were under attack in Galatia and therefore defended by Paul (see 
Lategan 1988a; Du Toit 1990:155-156; Kopta.k 1990; and for further references see 
chapter 1 § 4.3). While many scholars who defend the gospel thesis do so in prefer-
ence to the apostleship thesis, it is not necessarily true the other way round. Those 
who defend the apostleship thesis very often take apostleship and gospel to be 
closely linked. Beker, for example, argues that the opponents undermined Paul's 
apostolic authority (apostolate) in order to discredit his gospel (1980:42-43). 
The main point in apostleship theses is that there was a dispute as to whether Paul 
really was an apostle similar to, say, Peter (see also Best 1986). In view of the doubt 
cast on his apostleship, it is then suggested that his gospel was placed in jeopardy by 
the opponents. Despite arguments from the letter itself which suggest that this was 
not at the root of the conflict in Galatia (see Lategan 1988a:416-417), there are his-
torical reasons against this position. 
It is commonly recognised that the term apostle represents no office in Paul's own 
lifetime (see Meeks 1983:131; Best 1986; Schiitz 1975:2, 21). Thus the question 
22 It should be admitted that it is often difficult to decide whether someone holds either of the two 
positions, clearly excluding the other, aspect or merely emphasises the one position above the other. 
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whether Paul fitted that office is premature - an anachronism. Best argues that 
apostleship was not an issue of great concern to Paul and functioned only in very 
specific contexts in his letters (see 1986:8-12). The point is that the suggestion of a 
dispute concerning Paul's apostolic authority does not take into account the social 
conditions in which Paul wrote. The selfsame thing happens in gospel theses in that 
the letter itself is (apparently) used as the only source to determine the situation 
against which Paul reacted. When I refer to his authority as an apostle, I am speak-
. ing of his claims to be a divine man in possession of power. Nickelsburg argues that 
Paul's self-designation in Galatians 1 should indeed be interpreted as implying that 
God had intervened in his conception (see 1986:203): he is worthy to be trusted with 
authority and to be honoured. 
The notion that different versions of the gospel (a message), m the sense of an alter-
native set of convictions, could bring about such disarray furthermore disregards 
both the cultural values of a scribal culture, the primary features of household com-
munities and the all-pervasiveness of magic in religious affairs. It should be realised 
that, given these conditions, it is very likely that members of the Pauline household 
communities could not at any particular moment express the exact content of their 
belief system. And if so, the truth of their beliefs was decided not by correlation to a 
written doctrine (since such a thing did not exist) but by the decision of authority fig-
ures. It is therefore not surprising that access to powerful people and the assurance 
of salvation was much more important than personal conviction. 
Belief systems and the truth of a message were not unaffected by status and honour 
positions. The gospel in Paul's world represented not only a set of beliefs but a total 
·life orientation. Embracing the gospel, even for persons who became members of 
the Pauline communities by default and not by personal choice, meant incorporation 
into a particular community. The message and the messenger in an oral world are 
inextricably connected. The truth of the message and the authority of the sender are 
part and parcel of a network of social relationships. Additions or, alterations to or 
rejection of matters of belief was not restricted to a cognitive act: it affected the 
whole social network. To challenge their 'imperfect faith' and to put the Galatians' 
'salvation in question' was to challenge not only their belief system but their social 
existence as a household community. 
In view of these factors it seems likely that a conflict about conflicting convictions 
fits the criteria of a literate culture (such as ours) and a definition of religion 
primarily concerned with dogma or doctrine. Apparently that was not the case with 
Paul. I am suggesting that we learn a new set of keys to understand what Paul was 
doing-in-saying in the first-century Mediterranean world. Describing the conflict as 
being of a social nature has such potential. 
53 A bipolar authority structure in the Pauline communities 
From a rapid survey of two examples from Paul's letters (Philemon and 2 Cor 10-
13), White suggests that a bipolar authority structure underlies the relations 
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between Paul and these particular communities (see 1987C:218-220). While each 
case needs elaboration, the underlying principle of his argument, to my mind, is 
sound, namely to describe the levels of authority in terms of the social conventions 
identified in each case. It seems worthwhile to push his insight a bit further, specifi-
cally in dealing with the conflict in Galatia. 
It seems reasonable to assume that, for a conflict in the household communities in 
Galatia, a configuration consisting of cultural values and conventions both of the 
household institution and of Paul's academic activities has to be kept in mind. These 
communities, after all, provided the main networks within which interaction took 
place, while the specifically Pauline configuration of components forms the setting 
for their interaction. The foregoing discussion on authority claims at least suggests 
that the conflict in Galatia be redefined as a conflict that includes honour and 
·authority. 
In view of the historical components of Paul's communicative context as discussed in 
this study, it seems likely that a variety of socio-cultural conditions paved the way for 
a conflict which can best be described as a socio-religi.ous conflict. The agrarian 
nature of the socio-cultural system, characterised by the interconnectedness of 
cultural phenomena together with the substantive nature of first-century religious 
phenomena, explains the use of this concept. It does not refer to a religious conflict 
(in the received sense) involving some social aspects (such as circumcision as an 
identity marker). Instead, it refers to the particular configuration of complex com-
ponents which contributed to the constitution of the Pauline household com-
munities: the household setting (the codes and conventions of social interaction), 
scribal culture (creed and doctrine existing in the memory of authority figures), sub-
stantive religion, missionary practices (magic and miracle). 
The strength of the configuration metaphor is that it provides a model in which as 
many components as possible can be taken into account when deciding on any indi-
vidual aspect. In view of Paul's idiosyncratic way of dealing with the authority of 
household patrons, together with the claims of charismatic authority prevalent in his 
letters, a social conflict about authority positions cannot be excluded. It should fur-
thermore be remembered that Paul did not reside in these communities in Galatia. 
He must have left and, given the continuous striving for honour and authority, it is 
not at all unlikely that Paul, when out of sight, was also out of mind (and honour) in 
Galatia. In view of his missionary practice, it is not unlikely that his power to 
mediate salvation declined (or disappeared) with his departure. Magic typically did 
not work in the absence of the magician. 
It is not that these conditions predict the cause of the conflict. Taken together, they 
merely suggest the framework within which any discussion of aspects of the conflict 
becomes intelligible. Since it would be mere speculation to identify, from this com-
plex set of components, any specific cause of the conflict, it seems more profitable to 
explore the possibilities suggested by the socio-religious conditions which probably 
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prevailed. If this is so, the conflict in Galatia can be described as a social (socio-
religious) conflict with regard to the authority structures in the household com-
munity. Paul's authority and honour were being challenged (if not rejected). 
5.4 A socio-religious conflict: a challenge to Paul's honour and authority 
The (social-scientific) communicative context discussed in this study provides an aid 
to rereading the letter to the Galatians (as well as Paul's other letters) and con-
structing the nature of the conflict as a socio-religious conflict. Given the high value 
placed on honour in Paul's society, it would not come as a surprise to learn that his 
honour was challenged. Although the traditional concepts related to honour and 
shame are not explicitly mentioned in the letter to the Galatians, it would be 
reasonable to assume that honour was tacitly assumed as part and parcel of his 
interaction with the Galatians. 
In view of the constructed communicative context, Paul's letter to the Galatians as 
an occasional writing (document of religious propaganda) can be construed in a way 
rather different from the received view. Once one is aware of the socio-cultural con-
ventions and the conditions of their interaction, and the respective positions of 
authority, it is remarkable to what lengths Paul went in the letter to the Galatians 
(as in no other letter) to (re)establish his authority.23 
5.4.1 Divine revelations: pointing towards the nature of the conflict? 
The part played by revelations and divine sanction in the letter to the Galatians is 
noteworthy. 
Paul insisted that the gospel the Galatians had heard from him was not based on 
human tradition or teaching but 'was a revelation of Jesus Christ' (1:12). He went to 
great lengths to deny any human contribution (1:11) and to (re)affirm the divine 
origin of his gospel; he even went so far as to identify his version of the gospel with 
the truth of the gospel (1:12). This viewpoint is reaffirmed by his insistence that his 
apostleship was of divine origin (this point will be discussed shortly), but also by the 
first recorded anathema in Christian history (1:8-9). In his own mind he identified 
the authority of his gospel with the truth of the gospel. By ruling out any subsequent 
revision of his original message, Paul demanded a respect for his authority which he 
conspicuously failed to accord to the other apostles in Jerusalem. 
23 It should be clearly kept in mind that by authority I do not mean something like 'Paul's apostolic 
authority' (Lategan 1988a:417; and see Meeks 1983:115). As has been argued, apostolic authority did 
not exist as a recognised social office or level of authority in Paul's world. What I mean is social author-
ity in the sense of position, power and honour (see§ 5.4.2). It has already been argued that honour in 
the first-century world was closely liked to power and authority (see chapter 6 § 5.2; and cf Momes 
1988a:210). 
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Similarly, his apostleship, as he states in the very first verse of the letter, 'was not 
from humans nor from human agency' (1:1). In fact, his commission as an apostle 
(we learn from him) was revealed to him during his conversion. He tells the story of 
his conversion (1:15-17) which, as a 'post-conversion account', can easily be seen as 
another reference to divine revelation. In this post-conversion account, as I have 
argued elsewhere, it was important at the time of writing to refer to his conversion 
experience as a divine call to be an apostle (see Craffert 1989). 
While Paul did not find it difficult to ascribe bewitchment to those who questioned 
his authority (3:1) or even to invoke a divine curse on anybody who dared to differ 
from him in these matters (1:8-9), he saw his own identity as taken over in some 
mystical way by the crucified Christ (2:20). He maintains: 'I have been crucified with 
Christ' and 'it is no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me' (2:20). He even claims 
that they, the Galatians, have received him as if he was an angel of God, as if he was 
Jesus himself (4:14). He indeed tried to incorporate the Galatians into his camp, but 
immediately made it clear that if they did not agree with him they would have to 
·bear (God's) judgment (5:10). It is noteworthy that Paul has no scruples about 
equating the rejection of his gospel (authority) with the rejection of God himself. 
It should be noted that in Paul's mind, because of the close identification of his 
gospel and apostleship with the divine origin, it would not be surprising if in 
Galatians 1:6 Paul meant that they had turned away not from Christ or God but 
from him, Paul (see Shaw 1983:41). In Galatians 5:8 too, it is not perfectly clear who 
has called them - God or Paul. 24 
5.42 Apostleship and gospel: Elements in Paul's authority struggle? 
An altogether different reading of the references to Paul's apostleship and gospel is 
possible. In fact, my suggestion is that the references to these two issues in the letter 
to the Galatians are equally part of his strategy, not to define or expound the con-
tent of his gospel or the legitimacy of his apostleship but to defend and uphold his 
authority and honour in Galatia. 
Four times in the letter to the Galatians Paul uses the term an6oi:oAoc; (or deriva-
. tives). At least twice he emphatically states that his apostolic office was the product 
of divine intervention and sanction (see 1:1, 2:8).25 What he apparently tries to 
emphasise is that he has both historic and divine sanction for his activities. 
24 It may be that (as these verses are usually interpreted) Paul refers to himself merely as God's 
agent who gave the actual summons. That is, however, to underplay the very strong identification 
between himself and God/Jesus in this letter. 
25 The other references are not significant in this regard, since they refer to apostleship in general 
(see 1:17, 1:19). 
235 
The fact that Paul downplays his own position as compared to the authority of the 
gospel (noted by Schiltz 1975:123 and Lategan 1988a) should not mislead us into 
thinking that in his mind his gospel existed independently of his person: his 
insistence on the truth of his gospel is much too strong for that (see below). 
Once the pivotal role of divine revelation in the letter is recognised, even the story 
of Paul's gospel being tested and approved by the Jerusalem apostles depends not on 
human decision but on divine revelation (2:1). He went up to Jerusalem, he says, in 
obedience to a revelation. The word ruayy€:\10v (or derivatives) occurs at least 
fourteen times in the letter to the Galatians; several times in chapters 1 and 2 and 
once in chapter 4. The latter will be passed over since it merely refers to the fact of 
Paul's first bringing them the gospel (as is the case in 1:23, which will also be dis-
regarded). 
Seven of these instances occur in Galatians 1:6-11, where Paul argues that there is 
no other (true) gospel except his own. There are other gospels, since he accused the 
Galatians of turning to such a gospel (1:6). The core of his argument is that only his 
gospel is divinely sanctioned (1:8-9, 11). His gospel was received not from a human 
being but by revelation from God (1:16). 
Two of the four occurrences in chapter 2 are just as interesting in view of Paul's 
objectives; the other two (2:2 and 2:7), again, simply refer to his preaching of the 
gospel. However, in 2:5 and 2:14 he equates his version of the gospel with the truth 
of the gospel (see§ 5.4.1). The result, says Betz (see 1979:49), is that he denies other 
gospels the salvific power of the gospel (see 2:17, 21). 
It should be noted that a clear shift from the received approaches is taking place in 
this interpretation. Reading Paul's letter in the light of the communicative context of 
the first-century world, what is considered primary in the received view emerges as 
secondary whereas elements that are secondary in that view manifest themselves as 
primary. To be more concrete: the object in the received approaches is to establish 
the content and truth of Paul's gospel. In terms of the alternative cypher key it 
seems that he was not, in the first instance, concerned with the content of the gospel 
but with its potential as a means to power. He used his gospel and apostolate as a 
means of re-establishing his authority and honour. A further feature of the letter -
his reliance on Scripture - confirms this interpretation. 
Paul's appeal to the authority of the Old Testament (3:6-14, 4:21-5:1), argues Shaw, 
is his way of dressing his convictions in Old Testament clothing (see 1983:44-45). 
Scripture, in his hands, becomes a 'ventriloquist's dummy' (Shaw 1983:44) by which 
Paul speaks while attributing the responsibility to God. In terms of such selective 
and idiosyncratic exegesis Paul is the master of the message, while the rhetorical 
power of his reliance on Scripture confers a gratuitous authority. An appeal to old 
documents in Paul's world may have been an attempt to establish the authority of 
his doctrine - something which could be done by claiming ancient tradition or 
customs (see Bossman 1987:8). 
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There is a final set of clues in the letter which points away from a conflict about con-
flicting convictions and affirms, instead, the thesis of a socio-religious conflict over 
Paul's authority: the traits of a magical letter. 
5.43 Evil eye accusations and divine curses: components of a magical letter? 
The symbolic means by which people in Paul's world could have an effect on others 
are quite different from those that are current in modern Western society. In fact, 
one of the functions of magic was social control (see Aune 1980:1523). Belief in the 
·evil eye, widely accepted in the ancient world and also by Paul (see Elliott 1988), is 
an excellent example of such a symbolism. Basic to belief in the evil eye and related 
protective strategies is 
the conviction that certain individuals, animals, demons, or gods have 
the power of producing a spell or causing some malignant effect upon 
every object, animate or inanimate, upon which their eye or glance 
may rest. 
(Elliott 1988:46) 
Not only the practice of but also protection against the evil eye arguably contributed 
to the conflict and tension in Paul's group in Galatia (see Elliott 1988:63ff). 
It is furthermore not sufficiently appreciated to what extent Paul's letters are con-
taminated by evil eye accusations, especially threats related to heavenly powers and 
beings (see Neyrey 1988:88-90). In fact, Elliott argues that accusations and counter-
accusations concerning the evil eye play a greater part in the Galatian conflict than 
is generally realised (see 1990a:263). 
The explicit evil eye accusation in the letter to the Galatians (3:1) is therefore highly 
·significant. It is seldom recognised that Paul also refers ( €KITTVELV Gl 4: 14) to one of 
the means of defending oneself against possible injury from the evil eye: by spitting 
(see Elliott 199Qa:265). Instead of treating him as a possible possessor of the evil 
eye, the Galatians received Paul as an angel of God - another indicator of evil eye 
activities by drawing on the evil eye vocabulary in his reference to their willingness 
to pluck out their eyes on his behalf (4:15).26 
Neyrey argues that such accusations often occur in contexts of competition about 
leadership and authority (see 1988:94). In trying to understand the academic com-
ponents of Paul's activities in their historical context, the accusation of bewitchment 
which is said to confuse them should not necessarily be interpreted as referring to 
cognitive confusion over the content of their belief system (the most frequent inter-
pretation). Given the other indicators of an authority conflict about Paul's position, 
26 Elliott mentions several more indicators of the evil eye repertoire in the letter to the Galatians 
(see 19908:268), but it is not necessary to recapitulate them all. 
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it is more likely that in this case he is falling back on one of the most potent 
weapons of his time - an evil eye accusation against those people who challenged 
his honour. A rereading of the letter (as in, for example, Elliott 1990a:269-270), 
taking into account the codes and conventions of the evil eye cultural script, may 
confirm the suggestion that the conflict was, after all, fought only at a secondary, on 
the level of conflicting convictions. 27 
Paul furthermore expresses the wish that those who cause confusion should mutilate 
their own bodies (5:12) by castrating themselves - another indication, in his world, 
that they were to be rendered permanently unclean and shameful (see Neyrey 
1988:83). 
Given all these indicators of a socio-religious conflict, Betz's suggestion (that the let-
ter to the Galatians should be seen as a 'magical letter', where Paul does not leave 
. things to be rationally decided by the Galatians but instead introduces magic - Betz 
1979:25) becomes all the more attractive. On the basis of the curse at the beginning 
of the letter (1:8-9) and the conditional blessing at the end (6:16), he maintains that 
the 'letter is not merely a piece of rhetoric, but it is composed in such a way that it 
functions at the same time as an efficacious display of the divine Spirit and Power' 
(1979:25). 
Curses and blessings in early Christianity were magical phenomena (see Aune 
1980:1552) which, as one variety of magical prayers, constituted magical letters (see 
Aune 1980:1554). 
The defence of Paul's authority in the letter to the Galatians confirms the thesis that 
the root of the conflict in the household communities in Galatia was a rejection or 
denial of Paul's authority or honour. 
6 IllE CONFLICT IN GAIATIA IN A FIRST-CENfURY COMMUNICATIVE 
CONTEXT: IllE EMERGENCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE CYPHER KEY 
. It is widely agreed that the conflict in Galatia was central to the occasion of Paul's 
letter to the Galatians. However, an analysis of opponent hypotheses as a cypher key 
(which are simply different proposals for the interpretation of the letter) revealed 
that opponent hypotheses, broadly speaking, share the same historical and meth-
odological points of departure. 
27 Elliott still thinks that the issue in Galatia was two different ways in which righteousness and 
membership in the Israel in God could be attained (see 19903:270-271). In fact, his description of the 
situation in Galatia focuses on the elements identified in most opponent hypotheses (see 19903:266). 
The point of the exercise in this study is to suggest that the totality of the socio-cultural and historical 
world of Paul should be taken into consideration when reading his letter. Thus not only the social 
mechanisms of evil eye accusations but also the popular culture of household religion and the features 
of the scribal culture, to mention only a few aspects, should all contribute to our estimate of Paul's 
exposition of the two different ways of attaining membership of the people of God. 
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A social-scientific methodology has been suggested which remedies the shortcom-
ings of the history-of-ideas approach. Even from the point of view of alternative 
methodological principles it became clear that the historical components of 
opponent hypotheses as a cypher key are also in need of reconsideration. Instead of 
·defining the Pauline communities primarily in terms of their creed or confession, 
and instead of taking the history of the early Jesus movement as a confessional his-
tory (as a struggle between different Christian parties and theologies), an attempt 
has been made to define them in terms of their cultural and societal setting. 
The methodological components of the social-scientific cypher key in themselves 
suggest (in contrast to the history-of-ideas approach and mirror reading in opponent 
hypotheses) an interpretive approach to the letter and all its components. As against 
the notion that the viewpoint of the text should be accepted at face value, the chal-
lenge of interpretive methodology is to interpret the text within a particular first-
century Mediterranean communicative context. That is to say, the letter can no 
longer provide its own key or be taken at face value to set the interpretive agenda. 
Even the so-called theological sections of the letter need to be interpreted within 
the overall socio-cultural setting. In this regard it is worth listening to Marshall when 
he says, referring to the variety of social problems in Corinth that 
[i]t should warn us that a theological response need not necessarily 
point to an opposing theology or philosophy. Common social practice 
or conventions can equally evoke such a response ... The relationship 
between social act and theology in Paul is complex. 
(1987h:361) 
Thus, instead of considering the letter to the Galatians (like Paul's other letters) to 
be a documentation of intra-Christian struggle about conflicting theological or doc-
trinal convictions, it was suggested that it is the product of Paul's missionary 
endeavour within the household setting, the subculture of Diaspora Judaism and the 
confines of orality and religion in the first-century world. That is to say, the letter is 
seen as the product (and simultaneously as part and parcel) of a first-century 
Mediterranean communicative context. The possibility should be explored that Paul 
was using every means at his disposal to defend and re-establish his authority - also 
with regard to the academic matters of belief and doctrine in the letter to the 
Galatians: The implication of the position argued here is that Paul fought a battle at 
the primary level of social relations and social interaction, but he fought it with the 
weapons of the secondary level: claims on traditions, symbols and identity markers 
which all contributed to one's authority and honour. He focused on those aspects 
which, in the eyes of the Galatians, provided power and secured authority. 
As an alternative cypher key, this communicative context at least provides the 
opportunity for a rereading of the letter to the Galatians - a rereading in which the 
whole letter as well as its smaller components can be analysed as part and parcel of 
Paul's persuasive strategy to re-establish his authority in the Galatian household 
communities. If the communicative context of the letter, as suggested in this study, 
239 
really was a socio-religious conflict over Paul's authority, then much more attention 
should be paid to the variety of historical components constituting the communica-
tive context of such a conflict.28 
28 At least one important aspect still needs to be taken into account (which will further complicate 
attempts to determine an appropriate setting for Paul's communication with the Galatians). That is the 
issue of social stratification - both Paul's and that of a typical Pauline community. 
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